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Vietnam's Sixth Party Congress: An Overview — *Carlyle A. Thayer*

ASEAN's Third Decade: Building Greater Equity — *Donald Crone*

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Southeast Asia in Indian Foreign Policy: Some Preliminary Observations*

MOHAMMED AYOOB

The purpose of this paper is to make a preliminary attempt to locate the position and importance of Southeast Asia in the broader framework of Indian foreign policy concerns. A major assumption behind this exercise is that Southeast Asia has in recent years begun to look increasingly important from New Delhi's perspective and that many Southeast Asians have also begun to re-evaluate their earlier perceptions of India as at best a marginal actor as far as the Southeast Asian region is concerned. While such a re-evaluation of Southeast Asian perceptions does not form a part of the subject matter of this paper, it would be correct to assume that it does have a positive feedback effect on the making of Indian policy towards this region and to that extent is relevant as an input into the Indian foreign policy making process.

While India's cultural and religious links with Southeast Asia go back to ancient times, and while there had been great sympathy among the Indian intelligentsia during the colonial period for the anti-colonial movements in the British, French and Dutch colonial possessions in Southeast Asia, independent India's interest in the region seemed to wane soon after the heady days of the Afro-Asian Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia, in April 1955. There were many reasons for this relative neglect of Southeast Asia by New Delhi. These included India's preoccupation with the conflict with Pakistan as well as its attempt, largely unsuccessful, to minimize external, principally superpower, intervention in the affairs of the subcontinent. Moreover, with Southeast Asia, specially Indochina, emerging as a major arena of contention between the two superpowers in the 1960s, non-aligned India's capacity to influence events in the strategic region was extremely limited. India's military humiliation at the hands of China in the border conflict of 1962 further circumscribed New Delhi's capacity to act outside its borders. It not only forced the government to look inward in order to better understand the reasons for the debacle, but it also had very adverse effects on India's standing abroad, particularly among Southeast Asian countries who, as close neighbours of both the Asian giants, were extremely sensitive to any change in the balance of power between India and China.

Although the harm done to India's military credibility, and therefore its standing as a major Asian power, by the 1962 debacle was partially overcome by

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*This article is the product of the very early stages of research on the project, "India and Southeast Asia: Strategic Interests and Policy Prospects".

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India's victory over Pakistan in 1971 and its crucial role in the creation of Bangladesh, India could not capitalize on its refurbished image (at least as far as Southeast Asia was concerned) for three major reasons. The first of these related to the fact that India's creditable military performance in 1971 coincided with the Sino-American *rapprochement*. The latter event almost completely overshadowed the former in terms of its potential importance for the Southeast Asian region, thereby considerably reducing the impact of the former.

Secondly, India's decision to sign a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in August 1971, principally to neutralize any Chinese and/or American intervention on Pakistan's behalf, tended to tarnish somewhat its image among the non-communist countries of Southeast Asia who considered it to be a major deviation from India's policy of non-alignment. Moreover, since their perceptions of the USSR were far from benign, the Treaty tended to make them suspicious of Indian intentions as well.

Thirdly, the 1970s also saw a major concentration of Indian capabilities — economic, technological and diplomatic — on the Middle East and Persian Gulf region. This was directly related to the dramatic increase in oil prices beginning in 1973. On the one hand, India needed assured sources of oil supply at concessionary prices, and on the other, it was interested in carving out a share for itself in the booming economies of the oil-rich Gulf. The availability of a large pool of technologically skilled manpower in India, the considerable sophistication of its industrial and manufacturing base and its capacity to export relatively cheap semi-skilled and unskilled labour combined to provide India with a respectable share of the booming market available in the oil producing countries of the Middle East and the Gulf. This concentration of energies in its western neighbourhood meant that New Delhi could not pay adequate attention to its neighbours in Southeast Asia in either diplomatic or economic terms.

By the mid-1980s many of these factors constraining Indian capacities for fruitful interaction with Southeast Asia seemed to be declining in importance. By then, the major impact of the Sino-American *rapprochement* had been fully digested by the ruling élites of Southeast Asia, so much so that it had become an accepted part of the political and strategic landscape of the Asia-Pacific region. While the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) governments continued to demonstrate a certain amount of unease regarding the Indo-Soviet Treaty, especially in the context of Indian stands on Kampuchea and Afghanistan, it was generally recognized that India was not interested in acting as a surrogate for the Soviet Union. It was realized by this time that despite India's refusal to condemn publicly the Soviet Union for its military intervention in Afghanistan, it had privately conveyed its disapproval of the Soviet measure in no uncertain terms to Moscow. Again, it has become increasingly clear that India's stand on Kampuchea had more to do with its equation with Hanoi and with the triangular relationship among India, China and Vietnam than with New Delhi's treaty obligations to the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, the virtual end of the oil bonanza in the Gulf has led to a

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downturn in the demand for Indian technical expertise as well as for semi-skilled and unskilled labour, thus making West Asia a considerably less attractive market for India's surplus manpower, compared to the 1970s. The dramatic decrease in oil prices in 1986 and the fact that India now produces two-thirds of its own oil requirements (compared to one-third at the turn of the decade) also seem to have led to a relative downgrading of the importance of the oil-rich countries of the Gulf and the Middle East in terms of Indian foreign policy priorities.

Political conditions in Southwest and West Asia are also expected to augment the economic rationale for New Delhi's gradual disengagement from its western neighbours. The continuing conflict between Iran and Iraq, two of India's most important economic partners in the Gulf, both in terms of oil supply and as markets for Indian technology, expertise and manufactured products, has led to an enormous drain on the resources of both countries and has drastically reduced their capacity for mutually profitable economic transactions with India. The high levels of potential or actual conflict as well as of superpower involvement in the Arab-Israeli arena and in Afghanistan also seem to have led New Delhi to realize that its capacity for diplomatic manoeuvring in the West Asian region is limited, especially since it does not want overtly to offend either superpower regarding the highly emotive and contentious issues plaguing that region.

A major factor which had traditionally influenced Indian policies towards the Middle East and had determined many of its diplomatic postures in that region had been related to New Delhi's desire to checkmate Pakistani activities in West Asia considered to be deleterious to Indian interests. This made a great deal of sense immediately after partition and independence when Pakistan tried to emphasize its Islamic credentials in order to gain the sympathies of the Muslim countries of the Middle East in its competition for power and influence against India. However, it became very clear by the end of the 1970s that the diplomatic postures and political alignments of the West Asian countries were based primarily on their assessment of their regime and state interests and of their strategic relationships with one or the other superpower. While Pakistan could at times gain some marginal advantage over India on relatively unimportant issues by playing its Islamic card, these instances were so few and far between that they did not require the expenditure of Indian diplomatic energies far disproportionate to the actual threat they posed to Indian interests.

Indian policy-makers seem to have finally realized the validity of this proposition and this will probably have some effect on their attitude towards competing with Pakistan in the West Asian arena. One likely outcome of this realization of the marginality of the Pakistan factor, as far as the foreign policies of West Asian countries are concerned, could be a reduction in the diplomatic and other capabilities mobilized by India to combat this assumed "threat" from Pakistan. One can reasonably expect that some of the energies "saved" from this hitherto futile exercise in West Asia will in the near future be diverted towards safeguarding and enhancing Indian interests in other neighbouring regions, principally Southeast Asia.

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The importance of Southeast Asia, and particularly of ASEAN in this context, is self-evident. The economic prospects and geographic location of Southeast Asia, combined with the cultural affinity that important parts of the region have with India, make it a leading contender for the position of principal recipient of Indian economic and diplomatic attention that has already been, or is likely to be, diverted from the Middle East and Gulf region. Since much of the Indian technological and economic capabilities likely to be released as a result of the slowing down of the oil-rich Gulf economies will be relevant primarily to developing economies they can be redeployed only in other developing regions. From New Delhi's perspective, the prospects for such redeployment are far superior in Southeast Asia compared to either Africa or Latin America, the first because of its relative poverty and the second because of its tremendous geographic and cultural distance from India.

Moreover, political considerations are also likely to prompt New Delhi to devote more attention to the Southeast Asian region for the rest of this decade and through much of the 1990s. This conclusion is the result of the assessment that if counteracting Pakistani manoeuvrings had been an important consideration as far as India's West Asian policies were concerned, countering Chinese influence, especially in the post-Cultural Revolution period, has been a major, though unstated, concern of Indian policy towards Southeast Asia. In the long term, this seems to make much more sense from the perspective of Indian policy-makers, given the balance of demographic and industrial resources as well as of military power between China and India. For, while Pakistan can attempt to match Indian capabilities only by "borrowing" power from abroad — so far from Washington and/or Beijing — China has in the past demonstrated its military superiority over India in the border conflict of 1962, is more than a match for India in demographic terms, and has built up an impressive industrial and technological infrastructure which is reflected not only in its conventional military power but also in its capacity to produce and deliver sophisticated nuclear weapons. The Sino-American *rapprochement*, which first became public in 1971 just when India and Pakistan were heading for a war over Bangladesh, has tended to augment Indian apprehensions about Chinese intentions and capabilities, especially since it has been viewed by New Delhi as a tacit alliance aimed against the Soviet Union on the one hand and against China's regional adversaries and competitors on the other.

Recent speculation about an impending Sino-Soviet *rapprochement*, especially following Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech of July 1986, has added to Indian concerns about the future direction of Chinese foreign policy, particularly as it might pertain to China's immediate regional environment, which includes both Southeast Asia and the Indian subcontinent. Contrary to what most analysts believe, the major Indian worry regarding a thaw in Sino-Soviet relations is not related to the effects of such a development on Soviet-Indian relations but to its effects on Chinese policy, especially in China's immediate neighbourhood, once Beijing is relieved of the uncertainty, both political and military, which has for the last twenty-five years accompanied Soviet pressures on China's northern borders.

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Potentially, this is of far greater concern to India than its adversary relationship with Pakistan on the subcontinent. Such a conclusion is based on the calculation that while conflict with Pakistan is a more likely possibility than a war with China in the short run, Pakistan's capacity, even with the help of sophisticated American weapons, to hurt India's vital interests is limited by the sheer asymmetry in indigenous resources that can be mobilized by the two South Asian neighbours in times of war. Furthermore, American support to Pakistan can always be matched and neutralized by Soviet support to India, thereby making the outcome of an India-Pakistan conflict primarily dependent on the inherent resources and capabilities that the two sides are likely to possess and mobilize at any point in time. This, of course, would give India tremendous advantage except in the case of a two-front war when India is faced with co-ordinated attacks by both Pakistan and China.

India's perception of the threat from China is almost exactly the opposite of such long-term complacency regarding, but short-term pre-occupation with, the threat from Pakistan. It is worth pointing out here that India's efforts at attaining nuclear capability, demonstrated by the nuclear explosion of 1974, a decade after China's first nuclear test, were and are related more to the imbalance in the Sino-Indian nuclear equation than either to the Pakistan factor (which in fact acts as a brake on India's nuclear ambitions) or to the discriminatory clauses in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (although these did form an important input into the Indian decision not to sign the Treaty). The current ambivalent, if not totally negative, Indian stance on a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in South Asia, a proposal strongly advocated by Pakistan in the United Nations, is principally determined by the fact that it would allow China to remain a nuclear weapons power while denying the same option to India. It is in this context of perceived Indian strategic inferiority *vis-à-vis* China that prospects of a Sino-Soviet thaw, which could have the twin effects of freeing a considerable proportion of China's military and political energies and at the same time rendering Moscow unreliable as a counterweight to Beijing particularly in times of conflict, seem to be causing grave concern to India's policy-makers and strategic analysts.

Several other recent developments which have the potential to augment China's impressive capabilities have also added to Indian worries. These include the "four modernizations" programme undertaken, however haltingly, by Beijng, China's import of high technology from the West, especially the United States, and the increasing volume of its economic and technological transactions with Japan. New Delhi's uneasiness on this score has been compounded by the lack of perceptible movement in Sino-Indian border talks (in fact, the Chinese position in these talks has hardened considerably of late), the constant exchange of high-level visits between Washington and Beijing, and Gorbachev's repeated invitations to the Chinese Premier to visit Moscow. All these factors have combined to increase India's interest in Southeast Asia, with the objective of finding complementarity of interests with countries of the region in an attempt, among other things, to contain the growth of Chinese influence and reach in Southeast Asia. In New Delhi's

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perception, an increase in Chinese influence in Southeast Asia could possibly embolden Beijing also to challenge India on the latter's doorsteps in South Asia, particularly in the sub-Himalayan countries of Nepal and Bhutan, or alternatively, to gang up with Pakistan to teach India yet another "lesson".

It is in this context of the projected increase in Chinese capabilities and influence, as perceived by New Delhi, that both Indochina and ASEAN seem to be assuming added importance in terms of India's overall foreign policy concerns. This is demonstrated, among other things, by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Indonesia and Thailand in October 1986 and by the swing through the ASEAN capitals by India's Minister of State for External Affairs, Natwar Singh, in early March 1987. Furthermore, this Indian perception of the likely expansion of Chinese capabilities has led to the augmentation of the centrality of roles prescribed by India in its broad policy framework to the two pivotal powers in the two subregional groupings in Southeast Asia: Vietnam and Indonesia.

Interestingly, this centrality of roles prescribed for Jakarta and Hanoi by Indian policy-makers is not a new development in terms of the world-view of the Indian ruling élite. Given India's own aspirations, as the pre-eminent South Asian power, to emerge as an autonomous decision-making centre, independent of the two superpowers and the two power blocs that had emerged after World War II, it had always had a great degree of empathy for the aspirations of similar regionally pre-eminent powers in the Third World which aspired to act independently of the managers of the international system. The genuinely nationalist and anti-colonial credentials of the leaders of the two pre-eminent Southeast Asian powers — Vietnam on the mainland and Indonesia in the archipelago — added to the stature of both these countries in Indian eyes (as was the case in relation to Nasser's Egypt in the Middle East), and to a strongly held view that these countries shared not merely a colonial past with India but also, and more importantly, significant interests and aspirations with regard to the future workings of the post-war global political and economic systems. This basic ingredient of the Indian perception of Vietnam and Indonesia has survived the numerous ups and downs in New Delhi's relations with both Hanoi and Jakarta.

The various degrees of antipathy towards China shared by India, Indonesia and Vietnam have further strengthened the Indian feeling that these three "regional influentials" have a fundamental similarity, if not identity, of interests that could be used as the basis on which India can build its relations with Southeast Asia on a relatively secure footing. The parallels in Indian and Indonesian attitudes towards the Vietnamese presence in Kampuchea, which are evident to the discerning observer, demonstrate the similarities in the two countries' perceptions of Hanoi's "rightful" role in mainland Southeast Asia as well as their shared interest in the preservation and augmentation of what they consider to be the major bulwark against presumed Chinese expansionism in Southeast Asia. It would be worthwhile to note in this context that the Indian decision to recognize the Heng Samrin regime in July 1980 was primarily the result of calculations related to the triangular relationship among China, Vietnam and India rather than the function,

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as it was commonly assumed in the West, of either Soviet pressure on India or of Indira Gandhi's return to power earlier that year.

Although Indonesia has been far more constrained in its dealings with Vietnam, because it considers itself bound by the ASEAN consensus, the comings and goings between Hanoi and Jakarta, including the visit of such important Indonesian figures as the Army Chief, General Benny Murdani, testifies to the flexibility of Indonesia's position on the Kampuchean issue and its half-hearted endorsement of the ASEAN consensus. It is interesting to note that India and Indonesia have kept up a constant flow of ministerial visits and formal and informal consultations from the late 1960s onwards despite serious divergences that have surfaced periodically in their strategic perceptions over the last two decades. "Mutual understanding" explains Indo-Indonesian relations better than any other term in the lexicon of political science.

Indo-Vietnamese relations, if anything, have been even better than Indo-Indonesian relations, especially since the unification of Vietnam and the deterioration in Sino-Vietnamese relations which accompanied that event. While Vietnam's strategic links with the Soviet Union and the latter's role as the principal supplier of military hardware to India have contributed in some measure to the strengthening of Indo-Vietnamese links, the two countries' almost parallel experiences with China have provided the strongest bonds of mutual empathy between New Delhi and Hanoi. The Chinese attack on Vietnam in February 1979, ostensibly to teach Hanoi a "lesson" for its invasion of Kampuchea, very strongly reminded policy-makers and opinion-moulders in New Delhi of the Chinese invasion of India across the Himalayas in 1962. This image was immeasurably strengthened by the almost identical statements issued by the Chinese leadership on both occasions and because of the fact that the Chinese incursion into Vietnam took place while the then Indian Foreign Minister, A.B. Vajpayee, was on an official visit to China, the first such visit in two decades. The timing of the incursion was, therefore, a source of great embarrassment for the Indian Government and the Minister had to cut short his visit to China as an act of protest. New Delhi interpreted the timing as a deliberate Chinese attempt to spoil India's relations with Vietnam.

The Indian interest in bringing about an understanding, and if possible an agreement, between Vietnam and the ASEAN countries on Kampuchea so as to prevent the expansion of Chinese influence within ASEAN has been reflected in periodic attempts by New Delhi to prod the two sides, however mildly, towards a compromise. From the Indian perspective, such a compromise must assuage Vietnam's security concerns, be acceptable to ASEAN and at the same time exclude, as far as possible, Chinese influence from Indochina whether through the medium of the Khmer Rouge or otherwise. Given New Delhi's friendly relations with Hanoi, India is in an excellent position confidentially to act as a conduit for Vietnamese views and proposals to ASEAN and vice versa. Recently, there seems to have been an acceleration of Indian efforts towards this end. The most dramatic example of the Indian drive to find a political solution to the Kampuchean problem was the visit of the Indian Minister of State for External Affairs to the ASEAN

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capitals, beginning with Jakarta, in March 1987. It was commonly assumed that he had communicated Hanoi's desire to find a solution to the problem as well as Vietnamese terms for a proposed settlement to the ASEAN foreign ministers. The visit, coming as it did on the eve of the Soviet Foreign Minister's visit to Indonesia and his stop-over in Bangkok, gained additional significance because of a perceived desire on the Soviet Union's part to find a solution to the Kampuchean issue because its continuance tended to complicate Sino-Soviet relations and because it constituted a serious drain on Soviet resources in terms of Moscow's underwriting of the military costs of the Vietnamese occupation. The Indian and Soviet efforts, although probably not co-ordinated, could be considered parallel attempts at finding a solution to the Kampuchean conflict. However, the reasons behind New Delhi's move seem to be very different from those motivating the policy-makers in the Kremlin.

The Indian desire to contain the expansion of Chinese influence strikes sympathetic chords in not only Hanoi and Jakarta among the Southeast Asian capitals. Kuala Lumpur's apprehensions of China, especially because of the fragile demographic balance in peninsular Malaysia and the experience of the (predominantly ethnic Chinese) communist insurgency, had also been reflected earlier in that country's relations with India, especially in the 1960s. In fact, Malaya took an extremely strong pro-Indian stand during the Sino-Indian war of 1962 and India, to the considerable irritation of President Sukarno, refused to endorse the latter's policy of confrontation with the newly-born federation of Malaysia in 1963. On the contrary, it strongly supported the creation of the federated state. Although at the moment Indo-Malaysian political relations seem to be in the doldrums, the recent visit of Prime Minister Mahathir to India can be read as a signal of increasing Malaysian interest in the revival of a political dialogue with New Delhi. The Malay élite's fundamentally negative orientation towards China and its relative lack of alarm regarding presumed Vietnamese intentions have led policy-makers in India to believe that there is no basic divergence in the two countries' world-views, especially as they pertain to this region. The Malaysian sponsorship of ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality) is seen by New Delhi as a further indication of parallel approaches adopted by the two countries, particularly regarding the presence of foreign powers in South and Southeast Asia.

India's perceptions of the other ASEAN countries, especially of Thailand and the Philippines, have always been different from its perceptions of Indonesia and Malaysia. While Singapore and Brunei seem to be too small to impinge on the Indian psyche, at least in strategic terms, Indian perceptions of Thailand and the Philippines have been deeply coloured by the military-security relationship that Bangkok and Manila have enjoyed with the United States. The presence of American naval and air bases in the Philippines and the use of Thai territory and facilities by the United States during the latter's military involvement in Vietnam, together with their membership of the now defunct SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization), of which India's subcontinental adversary Pakistan was also a member, have contributed to their image in New Delhi as the two Southeast

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Asian countries most committed to alliances conceived in the context of the Cold War.

New Delhi has been criticized and, in fact, described as hypocritical for not using the same criteria for judging Vietnam's international alignments and for not holding the latter's security treaty with the Soviet Union against that country, especially since the USSR has the use of Vietnamese bases and facilities at Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay. However, New Delhi seems to be convinced that, given the long history of Vietnamese sacrifices for national independence, Hanoi will not be willing to act as Moscow's surrogate unless absolutely pushed to the wall by Beijing and Washington and left with no option except to do the Soviet Union's bidding in order to preserve its hard-won unity and territorial integrity. In this connection, it is worth noting that, according to the perception of India's policy-makers, Hanoi was forced into almost-total dependence on the Soviet Union after North Vietnam's victory in 1975 because of Chinese and American policies which left it with little or no option except to turn to Moscow for support. The predominant view in New Delhi seems to be that Hanoi was reacting to Sino-American pressures when it signed a security treaty with Moscow, possibly against its original inclinations.

According to this view, there is a close parallel between India's own experiences and those of Vietnam in this regard. Indian policy-makers believe that India was also forced into signing a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in 1971 as a result of Sino-American collusion in support of Pakistan during the Bangladesh crisis which led to the India-Pakistan war in December that year. The fact that Henry Kissinger, then President Nixon's National Security Adviser, used Pakistan as the base for his secret trip to China in July 1971 and subsequently warned India not to expect American help if China intervened in an India-Pakistan war, is widely accepted as the proverbial straw that broke the Indian camel's back and forced it to turn to Moscow to neutralize any possible Chinese intervention on Pakistan's behalf. Indian policy-makers, therefore, have strong empathy for a Vietnam forced into Soviet arms as a result of what are perceived in India to be Chinese and American policies aimed at bringing about exactly that result.

Furthermore, the history of India's relations with the United States and the Soviet Union has led policy-makers in New Delhi to make an important distinction between the two superpowers. While extremely jealous of its autonomy and, therefore, fundamentally wary of the intentions of both the superpowers, India's experiences have led it to believe that its aspirations regarding its self-perceived role as an autonomous centre of power in its own region have been constantly thwarted, intentionally or otherwise, by the United States. This was the result, firstly, of Washington's decision in the mid-1950s to build up Pakistan militarily, ostensibly to "contain" the threat from the Soviet Union to the "free world". However, this policy resulted in creating a major security threat for India when Pakistan turned its American weaponry on its larger subcontinental neighbour in 1965. The Indians argue that a similar result was achieved later when the United States, according to

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them, "colluded" with China during the Bangladesh crisis of 1971 and immediately thereafter to circumscribe India's capacity for autonomous action even when its vital interests were gravely threatened. To the Indians, the parallels with Vietnam's experience in the middle and late 1970s are very clear.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is perceived by India as the lesser of the two evils, primarily because it has very rarely allowed its strategic interests in South Asia to take priority over India's vital interests as defined by India itself. Moreover, it has been willing to concede to India the position of the pre-eminent power in the subcontinent and to accept India's managerial role in the South Asian region. Furthermore, it is argued by members of the foreign policy-making élite in New Delhi that Moscow was willing to accept the validity of India's non-aligned policy at a time when the then U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, was still calling non-alignment "immoral". Again, Moscow was willing to supply India with sophisticated weaponry, more or less on India's terms, to meet first the Pakistani and then the Chinese threats to its security. Therefore, according to Indian perceptions, there has been a fundamental congruence of strategic interests between Moscow and New Delhi — a congruence principally arrived at on India's terms — which has resulted in the preservation of India's capacity for autonomous action while at the same time fending off the twin Chinese and Pakistani threats to its security.

Despite these differences in Indian perceptions of the two superpowers and their respective allies, of late there appears to have been considerable rethinking in New Delhi regarding America's overt allies in Southeast Asia. The Philippines seems to have gone up in India's esteem as a result of the "people power" revolution that brought Corazon Aquino to power in February 1986. The instinctive sympathy in Indian ruling circles for democratically elected middle-class governments mouthing populist rhetoric has considerably boosted the Philippines' image in India although grave reservations are still held about its linkages with the United States through the medium of the American bases in that country. That there has been a corresponding reassessment about Thailand is demonstrated by the fact that for the first time an Indian Prime Minister visited that country in October 1986. This is in part the result of the assessment made in New Delhi that Thailand, as the ASEAN country most directly affected by the conflict in Kampuchea, is crucial for any change in the ASEAN consensus on that issue and, therefore, for the future course of ASEAN-Vietnam relations. Given India's interest in narrowing the gap between the Vietnamese and ASEAN positions on Kampuchea in order to deny China a veto on the final solution to the Kampuchean problem, New Delhi is obviously anxious to open channels of communication with Bangkok at every possible level. Therefore, one should not be surprised if in the near future Thailand becomes an important target for Indian diplomatic initiatives in the ASEAN subregion, supplementing the primary Indian diplomatic thrust aimed at Indonesia.

To sum up, therefore, Indian interest in Southeast Asia, for the reasons mentioned in this paper, is expected to increase. While the economic reasons

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underlying this trend are expected to push India towards greater economic transactions with the ASEAN countries as a whole, these factors are likely to be secondary in terms of their impact on the overall Indian foreign policy concerns towards this region. The main imperatives for an increased Indian interest in Southeast Asia are expected to be political and strategic in nature, aimed at countering China's presence and influence in the region and at helping to maintain a Southeast Asia as free as possible from direct superpower involvement. In New Delhi's view, this is the only way to guarantee the autonomy of action of the major regional powers in South and Southeast Asia. New Delhi also believes that this is a view and an objective that both Jakarta and Hanoi share with it. It is in this context that Indonesia and Vietnam, irrespective of the nature of their regimes, would continue to be the central foci of Indian policy towards Southeast Asia. Indian policy-makers further believe that this triangular relationship, if manipulated adroitly by the three parties concerned, has the potential to determine much of the political agenda of Southern Asia during the last decade of this century.

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Vietnam's Sixth Party Congress: An Overview

CARLYLE A. THAYER

Introduction

In December 1986, Vietnam held its Sixth National Party Congress on schedule in accordance with party statutes. This is an important development, for it marks the "regularisation of politics" in Vietnam. Over the past 57 years, party congresses have been infrequent affairs with as many as sixteen years passing between them. The Sixth Congress is the third such party conclave to be held in ten years; the Fourth Congress was held in December 1976 and the Fifth Congress, in March/April 1982.

New patterns of politics are now discernable. Quite simply, Vietnam's top leaders are now being held accountable regularly for their policies. Secondly, the old guard has now virtually passed from the scene. Until the Sixth Congress, every Central Committee was dominated by members who had joined the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) in the 1930s. Now, not only are members of different generations being elected to the top decision-making body, but new sectoral groups are being given representation on the Central Committee as well.

These political developments are occurring at a time when Vietnam is facing severe hardships on the economic front.[1] Vietnam, with a population of 60 million, is the world's twelfth and the socialist community's third largest state. Vietnam is also one of the world's twenty poorest countries with a per capita income estimated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) at US$160 (1985 estimate).[2] Efforts to control the population growth rate have been only marginally successful. Recently, a projection by an international organization revealed that malnutrition is so widespread that, on an average day, about sixty Vietnamese die of starvation.[3] Inflation in Vietnam is reported at anywhere between 100–1,000 per cent a year.[4] Many sectors of Vietnam's economy are stagnant. There is also a serious shortage of basic consumer goods such as paper and medicine.

Likewise, Vietnam's external economic relations are in a parlous state. Vietnam has huge imbalances with its largest trading partners. Over the years, Vietnam has accumulated vast debts not only to the Soviet Union (over 3 billion roubles) and other COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) members, but also to thirty non-communist countries, banks, international organizations, and lending agencies (US$2.7 billion).[5]

Shortages, imbalances, poor planning, an inefficient state bureaucracy, and many other factors have not only kept living standards depressed, but have resulted in a severe crisis of confidence within the leadership itself. After thirty

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years of war, and a decade of socialist transformation, these and other ills surfaced as the main items on Vietnam's political agenda for 1986.[6]

Sixth Party Congress

Vietnam's Sixth National Party Congress was held in Hanoi from 15–18 December 1986. The proceedings of the Congress were attended by 1,129 official delegates, and representatives from thirty-five visiting delegations. According to a Western diplomat who followed the proceedings closely, the Congress was conducted in a very business-like fashion, with the programme extending into evening sessions. Speeches by delegates were generally brief and to the point. Over the four-day period, seventy-nine reports were tabled for consideration.

Although the Sixth Congress was an orderly affair, it was not as much a set piece as previous congresses. Quite dramatically, on the third day, it was announced that Vietnam's three top leaders, all members of the Politburo, had requested not to stand for re-election: Truong Chinh (Party Secretary-General), Pham Van Dong and Le Duc Tho. Observers also reported debate and wrangling over policy issues right up to the closing session when a general resolution was adopted. Two major reports delivered at the Congress deserve special emphasis and are analysed below.

Political Report. A summary of the Central Committee's Political Report was delivered by Secretary-General Truong Chinh.[7] It was blunt and to the point:

> the attitude adopted by our party in assessing the situation is: to look the truth in the face, to evaluate the facts correctly, and to tell the whole truth. Together with correctly appraising the achievements recorded, at this congress we shall focus on assessing the weaknesses, deeply analysing the errors and shortcomings, finding out the causes and taking measures to put things right. We will also define the tasks and objectives for the remaining years of the initial stage of the transition period.

The Political Report of the Sixth Congress generally followed the protocol established by previous party congresses.[8] It was divided into five major sections: situation and tasks, basic guidelines of social and economic policy, foreign policy, the role of mass organizations and the state, and the role of the Party. Emphasis was placed on the basic guidelines for the future, with approximately 40 per cent of the report devoted to this section. Slightly more emphasis was given to discussing the present situation and tasks compared with previous political reports; while less attention was devoted to the role of the state, the Party, and foreign policy issues.

The picture painted by Truong Chinh was stark indeed: production had not kept pace with demand nor did it reflect Vietnam's capabilities; investment was misdirected; valuable resources had been wasted; inflation was running at an all-time high; commodities and goods were not circulating properly because they were clogged up in the system; there were great imbalances in the economy, especially

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between supply and demand; the life of the ordinary person was beset with many difficulties; "negative manifestations" (anti-socialist tendencies) had appeared; and, most seriously, the confidence of the masses in the Party's leadership had declined.

Secretary-General Truong Chinh identified six major causes for this appalling state of affairs: 1) previous assessments about Vietnam's socio-economic conditions had been incorrect, and as a result unrealistic goals and targets had been set; 2) too much emphasis had been given to developing large-scale projects and heavy industry, and not enough to restoring the war-damaged economy; 3) the process of socialist transformation had been conducted in too hasty a manner, damaging the contributions of private capitalist enterprises; 4) inadequate progress had been made in dismantling the "bureaucratic centralised mechanism based on state subsidies" in favour of a "new management mechanism" [based on profit and loss]; 5) no effective solution had been found to solve the problem of "distribution and circulation" [that is, between the centrally planned economy and the free market economy]; and 6) the system of proletarian dictatorship had experienced shortcomings such as violations of state law and regulations [corruption] and in the spread of "petty bourgeois ideology" [placing the self and family before the state and community].

In brief, the Party had fallen down in three major fields: ideology, organization and leadership. According to the Central Committee's score card: "The errors and shortcomings in economic and social leadership originated from shortcomings in the party's ideological and organisational activity and its cadre work. This lies at the root of all other causes". Elsewhere the Report observed, "organisationally speaking, the state apparatus and those of the party and mass organisations were left to grow too big, overlapping and dispersed." And, in anticipation of subsequent leadership changes, the Political Report stated:

> The Central Committee, the Political Bureau, the Secretariat and the Council of Ministers were primarily responsible for the above-mentioned errors and shortcomings in the party leadership. It should be emphasized that the delay in correctly affecting a transition in the nucleus leading body was a direct cause for the inadequacy of party leadership in recent years in meeting the requirements of the new situation. The Central Committee wishes to self-criticise [itself] earnestly before the congress over its shortcomings.

Vietnam's immediate priorities were listed as follows: to rearrange the structure of production, and to make major readjustments in investment outlay; to build and consolidate the socialist relations of production, and to utilize and transform the various economic sectors in a correct way; to renovate the economic management mechanism; to bring into full play the driving force of science and technology; and to expand and heighten the effectiveness of external economic relations.

Economic Report. Both the political and economic reports stressed the idea of renovation. Perhaps the foremost advocate of this concept is Vo Van Kiet who, as

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Vice-Premier, delivered the important Economic Report to the Congress.[9] In his opening paragraph, Kiet declared: "in the economic field, there will be . . . renovation in economic policies and the management system." The Economic Report reversed earlier economic priorities which laid stress on the development of heavy industry. "In the years ahead," Kiet stated, "we will really consider agriculture the foremost battle front. . . . The primary and main orientation for heavy industry in this stage is to support agriculture and light industry on a proper scale and at an appropriate technical level."

Given the state of Vietnam's economy, what solutions did Party leaders offer? Kiet's report stressed three main areas: production of grain and food products, consumer goods, and exports. These three sectors constituted "the core of the socio-economic tasks for the five year period 1986–90" and were listed first among the main guidelines and economic objectives to be attained.

The most important objective set by the Economic Report was the production of grain and food products so that the needs of all the people could be met and reserve stocks built up. A target of 22–23 million metric tons of grain in paddy equivalent was to be attained by 1990. While a variety of methods to attain this objective were mentioned (intensive cultivation, multicropping, and so on), it was clear that the use of material incentives and end-product contracts would figure prominently.

The Economic Report linked food and grain production with the manufacture of consumer goods. "This is aimed at ensuring the daily needs of the people," stated the Report, "and the regeneration of the labour force, as well as attracting millions of labourers to solve the problem of employment for the people and, on that basis, create the source of accumulation and an important source of export." Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City are to receive the lion's share of investment funds, while the consumer goods industries in Da Nang and Haiphong were also mentioned.

The third prong of Vietnam's economic programme is the export sector. This was termed "a spearhead" by the Economic Report which further declared:

> it is our duty at present to increase the volume of export goods rapidly to meet import demands successfully. In the 1986–90 five-year period, the level of exports must be elevated by approximately 70 per cent over that of the previous five-year period, with emphasis on such major items as agricultural products; farm processing products; light industrial, small industrial, handicraft goods; and aquatic and maritime products.

In order to achieve these targets, the Report indicated that major reforms would have to be undertaken to improve the efficiency of the export sector; and that overseas Vietnamese would be encouraged to provide investment funds. Tourism was also mentioned as a source of foreign exchange.

Leadership Changes. Until recently, Vietnam's ruling communist party had been dominated by men who had become politically active in the 1920s and who had founded the Vietnamese Communist Party in 1930. This first generation of revolutionaries, comparable to Russia's Bolshevik or China's "Long March" generations, had been elected to the top party posts in the Politburo, Secretariat and

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Central Committee at each successive national congress since 1951. In 1986, in an act not usually associated with leadership change in communist states, the founding fathers of the Vietnamese Communist Party stepped aside, vacating their positions in these bodies. Even the Party's Secretary-General stepped down.[10] In order to appreciate the significance of these changes, note should be taken of two underlying processes which have influenced Vietnam's peaceful leadership transition.

Vietnam's Sixth National Party Congress brought to an end a protracted period of generational succession. A decade ago, coincident with re-unification, Vietnam's original revolutionary generation began to pass from the scene. At Vietnam's Third National Party Congress in 1960, for example, the proportion of Central Committee members first elected in 1951 stood at 63 per cent. By 1976, this figure had fallen to 20 per cent; at the Fifth Congress five years later, this number had shrunk to 11 per cent. In the five years since the Fifth Congress, ten members of the Central Committee have passed away. At the recent Sixth Congress, the number of members first elected in 1951 stood at only four persons, or 3 per cent of the total full membership.

The process of generational succession has preoccupied Vietnamese leaders for some time. Starting at the Fourth Congress in 1976, a consistent pattern of leadership turnover has emerged. At each congress, approximately 45 per cent of the Central Committee members are retained, 18 per cent promoted from alternate status, and 37 per cent newly elected.[11] These changes have rapidly reduced the voting power of the older generation. For example, 31 per cent of the current full membership was first elected this year; 37 per cent were first elected in 1982 and another 24 per cent were first elected in 1976.

Vietnamese party officials have also given some thought to generational succession involving members of the Politburo. In March 1982, on the eve of the Fifth Party Congress, the editor of the Party's newspaper *Nhan Dan* spoke of the necessity to "rejuvenate the Politburo only gradually and slowly."[12] That year, in an unprecedented move, six senior members of the Politburo stepped down. Throughout 1986, party spokesmen made clear to visiting journalists that the past pattern would be repeated, and that some of the top officials would retire. Despite Secretary-General Le Duan's untimely death in mid-year, and possibly some second thoughts by party officials, six full Politburo members were retired at the Sixth Congress. Three of the most senior have been appointed special advisers, while a fourth, Van Tien Dung, retains his seat on the Central Committee.

The process of generational succession has been accompanied by a second process, which may be termed the "regularisation of politics", as Vietnam's political system has moved from an operational mode dictated by the exigencies of war, to a more routine, regular pattern. As party congresses have become regular affairs, there has been a more frequent evaluation of the national leadership and its performance by the party's rank and file. Furthermore, the complexity of re-integrating the south and managing an underdeveloped economy has resulted

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in an expansion in the size of the Central Committee and the admission of new sectoral groups to the policy-making arena.

Membership of the Central Committee has steadily expanded, increasing sixfold between 1951 and 1986. The greatest influx occurred at the Fourth Congress in 1976 when the size of the Central Committee leapt from 74 to 133 members. It has risen at each subsequent congress, reaching 124 full and 49 alternate members presently. Most of the new officials represent Vietnam's second generation of revolutionaries who were born after the Party was founded and who began their careers during the anti-French Resistance (1945–54).[13] In the last decade, they have quickly risen to the top rungs of power. For example, 50 per cent of the Politburo, and 62 per cent of the Secretariat were first elected to the Central Committee in 1976.

Over the last two decades, the sectoral composition of the Central Committee has been changing markedly. The main beneficiaries have been secondary party and state officials whose representation on the Central Committee has leapt from 11 to 46 per cent. These are mainly provincial party secretaries, economic specialists and technocrats. In contrast, military representation has declined slowly but steadily with each passing congress from a high of 16 per cent in 1976 to a low of 8 per cent in 1986. The ranks of central-level party and state officials on the Central Committee have likewise declined from 74 (1960) to 46 per cent.

The dramatic increase in the number of younger, secondary level party and state officials has meant a greater focus on bread and butter issues. This was particularly evident at province-level party discussions in the lead up to the national congress. Here, similar patterns emerged, with the emphasis on younger, better educated and more technically competent leaders. In summary, the policies of the central-level economic reformers have found broad support in an emerging coalition of province-level officials, in both north and south Vietnam, now given increased voting representation on the Central Committee. These persons can be expected to benefit from economic policies which stress administrative decentralization, local autonomy, and greater initiative at the grass-roots level.

The person most identified with Vietnam's new economic policies is Nguyen Van Linh, the new Party Secretary-General. Linh has surrounded himself with colleagues who had actively prosecuted the war in southern Vietnam in the mid to late 1960s. These men are policy implementers and doers. Their experience has convinced them of the desirability of reaching out to broaden the base of popular support for their objectives. Already, Linh has spoken out urging reconciliation between the Party and Vietnam's ethnic Chinese, Catholics and former members of the Saigon regime. The nature of Linh's broad new coalition is encapsulated in a slogan heard at the Sixth Congress: "the north won the war, the south must manage the economy."[14].

Foreign Policy. None of the reports or speakers at the Sixth Congress indicated that any radical shifts in Vietnam's external policy were being contemplated. Rather, the Central Committee's Political Report reiterated long-standing policy:

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Vietnam would maintain its close ties with the Soviet Union and develop its "special relationships" with Laos and Kampuchea as the corner-stone of its foreign policy. Delegates from the USSR, Laos and Kampuchea were in fact given pride of place at the Congress. In a new emphasis, Vietnam highlighted the need to develop closer relations with members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

One of the most startling developments announced during the Sixth Congress came from Yegor Legachev, head of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) delegation. According to one report "[he] stunned observers: a total of 8–9 billion roubles would go to Vietnam in [Soviet] economic aid alone by 1990. At official exchange rates, that amounts to $11–13 billion — about equal per capita to the aid the U.S. gave South Vietnam before 1975, according to one economist."[15] This increase in Soviet aid is all the more remarkable given the misuse of such aid by Vietnamese officials, a fact which they now publicly acknowledge.

The foreign affairs section of the Political Report also stressed the importance Vietnam attached to the Non-Aligned Movement and its relations with India. It also repeated Vietnam's offer to meet anywhere at any time with China in order to normalize relations. Finally, the Political Report declared that Vietnam hoped to improve its relations with the capitalist world, specifically mentioning Sweden, Finland, France, Australia and Japan in this context.

Conclusion. If there is one term that can capture the major themes running through Vietnam's Sixth National Party Congress, it is the word "renovation". Nearly all speeches and major reports highlighted the need to bring about renovation. The general resolution adopted on the final day declared: "the main targets of ideological work are to renovate the way of thinking in all fields of activity of the party and state, especially to renovate economic thinking . . . renovate the party's organisational and cadre work, and renovate its workstyle."[16]

Following the Congress, on 16 February, Vietnam's Council of State announced a massive reshuffling of ministerial portfolios and the restructuring of several ministries. In all, thirteen officials were dropped and twenty-one new ministers appointed. Quite plainly, the process of renovation had begun.

APPENDIX

Changes in the Council of Ministers announced by the State Council on 16 February 1987:

Council of Ministers

Chairman

Pham Van Dong	retained

Secretary-General

Doan Trong Tuyen relieved	Nguyen Khanh appointed

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Vice-Chairmen (8):	*(11)*
Do Muoi	retained
Dong Sy Nguyen	retained
Pham Hung	retained
Tran Quynh relieved	Nguyen Co Thach appointed
Vo Nguyen Giap	retained
Vo Chi Cong	retained
Vo Van Kiet	retained
Vu Dinh Lieu relieved	Nguyen Ngoc Triu appointed
	Tran Duc Luong appointed
	Doan Duy Thanh appointed
	Nguyen Van Chinh appointed
Ministries *(26)*	*(22)*
Agriculture	Nguyen Ngoc Triu reassigned
Food	Nguyen Van Chinh reassigned
Food industry	vacant
	3 ministries merged to form Agriculture and Food Ministry; Nguyen Cong Tan appointed
Building	Phan Ngoc Tuong retained
Communications & Transport	Bui Danh Luu retained
Culture	[vacant since July 1986] Tran Van Phac appointed
Education	Nguyen Thi Binh relieved
	Pham Minh Hac appointed
	[incorporated Commission for the Protection of Mothers and Children]
Engineering & Metals	Nguyen Van Kha relieved
	Phan Thanh Liem appointed
Finance	Vu Tuan re-appointed Minister for Light Industry. Hoang Quy appointed
Foreign Affairs	Nguyen Co Thach retained
Foreign Trade	Doan Duy Thanh retained
Forestry	Phan Xuan Dot retained

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Higher and Vocational Education	Nguyen Dinh Tu relieved Tran Hong Quan appointed [incorporates General Department of Job Training]
Home Trade	Hoang Minh Thang retained
Interior	Pham Hung ceases to hold post Mai Chi Tho appointed
Justice	Phan Hien retained
Light Industry	Nguyen Chi Vu relieved Vu Tuan appointed
Marine Products	Nguyen Tien Trinh retained
Mines and Coal	[vacant since July 1986]
Power	Pham Khai relieved 2 ministries merged to form Ministry of Energy. Vu Ngoc Hai appointed
National Defence	Van Tien Dung relieved Le Duc Anh appointed
Public Health	Dang Hoi Xuan retained
Supply	Hoang Duc Nghi retained
Labour War Invalids and Social Welfare	2 ministries merged: Ministry of Labour, War Invalids and Social Welfare formed Dao Thien Thi (Labour) relieved Song Hao (War Invalids) relieved Nguyen Ky Cam appointed
Water Conservancy	Nguyen Canh Dinh retained
[Vietnam Radio & Television Commission dissolved]	Ministry of Information created Tran Hoan appointed
Commissions *(10)* Capital Construction	*(8)* Do Quoc Sam retained

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State Bank	Luu Minh Chau retained
Inspection	Bui Quang Tao relieved Nguyen Van Chinh appointed
Law	Tran Quang Huy retained
Nationalities	[dissolved]
Planning	Vo Van Kiet retained as chairman
	Hoang Quy ceases to be First Vice-Chairman, with rank of Minister, reappointed Finance Minister; Dau Ngoc Xuan appointed Minister and First Vice-Chairman
Price	Phan Van Tiem appointed
Science and Technology	Dang Huu
Social Science	Pham Nhu Cuong promoted
newly established	
	Commission for Economic Relations with Foreign Countries; Nguyen Co Thach appointed
Vietnam Radio & Television Commission dissolved	Ministry of Information created
General Geological Department	renamed General Department of Mines and Geology

पुस्तकालय 077580 गुरुकुल कांगड़ी विश्वविद्यालय हरिद्वार

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1. For a recent analysis, see Tetsusaburo Kimura, "Vietnam — Ten Years of Economic Struggle", *Asian Survey* 26, no. 10 (October 1986): 1039–55.
2. William Branigan, *Washington Post*, 22 April 1985.
3. Barbara Crossette, despatch from Bangkok in *New York Times* (4 February 1987), cites a briefing given by a Hanoi-based diplomat to a visiting group of American scholars.
4. Nicholas Cumming-Bruce, despatch from Bangkok in *Canberra Times* (24 October 1986) provides the low figure, while "Uncle Ho's Men Bow Out," *Economist* (20 December 1986, p. 32) sets

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inflation at between 500–1,000 per cent. Other sources, citing Vietnamese and foreign experts, report inflation at 700 per cent in 1986; see *Agence France Presse* (*AFP*) despatch from Hanoi, *International Herald Tribune* (29 December 1986); and Murray Hiebert, "Call for Radical Surgery", *Far Eastern Economic Review* (27 January 1987, p. 51) which attributes the 700 per cent to a report by Vietnamese officials to the IMF. Interestingly, some Chinese sources are more conservative. One analysis states that the inflation rate rose from 100 per cent in 1976 to 300 per cent: Li Li, "War Brings Suffering to the People", *Beijing Review*, 24 November 1986, p. 13. Two months later, the same magazine reported the 700 per cent figure: Mei Zhenmin "Occupation of Kampuchea Harmful to Economy", *Beijing Review*, 12 January 1987, p. 10.

5. Francois Nivalon, "Rescheduling, Rethinking: Interview with Tran Phuong", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 19 December 1985, p. 98.
6. Economic issues figured prominently in the criticism – self-criticism campaign, and the round of basic-level, district and provincial level congresses in the lead up to the National Party Congress.
7. The complete text may be found in Communist Party of Vietnam, "Sixth National Congress Political Report of the Central Committee" (Hanoi: typescript, December 1986). All references to the Political Report are from this source.
8. The texts of the Central Committee's Political Report to the Third (1960), Fourth (1976), Fifth (1982) and Sixth (1986) Congresses were compared. Percentage figures were derived by dividing the number of pages devoted to each section by the total number of pages in the Political Report. Both the preamble and concluding sections were excluded.
9. The text of the Economic Report was carried by Radio Hanoi home service, 0313 gmt, 15 December 1986.
10. Contrary to much foreign press coverage, this was neither unique nor unprecedented. In 1956, two Politburo members, including the Party's First Secretary, stepped down in the wake of failures associated with agricultural collectivization. In 1982, six Politburo members retired at the Fifth Congress.
11. These figures are derived from data on leadership changes from the Third to Sixth Congresses (1960–86).
12. Carlyle A. Thayer, "Vietnam's Two Strategic Tasks: Building Socialism and Defending the Fatherland," in *Southeast Asian Affairs, 1983*, edited by Pushpa Thambipillai (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1983), pp. 299–324.
13. According to the Vietnam News Agency, "their average age is 56.1; 116 members are aged from 40 to 59 (67%), 56 others from 60 upward (32.3%), and one member below 40. Twenty-one members of the new Central Committee were admitted to the party before 1945 (12%); 142 in the 1945–65 period (82%) and 10 in the 1965–69 period (5.9%). Of the party Central Committee, 75 members have university or higher academic degrees, accounting for 43.3%, and 56 others have graduated from senior high schools (32.3%)."
14. Reported to me by a Western correspondent; the slogan is not an official one, however.
15. "Sweeping Changes at the Top," *Asiaweek*, 4 January 1987, p .12.
16. The text of the final draft resolution was carried by Radio Hanoi home service, 0734 gmt, 18 December 1986.

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"ASEAN's Third Decade: Building Greater Equity"*

DONALD CRONE

The ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) region has emerged over the past several decades as an example of progress in the Third World. This is true for the regional organization, which has been one of the most dynamic and long-lasting of its type. It is also true of most of the members which have posted annual rates of growth at the peak of Third World experience, as well as demonstrating resilience to extended global recession beyond the norm. The first two decades of the ASEAN experience have been quite positive, in many aspects of the external and internal realms. The forthcoming third decade offers important challenges to ASEAN and its members, particularly in the realm of social development, which must be addressed if the promising record of the past is to continue.

This paper is directed primarily to the internal realm of the ASEAN experience, with particular attention to issues of equity. Any observer of these countries is aware of great changes over the past several decades, with quite visible improvements in many aspects of living conditions in the region, from the vast building spree that has changed the face of the urban areas, to increased infrastructure, and alleviation of some of the most onerous aspects of rural life. There is little doubt that, despite great variation across countries and within them, a higher quality of life has been achieved. Despite this achievement, which should not be discounted, the issue remains an important one, with much more progress necessary before poverty is no longer a central problem in the ASEAN region.

Welfare and improved standards of living are essentially domestic issues, but with numerous international ties. "Regional resilience" and "national resilience" have long been recognized as interdependent by leaders in the region. In addition, the ASEAN states have each chosen a development strategy that includes substantial exposure to the global system, through trade, finance, investment, and aid relations; this "openness" links domestic economic and social change directly to the international system. Internationally-linked urban-biased, industrial development may exacerbate inequalities. As small states interacting with economic great powers, the ASEAN members, even acting collectively, are greatly disadvantaged by power inequalities, and are thus dependent; this dependence conditions the domestic policy environment that is primarily responsible for development programmes. International inequality may also condition domestic welfare. Thus, welfare issues are not realistically isolated in the domestic realm at all, particularly for dependent Third World states, but are closely linked to the regional, and wider

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international system. Goals outlined for ASEAN by its members clearly recognize this.

The purpose here is to make explicit some of the links between national equity needs and the regional international sub-system. Not only is this level of the international system increasingly controlled by the ASEAN members, but it has already manifested a substantial economic and organizational component which provides a potential base to support national equity policies. Several concrete steps can be taken through ASEAN mechanisms that would contribute to greater equity in the region.

The ASEAN Mandate

Achieving greater equity and addressing the primarily rural, agrarian character of the members' societies are among the primary purposes of ASEAN. This is clearly evident in the rhetoric of its establishment. The first purpose of the Bangkok Declaration establishing ASEAN was "to accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development of the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of South East Asian nations." Likewise, the 1976 Declaration of ASEAN Concord stresses in its preamble the contracting parties' "endeavour to promote peace, progress, prosperity and the welfare of the peoples of member states." The organization is to have a particular focus on the improvement of living conditions in their largely agrarian societies, according to the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (Article 6), specifically a priority on increasing food production, repeatedly emphasized in the Declaration of ASEAN Concord.

The basic ASEAN documents contain a clear vision of precisely what welfare needs are to be promoted in the region. The Treaty of Amity (Article 7) states their aim "to achieve social justice and to raise the standards of living of the peoples of the region", adopting appropriate regional development strategies towards this goal. It goes on:

> The elimination of poverty, hunger, disease and illiteracy is a primary concern of member states. They shall therefore intensify co-operation in economic and social development, with particular emphasis on the promotion of social justice and on the improvement of the living standards of their peoples.

The first item of social co-operation in the Declaration is an "emphasis on the well-being of the low income groups and of the rural population, through the expansion of opportunities for productive employment with fair remuneration." Welfare and social equity, with particular emphasis on the poor, agrarian population is a central concern of ASEAN.

Many of the activities and programmes of ASEAN, which accelerated during the organization's second decade, made contributions to the welfare of the region's population. The economic programmes, ranging from the ASEAN Indus-

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trial Projects, some of which were chosen with the agrarian character of the region in mind, to the smaller scale Industrial Complementation Projects and ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures, and to the Preferential Trade Agreement and petroleum and rice sharing schemes each potentially contribute to some groups' welfare. Likewise, the private sector initiatives, largely under the umbrella of the ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry, have intensified co-operation on a regional scale, with beneficial effects for some sectors. Organizationally, there are now abundant ties across the region at both the governmental and non-governmental level, providing for increased co-operation and the possibility of mutual benefit.

However, the original "priority" for the agrarian population seems to have been overcome by the rapid growth of regional co-operative ventures that are primarily commercial and urban in nature. The vast majority of ties promoted in the areas noted above are between professional, commercial and industrial élites, providing only indirect benefit at best for the majority of the region's population, and hardly any for the poorest. One of the few examples of a direct rural benefit was the inclusion of two fertilizer plants (in Indonesia and Malaysia) in the regional industrial projects. Thus, ASEAN may have contributed to the welfare of urban residents, but has had less effect in the rural areas.

ASEAN has done little towards its priority goal of contributing to the welfare, social justice and equity of the poorer segments of the rural population. In part, this may reflect the assumption that welfare would "trickle down", which was widely accepted when ASEAN was fashioned. While overall regional co-operation has accelerated, an important aspect of the ASEAN mandate has stood unfulfilled, one that has direct implications for the long-term prospects of the regional members' societies.

Dimensions of ASEAN Equity Problems

In order to clarify what ASEAN can do in order to better fulfil this aspect of its mandate, it is first necessary to review the equity experience of the region. Particular attention will be devoted to identifying where the most severe equity problems are located, in social and spatial terms. Since data in this area are notoriously deficient, they should be interpreted only broadly, and will be supplemented with more descriptive accounts of each country's experience. As it is the purpose here to identify problem areas, it should be understood that the following is necessarily one-sided, and not intended either as a balanced assessment of social development in the ASEAN region, or as an unbalanced critique of their governments.

Table 1 provides the frequently noted evidence on the rapid rates of growth of the ASEAN countries. What is significant here is the acceleration of growth from the 1950s through 1980, which has moved the ASEAN countries up into the middle-income group of developing countries. However, population growth, inflation and consequent currency devaluations have reduced the effect of this growth in per capita terms for Indonesia, and more especially for the Philippines, which suffered a contraction for the period in real per capita terms. Even put in this

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TABLE 1
ASEAN GROWTH

GNP Growth (%)	1951–60	1961–70	1971–80	1981–85	Per/capita 1960–80
Malaysia	4.1	6.5	7.8	6.3	4.3
Philippines	6.6	5.1	6.2	-0.2	2.8
Thailand	6.4	8.4	7.2	5.2	4.7
Indonesia	3.8	3.9	7.8	4.8	4.0
Singapore	5.4	8.8	8.5	6.1	7.5
Average	5.3	6.5	7.5	4.4	

SOURCES: World Bank, *World Tables* (IBRD, 1976, 1980); World Bank, *World Development Report* (IBRD, 1983); International Labour Organization (ILO), *World Labour Report* (ILO, 1984); *Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific 1985* (ESCAP, 1986).

TABLE 2
ABSOLUTE POVERTY

	c.1960(%)	c.1967(%)	c.1970(%)	c.1975(%)	c.1975 (millions)
Malaysia	n.a.	n.a.	49	44	5.4
Philippines	58	43	45	52	21.9
Thailand	52	39	34	33	13.6
Indonesia	n.a.	98	91	56	72.1
Singapore	21	20	12	4	0.1

SOURCES: ESCAP, *Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific, 1978*, p. 87; ESCAP, *Regional Development Strategy for the 1980s* (1980), pp. 129–30; Wong (1979), p. 195; Rao (1979); and White (1979).

worst possible light, however, growth has been strong and consistent in the region, presumably facilitating substantial advances in living standards for the region's population.

Tables 2 and 3 give available figures on the levels of poverty and physical quality of life. The proportion of the region's population in poverty declined from roughly three-quarters in the early 1960s to about one-half in the mid-1970s. Poverty rates probably continued to fall until the early 1980s, when there is some evidence of reversal towards higher rates. With population growth, the absolute numbers of poor declined only modestly, staying over one hundred million. National experiences varied quite markedly, from strong reductions to little change. More consistent and positive change is evident in the PQLI (Physical

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TABLE 3
PHYSICAL QUALITY OF LIFE INDEX

	1960	1970	1980
Malaysia	47	66	72
Philippines	60	71	73
Thailand	58	68	76
Indonesia	—	48	55
Singapore	70	83	86
Average	58.8	67.2	72.4

SOURCES: Morris Morris, *Measuring the Condition of the World's Poor* (Pergamon, 1979), pp. 126–35; John Lewis and Valeriana Kallab, eds., *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Third World, Agenda 1983* (Praeger, 1983), pp. 210–21; and ESCAP, *A Development Strategy for the 1980s* (ESCAP, 1980), p. 136.

Quality of Life Index) figures, which indicate longer life-spans, lower infant mortality rate and higher levels of literacy. Life chances, as reflected in PQLI figures, are unambiguously better, while poverty reduction has not been as marked and universal throughout the region.

Table 4 addresses equity by reference to the distribution of incomes, indicating changes in relative standing among social strata. Income inequality in the ASEAN region is relatively high for developing countries, with 45–56 per cent of incomes accruing to the top 20 per cent of families. The bottom 40 per cent, generally the poverty group, are clearly marginal, and appear to be making little progress. Only in Thailand and Singapore have inequalities declined, while Indonesia shows the clearest increase; the others are relatively stable or fluctuating. Growth would have to be strong indeed, and directed towards the bottom of the social order, to eradicate poverty. However, few signs of this are evident. Rather, growth has contributed primarily to relative increases in welfare for middle and upper income households.

Overall, it is apparent that there have been positive changes in some measures of welfare, but that poverty and severe inequality remain significant issues. Attention to some of the details of each country's experience will clarify some of the most relevant dimensions of this common problem.

Indonesia is the region's most important source of poverty, both because of the large population affected, and because of the country's low level of overall economic attainment. The most impoverished population group are the rural Javanese. Changes in the structure of agriculture have been accompanied by increased landlessness, fewer opportunities for agricultural labour, and consequently a large negative impact on the poor, particularly women, more than half of whom have incomes below the poverty line (Palmer 1977; Moir 1980). In the

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TABLE 4
HOUSEHOLD INCOME DISTRIBUTION (QUINTILE SHARE)

	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Gini Coefficient
Malaysia,						
1957–58	5.80	9.90	14.10	20.60	49.60	0.49
1967–68	3.20	7.20	11.50	18.90	59.20	0.62
1973	3.50	7.70	12.40	20.30	56.10	0.59
Philippines, 1956	4.90	8.00	12.30	20.00	54.80	0.56
1965	3.60	7.90	12.70	20.40	55.40	0.58
1970–71	5.20	9.00	12.80	19.00	54.00	0.54
Thailand, 1962	5.70	7.50	11.10	18.20	57.50	0.57
1970	5.60	8.70	13.30	21.30	51.10	0.52
1975–76	5.60	9.60	13.90	21.10	49.80	0.50
Indonesia,						
1964–65	7.70	12.40	16.50	22.90	40.50	0.33
1971	6.80	10.50	13.40	17.30	52.00	0.49
1976	6.60	7.80	12.60	23.60	49.40	0.51
Singapore, 1966	4.70	11.10	16.10	20.70	47.40	0.46
1973	5.00	12.00	17.70	22.90	42.40	0.42
1978	6.80	10.70	15.20	22.00	45.30	0.37

Sources: Jain (1976); World Bank (1983); Wong (1979); Singapore (1979).

early 1970s, Palmer (1977, p. 210) estimated rural landlessness at 20 per cent, which according to Sajogyo (1982, p. 4) had increased to 40 per cent by 1980. Landlessness has been accompanied by a decline in the agricultural labour force from 75 per cent in 1960 to 55 per cent in 1980 (World Bank 1983) and by a reduction in the number of small farms (Sajogyo 1982, p. 2). Rural non-agricultural employment has grown (Bose 1982), but the income return is lower than for agricultural employment (White 1979, p. 98).

The depressed rural economy, an urban bias in income opportunities, and regional disparities each contribute to continuing low levels of physical quality of life and high poverty rates in Indonesia. The majority of the poverty population live in rural Java, where the overall poverty rate fell modestly from 51 per cent in 1969 to 46 per cent in 1976 (ESCAP 1986, p. 100). Daily wages there are the lowest, while incomes and employment are increasing in Jakarta and on some of the outer islands, reflecting industry and resource locations. The urban-rural gap in incomes increased from 43 per cent higher in urban areas in 1970, to 84 per cent higher by

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1976 (Sundram 1979, p. 137). Regional inequality is also extremely high, and seems to be increasing (Esmara 1975; Sundaram, 1983). Timber exploitation has contributed greatly to local income in Kalimantan, for example, where rural poverty is 17 per cent (Sundaram 1983, p. 140). Growing income inequalities must exacerbate lags in achieving greater equity.

Thailand, by contrast, seems to have had the most successful experience of the agrarian countries in reducing poverty and inequality. A careful observer reports "conclusive evidence that the standards of living of the Thai population have been rising quite rapidly" as a result of real increases in per capita income for all areas, rural and urban; the number of poor fell from 15.8 million in 1962 to 12.9 million in 1975 (Meesook 1979, pp. 15,55). Urban areas, particularly Bangkok, are far better off than rural ones, producing regional inequality. Poverty is increasingly concentrated in the North and Northeast: 50 per cent of the poor lived in the Northeast in 1975, an increase from 45 per cent in 1962, with another 23 per cent in the North (a decrease from 25 per cent), while the central plains and Bangkok together contained only 15 per cent (World Bank 1980, Table 10). While the poor regions' income growth is said to be higher than the richer areas (World Bank 1980, p. 3), government figures show regional disparities increasing between 1960 and 1979 (National Economic and Social Development Board, *Fifth National Economic and Social Development Plan,1982–1986*, pp. 495–97). In 1979, per capita income in Bangkok was 250 per cent of the national average, while that of the Northeast was 41 per cent. Yet, total poverty decreased substantially between 1962 and 1976, and faster in the poorer areas: Northeast, from 74 to 46 per cent; North, from 65 to 35 per cent; Bangkok, from 28 to 12 per cent (Meesook 1979, p. 52). Even then, 75 per cent of the poor are farm operators (Meesook 1979, p. 57), and with agricultural wages one-sixth of manufacturing and one-tenth of commercial wages (Girling 1981, p. 179), the recent financial squeeze faced by farmers (*Far Eastern Economic Review* (*FEER*), 31 January 1985) is likely to continue to support high levels of poverty and inequality.

The Philippines is in many regards quite similar to Thailand, in size, population, economic level, and initial levels of poverty. But, while estimates vary widely (Mangahas 1979), all agree that poverty is increasing in absolute and relative terms, from 2.1 million families in 1965 (41 per cent) to 3.5 million in 1975 (52 per cent) according to one conservative evaluation (Tan and Holazo 1979, p. 473–74). A World Bank study added to this discouraging picture the conclusion that malnourishment is widespread, with average levels of caloric intake at 88 per cent of sufficiency (*FEER*, 27 March 1981, p. 125).

A primary dimension of poverty is regional inequality, but it appears to be declining in some respects. Measures of social welfare vary widely by province, from close to developed country levels in parts of the Manila area to abysmally low levels in the poorer areas such as the Visayas and Cagayan Valley (Alvarez 1982). Likewise, poverty varied from 10.5 per cent in the capital area in 1965 to over two-thirds in the Cagayan Valley; but this disparity eroded with the increase in poverty generally, so that the higher levels remained roughly the same in 1975 for the

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poorer rural parts of the country, while urban levels of poverty rose dramatically, as in Manila, to 41 per cent (Tan and Holazo 1979, pp. 473–74; see also *FEER* report on the World Bank study, 27 March 1981, p. 126). This reflects consistently declining real rural wages from 1960 onwards (Azizur 1977, p. 244), with a 53 per cent decline just from 1976–79 (Bello 1982, p. 97). The deterioration has been particularly acute for women (Anderson 1982, p. 148) and the rest of the bottom 20–40 per cent of the rural population, many of whom are selling belongings and going into debt to maintain minimal levels of consumption, while the upper 20 per cent have gained substantially (Grace 1977, p. 5; Azizur 1977, p. 234). One consequence is that over two-thirds of the population were below the level of income required simply to maintain food consumption in 1975 (Hainsworth 1979, p. 23). Urban workers' incomes have also declined, with the result that 39 per cent of all urban families, and 80–90 per cent of slum families (who made up to 40 per cent of Manila's population in 1979), were below the poverty line in 1977 (Bello 1982, p. 102). Rates of urban poverty were higher than rural poverty in six of the thirteen regions of the Philippines in 1975, with most of the rest not strikingly lower. The urban poor, however, accounted for only 842,000 families, compared to 2.3 million poor rural families (*FEER*, 27 March 1981, p. 126).

Malaysia's initial position was quite similar to that of the Philippines or Thailand. Malaysia had a large agrarian labour force, relatively high (over 50 per cent) poverty, low living standards and undeveloped infrastructure, and a particularly sensitive racial composition of its population. Poverty was highly concentrated. Almost 90 per cent of the poor were rural, and 80 per cent of those were paddy smallholders or labourers, rubber smallholders and workers, and fishermen (Anand 1983, p. 18). Almost three-quarters of the poor households were Malay, compared to only 17 per cent Chinese and 8 per cent Indian; overall, 65 per cent of the poor were Malays (*Third Malaysia Plan*, 1976–80, p. 5). About one-half of the poor lived in the mostly Malay northern states, where, for example, Kelantan's gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was less than one-half of the national average (Sundaram 1983, p. 99). Woman income earners received just over half of what the men received, and were more likely to be in poverty (Anand 1983, pp. 127, 206; Shari 1979, p. 428). As a result of the New Economic Policy (NEP), this poverty figure dropped precipitously, from 49 per cent in 1970 to 29 per cent in 1980; rural poverty stood at 37.4 per cent in 1980, compared to 58.7 per cent a decade earlier. At the same time, income inequality appears to be increasing between *bumiputra* (native Malay) and non-*bumiputra* (Chinese and Indian), as well as within the racial communities, especially the Malays (Lim 1982, p. 631; Snodgrass 1980, pp. 82, 275). Basic services, such as clean water and sanitation, are still beyond the purchasing power of the bottom one-quarter of the population, mostly in the northern states (Meerman in Young 1980, p. 152). Some groups, such as untenured paddy farmers and rubber smallholders, still seem to be in marginal (and perhaps worsening) conditions ("Poverty and Land Ownership in Malaysia", conference paper, Singapore, June 1982). Poverty has been reduced, but not eliminated, even to the degree envisioned by the NEP.

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Singapore is, in almost all respects, the exception in Southeast Asia — a small city-state, with little agrarian sector left after 1945, largely commercial, industrial and Chinese. Because of the lack of an agrarian sector, poverty does not seem to have been as large a problem as for other regional states even in the 1950s, and the small size precludes much spatial inequality. Today, Singapore is, by most standards, a developed country, with a large and growing middle class (Pang 1975). One aspect of inequality that has been particularly stubborn is the racial stratification which has left the Malay population of Singapore behind. Malay incomes, which were 80 per cent of the average for Chinese in 1966, declined to around 70 per cent in the 1970s and continue at that level, leaving Malays in the least skilled jobs, and consequently at the bottom of the national income distribution (Pang 1975, p. 26; *FEER*, 28 June 1984, p. 30). Income distribution continues to be the least unequal in the region. Singapore has achieved substantial equity and has eliminated poverty as a substantial national problem.

The first decades of ASEAN, then, were generally characterized by rapid growth, and by some observable increases in the physical quality of life for wide sectors of the population. But poverty remains a significant problem for many in the more remote areas and in agrarian occupations, which severely limits the equity consequences of rapid growth. High inequality between urban and rural populations, between agrarian and non-agrarian, and between male and female-headed households is characteristic; rural, agrarian and female households are much more likely to be in poverty. These were correctly identified by the framers of ASEAN as the target groups for national and regional focus. Achieving adequate standards of living for these groups continues to be a challenge, and calls for increased, direct attention to better achieve national and regional resilience.

Implementing the ASEAN Welfare Mandate

There are a number of ways in which ASEAN can more effectively assist its members toward greater welfare and equity. Many of these are simple extensions of what the regional organization has already achieved in structuring co-operation among its members, and require nothing that is politically difficult or administratively taxing. ASEAN has already established an extensive infrastructure of regional organization and co-operation that at least nominally makes provision for most social and economic groups.

However, in areas most relevant to low income and poverty groups, ASEAN has been relatively inactive. The ASEAN Committee on Food, Agriculture and Forestry (COFAF) has not taken an effective lead in developing projects to benefit agrarian populations as, for example, the Committee on Trade and Tourism (COTT) has in its mandate, although the regional seed technology programme and Agricultural Development Planning Centre are positive steps. Likewise, the ASEAN Committee on Social Development appears to have a very low profile. While one recent visitor to the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta reported the existence of a "pile" of projects directed towards improving the position and status of women, active programmes have not been reported.

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ASEAN has been active in assisting national management of many transnational economic flows, such as trade and foreign investment, but not development assistance. ASEAN transmits some requests for external assistance in development projects, including the handful of regional projects. But it has neither co-ordinated external aid nor contributed to increased efficiency in the much larger flow of resources in national development budgets. ASEAN needs to take its stated commitment to achieve social justice and eliminate poverty more seriously, and stimulate those committees responsible for the relevant populations and sectors.

What remains to be done is to expand the ASEAN agenda of functional economic co-operation (Weatherbee 1985) in a manner that will contribute directly to the welfare of groups at the bottom and in the peripheries of their societies. No ASEAN-level initiative is likely to eliminate poverty; only the national governments can. But ASEAN can strengthen national capacities and assist in the more efficient use of resources, making national action more effective. Increasing the usefulness of ASEAN has been a consistent theme, recently resulting in a major study, started in 1982 and presented to the Sixteenth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (ASEAN, n.d.), that identified present achievements and future policy directions. A number of points were made by the ASEAN Task Force that are relevant to the pursuit of greater welfare.

A first group of suggestions focus on expanding basic information resources:

> ASEAN should closely monitor the economic development of member countries in the context of subregional, regional and global economic developments with the view to identifying areas for cooperation, common strategies and joint approaches, and avoiding possible conflicts. A greater exchange of information on national development plans and objectives should be encouraged to bring about deeper mutual understanding and trust, and to facilitate identification of complementarity and co-operation opportunities. (ASEAN, pp. 16,17.)

There is little that can be undertaken without first creating a pool of shared information. Information collection and dissemination is one of the primary functions of international organizations of all types, and one that is especially relevant to developing countries' more constrained resources.

ASEAN information services need to be greatly expanded to serve better national social welfare programmes. Each country has planning units of some sophistication. The experience and techniques of these need to be shared at the regional level, and made available through the ASEAN Secretariat. No commitment to negotiate the details of national plans with regional partners is required; no competitive advantage can be lost, as they are not confidential in any case; little financial cost would be incurred. Such information exchanges should include development plans for rural areas, welfare programmes for specific target sectors or groups undertaken, cost and financial arrangements, administrative mechanisms tried, and evaluation studies of their outcomes where available. For externally-

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sponsored projects, whether multilateral, bilateral or private, some assessment of development contributions would also be useful.

An ASEAN Development Information Pool could be quite valuable to the ASEAN governments. Development is hardly a science, and methods to approach a specific problem vary greatly from project to project, and from time to time. Given the similarity of context in the region, particularly in rural settings, the creation of a fund of experience about what works and what does not is as close to a laboratory as one can get. Sharing fifty states' experiences is often cited as one of the strengths of the U.S. local administrative system. Doing the same among the six ASEAN members seems potentially beneficial in saving scarce resources, in making best use of available indigenous solutions, and in selecting among foreign models, with their shifting fashions in means and priorities. The network of personal contacts around the region that has developed from the wide range of ASEAN government officials' frequent meetings could facilitate the development and use of a regional information pool.

Sharing information enhances national capabilities with little cost. It is implausible for ASEAN to monitor, evaluate or in any other way pass judgement on national development plans or progress; that is entirely a domestic prerogative. However, good information is a prerequisite of intelligent, efficient use of scarce resources. ASEAN can make a significant contribution to the analytical power of its members.

A second area in which the expansion of functional economic co-coperation could address regional welfare relies on the extension of already established structures of regional co-operation. Again, the ASEAN Task Force reported: "Member countries should continue to encourage the participation of ASEAN non-governmental organizations pursuant to ASEAN objectives in the political, social and cultural fields" (p. 5). Regional non-governmental organizations (RINGOs) offer a promising and dynamic tool of regionalism.

Neither the ability nor the past experience of ASEAN non-governmental organizations in the regional development process should be underestimated. However, only some sectors of the ASEAN societies have so far really made use of them; these have been primarily urban, industrial and commercial groups (see Crone 1983). A relatively dense network has developed, ranging from port officials to librarians, to the ASEAN Business and Commodity Clubs organized under the umbrella of the ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry. Some of these have taken such an active role that they virtually supplant a government body. Many positive examples of this kind of regional co-operation can be found which benefit the groups participating, and the cause of regionalism.

However, parallel regional organizations with a focus on agrarian issues, or relevant to underprivileged populations, do not exist. The poor generally have fewer resources with which to organize to help themselves, a major impediment to increasing their social welfare. Still, rural co-operatives, some government-sponsored, are a common feature of most of the ASEAN societies. Some could likely be effective on a regional scale, in activities such as joint marketing and

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financing, providing information to their governments, and lobbying foreign groups. These paths have already been broken by the existing RINGOs with some success.

Rural Business Clubs would be a natural extension of the structure of ASEAN, and could be sponsored just as the existing urban groups have been. Some of these might naturally fit in with the Regional Industry Clubs, under the ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry's (ACCI) Working Group on Industrial Co-operation, and others might better fit with the Regional Commodity Clubs, under the ACCI's Working Group on Trade. These groups would bring a wider population base into regional co-operation, and help rural groups to help themselves.

Another aspect of organization on a regional scale seems desirable and feasible: to assist co-operation in rural development efforts by private voluntary organizations. Participatory rural development, assisted by indigenous and international private voluntary organizations (PVOs), has been the focus of much recent attention, as well as becoming more central to international aid agencies' funding priorities (see ESCAP 1985b). PVOs have become more central to development efforts in part because of their commitment to, and willingness to administer, small-scale projects that identify and assist specific target groups, but also because of their lower costs. In the Indonesian case, Hainsworth (1985) has argued for their effectiveness, and many development professionals point to similar conclusions in other Third World areas. Their approach is particularly appropriate in the Southeast Asian context of overall growth that leaves behind, or marginalizes, significant groups.

However, the large number and small budgets of PVOs result in fragmentation and disorganization of their efforts. There have been some attempts at co-ordination of delivery programmes to reduce competition and duplication of efforts, but more effort is needed to integrate their efforts and bring them in line with government and international agency efforts (Gorman 1984, pp. 65–69). External aid consortia do this for government donors already. While PVOs also desire independence, their record of co-operation with governments is generally better than donor governments that frequently impose conditions on their aid. Some well-intentioned programmes compete, duplicate, or waste resources.

The effectiveness of such development groups could be enhanced by the creation of a regional network through which they could share information and resources. Development Action Clubs under the auspices of ASEAN could contribute directly to more efficient use of domestic and external resources. An enhanced regional development information pool, as outlined above, would make the identification of needs easier for members of these groups, as well as serving as a clearing house for priority projects. Sharing experiences with others would eliminate some wasted efforts in the search for appropriate measures. Dynamic projects could be extended to other ASEAN sites, without the full cost of start-up each time. Recent international interest in PVOs might be channelled into supporting the establishment of Development Action Clubs. They would logically fall under

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the purview of the ASEAN Committee on Social Development, and greatly expand its ability to develop and implement an active agenda.

Organizing for local development is a major area of potential ASEAN activity that could go far to strengthen purely national activities. Treating the ASEAN region as a single "development zone" could produce economies of scale, and an orientation towards peripheral social groups that would more effectively address existing equity problems. ASEAN can assist by creating an infrastructure of information and organization for the use of member governments and private development agencies. An ASEAN Development Information Pool, Rural Business Clubs, and Development Action Clubs are steps in the right direction. ASEAN cannot "solve" members' development problems; it can only assist them towards their own solutions. The strategy of regionalism relies exactly on sharing of resources, experience and power, for joint benefit.

Conclusion

ASEAN efforts need to be brought into line with changing national development emphases. Each of the ASEAN members has recently sought to attain a more balanced development programme, that brings rural, agrarian elements of the population more into the mainstream of national development. While the urban, industrial sectors will undoubtedly continue to be central throughout the region, ASEAN can also assist in fostering rural development. The commitment to greater equity elaborated in ASEAN's documents needs to be fulfilled, and can be, starting with a few clear extensions of present regional programmes.

The two areas of potential ASEAN activity identified here, information gathering and networking, are central to the traditional mandates of international organizations. ASEAN does both, in some regard, already. Neither is expensive. Neither is politically disruptive of "national interests". Both have demonstrated quick returns in other contexts. ASEAN's own internal re-evaluation points to some version of each. With an appropriate focus on the most needy groups and sectors, ASEAN can contribute to regional autonomy and stability through providing information and organization.

Support for more balanced development will contribute directly to regional and national resilience. Improved equity and opportunity in the rural areas insulate national economies against external sensitivity. Spreading welfare produces a base for more rapid national economic development, and for more national economic autonomy. Political instability resulting from inequality and poverty is reduced. ASEAN, of course, cannot make direct contributions to what are sensitive national problems; only the member governments can. But ASEAN can make it easier, more effective, and more possible for the governments to do so.

ASEAN's third decade offers new opportunities to be grasped. ASEAN has already contributed to the development of the region, but in areas that were the easiest to start up and prove itself as an organization. That stage of ASEAN's development is firm now, and new departures are required to maintain the record of success of the past through the third decade. No better set of commitments can be

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imagined than those that address the most critical issues of the members' development, attaining greater social justice and more equitable development. Nothing would contribute more firmly to national and regional resilience, or better preserve ASEAN's relevance to its governmental members, and peoples, for the future.

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The Malaysian Connection in the Vietnam War*

PAMELA SODHY

This paper examines an often neglected aspect of the Vietnam War — the Malaysian connection. Many books and articles on the Vietnam War make only passing references to Malaya or Malaysia and how it featured in that war. Since the Malaysian connection actually formed an important aspect of the Vietnam War and merits more attention, this paper will concentrate on studying the different manifestations of that connection.

Very briefly, during the Vietnam War from the end of World War II to the fall of Saigon in April 1975, the Malaysian connection was manifested in four major ways. Firstly, there were constant official Malayan or Malaysian references to the "domino theory": it was argued that if Vietnam fell to the communists, Malaysia and other Southeast Asian countries would eventually succumb to a similar fate. Secondly, the Malaysian connection was manifested through Anglo-American co-operation over Vietnam. This co-operation led the British to support the U.S. war effort in Vietnam and to use Malaya to train South Vietnamese soldiers in counter-insurgency and police administration. The United States also adopted plans and strategies that the British had successfully employed in Malaya to fight communist insurgency during the "Emergency". These plans included the resettlement of villagers and the use of defoliant chemicals in the jungle. Britain and the United States also defined spheres of responsibility in Southeast Asia, with Britain being responsible for Malaya and the United States for Vietnam. Thirdly, the Malaysian connection was reflected in the Malayan and Malaysian governments' support for the U.S. war effort in Vietnam, even after independence from Britain in 1957. Besides continuing to train South Vietnamese officials, Malaya gave arms to Vietnam when the "Emergency" ended in 1960 and allowed U.S. servicemen based in Vietnam to come to Malaya for "Rest and Recreation" leave. Fourthly, Malaysia tried, with other countries, to bring the Vietnam War to a peaceful end. All four manifestations of the Malaysian connection revolved around one major theme — the containment of communism.

The Domino Theory

Early references to a link between the war against communism in Vietnam and Malayan security were made even before the "domino theory" was formally enunciated as such. For example, in 1950 Charles J. Shohan, the Officer-in-Charge of Economic Affairs, Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs in the U.S.

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State Department, alluded to the serious communist threat in both Indochina and Malaya, warning that:

> The nearby spectacle of approximately one-third of the Army of the French Republic fighting an expensive and precarious holding action, in limited areas of Indochina, leaves nothing for the Westerner to be smug about in Malaya.[1]

The same year, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, also stated that "the fall of Indochina will undoubtedly lead to the fall of the other mainland States of Southeast Asia".[2]

British officials serving in Malaya likewise believed that the defence of Indochina was vital to the defence of Malaya. For instance, Malcolm MacDonald, the British Commissioner-General in Southeast Asia, claimed that the communist threat to Malaya hinged upon the fate of Indochina and that "If Indochina holds, all holds". He noted: "Indochina is top priority in world economic and political situation and we would give it first place in all our considerations".[3] To General Sir John Harding, Commander-in-Chief of Britain's Far East Land Forces: "This whole thing in Malaya lies in the defence of the frontier of Indochina, and Malaya is very closely interlocked with this and cannot be separated".[4]

Both U.S. and British officials believed that Malaya's defence was connected to Indochina's because of the latter's strategic position in Southeast Asia. As MacDonald explained, Indochina was "the highway to the rest of Southeast Asia".[5] During World War II, when Vichy France gave Japan the right to use air bases in Indochina, Japan had used the country, particularly Vietnam, as a springboard to attack Siam, Singapore, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines.[6] Vietnam was thus viewed as the gateway to the domination of Southeast Asia. Not surprisingly, both Britain and the United States feared that a communist victory in Vietnam would also mean the eventual loss of neighbouring countries to communism.

Britain declared an "Emergency" in Malaya on 15 June 1948 after the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) had changed its policy from labour agitation to armed revolt. To achieve their long-range objective of controlling all Malaya, the communists planned to create economic chaos through sabotage, terrorism, and the cutting off of Malaya's main exports of rubber and tin. They then hoped to force the British out and take over the government.[7] The British authorities responded by placing the Federation of Malaya and Singapore under regulations that gave virtually unlimited powers to the government. Britain strengthened its position in Malaya by placing 20,000 police and troops in action by July 1948 and supplementing them with units from the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force.[8] Interestingly, there was an American response to the crisis: limited supplies of small arms and ammunition bought by private individuals were shipped to Malaya.[9]

Both the United States and Britain believed that the Malayan Communist Party, formed in the early 1920s by local Chinese with Comintern guidance, had been influenced to change its strategy to armed revolt as a result of a communist

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conference held in Calcutta in February 1948. At this conference, attended by representatives from Vietnam, Malaya, and other Southeast Asian countries, the call to armed revolt had reportedly been made. Because the Calcutta conference was followed by communist outbreaks in Malaya, Burma, and Indonesia, officials in Britain, the United States, and France concluded that emissaries had been sent out from Calcutta to stir up trouble throughout Southeast Asia. Although a detailed study of the Calcutta conference has since presented the counter-argument that no direct connection existed between that conference and the uprisings in Southeast Asia, in 1948 British and U.S. officials nevertheless perceived a connection.[10] Fears about the threat of communism increased when China fell under communist rule in 1949, when China and Russia signed a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance in 1950, and when the Korean War broke out in the same year.

There were several views about the direction of Malayan communism. Most U.S. officials believed that the Malayan communists were in league with the Kremlin.[11] Some British officials shared this view[12] but their counterparts in Malaya, particularly the Commissioner-General, Malcolm MacDonald, were of the opinion that the Malayan communists took their directions from China and not Moscow.[13] Others thought that directions came from India. For example, possibly because of the Calcutta conference, Tillman Durdin of the *New York Times* wrote that "the immediate foreign link of the Malayan rebels seems to be the communist party of India rather than the Mao Tse-Tung party of China".[14] Despite conflicting views about the orientation of Malayan communism, however, all sides agreed that it constituted a very serious problem. One book on the Emergency claims that before 1949 the MCP was influenced by both Russia and China; Russia supplied the ideology and China the practical model.[15] Moreover, there is evidence of links between the communist parties of Malaya and Indochina. One section of a secret document, captured by the French Expeditionary Corps in North Vietnam during the spring of 1952, disclosed:

> Not only is it our duty to aid the revolutionaries in Cambodia and Laos but we must also aid the revolutionary movements in the other countries of Southeast Asia, countries such as Malaya, Indonesia, Burma, etc.[16]

Thus, the communist threat was very real in Malaya as well as Indochina. To fight the communist threat in Southeast Asia, the United States had of necessity to co-operate with the colonial powers still in the region. With regard to Indochina, this meant massive aid to the French to help them deal with the Viet Minh. In Malaya, the United States had to co-operate with the British because of the prevalent belief that the defence of Indochina and Malaya were intrinsically connected. Indeed, influential Americans saw Malaya's defence as important also in relation to the security of other neighbouring countries. As noted by Major-General Malony of the Department of Defense in 1950: "Accordingly, it is important to strengthen the defense of Burma, Thailand, and Indochina in order to keep the threat of communist encroachments as far away from Malaya as possible".[17]

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The following year, during the Tripartite Military Talks between the United States, France, and Britain, dire predictions were made that if Indochina fell, Malaya probably would also because "the situation in peripheral countries has a direct bearing on the internal security situation in Malaya".[18]

The United States shared Britain's fear about Malaya falling to the communists, because Malaya's economic importance was relevant to Britain's effective participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This organization was formed in 1949 and mirrored Anglo-American co-operation in the common fight against communism. In 1950, Major-General Malony stressed the importance of Malaya: "Malaya is significant in this area because it is a large source of dollar earnings for the United Kingdom. These earnings, in turn, affect British capabilities within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization".[19] In 1951, a secret report by the Central Intelligence Agency also stressed the significance of Malaya for NATO:

> The loss of Malaya's dollar earnings would be a severe blow to the U.S. The consequent maladjustment that would be created in the strategic material and in the balance of payments position of the NATO countries could result in a serious setback in the rate of NATO rearmament.[20]

The United States thus watched Britain's handling of the Emergency in Malaya with great interest and concern. Britain's anti-communist effort was a tough and prolonged affair lasting from 1948 to 1960. In the first three years of the Emergency, the British were on the losing side. British losses during this first phase included the assassination in 1951 of Sir Henry Gurney, the High Commissioner. However, by the end of the sixth year of the Emergency, the British were showing signs of winning; more guerrillas had surrendered than remained in the jungle.[21] The second phase of the Emergency, from 1952–54, was directed by Gurney's successor, General Sir Gerald Templer, who served as both High Commissioner and Director of Operations. This period ended with the abortive peace talks at Baling in 1955 between Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Malayan Chief Minister, and Chin Peng, the communist leader. Subsequently, the third and final phase of the Emergency was essentially a mopping-up of the remaining communist terrorists. When the Emergency ended, the approximately five hundred terrorists that remained took refuge in the jungle on the Malayan-Thai border, which has been their base of operations ever since.[22]

Whereas the British, much to the satisfaction of the United States, managed successfully to handle the communist threat in Malaya, the French faced increasing problems in Indochina and their performance against growing Viet Minh resistance was dismal. Because the United States regarded the French effort as an anti-communist struggle, it increased its aid to France. By 1953, as the Indochina War raged between Viet Minh forces and French troops, the United States was paying 80 per cent of the cost of the French war effort.[23] Despite this aid, the Viet Minh attacked the French forces at Dien Bien Phu in April 1954 and succeeded in

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effectively defeating France the following month. On 9 April 1954, before the fall of Dien Bien Phu, President Eisenhower officially articulated what he called the "falling domino" principle. With regard to Indochina and the rest of Southeast Asia, he said:

> Finally, you have broader considerations that might follow what you would call the "falling domino" principle. You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is a certainty that it will go over very quickly.[24]

Like President Eisenhower, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles also believed in the domino principle and tried to convince the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, that the loss of Indochina to communism would lead to the same happening in Thailand, Malaya, Burma, and Indonesia.[25]

After the fall of Dien Bien Phu, the United States replaced the French in Indochina and embroiled itself in what became known as the Second Indochina or Vietnam War. Allusions to the "domino theory" continued. For example, in September 1963, President Kennedy insisted in a television interview that the United States would not withdraw its troops from Vietnam, noting that "if South Vietnam went", this would lead "to a guerrilla assault on Malaysia".[26] In March 1964, when former U.S. Vice-President Richard Nixon visited Malaysia, he also said that Malaysia had a vital stake in what was happening in South Vietnam and warned that the collapse of that country under communist pressure would convert the country into "a dagger aimed at the heart of Malaysia".[27] Then, in November 1964, the National Security Council (NSC) discussed the "domino theory" and pointed out that mainland Southeast Asia might fall to communist domination if South Vietnam did so. The NSC also warned that "if either Thailand or Malaysia were lost, or went badly sour in any way, then the rot would be in real danger of spreading all over mainland Southeast Asia".[28]

Meanwhile, to counter the communist threat in Vietnam, there was considerable Anglo-American co-operation. Part of this co-operation involved the Malayan connection. For instance, in 1960 when the Emergency ended, Britain encouraged Malaya to hand over some armoured vehicles and other military equipment to the South Vietnamese government.[29] Furthermore, Britain helped the U.S. war effort in Vietnam by allowing American, Vietnamese and Australian soldiers to take counter-insurgency courses at the British Jungle Warfare Training School in Malaya.[30] Between 1961 and 1966, more than 3,000 South Vietnamese officers were trained in anti-guerrilla operations.[31] South Vietnamese officers were also trained in police administration.

Anglo-American co-operation involving Malaya during the Vietnam War operated in other ways as well. For instance, after 1963 when Malaya joined with Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak to form Malaysia, the United States and Britain had a tacit agreement about defence arrangements in Southeast Asia.[32] The then U.S. Ambassador to Malaysia, Charles F. Baldwin, later confirmed the existence of such a trade-off:

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> There was a kind of tacit understanding . . . really an unwritten agreement . . . that the United States was carrying in Vietnam all the burden with respect to Southeast Asia that we should carry at the time, and that Britain would consider the protection of the Malaysian area a British responsibility. That was clearly understood in London, Washington, and in Kuala Lumpur.[33]

Baldwin was probably referring to the Home-Johnson Agreement of February 1964 which had divided Southeast Asia into respective American and British "spheres of responsibility".[34] Britain assumed responsibility for the defence of the new Malaysian federation as U.S. involvement in Vietnam meant that the United States was already "carrying a disproportionate share of the burden of aid to Southeast Asia".[35]

This tacit understanding was tested during Indonesia's Confrontation against Malaysia from 1963 to 1966 when Britain was heavily involved in protecting the federation. Although the U.S. Government feared that it would have to face another war in Southeast Asia, besides that in Vietnam,[36] fortunately both the United States and Britain were able to keep to their specific spheres of responsibility. Because of Britain's heavy responsibilities in Malaysia, the United States did not expect Britain to send troops to Vietnam. Britain did, however, support the South Vietnamese Government with military supplies and advice.

The Malayan Model and Counter-insurgency in Vietnam

By the early 1960s, because the British had succeeded in bringing the Malayan Emergency to a close in 1960, Malaya served as an example that communist insurgency could be defeated. In fact, Malaya came to be regarded as a model of success for the United States to emulate in Vietnam. Although earlier American experiences against communism in Greece, Iran, Guatemala, and the Philippines also served as relevant examples,[37] the British experience in Malaya was especially relevant because of its proximity in distance and in time and because of its special nature, involving guerrilla warfare in the jungle. As noted by a *United Press International* correspondent, LeRoy Hansen, in 1964:

> Most Americans also see in Malaysia living proof [that] communist guerrillas, such as those the U.S. servicemen are facing in South Vietnam, can be defeated . . . the very fact that once powerful communist forces were drawn from the Malayan jungle holds a promise for the future of Vietnam.[38]

Not surprisingly, therefore, the United States decided to adopt some of the tactics employed by the British authorities in Malaya to fight communist insurgency. One major strategy that was largely copied from the British was the plan to resettle villagers so as to control their activities and prevent them from giving food and other supplies to the communists. In Malaya, the British resettled Chinese villagers in "New Villages" to provide them with security on the one hand and to deprive the communists of the villagers' support and protection on the other.[39]

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These villagers were immigrant Chinese whose loyalty was suspect as the Malayan communist movement was about 90 per cent Chinese, with very few Indian and Malay members.[40]

Because British counter-insurgency experts had been instrumental in bringing the Emergency to a successful conclusion in Malaya, the U.S. Government decided to engage a British Advisory Mission led by Sir Robert Thompson to help the South Vietnamese government launch its resettlement programme. Sir Robert arrived in South Vietnam in September 1961 and was influential in developing the strategic hamlet programme (launched in February 1962) which involved moving peasants to fortified villages.

Unfortunately, the strategic hamlet plan was not as successful in Vietnam as it had been in Malaya. In the first place, the analogy that what had worked in Malaya would work in Vietnam proved to be fallacious. In Malaya, the resettled villagers were immigrant Chinese whereas in Vietnam they were indigenous people with strong roots in the soil.[41] Moreover, South Vietnam lacked an efficient police network to help in the resettlement process and in the sustained maintenance of law and order in the new villages. The British had succeeded in fighting the communists in Malaya in large part because of an effective police system.[42] Furthermore, the strategic hamlet plan was not carried out in as orderly a fashion as in Malaya, in spite of Thompson's advice about proceeding in stages, from "white" to "grey" and then to "black" areas. Instead, as Donald Wise noted:

> Diem and the Americans, however, flung new hamlets throughout the South as haphazardly as a cook tipping raisins and plums into a pudding and the Vietcong ate them up easily one by one.[43]

The strategic hamlet programme exemplified Anglo-American co-operation over the Vietnam War, but the Malayan connection in Anglo-American co-operation in Vietnam was also reflected in the use of defoliant chemicals by the United States during the war. From the British experience in Malaya, the United States received advice on how to conduct chemical warfare in the jungles of Vietnam. For example, during the Vietnam War there was reportedly much Anglo-American co-operation regarding the use of substances invented and perfected at the British Government's Chemical Defence Research Establishment at Porton Down. The British Government was secretive about this help and Prime Minister Harold Wilson's Minister of Defence, Denis Healey, even tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to deny such aid in the House of Commons. This Malayan connection with the Vietnam War was officially revealed in early 1984 when British Government records, released under a thirty-year secrecy rule, disclosed that much of the herbicide that Britain sprayed on Malayan crops during the campaign against communist guerrillas in the early 1950s was almost identical to the deadly "Agent Orange" a defoliant widely used during the Vietnam War. Both the British herbicide and "Agent Orange" contain the deadly contaminant dioxin.[44]

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Vietnam and the Security of Malaysia

During the Vietnam War, the United States viewed its war effort as aid to Malaysia as well. As a State Department report explained:

> The United States has exceptionally heavy commitments in Vietnam and elsewhere in Asia, where we are expanding our resources to defend the independence of free nations. These efforts represent a real contribution to the security of Malaysia.[45]

Malaysian leaders agreed with this view. The then Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak said, in response to this statement: "American aid to South Vietnam, another country like Malaysia which is fighting a life-and-death battle against communists, is appreciated by us".[46] Malaysian officials, like their U.S. counterparts, subscribed to the "domino theory" and viewed the American role in Vietnam as an attempt to help both countries withstand the threat of communism.[47]

In April 1965, the then Malaysian Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, expressed total support for U.S. policy in Vietnam. He even said, "All the bombings by the Americans on military installations and communications, are, I consider, justified because they are being used by the Viet Cong to attack South Vietnam".[48] As expressions of Malaysia's support for America's role in Vietnam, Malaysia continued to train South Vietnamese officers in counter-insurgency and police administration, measures begun by the British. Malaysia also allowed U.S. combat troops in Vietnam to use Malaysia as a leave base for "Rest and Recreation".[49] This gesture was, of course, very much appreciated by the United States.[50] Malaysia, however, declined to send a contingent of soldiers to help in the American war effort in Vietnam although the U.S. Government had approached it to do so.[51]

Malaysia was wary about sending troops to South Vietnam because it did not want to align openly with the United States in the Vietnam War. This response, in turn, was possibly due to the quite critical unofficial Malaysian views, in non-government circles, of U.S. participation in the Vietnam War. For example, Professor Wang Gung-Wu, the then Head of the History Department at the University of Malaya, expressed serious doubts about the U.S. involvement in Vietnam:

> United States power on the side of anti-communism in Southeast Asia may well confirm the "domino theory". The longer the United States believes that the Southeast Asian countries cannot help themselves, the more dependent it will expect these countries to be on American support and the more likely it becomes that they cannot do without that power if they wish to survive.[52]

Anti-War Sentiment in Malaysia

Many students at the University of Malaya also opposed the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. During a welfare carnival procession organized by the University

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Students Union, some students shouted "Stop the Vietnam War and go home" when passing the U.S. Embassy.[53] Moreover, the Muslim College Students' Union called on the United States to stop the bombing of North Vietnam and to look at the Vietnam issue from a humanitarian rather than a political angle.[54] Furthermore, the Penang division of the Labour Party of Malaya criticized the Malaysian Government for having offered Penang for use as a leave base for U.S. troops. In March 1966, members of the Labour Party put up anti-American posters with the words "Yankee go home" to protest the visit to Penang of four U.S. destroyers.[55] When the Labour Party criticized the State Government, the Chief Minister of Penang, Dato Wong Pow Nee, claimed that the State Government had agreed to the visits because they would promote tourism.[56] This led to outcries that the U.S. servicemen were not tourists but military personnel.[57] There was also apprehension in Malaysia about the undesirable social effects of such visits, with the result that the Malaysian Government soon rescinded its earlier decision.[58]

When William Bundy, the then Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs arrived for talks with the Malaysian Government in March 1966, more than 200 Malaysians stoned the building housing the United States Embassy in Kuala Lumpur to demonstrate against both the visit and U.S. participation in the Vietnam War. The demonstrators carried placards reading "Hang the war criminal", "Out, Bundy!", and "Down with U.S. imperialists", and damaged the First National City Bank of New York office on the ground floor of the Embassy building. The Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, condemned the anti-U.S. demonstration as "the act of hooligans",[59] and said that he would apologize to the U.S. Government.

Anti-U.S. demonstrations broke out again when President Lyndon Baines Johnson and Mrs Johnson paid an official visit to Malaysia in October 1966 as part of the U.S. leader's six-nation Pacific and Far East tour. This was the first visit to the country by a U.S. President. Before Johnson's arrival, demonstrations occurred in various towns in Malaysia. In Kuala Lumpur, a crowd of 500 demonstrated against the President's visit and U.S. intervention in Vietnam. The demonstrators gathered outside the USIS building in the capital and fought with the police, resulting in one death and 127 arrests. Despite the demonstrations, the President flew in to a tumultous airport welcome by 20,000 Malaysians.[60] During his short stay in Malaysia, President Johnson announced concessions over control of releases from rubber and tin stockpiles, a move that pleased Malaysia as the stockpiles had been a source of irritation in U.S.-Malaysian relations.

Malaysian Peace Efforts

In the meantime, Malaysia helped to search for ways to bring the Vietnam War to an end. At the three-nation Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) Conference held in Bangkok in early August 1966, Malaysia, with Thailand and the Philippines, appealed for an end to the Vietnam War and proposed an All-Asia Peace Conference in Asia. Communist China and North Vietnam, however, rejected invitations to attend the proposed Conference. At a meeting of the United Nations

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Assembly in September 1966, ASA made another appeal for joint Asian action to end the Vietnam War.[61]

These efforts by ASA, however, did not bear fruit. Therefore, in May 1970 at the meeting of the foreign ministers of twelve Asian nations in Jakarta, another call was made to convene a new international conference to end the conflict in Indochina. By then, trouble had increased in Cambodia and the foreign ministers also recommended the reactivation of the International Control Commission (ICC) in that country. A "task force" was set up, made up of the foreign ministers of Japan, Malaysia, and Indonesia, to start immediate talks with Britain and the Soviet Union (the co-chairmen of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina) to promote the new international peace conference and to reactivate the ICC. The task force was also told to liaise with United Nations Secretary-General U Thant to encourage U.N. help to restore peace.[62] The task force's efforts, however, were also unsuccessful.[63]

While Malaysia's efforts to help resolve the Vietnam conflict were repeatedly thwarted, these efforts showed that Malaysia was becoming more open and vocal in its support for South Vietnam. In 1964, Malaysia was the only Southeast Asian country to respond to the U.S. appeal for non-military assistance to South Vietnam.[64] Another sign of Malaysia's support was mirrored in its participation at a rally at the Atlantic Stadium in Georgia, USA, in February 1966 to endorse U.S. policy in Vietnam. This rally was part of a movement known as "Affirmation: Vietnam" started in December 1965 among some American college students. High-level officials from Malaysia, Thailand, Korea and other nations attended the rally. Malaysia showed further support for South Vietnam by joining several other nations, including Thailand, Taiwan and the Philippines, to express "sympathy" for the government and people of the Republic of Vietnam in their firm stand to protect their independence and sovereignty.[65]

In the late 1960s, Malaysia maintained its support for the U.S. war effort in Vietnam by continuing to train South Vietnamese officials in counter-insurgency and police administration. Malaysia, however, still declined to send a contingent of soldiers to South Vietnam, because it did not wish to align too openly with the United States and its policies. Nevertheless, Malaysian leaders continued to regard the Vietnam War as "an immediate and serious threat to the peace, progress and stability of the region".[66] As in earlier years, U.S. involvement in Vietnam was considered a major contribution to the security of Malaysia and other Southeast Asian countries.[67] For example, in January 1970, during a visit by U.S. Vice-President Spiro Agnew, the Malaysian Premier, Tunku Abdul Rahman, declared that it was "a matter of great encouragement to us to get the assurance from the President [Nixon], and now from you, Mr Vice-President, that we can expect help in the advent of unprovoked aggression by enemies from without who have sinister designs against us".[68]

Meanwhile, ostensibly mainly for economic and socio-cultural reasons, Malaysia had joined Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines to form the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in August 1967. In 1971,

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through Malaysia's initiative, ASEAN proposed the concept of Southeast Asia as a "Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality", commonly referred to as ZOPFAN. According to the then Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tun Dr Ismail bin Abdul Rahman, the policy of neutralization was prompted by the Vietnam War and by fears about American and British withdrawal from Southeast Asia.[69] The then Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tun Abdul Razak, also referred to the need for a policy of neutralization as "the lesson of the Vietnam War".[70]

Malaysia's growing concern over the Vietnam War led it to join Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand to conclude the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, in Kuala Lumpur on 15 February 1973.[71] The following month, the Government of Malaysia and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (that is, North Vietnam) decided to establish diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level as from 30 March 1973.[72] Malaysia expressed willingness to participate in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Vietnam especially in the field of rural development.[73] But Malaysia continued to hope that the Vietnam War would be resolved peacefully and that the democratic (anti-communist) forces would emerge triumphant.

After the Vietnam War

When the Vietnam War finally ended with the fall of Saigon to the communists in April 1975, Malaysia feared that the United States would respond to its defeat by withdrawing from Asia. Particularly important was the fact that ASEAN's trade with the United States had grown rapidly: by 1981 it had emerged as America's fifth largest trading partner.[74] The United States, however, claimed that it had no intention of turning its back on Asia.[75]

Although the Vietnam War ended in 1975, the Malaysian connection with that war did not end, because of the flow of Indochinese refugees to Malaysia. These refugees came from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Those that fled by sea, the "boat people", first made their appearance in mid-1975. Many boatloads of refugees arrived in Malaysia at the east coast states of Kelantan and Trengganu.[76] Malaysia was called upon to provide humanitarian help by giving temporary asylum and responded by setting up a refugee camp off the shore of Trengganu, at Pulau Bidong, an island location that minimized the visibility of the refugee population.[77]

In helping the Indochinese refugees, the Malaysian Government faced a dilemma in that while wanting to assist for humanitarian reasons it was also wary about a "residual problem". The country already had a large Chinese population (35 per cent Chinese compared with 47 per cent Malay in 1979) and the government viewed the large influx of refugees as potentially dangerous to the already delicate Malay-Chinese balance in Malaysia.[78] Unfortunately, the Malays tended to view all the Vietnamese "boat people" as Chinese, although in fact only two-thirds of them were ethnic Chinese.[79] These refugees heightened Malay fears over the "Chinese threat" and that the New Economic Policy, intended to help the Malays gain control of a larger share in the economy, would not work. The Malaysian Govern-

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ment was especially fearful of the social and political costs of providing asylum for the refugees. The economic costs were less worrying.[80] Not surprisingly, violent incidents did break out between the local inhabitants and the Vietnamese refugees. These incidents took place mainly in Kelantan and Trengganu, the heartland of Malay nationalism.[81]

In 1979, the problem of the Vietnamese refugees reached crisis point when their numbers in Malaysia rose to 70,000, with 40,000 crammed onto Pulau Bidong. The Malaysian Government became alarmed and threatened to stop accepting refugees. Malaysian authorities began publicly to deny landing permission for large ships carrying refugees and even began to push back to sea many seaworthy boats after giving them provisions.[82] Malaysia's tough stand drew world-wide attention in June 1979 when the then Deputy Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir Mohamad, was said to have remarked that Malaysia would shoot refugees who attempted to land in the country. Although he later claimed he had been misquoted, the statement led to a quick reduction in Vietnamese refugees landing in Malaysia.[83] Moreover, the international community speeded up its resettlement of refugees already in Malaysia.[84]

Even though the Malaysian Government refused to give permanent asylum to the Vietnamese refugees, it did quietly grant this to Cambodian refugees who were Muslims. By August 1979, Malaysia had granted permanent asylum to 1,500 Cambodian Muslims.[85] As of July 1986, the number of Cambodian Muslims who had been granted asylum in Malaysia had risen to 7,000.[86] As the situation in Indochina is still unstable, the flow of refugees to Malaysia has not stopped, although the numbers have decreased. There were still about 6,000 Indochinese refugees in Malaysia in 1986, awaiting resettlement in other countries.[87]

In conclusion, Malaysia had a long connection with the Vietnam War. This connection revolved around the "containment" thesis. The ties that connected Malaysia with the Vietnam War included the "domino theory" and close Anglo-American co-operation throughout the war over ways to combat the communist threat in Vietnam. After independence, the Malaysian Government showed its support for South Vietnam by giving it military equipment when the Emergency ended; by continuing to train South Vietnamese officials in counter-insurgency and police administration; by allowing U.S. military personnel to visit Malaysia for their "Rest and Recreation" leave; and by supporting U.S. policy in Vietnam. Malaysia also tried, with other nations, unsuccessfully, to help bring the Vietnam War to a peaceful conclusion. Perhaps the Malaysian connection with the Vietnam War has not been sufficiently emphasized because that war resulted in defeat for the United States. Nevertheless, the end of the Vietnam War did not mean the end of the Malaysian connection because of the flow of refugees to Malaysia. The refugees were still arriving in 1987, although in smaller numbers, so the Malaysian connection with the Vietnam War continues.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Crisis in the Philippines: The Marcos Era and Beyond. Edited by John Bresnan. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986. 267 pp.

As the editor, John Bresnan, indicates in his Preface, this book attempts to do three things: to describe the rise and fall of Ferdinand Marcos; to assess the impact of his regime on the political and social life of the Philippine people; and to consider the implications of this experience for the United States. The book was commissioned by the Asia Society in New York in the fall of 1983, following the assassination of Philippine opposition leader Benigno Aquino, Jr. Its publication was overtaken by the February 1986 "snap election" called by Marcos, which started an unusual chain of events that culminated in the dramatic overthrow of his regime in what is now enshrined in Philippine history as the "People Power Revolution of 1986".

The nine articles by reputable authors comprising the book are quite thorough and almost exhaustive. By themselves they are nearly complete accounts of the various aspects of the Philippine situation in the period covered. But collectively, they do not quite add up to a coherent book. Neither do they address adequately the three objectives mentioned above. Although many of the articles touch on the political career of Marcos, for instance, there is really no analysis of his "rise and fall". This could have included his early experience as a young warlord politician in his native Ilocos Norte, with its ethos of violence and corruption which he would later bring to the presidency of the country. Such an analysis could also have probed Marcos's obsession with power, the "fire that drove him", which isolated him from reality and consumed him in the end.

While that essential part is lacking in the book, there is an abundance of certain topics, which could have been cut down for balance. For instance, almost a quarter of the book is devoted to two long historical articles by well-known American specialists on Philippine history, Theodore Friend and David Joel Steinberg. A historical background is always necessary, but since this is a book on the crisis of the Marcos era, these two articles could have been more focused, instead of giving encapsulated histories of the entire country, covering the whole gamut from pre-Christian times through the "mestizo-shaped culture" and "American compadre colonialism" to the present. Friend's article on Philippine-American "tensions" in Philippine history is not sharp enough. It is more of a discussion of Filipino co-operation with or capitulation to American sovereignty and the development of a political culture with a "peculiar amalgam of Filipino and American elements". There is no mention of the continuing social unrest that characterized much of the American period, the various uprisings like the Sakdal that resisted American colonial rule, the Filipino nationalist arguments against such impositions as "free trade" as early as 1910, and the continued presence of the American bases on Philippine territory. Neither is there discussion of other "tensions" or "irritants", such as the "new Filipino nationalism" of the

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1960s, nor the militant activism of students and other disaffected elements in society, which eventually triggered the declaration of martial law. Many of the roots of that activism can be traced to the continued American military presence in the country and its stranglehold on the Philippine economy. However, William Barnds' last chapter on "Political and Security Relations" touches on some of these critical points. This brings up what probably is the major flaw of the book: disjointedness and lack of organization, which is primarily an editorial responsibility.

If the editor had organized the articles better, he could have spotted the gaps. The articles by Friend, Steinberg, Estanislao and Barnds could have been grouped together under the subtitle of "Philippine History and Philippine-American Relations". The editor would then have noticed that this section was top-heavy, and could have tightened it up to prepare the reader for the supposed focus of the book — the Marcos era.

The second section, logically, would have been the article by Wilfredo Arce and Ricardo Abad on the "Social Situation". Again, the editor would have seen that this portion was too thin and probably needed another couple of articles to present and analyse the basic issues of poverty, inequality, social unrest, the rural sector, and development, in so far as they were contributing to the deterioration of society during the Marcos dictatorship.

The third logical grouping would have consisted of the articles by Lela Noble, Carl Lande and Carolina Hernandez on the antecedents and dimensions of the political crisis under Marcos. Similarly, this section could have been pulled together more tightly: there is much overlap, and some important developments are missing. For instance, I could not find even brief discussions of the Muslim problem or the tribal and indigenous minorities. I am surprised that Lela Noble, who has done excellent studies on the Moro National Liberation Front and other aspects of the Muslim question, has not included any of that in her broad essay on "Politics in the Marcos Era". Likewise, Carolina Hernandez, who has also written excellent works on the Philippine military, has not incorporated much of that expertise in her essay on "Reconstituting the Political Order". It was left to Carl Lande to comment, at times superficially, on a wide range of complex topics — the Aquino assassination, the middle and upper classes, the Catholic Church, the political opposition, the communists, the military, the students, elections, and finally, Marcos. There is a great deal of unevenness in this subgrouping.

The fourth component of the book would have been a thorough analysis of the economic crisis which hastened the political demise of the Marcos dictatorship. Here, a perceptive editor would have sensed that one or two articles on the economy, preferably written by nationalist or non-mainstream economists, would have complemented or supplemented Bernardo Villegas' analysis. Harvard-trained Villegas, who also heads the Center for Research and Communication, a sort of Rand Corporation think-tank, articulates the mainstream economic view, which is criticized by the Left and other nationalist groups for its bias towards agriculture, privatization, the participation of the World Bank and other financial institutions in the Philippine economy, and a model of development based on Western capitalist principles and practices.

Finally, a fifth section could have been devoted to assessing the political survival of the successor Aquino government, particularly the difficult problems of "re-democratization". The emergence of Cory Aquino as a tremendously popular leader of 54 million Filipinos is a fascinating story by itself, which merits a serious study. No social scientist specializing on the Philippine political scene, no matter how skilful, was able to predict this phenomenon, even remotely. This portion of the book would have been in keeping with the "Beyond" part of its subtitle ("The Marcos Era and Beyond"). This vital part, however, is

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missing and only Carolina Hernandez' article addresses some of the major issues confronting the Aquino government, such as economic recovery, the new Constitution, the role of political parties, "people power", and "the future of the democratic ethic". Ideally, an assessment of the Left (CPP, NPA, NDF, and so on) and the various cause-oriented groups, and the military establishment under the new administration would have been in order.

Fortunately again, the article by Barnds contains some meaty exploration of the future issues facing the United States in its relations with the Philippines. Barnds' advice is that the basic U.S. approach to the Philippine situation should be to keep a low profile. "The same approach should govern the U.S. stance on the issue of strategy and tactics — for negotiating with — and fighting — the NPA. More U.S. military assistance and training for Philippine military forces are desirable, but we must recognize that U.S. involvement beyond such measures probably would be counterproductive" (p. 251). I emphasize this because, contrary to Barnds' suggestion, the United States has had a high profile in the Philippines since Aquino assumed power. U.S. officials could not resist the temptation to pat Cory on the back every time they liked what she was doing, as though she was their "patsy". Old habits die hard but the United States has to learn to deal professionally and equitably with the Philippines, instead of looking at Cory Aquino as a "little brown sister".

Some errors of fact, and probably of judgment too, may also be pointed out. Carl Lande's characterization of the "communist movement" that "the general public knows" may be erroneous. He lists the movement as consisting of "the New People's Army (NPA), its noncombatant political counterpart, the National Democratic Front (NDF), and the more secretive body which appears to control them both: the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) [sic]" (p. 129.)

If one goes through the literature on the Left, or talk to people who are knowledgeable concerning the movement, there is really no doubt about who is controlling whom. The CPP and its military arm, the NPA, are the leading members of the NDF, usually described as an umbrella organization composed of other progressive and left-of-centre groups. It has put forward a twelve-point political programme. It was the NDF which appeared to be a "more secretive" body during the Marcos years. Although clandestine, the CPP and the NPA had a much higher profile, having been in the forefront of the struggle. They were also more organized and visible at the grass-roots. The leaders of the CPP/NPA, such as Jose Maria Sison and "Kumander" Dante were quite well known. The NDF-types on the other hand, were not generally well known. And to many people, it was not clear what the relationship of the CPP/NPA and the NDF was, but "control" is probably not the term to characterize it. It was not as though there was some kind of a power struggle going on to gain control of the movement.

Another point that Lande brings up is debatable. He says "The Communist Party of the Philippines and its various front organizations also played no part in the Aquino-Laurel victory. Indeed, Mrs Aquino declined their offers to help" (p. 144). This was an improbable scenario and Lande should have checked the facts first. The CPP did not offer Cory Aquino their help, so such an offer could not have been refused. They decided, after months of long and painstaking internal debate, to boycott the 1986 "snap election" on the grounds that it was just another manifestation of "U.S. imperialism". Thus, the CPP was "marginalized" and missed a chance to play a major role in the "people power" revolution that toppled Marcos. Realizing their mistake, the CPP in its own mouthpiece, *Ang Bayan*, issued a "rectification" statement, a sort of self-criticism for its flawed stand in boycotting the election. According to University of the Philippines professor, Francisco Nemenzo, the CPP

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leadership miscalculated the intentions of "U.S. imperialism", failed to perceive and appreciate the "contradictions" in the government's armed forces, erred in reading the nature of the opposition to Marcos, and underestimated the people's readiness to go beyond electoral politics (hence "people power") should Marcos cheat in the elections.

Even if the CPP had offered their support to Cory Aquino, it was more than likely that she would have accepted the offer, rather than refused, as Lande contends. After all, many of the "cause-oriented" groups that supported her were not really that far apart from the CPP on several of the issues they were fighting for, particularly concerning the Marcos dictatorship.

Villegas' explanations of the "crony capitalism" phenomenon, the agricultural monopolies, and the staggering foreign debt of the Marcos regime are either weak or incomplete. For example, "It is very likely that they [the cronies] were more interested in enriching themselves . . ." (p. 164) is an understatement. The Marcoses, particularly Imelda, and their cronies flaunted their wealth, and corruption in high places was flagrant. It was not just "likely", but blatant. They skimmed off not just the "usual ten per cent" but even more considerable amounts from the numerous multimillion dollar loans that the World Bank and other international institutions kept providing to the regime. Military, economic, and other forms of international assistance were diverted to Swiss banks and other repositories of the private fortunes of Marcos and his inner circle. Bastions of corruption in the regime, such as the Ministry of Human Settlements, which Imelda Marcos headed, siphoned off government loans and resources to private companies that they themselves controlled. Massive "losses" in state corporations were manipulated to a point where it was more than likely that they were being pocketed by a few individuals. The cronies faltered one by one in their business "misadventures" but the government repeatedly bailed them out, using precious foreign exchange and funds intended for social services, housing, and other vital functions. These practices contributed significantly to the near collapse of the economy, yet Villegas' explanations emphasize the increases in government borrowings, the oil shock in 1979 and the subsequent international recession, "missed opportunities", higher interest rates, and other "economic" factors that could not have fully accounted for the economic crisis under Marcos. Villegas' "sanguine view of the Philippines" does not appear to be that sanguine either because it is premised on the usual hope on "agribusiness" development. There is no mention of any kind of industrialization policy, which many of the country's economists say would alleviate some of the major ills of the Philippine economy.

Another glaring omission in this book, which intended to explain the ramifications of the Marcos disaster, is a discussion of the country's militarization and its consequence — the gross violations of the human and civil rights of Filipinos on a scale never experienced before. The repression escalated with each year of the regime. The acquisition of too much power made the military establishment not only arrogant but brutal. A combination of this political repression and economic deprivation for a large segment of the population no doubt led to the radicalization of the countryside. It is really unfortunate that the book analysing the Marcos era should overlook the scale and scope of human repression that the regime unleashed on its own people.

Finally, the growth of the "state technocracy" under Marcos should have merited some serious examination. For the first time in the Philippines' political history, Western-trained technocrats were put in charge of state economic planning and development. The number of state enterprises rose from no more than 10 before martial law to more than 300 by 1984. Why the country suffered its worst economic crisis under their direction is a study that could produce startling findings. Were the technocrats politically naive or were they in

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collusion with the "plunderers" of the regime? It was strange that most of them opted to stick it out with the regime even when they were constantly overruled or ignored by the political warlords. Because of their honest backgrounds and sophisticated academic training, the technocrats were expected by most Filipinos to have had some self-respect instead of remaining apologists for the regime to the bitter end.

In any case, the book is a welcome addition to the increasing literature on the Marcos years. One only wishes, however, that it was better edited and organized more coherently because there is much substance and analysis in the individual articles. This plus the addition of the suggestions above could have made this book a solid postscript to the Marcos era.

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ISIS Research Notes: Hans H. Indorf, *Strategies for Small-State Survival* (1985, 54pp); Muthiah Alagappa, *US-ASEAN Security Co-operation: Limits and Possibilities* (1986, 31pp); Mohamed Noordin Sopiee, *The Russian Threat: Between Alarm and Complacency* (1985, 15pp).

ISIS ASEAN Series: Chin Kin Wah and Narciso G. Reyes, *Two Views on Summit Three* (1986, 39pp); J.N. Mak, *Directions for Greater Defence Cooperation* (1986, 32pp); Sukhumbhand Paribatra, *Kampuchea without Delusion* (1986, 27pp); J. Soedjati Djiwandono, *Southeast Asia as a Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone* (1986, 7pp).

ISIS Seminar Papers: Robert C. Horn, *The Soviet Threat in Southeast Asia: Illusion or Reality?* (1985, 16pp); Michael Yahuda, *The China Threat* (1986, 41pp); J.R. Pouvatchy, *The Vietnamisation of Cambodia* (1986, 14pp).

As a recent study* by John Chipman of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) emphasizes, in recent years the diffusion of economic and military power to the Third World has been matched by the proliferation of institutes and centres concerned with the analysis of local and regional strategic and political issues. This logical development should be welcomed. The London-based IISS and its European and North American cohorts have, unsurprisingly, generally failed to break out of their NATO-oriented "mind-set", notwithstanding recent efforts by the IISS to broaden the scope of its "regional" studies. The North Atlantic remains the focus of these Institutes' interests, with Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Latin America cast in the roles of peripheral "regions".

All the ASEAN countries (except Brunei) now have strategic studies centres of one sort or another: one of the more recently established is the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), Malaysia, in Kuala Lumpur. Like most such institutes, ISIS has started its own publications programme and by the end of 1986 it had produced a score or more of monographs in three series: ISIS Research Notes; ISIS ASEAN Series; and ISIS Seminar Papers. The ten titles reviewed here are all concerned with international security issues; several others have dealt with domestic politics and economic matters. One wonders

*John Chipman, *Survey of International Relations Institutes in the Developing World* (London: IISS, 1987).

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why ISIS chose to adopt the somewhat confusing technique of dividing its publications between different series, each of which includes papers covering a range of strategic and international issues and varying greatly in length and level of analysis. Surely a more sensible arrangement would have been to allocate the various papers to a "Security Series", an "Economics Series", and so on.

Despite their diversity, a common feature of many of the ISIS monographs is that they are essentially argumentative "think-pieces" on contemporary issues rather than closely researched, dispassionate analyses. Three of the papers under review (one from each series) have no footnotes or references whatsoever, but are nevertheless interesting enough. In a rare attempt to look at arms control in a Southeast Asian context, J. Soedjati Djiwandono argues the case for the declaration of the region as a "Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone" (NWFZ). Unfortunately, Soedjati fails to present a convincing rationale for a NWFZ, apart from conveying a vague notion that the very act of declaring such a Zone might help to sustain ASEAN'S political momentum in the face of a continuing failure to resolve the Cambodian problem. Mohamed Noordin Sopiee's monograph on *The Russian Threat* is really more an extended editorial than a Research Note; nevertheless, it is a well-balanced and sensitive piece. Robert C. Horn's Seminar Paper on the same topic is similarly judicious, and his conclusion that "Moscow is unlikely to reduce its attempts at establishing influence . . . in Southeast Asia" reads well in the light of Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech of 28 July 1986.

In contrast to the two papers on the Soviet threat, Michael Yahuda's Seminar Paper on *The China Threat* is a fairly substantial monograph. Although Yahuda does not say anything startlingly new, his careful analysis of the relationship between the People's Republic of China and the ASEAN states does contain some refreshing insights, especially his concluding reflection that "it may be more helpful to think of China as a problem for rather than as a threat to Southeast Asia".

Two of the ISIS monographs look at Vietnam's relationship with Cambodia, but adopt very different approaches to the issue. J.R. Pouvatchy projects an unashamedly partisan line, claiming that Cambodia is being "Vietnamised" in a sense broader than the presence of substantial Vietnamese military forces in the country. According to Pouvatchy, Hanoi has also tampered, to its own advantage, with the delineation of the Cambodian-Vietnamese border, has encouraged the settlement of hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese in Cambodia, and has posted Vietnamese advisers throughout the Cambodian civil service. This "Vietnamisation" allegedly also has an economic dimension: according to Pouvatchy, ethnic Vietnamese dominate the distribution of fish and rice, and "Cambodian provinces are linked in sister province arrangements which demand that they forward part of their agricultural production to overpopulated areas in Vietnam". But Pouvatchy does not claim that this "Vietnamisation" is a novel phenomenon: on the contrary, he traces its historical origins as far back as the eighteenth century, with the invasion at the end of 1978 as merely the latest stage in an apparently inexorable Vietnamese quest for *lebensraum*. This is a sobering argument, but perhaps Pouvatchy is overly pessimistic in expressing the fear that "Cambodia's Vietnamisation will soon be completed". It could just as plausibly be argued that, even if Hanoi and the Heng Samrin regime succeed in defeating the resistance coalition (which is by no means a foregone conclusion), Cambodia would have as much chance of retaining its national individuality in relation to Vietnam as Poland has had in relation to the Soviet Union over the last forty years. Incidentally, Pouvatchy's argument is weakened by his failure to provide authoritative sources for most of his claims regarding recent Vietnamese immigration into Cambodia.

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Sukhumbhand Paribatra's ASEAN Series paper is essentially a critique of ASEAN policy towards the Cambodian problem, coupled with a suggestion for an alternative policy. Sukhumbhand's argument that ASEAN should reappraise the assumptions underlying its Cambodian policy, and as a result effectively moderate its goals, is not likely to meet with approval in several of the region's foreign ministries. But his suggestions are by no means outrageously impracticable, and are representative of a growing "alternative conventional wisdom". While clearly not a "hawk" in his attitude towards the Cambodian issue, Sukhumbhand is apparently more an "owl" than a "dove".

Some critics of ASEAN's position on the Cambodian problem have, as Chin Kin Wah points out in his essay on "The Question of a Third ASEAN Summit" in *Two Views on Summit Three*, wondered whether there is a danger of the Association "becoming a one-issue organisation". The possibility of ASEAN losing sight "of the other pressing demands for intra-regional resilience and domestic welfare through functional co-operation", coupled with "the challenges posed by the economic downturn", the need to arrest "institutional drift" within the Association, the instability in the Philippines, and the relatively recent accession of Brunei to ASEAN membership, collectively provide a plausible rationale for a third conference of the ASEAN states' heads of government. Chin points out the possible pitfalls of such high-level summitry, but appears optimistic that a new summit could perform a useful function provided that its goals are modest. Narciso Reyes, the former ASEAN Secretary-General, whose paper entitled "The ASEAN Summit Syndrome" forms the second part of *Two Views on Summit Three*, is more enthusiastic than Chin Kin Wah about the prospect of a new summit, arguing that it is at the level of the summit "that the solution to the political and economic dilemmas which beset the association must be found". Regretfully, one suspects that Chin Kin Wah's view may be more realistic.

While a third summit may not prove to be a panacea for ASEAN's problems in furthering political and economic collaboration, there are grounds for anticipating that co-operation in these areas may gradually intensify over the years. Can the same also be said of military co-operation within ASEAN? In *Directions for Greater Defence Co-operation*, J.N. Mak rehearses the well-known reasons (particularly in terms of the lack of a common perception of external threat) for the lack of institutionalized, multilateral defence co-operation between the Association's members. Having investigated the potential for greater military co-operation in the spheres of training, C^3I (Command, control, communications and intelligence), maritime surveillance, the sharing of base facilities, the rationalization of equipment and logistics, arms and equipment production, and commanders' conferences, Mak concludes that any upgrading of collaboration in even these limited areas is effectively dependent on the development of a greater sense of political and economic purpose within ASEAN. Mak's paper is an interesting and worthwhile study, despite its rather downbeat (but entirely sensible) conclusion.

Muthiah Alagappa's Research Note investigates another aspect of the ASEAN states' international security relationships. Muthiah's paper (like Mak's) *is* carefully researched, and contains not only useful data on U.S. military assistance to, and exercises with, the ASEAN states' armed forces, but also some interesting conclusions relating to the future of this collaboration, especially in terms of the possible impact on the region of a future relocation of the United States' Philippine bases.

In contrast to the other papers reviewed here, which all examine particular foreign policy issues of current importance in Southeast Asia, Hans Indorf's *Strategies for Small-State Survival* is a theoretical (but stimulating and topical) investigation of a major and

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perennial problem in international relations. Probably because it has a more universal amd timeless significance than the other papers, it is also the most impressive. Whereas the present "Cambodian problem" will probably be resolved in one way or another within the next decade, Cambodia (and other Southeast Asian countries) will have to cope with the problems of surviving as small states indefinitely. The main thrust of Indorf's argument is that a "carefully selected synthesis" of aspects of various survival strategies (emphasizing sovereignty; seeking safety in international linkages; military defence; "domestic preparation for survival"; and "trans-nationalism") may be the answer to the security problem of small states. Although Indorf claims that his paper is merely an analysis of observations and that he has no desire "to follow in Machiavelli's footsteps by providing prescriptions for rulers", many small states' policy-makers would probably find much of interest in *Strategies for Small-State Survival*. The chapter on "Strategies for Defence — the Military Dimension of Security" is particularly valuable, and Indorf's comments on smaller states' reluctance " to initiate steps for the exclusion of advanced conventional weapons in their immediate environment" are especially apposite.

All in all, the ISIS monographs are stimulating and valuable additions to the literature on Southeast Asian security issues. They cover a broad range of important topical issues, and their analyses are generally of high quality. If future papers were based on rather more substantial research than most of those reviewed here, they would be well on the way towards becoming Southeast Asian equivalents to the International Institute for Strategic Studies' *Adelphi Papers*.

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Ressources, problèmes et défis de l'Asie du Sud-Est. Edited by Rodolphe de Kononck and Jean Nadeau. Travaux du Departement de Geographie de l'Université Laval: 7. Quebec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1986.

This collection of papers originated from the fifteenth annual gathering of the Conseil Canadien des Etudes sur l'Asie du Sud-Est held at the Université Laval in November 1985. Fifty-three papers were presented at this conference, dealing with a broad range of subjects relating to Southeast Asia. The conference sessions touched on culture and society, development problems, politics, contemporary Islam, religion and philosophy, and on Southeast Asian minorities in Canada. Twenty-four of the papers were submitted for publication, and fourteen were accepted. This work is made up of seven papers in English, and seven in French, although three of the latter papers were translated from English into French for this publication. The Foreword, explaining the background to the conference and the subsequent publication of this work, and the Introduction, giving some background on Southeast Asia, are in French only. Surely in such a work as this, the Foreword and Introduction should have been given in both French and English. As it is, the Introduction is brief and does not tie together this very diverse range of papers. The only common thread is that all papers are related to some aspect of Southeast Asia. A paper such as "International

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developmental assistance through sport: Canada and Southeast Asia'' sits uncomfortably alongside ''The refugee camp at Kab Cherng'', as does ''Reciprocity and labour relations in rural Kedah'' with ''Being Southeast Asian in a Canadian Christian World''. One wonders why such a varied and unrelated collection of papers was put together, apart from the fact that the papers were given at the same conference. Outside Canada, how many students and scholars of Southeast Asia are fluent in both English and French? It would have been better had the work been translated entirely into English or French, or both, rather than half the papers in one language and half in the other.

The first paper, ''The legend of Rama in the sculpture of the corner pavilions of Angkor Wat Temple'' briefly examines the sculptures and their use in justifying royal politicking at that time. The paper ''The role of Islam in Malaysian and Indonesian politics'' is a good background introduction to the different roles that Islam plays in the politics of the respective countries, but its brevity means that it must be very generalized. Other papers also suffer from lack of depth. The second part of this work is made up of papers, including some detailed case studies, dealing with rural development. Overall, this section on rural development is the best part of the book, as there is a theme that unites the papers. The third section covers diverse topics such as sport, refugee camps and the management of political risks in the ASEAN countries.

Whatever the merits of these papers, one feels they would have received a wider audience if published as articles in journals related to their field of coverage. Together they form an odd assortment.

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DOCUMENTATION

USSR and Indonesia Issue Joint Communiqué on Shevardnadze's Visit

"Full text", as transmitted by Tass News Agency, in Russian, 1214 GMT, 8 March 1987, of Joint Soviet-Indonesian Communiqué

E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, was in Indonesia on an official visit from 5th to 8th March 1987 at the invitation of the government of the Republic of Indonesia.

E.A. Shevardnadze was received by Suharto, President of the Republic. In the course of the meeting, it was noted with satisfaction that friendly relations between the USSR and Indonesia, founded on the principles of peaceful co-existence among states, equality and mutual respect, self-determination and non-interference in internal affairs, were taking on a more and more stable and varied character. Mutual interest in strengthening and broadening them further was confirmed. It was stressed that the official visit by President Suharto to the Soviet Union would be a weighty contribution to the development of relations between the two countries.

Talks were held between E.A. Shevardnadze and Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the course of which there was discussion in a frank and friendly atmosphere of the state of and prospects for development of Soviet-Indonesian ties, and a review was made of a wide circle of international problems of mutual interest. The ministers expressed themselves in favour of stepping up exchange of opinions at various levels on issues of bilateral relations and the international situation.

Attention was drawn to the contribution which contacts between the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Indonesian House of People's Representatives were making towards strengthening mutual understanding between the peoples of the two countries . . . The sides declared their intention of making fuller use of the available opportunities for expanding trade exchange, with the aim of deepening mutually-beneficial economic co-operation. Giving a positive appraisal of the creation of a joint Soviet-Indonesian trade and economic co-operation commission, they consider it necessary to bring its mechanism into play, and also to set out the specific directions, objects and conditions of co-operation. Readiness to develop scientific and technical ties and cultural and sports exchanges was confirmed.

Having expressed deep concern about the maintenance of tension in the world, the building up of the nuclear and conventional arms race and the increase in the danger of its spreading to outer space, the sides stressed that safeguarding peace and international security was currently the most pressing issue. They expressed their conviction that all states, first and foremost those possessing nuclear weapons, must play their part in removing the threat of a nuclear catastrophe, and stated their readiness to co-operate as regards these

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goals with all other countries irrespective of their size and differences in socio-political systems.

Attention was drawn by the Soviet side to the programme, put forward in the statement of M.S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on 15th January 1986, of totally eliminating nuclear and other types of mass destruction weapons by the end of the present century, to the proposal of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries regarding the setting up of an all-embracing system of international security, and to the principles drawn up in Delhi of building a non-violent world free of nuclear weapons. The content of the new major initiative of the USSR on medium-range missile matters was elucidated.

The Soviet Union and Indonesia advocate the immediate halting of all nuclear weapons tests and the earliest conclusion of a multilateral treaty completely banning them. The ministers spoke out in favour of the prevention of the extension of the arms race into space and of the development of international co-operation in utilising space exclusively for peaceful purposes. They also stressed the necessity of intensifying efforts at the disarmament conference to conclude a convention on banning chemical weapons.

Discussing questions related to the situation in different regions of the globe, the sides expressed serious anxiety over the exacerbation of tension there, something which carries a threat to universal peace and security. They reaffirmed their principled position concerning the need for a political solution to conflicts and disputes in accordance with generally recognised rules of international law.

The parties to the talks noted the urgent necessity of arriving at a just and comprehensive settlement in the Near East in accordance with U.N. resolutions. In this context, they backed the calling of an international conference with the participation of all the interested parties, including the Palestine Liberation Organisation — the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. They advocate the earliest halt to the war between Iran and Iraq and the settlement of the conflict by peaceful means, at the negotiating table. Having set out their respective positions on the Afghanistan question, the sides regard the talks being conducted in Geneva through the intermediary of a representative of the U.N. General Secretary to be useful and express the hope that they will end with concrete results.

Both sides condemned the shameful apartheid system in South Africa and the continuing occupation of Namibia by the racialist Pretoria regime. They called on the international community to take urgent measures for the elimination of the apartheid system in the RSA and the immediate granting of independence to Namibia in strict accordance with decisions of the OAU and the U.N. and stressed the need for the speediest possible introduction of comprehensive mandatory sanctions against the racialist Pretoria regime.

Special attention was paid during the talks to the situation in the Asian-Pacific region.

The Ministers noted the insistent need to step up the search with the involvement of all Asian states for ways to ensure peace and security in the area and to create an atmosphere facilitating the development of relations of friendship and co-operation at bilateral and regional levels.

In connection with this, the Soviet side gave a detailed explanation of the package of initiatives aimed at guaranteeing security in Asia and the Pacific and Indian oceans, and at establishing peaceful co-operation and interaction in the Asian and Pacific region, which were expounded in M.S. Gorbachev's speech in Vladivostok.

Having affirmed their position in favour of turning the Indian ocean into a zone of peace, the USSR and Indonesia called for an international conference to be convened on this

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issue urgently, which should begin work no later than 1988. They gave backing [to] the idea of creating nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world, regarding these as an important step in the interests of international peace and security. They welcomed and expressed their support for establishing a zone free of nuclear weapons in the southern part of the Pacific ocean.

Having put forward their respective assessments of the situation in South East Asia and the reasons for the problems existing in this region, the sides were in agreement on the fact that it was of key importance to the region's peace and stability to continue and intensify constructive efforts aimed at working out a mutually-acceptable political solution to issues relating to Cambodia. They were also in agreement that interested countries outside the region might make a useful contribution towards seeking such a political solution.

The Soviet side reaffirmed the consistent position of the Soviet Union in favour of a political settlement in South East Asia and its interest in ensuring peace and stability in this region. The firm intention of continuing to pursue a course aimed at strengthening and developing friendly relations with the ASEAN member countries was expressed.

The ministers noted the growing role of the Non-Aligned Movement as an influential force actively supporting the adoption of measures designed to ensure universal peace and security and the creation of a new international economic order. The importance of the decisions adopted by the 8th conference of heads of state and governments of the non-aligned countries in Harare was emphasised.

The Soviet Union and Indonesia supported the reconstuction of international economic relations on a just and democratic basis and the establishment of a new international economic order. In their view the tasks of normalising international economic relations and of affirming trade-economic and scientific-technical co-operation between countries devoid of all discrimination were becoming increasingly important and pressing in the present-day international situation.

Having underlined the close interconnection between disarmament and development, they considered it necessary to switch the resources now being spent on military needs to socio-economic development purposes, including granting aid to developing countries.

Having noted the usefulness of holding consultations between the two countries on issues relating to bilateral relations and international problems of mutual interest, and also within the framework of international organisations and multi-lateral forums, the sides agreed to continue such consultations.

Both sides expressed their satisfaction with the results of the visit which had taken place, which would serve to strengthen mutual understanding between the two countries and peoples and promote further development of friendly Soviet-Indonesian relations.

E.A.Shevardnadze expressed gratitude for the warm and hearty welcome given to him on Indonesian soil. An invitation on behalf of the Soviet government was conveyed to M.Kusumaatmadja, Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to pay an official visit to the USSR. The invitation was accepted with thanks.

SOURCE: *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, FE/8512/A2/1-3, 10 March 1987.

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Australian Defence White Paper

Excerpts from statement by Kim Beazley, Australian Minister for Defence, tabling the Defence Policy Information Paper, 19 March 1987.

The problem confronted by all Australian defence planners is that while we are firmly part of the Western community of nations, our defence situation is unique and requires unique solutions.

The Australian people expect that Australia should be able to defend itself. The Australian Government accepts its duty to provide Australia with defence forces able to meet that expectation.

This paper sets the course for a decade or more of development of self-reliance in the defence and security of Australia.

For Australia, defence self-reliance is set firmly within the framework of our alliances and regional associations. The support they give us makes self-reliance achievable. They, in turn, will draw added support from a self-reliant Australia which will be better able to discharge its responsibilities in the vast strategic region to which we belong . . .

The five-power defence arrangements (FPDA) remain relevant to our defence policy objectives of promoting strategic stability and security in our region.

The FPDA were established in 1971 at the time of Britain's withdrawal from east of Suez to provide a framework to support the external defence of Malaysia and Singapore and for the development of their defence capabilities.

Since that time, the two countries' defence forces have expanded considerably and the formation and consolidation of ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) has reinforced the ability of each member to withstand external pressure and has fostered the development of a broad political and strategic consensus.

With changing circumstances, including New Zealand's announcement of its planned withdrawal from Singapore in 1989, Australia is particularly important in maintaining the FPDA framework.

Australia does this through our Mirage deployments, our P3C maritime surveillance operations, our naval deployments, participation in bilateral exercises and other defence co-operation activities.

As the Government has previously announced, an RAAF presence at Butterworth will be maintained after the withdrawal of the Mirage aircraft in 1988 by rotational deployments of F/A-18 aircraft, supplemented on some occasions by F-111 aircraft.

The Army Rifle Company will continue to be deployed to Butterworth, as will RAAF P3C aircraft.

It is important to understand that this activity is not seen as a left-over from an era long gone. This Government has had several opportunities to view the situation afresh and has concluded that there is substantial political value in our co-operation.

The Soviet Union's naval and naval air presence at Cam Ranh Bay is a significant concern for Australian defence policy. The Soviet Union does not enjoy naval and air dominance in the region and in the event of global conflict its military assets in Vietnam would be very vulnerable to U.S. forces in the region. None the less its presence is an adverse element in regional security.

Its primary significance lies in the political influence it provides the Soviet Union. It gives added importance to our defence co-operative activities in the region, particularly our

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maritime surveillance of the South China Sea and the north-east Indian Ocean and our naval deployments to the region.

SOURCE: *The Australian*, 20 March 1987.

U.S. Military Assistance to Asia Facing Cuts

Excerpts from statement by Karl D. Jackson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asian and Pacific Affairs before a U.S. House of Representatives Appropriations Subcommittee, 26 March 1987.

I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with the Subcommittee today the Administration's FY 88 security assistance program for East Asia and the Pacific.

Last year, Congress reduced the military component of our security assistance program worldwide by 14 percent below FY 88 levels and 26 percent below the President's FY 87 request. Moreover, the Congress earmarked 86 percent of our military aid funds for only five countries. The result was a 40 per cent reduction in funds available for our other commitments, including all of East Asia and Pacific. This action has had a detrimental effect on our security assistance program in this region, forcing the reduction or elimination of assistance to several key nations and casting doubt on our credibility as an ally and friend.

Security assistance is an indispensable tool of American foreign policy throughout the region and an essential element in strengthening our defense posture. Before describing the details of the FY 88 security assistance program, I would like to review with you the important relationship between security assistance and defense policy.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND DEFENCE POLICY

Our interests in East Asia and the Pacific — political, economic, and security — are extensive. This economically vital region is the United States' largest trading partner. Reflecting our mutual concern for the security of the region in the midst of continuing military threats from the Soviet Union, North Korea, and Vietnam, we have entered into mutual security agreements with five countries in the region, and have other security relationships with several more. In March 1981, Secretary Weinberger spelled out the roles the U.S. is willing to assume in Asia: continuation of U.S. presence and strengthening of our military capability in the Pacific, provision of defense against nuclear blackmail; continuity of our deterrent forces in the Republic of Korea; provision of offensive capability to strengthen deterrence of threats against Japan; and protection of critical sea lanes in the Southwest Pacific and Indian oceans.

Because our interests, values, and concerns are shared by many East Asian and Pacific nations, and because of our own insular geographic location, we cannot adequately defend those interests with U.S.-based forces only. The proximity of Soviet forces, and those of Soviet surrogates, to our Pacific allies and interests imposes severe demands on the timeliness of our response. Thus, our strategy requires forward deployed forces for several purposes: first, to deter aggression and coercion; second, to increase our ability to respond

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effectively and quickly in the event of a conflict; third, to reassure our allies of our commitment to our common security; fourth, to discourage regional instabilities; and, finally, to provide a more stable international environment for constructive diplomacy. For these reasons, we maintain ground and air forces in Japan, Korea, and the Philippines, plus naval carrier battle groups and marine amphibious forces in the Western Pacific.

Security assistance directly supports our defense policy in the region by helping us gain access to foreign bases and training areas for our forward deployed forces, obtain critical overflight privileges, and standardize military equipment. In addition, security assistance programs enhance our strategy for developing strong, self-sufficient, and reliable allies. Our alliance strategy, which includes forward deployed forces and security assistance programs, enables us to husband our limited resources, meld them with those of our allies, and employ them effectively to deter aggression or, should deterrence fail, to defend our interests and restore peace on terms acceptable to us and our allies.

THE FY 88 SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

East Asia and Pacific was the region hardest hit in percentage terms by the FY 87 reductions. We terminated the security assistance program in the Republic of Korea, suspended assistance to Malaysia, and reduced sharply our assistance to Thailand and Indonesia. The decision to allocate only $50 million to the Philippines was particularly difficult. We wanted to allocate more, but the resources were not there. To have provided an additional $50 million to the Philippines would have required us to terminate virtually every program in Africa or make very major reductions in Central America. President Aquino, Minister of Defense Ileto, General Ramos, and the Philippine Armed Forces were greatly disappointed and have questioned our commitment to the security of that country. We have assured them that we would seek the support of the Congress for the FY 87 supplemental that includes $50 million for the Philippines.

The administration's FY 88 security assistance request for East Asia and the Pacific is for $34 million in foreign military sales (FMS) credits and $160.3 million in military assistance program (MAP) grants. We do not propose to fund Korea in FY 88. We propose to restore only $10 million to the amount cut from Thailand in FY 87, to bring Indonesia to $20 million in FMS credit, and to restore a small FMS credit program in Malaysia. We are seeking $110 million for the Philippines, less than the need, but a realistic request for a close and beleaguered ally. Finally, we are seeking a small MAP grant for an important friend in the South Pacific, Fiji.

PHILIPPINES

The past year has seen truly remarkable developments in the Philippines. Americans are deeply impressed with the achievements of the Philippines in the short time since the February revolution. President Aquino and her government inherited social, economic, and security problems on a scale rarely encountered by contemporary political leaders. Her wisdom, grace under pressure, and affection for her people have won the admiration of Filipinos and all freedom loving peoples.

Likewise, Secretary of Defense Ileto, General Ramos, and the senior leadership of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), faced on one hand with internal divisions and on the other by a virulent communist insurgency, have preserved the AFP as a national institution and begun the long-term task of renewing its identity as a professional military

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organization. Their achievements have been remarkable, even under the most difficult circumstances, and they deserve the praise of a grateful Philippine nation.

I would be remiss, too, were I not to mention the officers and men of the AFP who carry out the perilous and often thankless task of securing the nation. This has been a difficult, sometimes confusing year for the Filipino soldier, but he has responded to rapidly changing circumstances with increasing professionalism and he has earned the growing respect of his nation.

Yet, the Philippines' journey to democracy has only just begun and much remains to be done if President Aquino is to succeed in her efforts to lead the Philippines to a stable and prosperous future. Despite the gains of the past year, the communist insurgency has not dissipated, the insurgents have not rejoined Philippine society, and many of the social and economic problems which beget the insurgency remain. Thus, we want to focus the attention of the Congress, as well as the attention of other Americans, on the need to continue our strong support for President Aquino.

COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IN THE PHILIPPINES

At first glance, the intensity of the insurgency may seem to be lessening. Indeed, violence and casualties did decline in 1986. According to official Philippine statistics, violent incidents decreased by 24 per cent, casualties to government forces declined by 22 per cent, and civilian casualties were down by 29 per cent. At the same time, casualties to the communist armed forces declined 42 per cent. By another measure, the rate of growth in the size of the communist New People's Army — which was growing at almost 100 per cent per year by the end of the Marcos regime — has declined markedly over the past year. But, insurgent strength still increased 9 per cent last year and the area of communist insurgent control expanded to 20 per cent of rural areas, about a fifth more than the previous year.

The situation does not call for a military solution to the insurgency problem. It calls for a Filipino solution which recognizes that, as the AFP leadership has pointed out, insurgency is primarily a political problem with roots in economic and social inequities. Nations which have contended successfully with insurgency have taught us that the role of force is secondary to that of co-ordinated political, economic, and social reform. Technological solutions, be they helicopters, trucks, or increased firepower, have never worked except in combination with a willingness on the part of civil and military agencies to remain in rebel areas over time, there to undertake the painstaking process of creating new loyalty bonds among those previously alienated from the national government. In this context, accurate information and effective local government are often as important as weapons in coping with an insurgency. Moreover, agrarian reform, enhanced rural economic opportunity, and a credible system of justice can insure that the salutary effects of the counter-insurgency campaign will be permanent, that the insurgency will not rise again with the next generation.

I would like to review with you and the members of the Subcommittee some of the actions taken by defense during the past year to support President Aquino, the AFP leadership, and the Filipino soldier in their effort to protect Philippine democracy.

DOD [DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE] HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE PHILIPPINES

The administration is pursuing a broad range of initiatives to help President Aquino's government succeed and to preserve vital U.S. interests in the Philippines. As part of this team effort, the Department of Defense is determined to demonstrate its concern and

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support for our colleagues in the AFP and for the people of the Philippines. Last September, in response to the visit of President Aquino, the President approved DOD's request to transfer $10 million of our own medical supplies and equipment to the AFP. More than half of this aid commitment, a total of $6.0 million, has been dispatched. This assistance includes $769k in drugs and medicines, $2.2 million in medical supplies and equipment, and 54 ambulances. The remaining $4.0 million will be identified and shipped as soon as possible.

In a second DOD-sponsored program, Philippine civilians received $13 million worth of drugs donated by the Americare Foundation and transported to Manila by U.S. Air Force aircraft. Finally, as we sit here, the U.S. Navy hospital ship, *Mercy*, is providing medical care for both civilians and military personnel in the Philippines.

She will call at seven ports over the next six weeks. The price tag of this combined DOD and private effort to deliver medical equipment and care to the Philippines will be about $40 million.

REBUILDING THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES

The AFP is one of the most important institutions in the Philippines and, with some exceptions, its members have exerted their influence in ways that are highly commendable. U.S. assistance continues to play a constructive role in the restoration of military professionalism and combat effectiveness. Our efforts to accelerate the acquisition and delivery process since the February revolution resulted in the highest volume of security assistance deliveries to the Philippines in the past five years. More than $64 million in military aid, including 665 trucks, 626 radios and telephone sets, $2.3 million in individual clothing, and a wide variety of spare parts, were added to the AFP inventories. As a result, operational readiness rates for helicopters, trucks, and communications equipment showed genuine improvement over the past year.

The senior leadership of the AFP has made tough decisions in its effort to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the current force structure and to focus more acutely on counter-insurgency operations. Obsolete F-8 aircraft are being eliminated; the financial drain from the National Air Defense System has been reduced; and the Philippine Navy is cutting the size of its fleet from 200 to 90 ships and craft. Most of the army's division and brigade headquarters have moved into the countryside where governmental presence is the *sine qua non* of effective counter-insurgency. In spite of tight fiscal constraints, the army initiated a unit training cycle that has retrained four battalions in counter-insurgency operations during the past four months.

AFP reforms are continuing. A national training center has been established to promote professionalism and combat effectiveness. Pay for enlisted personnel was increased by 14 per cent and officers' pay by 9 per cent in 1986. As a result of training and command interest, human rights abuses by AFP soldiers have declined.

We would take comfort in the improvements in the NAFP [*sic*] were it not for the remaining deficiencies which oblige us to intensify further our security assistance effort. Although operating rates have improved, logistic support and maintenance capabilities remain crucial. By one estimate, the AFP's maintenance backlog could consume approximately 1,000 million dollars in spare parts and supplies.

To remedy these deficiencies and improve further the readiness rates, we have developed with the AFP procurement programs that emphasize maintenance and logistic support, and items for the individual soldier. An estimated 65 per cent of military assistance during FY 85–FY 87 has been or will be committed to supply and maintenance items. We

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have identified the material that would be procured with our proposed $50 million supplemental. If approved, this program will enable the AFP to improve its readiness rates, increase the tempo of operations, and begin a modest modernization program.

Earlier, I discussed our unavoidable action in reducing the 1987 security assistance allocation to the Philippines, and our hope that the shortfall in aid could be remedied by a supplemental appropriation. I want to commend you and the members of this Subcommittee for your statesmanship and foresight in including $50 million in MAP for the Philippines in the FY 87 supplemental. It is my hope that others in the Congress will reach the conclusion that you have reached, and that we will be able to maintain an uninterrupted flow of military assistance to the Armed Forces of the Philippines during 1987.

The Aquino government also has slightly more than $29 million in FMS credits from previous years that have not been disbursed for procurements. The heavy debt burden of the Philippines militates against further use of credits. President Aquino has requested that we convert those remaining FMS credits to grants, and we agree, but we need Congress' support.

SUPPORT FOR THE AQUINO GOVERNMENT

Our assessment of the problems confronting President Aquino and her armed forces is not intended to highlight negative, rather positive aspects of the situation. A balanced picture emphasizes President Aquino's truly dramatic achievements which suggest that she will successfully lead her country to a stable and prosperous democratic future. The results of the recent plebiscite demonstrate again the vast reservoir of her personal support. After scarcely a year in power, she has become the most popular President in modern Philippine history. There should be no doubt, either on the left or right, concerning the importance we place on supporting an elected, democratic government in the Philippines. However, our strong, uncategorical support for the Aquino government and for the President herself must be based on a clear reckoning of the problems facing the Philippines. Those problems can be solved, if — first and foremost — both we and the Philippines recognize the character of the problems and are willing to make the hard decisions necessary for their solution.

THAILAND, MALAYSIA AND INDONESIA

Thailand, a treaty ally and front-line state, faces a serious and continuing security threat from Vietnam. The continued modernization of Thailand's armed forces is essential to deter and defend against Vietnamese aggression along the dangerously volatile Cambodian border. There has been no fundamental change over the past year in the stalemate which marks the Cambodian conflict. Vietnam maintains some 140,000 troops in Cambodia and Vietnamese forces have entered Thai territory on numerous occasions, causing casualties to the Royal Thai Armed Forces and to Thai civilians.

We have emphasized our strong support for Thai independence and territorial integrity, primarily by political and diplomatic means. Secretary Weinberger's visit to Thailand, during which he also travelled to the Thai-Cambodian border area, exemplified our commitment to Thailand's security. Unlike Korea, where American military presence is the most visible symbol of this commitment, the primary symbol for our Southeast Asia front-line ally is our willingness to provide security assistance. Last year we were forced to reduce the Thai program by about half the FY 86 level. Our FY 88 request of $60 million, $50

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million of which would be in MAP grants, represents only a modest increase over the depressed FY 87 level.

Since the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1979, our security relationship with Thailand has focused on building readiness and sustainability to cope with external threats. One element of this effort has been a joint program of logistics co-operation. In January 1987 we reached an important milestone in this effort when representatives of the U.S. and Thailand signed a war reserve stockpile agreement. The agreement was developed from a request by the Royal Thai Government for cooperation in establishing a stockpile of defense articles in Thailand that could be made available to the Royal Thai Armed Forces in an emergency. The purpose of the war reserve stockpile program is to enhance the capabilities of the Royal Thai Armed Forces to sustain combat and defend Thailand against any attack that threatens Thailand's national security, thereby also increasing deterrence against such an attack. Legislation is required to implement the war reserve stockpile program, but no appropriations are required.

Thailand's independence, integrity, and stability are crucial to peace and stability in Southeast Asia. Our security assistance program is intended to help Thailand meet regional threats and defend its border against Vietnamese aggression. Inadequate security assistance could imperil a staunch American ally and undermine the ASEAN strategy for a negotiated solution in Cambodia by calling into question our commitment and sending the wrong signals to Moscow and Hanoi.

Over the past decade we have developed important defense ties with the non-aligned but anti-communist states of the ASEAN community. Malaysia has successfully maintained democratic practices and fostered rapid economic growth throughout its independence.

Indonesia, the fifth largest country in the world, has undergone a remarkable transformation since the 1960s. In the early 1960s, under the flamboyant leadership of President Sukarno, Indonesia was a vocal apostle of anti-Western orientation. With the advent of President Suharto's New Order, Indonesia found new prosperity through rational economic planning and adopted a foreign policy which remains neutral and independent while being generally friendly to the West. Our ties with Malaysia and Indonesia have benefited from modest U.S. security assistance programs. Last year was particularly difficult for these regional friends, as reductions in U.S. security assistance were accompanied by serious economic difficulties resulting from the simultaneous decline in prices of oil and virtually all traditional export commodities.

Our decision to restore a very modest FMS credit program for Malaysia in FY 88 symbolizes the importance we attach to our growing defense relationship with this nation which is located along the strategically vital Straits of Malacca. In recent years Malaysia has rapidly increased its defense expenditures, upgraded its air defense system and made improvements in logistics and communications. Last year's lack of security assistance funds forced us to eliminate temporarily the Malaysian program. This year we are seeking $4 million to fund continued maintenance of existing U.S.-origin equipment, including logistics, air defense, and command, control and communications systems.

In the case of Indonesia, the extension of FMS credits is both substantive and symbolic. With its 3,600 mile expanse containing thousands of islands, Indonesia's security requirements are massive. Nevertheless, the government of President Suharto has consistently emphasized economic development and social welfare over defense requirements. Indonesia's recent purchases of advanced military systems, including a small number of F-16 fighter aircraft, have been both modest and appropriate considering its strategic situation. The procurement of F-16 aircraft reflects the desire to experience the operation and

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maintenance of advanced fighter technology rather than an ambition to field combat capability commensurate with Indonesia's size, population, and geographic location. Last year, necessity forced the reduction of our FMS credit program to $10 million — allocated by the government for the F-16 purchase. This allocation fell short of Indonesia's expectations for U.S. help in acquiring these aircraft. For FY 88 we are requesting $20 million in FMS credits so that Indonesia may proceed with the acquisition of an advanced fighter. To the Indonesians, our security assistance evidences our intention to help them modernize their armed forces and, in so doing, improve their ability to defend the critical airspace and sea lanes in their archipelago.

SOURCE: United States Information Service, *Wireless File*, 27 March 1987.

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Preface

This issue, Volume 9, Number 2, has been designated a Special Focus issue in order to publish some of the papers presented recently at the conference on "ASEAN in the 1990s" that was organized by the Malaysian International Affairs Forum (MIAF), a private non-profit and non-governmental body which has as its objectives the promotion of the study and research in the field of international affairs, with specific reference to Southeast Asia and particularly Malaysia, and the provision of an avenue for persons interested in international affairs to exchange ideas. The papers have been specially selected and edited by Dr Zakaria Haji Ahmad, President of the MIAF, and we are grateful to him for his interest and efforts in reminding us of the importance of ASEAN as it enters its twentieth year of existence — a remarkable regional achievement by any standards.

The Editors

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Introduction

ZAKARIA HAJI AHMAD

Resuscitated from its languishing state largely because of political developments in Indochina with the collapse of the Saigon government in 1975 and the concomitant U.S. "withdrawal" from the Southeast Asian region, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, better known as ASEAN, has forged since then a regional unity whose stature now parallels the European Community in the non-communist world. Whilst the grouping has grown from its original five members (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) in 1967 to include a sixth (Brunei Darussalam in 1984), it is no exaggeration to note that this regional association of basically free-market, non-communist countries has been more successful politically than in the realm of socio-economic co-operation on which lay its *raison d'etre*. It can be noted further that its status as a grouping has been intact such that its cohesion probably rests on the self-imposed restriction of its membership — for which at least two states are clamouring — rather than on the possibility and potentiality of a sequestration from within.

Be that as it may, it cannot be denied that a major factor for ASEAN's continued solidarity and viability is largely the need to stand together against the possibility of a communist advance in the region as viewed in the train of events that resulted in a *de facto* Indochinese federation comprising a united North and South Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea starting from 1975 and reaching an apogee in 1978 with the Vietnamese invasion of the latter and the occupation of Phnom Penh. Whilst the perception of this threat "from the north" has receded since the early 1980s, ASEAN remains wary of the possibility and has maintained the need for a political solution to the conflict in Kampuchea.

Inasmuch as a military "threat" is now viewed as less likely in some quarters of ASEAN, the fact that other perspectives exist in the regional grouping has perhaps underscored the reality that ASEAN's cohesion may be less concrete now than when it was originally conceived. For a grouping whose decision-making is based on consensus and *musyawarah-mufakat*, such differences in views bespeak of divergences that may make regionalism even less enduring. A poignant indicator of this trend was demonstrated in 1985 when one of its member-states decided against going along with the project dubbed as the APC (ASEAN-Pacific Co-operation) that had in fact been agreed upon at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting in 1984. There is even speculation and debate on whether Indonesia's emerging role and desire to be a "middle-power" in the region may mean that ASEAN is "too small" for Jakarta, not to mention its decision to engage in

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dialogue with Hanoi even if this largest state has been designated as the "official interlocutor" for the grouping. Some observers even thematize on the apparent, if nascent, nature of a "Jakarta-Hanoi axis" in terms of regional leadership in the present and future international relations of Southeast Asia. While the stand on Kampuchea appears united in calling for a Vietnamese troop withdrawal and the surrendering of Hanoi's occupation, making plausible the contention that ASEAN is "bleeding Vietnam white", a picture nevertheless emerges of a "weariness" over the likelihood of a political settlement. Officially, however, there is every indication of ASEAN's resolute and steadfast position.

If the issue of a Southeast Asian regional order revolves around one of seeking a *modus vivendi* between ASEAN and Vietnam, it could be speculated that the Kampuchean issue has given Thailand an ascendant status in the mainland politics of the region, principally because of Bangkok's "front-line status" in having to meet Hanoi's military adventures and possible aggression. That itself, however, revives some of the trends of Southeast Asia's historical past and presumably presages their continuation into the future as well.

In an association of six equal members — and one has to emphasize that it is *an* association — it is perhaps understandable that there are divergences of views and that their convergence into a consensus is itself a difficult process. While there is ASEAN agreement on the illegal Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea and the necessity for Hanoi to withdraw its troops to be followed by the neutralization of this ancient state and self-determination by its people, how to proceed and deal with its antagonists is subject to interpretation and emphasis among the ASEAN states.

Such examples of divergences or poor performance in political cohesion or even rivalry in ASEAN, however, provide a more worrisome picture given the dismal state of economic co-operation in ASEAN. Attempts to achieve such co-operation in the ASEAN Industrial Projects (AIP), ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures (AIJV), in the reduction of tariff barriers known as the Preferential Trading Arrangement (PTA), and even a private-sector effort in the form of the ASEAN Finance Corporation (AFC) have all floundered. In the recessionary times of the 1980s, even ASEAN co-operation on commodities is less successful than it should have been, and the notion that emerges is that each of the grouping's members may decide to "go it alone", instead of closing ranks in dealing with the common challenges that now confront this association of equals. The latter tendency is indicated by an attempt to link ASEAN with the larger efforts of cohesion and unity among the developing nations, such as the attempt by Malaysia to establish a "South" commission.

Criticism about the nature and progress of ASEAN economic co-operation has been most vocal in the past two years or so, especially from within. Indeed, even the gradualism so necessary in regionalism against the background and reality of the primacy of nation-states in the international arena has been deprecated. One prospect being currently discussed is the notion and desideratum of an ASEAN Common Market so that the grouping can become an effective trading bloc for

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trade with others as well as to enhance intra-regional trade among the constituent units. The reality, as is already well-known, is that ASEAN is a grouping of economic competitors trying to sell to the same external markets or attempting to attract investment from the same foreign sources; they are also producers of the same primary commodities. Earlier this year, a private-sector effort called the "Group of 14" (or "G-14") was formed which produced a report to come to grips with the approaches and strategies of enhancing economic co-operation. But, as also seems clear, there is official resistance to any major step towards a common market arrangement.

Up to the end of the second decade of its existence — to be exact up to 8 August 1987 — ASEAN therefore could be called a "success story" but it was also clear that it was faced with problems, the resolution of which would enhance its status or the non-resolution of which would presumably lead to its demise. After all, attempts at regionalism in Southeast Asia are not new and many in fact have met with failure. In its third decade, however, the challenges to ASEAN are complex and of a magnitude that spans political, economic and social and even strategic dimensions. What are the prospects for continued ASEAN co-operation? What trends and developments are likely to have an impact on the cohesion of the regional grouping? What are the areas in which co-operation can be forged and complementarity enhanced even as there has to be economic competition between its members? Should the grouping's membership be enlarged (for example, to include Australia and New Zealand) so as to provide more opportunities for co-operation and trade? Should ASEAN's third-country dialogue partners be expanded? What are the likely parameters of ASEAN-Indochina relations — will they be confrontational or will there be accommodation of the reality of a two-bloc Southeast Asia?

These questions, of course, are only a sampling of the many that could be asked. What is important is that they seek answers or clues to the challenges of ASEAN in the last decade of this twentieth century, the 1990s. They, in fact, raise a general theme of ASEAN as a viable regional organization in a geographical area that has known much war and tumultuous change. Against the larger background of the issues elaborated above, the authors of the papers that follow were designated specific areas of focus according to their expertise, touching on politics, economics, structure, external relations and security. The authors were invited to "think aloud", as it were, about the general questions, but so as not to cast their approaches in a procrustean mould, were also allowed to vary their scope and parameters. The papers in this issue reflect as much their insights about the future as their analyses of the state of ASEAN regionalism.

Providing an "extra-regional" perspective, long-time observer and student of Southeast Asia, Hans Indorf, notes that there has been a lot of "ASEAN activity" over the last twenty years, but asks: are they building a pyramid or a mere mole-hill? From the outside looking in, Indorf finds that while ASEAN has become a "positive factor in world politics" and that it is attractive in terms of potential wealth, these are "largely negated by substantive problems and procedural

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weaknesses''. He then proceeds to provide a critical perspective of ASEAN along four themes: foreign affairs, collaboration with other international organizations, the membership question and the dialogue process.

Although cognizant of the individual rights of each member-state, Indorf observes that its various policies sometimes mar the Association's international image by the lack of its emphasized importance from *within*, in spite of ASEAN being each member-state's primary pillar of its foreign policy. For Indorf, a regional impetus — even a ''grand design'' — is highly necessary to get ASEAN to function as a real dynamic factor which would in turn merit the continued, serious attention of its dialogue partners. The implications are that regional interests should override national interest, albeit without denying the latter, and that ASEAN should not succumb to structural inertia.

But the precedence of regional over national interests is a political matter, a subject that Lau Teik Soon addresses in his paper. He notes that there are varieties of regional political co-operation which involve certain presuppositions in the case of ASEAN. As such, prospects for political co-operation in ASEAN include the following: ''understanding and respect for the political system of each country, support for the government and leaders, strong backing for the state which is threatened by an external power, and co-ordination of views and policies on various international matters''. Underlying these are the shared nature of their anti-communist struggle, their development-oriented economic strategy, their notion of representative government and the ''consensus'' principle, embodied in the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation that was signed at Bali in 1976.

Although each ASEAN political system has its own peculiarities, he notes that one striking characteristic is the ''dominance of the power élites in the political process for the next five to ten years at least''. Nevertheless, he cautions that ''for political co-operation in ASEAN to progress, it is vital that the member-states understand and respect the political system of one another''.

Giving his own perspectives on the challenge of political co-operation, he outlines three aspects, namely, those factors which may undermine the bases for political co-operation (such as succumbing to communism or becoming an extremist Islamic system); the perceived or real threat against another (as had happened during Indonesian ''Confrontation'' against Malaysia before the advent of ASEAN); and the foreign policy orientation of a state which may be against the interest of another (as, for example, an alignment with Beijing). These are very important dimensions, for in a real sense they impinge on the question of ''non-interference'' in each other's affairs; however, bilateral issues within ASEAN over the last two years have shown that it is a fragile and sensitive area. Thus, whilst normative in orientation, Lau's analysis does provide thought regarding some basic, underlying tensions within the ASEAN system.

The papers by Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti and Bernardo Villegas address the economic challenge of ASEAN co-operation in its third decade. For Dorodjatun, ASEAN cannot avoid its role and place in the global economic environment and the importance of trade as the ASEAN countries themselves become more

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externally-oriented. Indeed, in terms of economic performance, he observes that by 1981 all of the ASEAN economies had been categorized as "middle-income economies" by the World Bank. This was possible because of the very nature of their economic situation and strategies, but which also meant growth being "fuelled by debt and induced by trade".

Spectacular economic performance thus meant a strong linkage and "dependence" on the international economic system, which in the mid-1980s meant that ASEAN also suffered from the effects of global recession and economic contraction. For a grouping whose record of intra-regional trade had been dismal, this makes economic co-operation even more tenuous. The dilemma, according to Dorodjatun, is that ASEAN "has to find a dynamic balance between attempts at exploitation of external markets and at exploitation of internal markets, while reducing the heavy load of maintaining the trappings of an import-substitution industrialization strategy".

Taking the bull by its horns, Bernardo Villegas offers prescriptions for the poor economic situation ASEAN is in as it enters its third decade. He first discusses the forms or levels of meaningful economic co-operation from a "free trade area" to "full economic union". Lamenting that ASEAN has yet to reach the first stage, he then reviews the existing and past record of the effort at intra-regional economic co-operation.

He then lists two reasons for the dismal record: the so-called "non-complementarity of the ASEAN economies" and the "lack of political will". Villegas, however, disagrees with both by noting that comparative advantage can be obtained as proven by businessmen, and that conflict between regional and national interest is really one between "short-term interests and long-term gains". Observing that past spectacular economic performance was actually externally-induced, he holds out the hope that future economic co-operation is possible if certain steps or actions are taken, which are then listed, all of which can be summarized as "market sharing" and "resource pooling".

The next two papers of this volume deal with "security co-operation" and ASEAN's place in the Asia-Pacific.

In their discussion of ASEAN security co-operation, Khong Kim Hoong and Abdul Razak Abdullah note that although the grouping is not a military pact, security matters are accorded "tacit" attention. Examples of this attention are the Kampuchean problem, the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) concept, and most recently the call for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. But they note that ASEAN security co-operation thus far has not been regional but that of "six states co-operating with one another".

Security co-operation, apart from joint training and exercises, sharing of information, and the like, could be said to be under the ambit of containing communist insurgency, a point that Lau Teik Soon also referred to. For the most part, however, these are bilateral in nature.

Khong and Razak note that, while progress in co-operation has been made, the "lack of an agreement of the main threat has hindered co-operation in the

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military field amongst its members''. They attribute this largely to the differing nature of threat perception held by each ASEAN country with regard to Vietnam, China and the Soviet Union. They also note that another obstacle to security co-operation is ''mutual suspicions'' among ASEAN countries. Their overall conclusion, however, is that the ''coming decade will not witness any fundamental change in the move towards the enhancement of security co-operation amongst the ASEAN states''.

In a very significant sense, the issue and prospect of security co-operation in ASEAN has much to do with the ''threat'' from Indochina in the form of a Hanoi-led federation of a unified North and South Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea. The invasion of Kampuchea in 1978 by Vietnam, only three years after the collapse of South Vietnam, and a perceived withdrawal of the United States from the region, raised the spectre that Hanoi may go beyond Phnom Penh and overrun the rest of Southeast Asia. The upshot was the galvanization of ASEAN into ''action'' that has become its mainstay as a cohesive entity, leading some to call it a ''one-issue organization''. Opposed as ASEAN is to the continued, illegal occupation of Kampuchea, an uneasy state of affairs, therefore, exists between communist Indochina on the one hand and non-communist ASEAN on the other.

It is this central issue of ''co-existence'' between these two *blocs* that Sukhumbhand Paribatra addresses in his paper, providing in the process the various plausible scenarios in the 1990s. Sukhumbhand notes in his analysis the complex nature of the ''Kampuchean problem'' in which there has arisen the peculiar circumstances of Kampuchea itself under the genocidal Pol Pot, the historic geopolitical and national rivalries of mainland Southeast Asia and the involvement and interest of the major, external powers, namely, the United States, the Soviet Union and China, not to mention the specific interests of both ASEAN and Vietnam. Depending on three sets of developments, namely, the political (transition to ''second generation'' élites, including the rise of ''technocrats''); economic change (recession and developed country protectionism); and strategic (the changing configuration between the Soviet Union, the United States and China), Sukhumbhand then lists out five plausible scenarios in terms of ASEAN–Indochina relations, namely, a military solution by Vietnam; a military solution by Vietnam based on a collusion between the PRC and the Soviet Union; ASEAN's ''preferred solution''; continuation of the present impasse; and an ASEAN–Vietnam compromise.

However, his own analysis indicates that the scenario most likely to emerge is that of a continuation of the present impasse, since it is one that benefits all parties save the Kampucheans themselves. Although this is not exactly the ''best solution'' for ASEAN, he foresees a concomitant development in the ''consolidation of a Sino-Thai alignment'', a development that is already more than apparent, anyway.

Sukhumbhand's bold attempt at looking at the future is most commendable and very insightful, but overlooks the resistance (both military and political) efforts of the tripartite CGDK (Coalition Government of Democratic

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Kampuchea) itself. In this regard, the recent reported "resignation" of Prince Sihanouk as leader of the CGDK is a sign of his discomfiture at the attempts to resolve the issue whilst treating the Kampucheans secondarily. Whether or not Kampuchea in 1990 becomes "Vietnamized", that issue and the larger one of ASEAN–Indochina "coexistence" will be one that strikes at the very core of regional order in Southeast Asia in the next decade.

Going beyond Southeast Asia, Lee Poh Ping's discussion centres around the issue of Japan-U.S. relations as *the* Asia-Pacific economic giants and their impact on a grouping like ASEAN. This is not to denigrate the roles of other actors in Pacific Asia, but Lee's view is that their economic performance in a post-industrial phase and its relation with high technology will determine the pace of events of the region. For ASEAN, the challenges of the Pacific are that of a world economy moving against the producers of commodities and the "fall-out from strained Japanese-American relations". Lee Poh Ping is mindful of the possible scenarios arising out of these developments, and he then discusses the likely strategies for ASEAN, namely, self-reliance, industrialization, a "high technology" approach, just continue as it is, or a combination of these (which he considers more likely). A key factor, however, will be the format of ASEAN's relations with Japan and the United States.

Whatever the future, ASEAN in its third decade enters an era which is akin to, in the words of former Malaysian Foreign Minister Rais Yatim, one of moving "from adolescence to adulthood". As some of these papers indicate, the problems of ASEAN as it moves into the 1990s will be those that touch the fundamentals of its very existence. While the papers in this issue look to the future, an analysis of ASEAN's past two decades may well have been the basic search for regional order in a divided Southeast Asia.

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ASEAN in Extra-Regional Perspective

HANS H. INDORF

Regionalism as the focus for systematic study has been temporarily submerged by global or area-related issues.[1] Regional organizations in Europe, Latin America and Africa, that were once the pride of scholarly enterprise, have become mere symbols of original promise. Instead, political ambitions and institutionalized bureaucracies vie for the continued prominence of supra-national structures which, in reality, have become a struggle for organizational survival. The pursuance of national goals has relegated regional co-operation to a secondary function, making it a useful by-product rather than the design for progress.

A similar observation regarding Southeast Asia is gaining credence abroad. The impression is one of feverish activity where, in the name of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), hundreds of government officials, businessmen and academics attend hundreds of regional meetings of committees and commissions, where thousands of pages are produced, printed, co-ordinated and disseminated, where reciprocal visits abound among political leaders, cultural groups and animal breeders, and where thousands of working hours are spent to evolve ideas for potential future activities. Hyper-activism does not fail to impress Western societies. While devotion and performance receive high marks, there is a prevailing uncertainty about the end product of this regional assiduousness: are they building a pyramid or a mere mole-hill?

High praise for diligence cannot assuage the concern for the ultimate motif. Have the multitudinous activities on behalf of ASEAN become just self-serving projects rather than being regarded as building blocks for the implementation of a concept of regionalism in all its manifestations? Has ASEAN itself become a mere project? The absence of a plan for institutional progression, linked to an evolutionary time-table, fosters doubts in the minds of foreign observers.

Dimensions of Image Creation

Any study of ASEAN will show that six sovereign nations entered voluntarily into a co-operative relationship for obtaining functionally specific results in economic, cultural and social affairs. Over the years, the member states have acquired a deepened sense of the utility of their original agreement through a constant bargaining process which has tested the limits of their mutuality. These limits are becoming more apparent as governments grow more responsive to an electorate who demands not just a national articulation of its needs but a satisfaction of its economic demands. Inevitably, grandiose regional schemes will find themselves

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on the backburner until the national political élite can assure its own survival.

Nevertheless, for almost twenty years, ASEAN has been a positive factor in world politics. If nothing else, the longevity of the organization persuades the foreign critic to view its future with optimism. ASEAN achievements in terms of project results have not been monumental. Smaller activities seem to succeed, such as a regionally accepted driver's licence, a marine cable network, an emergency oil-sharing plan, an ASEAN airfare scheme, and a drugs and narcotics prevention scheme. Larger industrial projects have had a rather discouraging rate of implementation, while only the ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures, private-sector based, show any sign of vigour.

What attracts the attention of foreign government officials and entrepreneurs alike is not the minutiae of intra-regional relations but the economic potential of the ASEAN member states. This includes geographic location as well as market size of a 300-million population, a past average regional growth rate of 7 per cent, an aggregate ASEAN demand for foreign goods of US$70 billion per year, natural resources of rubber, palm oil, tin, copra, copper and natural gas (constituting more than one half of the world's supply), an industrious labour force with competitive wage rates, an adequate infrastructure, and a strong belief in private enterprise and rudimentary rules of democratic procedures.

These regional assets are neither sufficiently advertised nor fully understood abroad. Yet, can the existence of ASEAN be credited to these assets?

Regrettably, the potential of ASEAN wealth in the member states, and the quantitative impact of ASEAN projects are largely negated in foreign eyes by substantive problems and procedural weaknesses.[2] ASEAN interests are viewed as particularistic and parochial; political co-operation precedes joint economic endeavours; there is a willingness to pool resources but not to share markets; preferential tariff agreements have little impact on intra-ASEAN trade; bilateral disagreements abound — whether over Sabah, the Israeli President's visit to Singapore, or territorial claims in the South China Sea. Even national development plans have not yet been co-ordinated.

Just as many disputes can be found in ASEAN's structure and operation. Decision by consensus avoids unacceptable coercion but produces protracted negotiations, and agreements only on the lowest common denominator; the "six minus X" principle can provide a convenient excuse for non-participation by a member state but it seriously challenges a cohesion based upon consensus;[3] the unequal status of ASEAN economic ministers in the organization's hierarchy has led to a de-emphasis of economic co-operation; and most ASEAN projects are still being financed either by third countries or international organizations while the ASEAN fund for this purpose is hardly being utilized.

The point of this partial enumeration of ASEAN achievements and impediments, judged by foreign perceptions, is that they appear to balance each other, leaving a blank slate. Consequently, the internal affairs of ASEAN are evaluated in Tokyo, Washington or Bonn largely by the pronouncements made by ASEAN leaders. And these are not too optimistic.

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On 7 February 1985, Malaysia's Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad told the ASEAN economic ministers that ASEAN's performance in economic and trade co-operation is "mediocre or worse",[4] ascribing it to a lack of serious commitment on the part of the member states. Philippine President Corazon Aquino, in June 1986, told ASEAN foreign ministers that the organization is beset "by problems which . . . threaten to render meaningless our continued association". Two months later, and after her visit to Jakarta and Singapore, a change of attitude became apparent: "I must now say that ASEAN will endure regardless of the speed . . . with which the association proceeds toward its objectives". Professor Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, Indonesia's Foreign Minister, felt that further reassurance was necessary: "Indonesia's stand toward ASEAN remains unchanged even though this regional organization has not yet fully attained its aspirations". These honest self-appraisals have contributed to the ambivalent assessment of ASEAN abroad.

However, foreign perceptions of ASEAN are not really determined by what happens in the region but by the extent ASEAN activities affect the fate and policies of other nations. No doubt, many segments of the international community expect Southeast Asian regionalism to produce centripetal forces which will eventually catalyse common national expectations. There is a critical and impatient undertone in predominantly Western thinking which demands measurable results from indigenous endeavours, particularly if they directly influence international relations. There are probably four areas which can be discerned as providing interactions between ASEAN and its foreign counterparts. They include foreign affairs in general, collaboration with other international organizations, the membership question, and the dialogue process. Each of these topics will be examined in greater detail for evaluating past performance, for seeking out remedies and new approaches, and for explaining foreign reactions.

An ASEAN Foreign Policy and Its Protagonists

Ushering in the new year of 1987, ASEAN government leaders made their traditional year-end remarks, reviewing the past and anticipating the future. Anyone looking for a reference to ASEAN in the context of national development, or an indication on how to adjust to the world around Southeast Asia, would have been unhappily surprised: there was no mention at all of either topic despite the fact that they are presumably high on national agendas. President Suharto referred to Indonesia "as a nation which has always been dynamic in the improvement of its strategic environment"; his counterpart in the Philippines was primarily interested "in rebuilding the house of democracy"; Thailand's Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanond was proud that "several important foreign institutions rated Thailand as having the strongest and most advanced economy in ASEAN"; Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew was more pessimistic, seeing "Singapore's recovery as not complete, . . . with commerce, financial and business services sectors not expected to rebound". Finally, Dr Mahathir's two resolutions for the new year were to

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"reject all rumours" and to improve "our performance and ability to produce goods".[5] National concerns dominated the messages to the total exclusion of foreign affairs.

The unavoidable conclusion is that these countries rely upon collective international action only when there are immediate rewards, while pursuing widely divergent national priorities in foreign policy objectives. Thus, Thailand is looking towards China and its communist neighbours, Malaysia to Antarctica, South-South relations and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Singapore is identifying with potentially receptive markets wherever they can be found, Indonesia is in search of a global role within the Non-Aligned Movement and beyond the confines of ASEAN, and the Philippines is inclined to associate with possible donor countries, especially the United States, which can guarantee its future.

In national perspectives, these preoccupations appear to be quite rational but it certainly removes ASEAN from being the proverbial "primary pillar" of the member states' foreign policies. ASEAN has no joint foreign policy except when interests occasionally coincide. Professor Mochtar, perhaps the most outspoken among the six ASEAN foreign ministers, limited the issue further by declaring that "ASEAN has a common policy only in efforts to settle the Cambodian problem".[6] Past differences concerning the methods of approach might even make this statement overly optimistic.

Certain uniform steps were, of course, taken in the name of ASEAN. In 1971, the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) was signed, and followed by more informal efforts, beginning in 1984, for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. The 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation opened the door for broader neighbourly participation. The 1979 Sino-Vietnamese conflict, and its regional repercussions, led to numerous joint ASEAN measures, including co-ordinated policies which covered the Vietnamese refugee influx. Although all these efforts were collectively initiated, they still lack follow-up and a successful conclusion.

Even the renowned *ASEAN Task Force Report* of 1983, a private effort to assess ASEAN's achievements and to recommend innovative changes, failed to mention the positive effects of a concerted ASEAN foreign policy initiative. The dramatic results of joint actions were effectively demonstrated when ASEAN collectively negotiated with developed nations. Consequently, ASEAN has attained a formidable image on a global scale, but not through its regional accomplishments; it was the authority projected by ASEAN's foreign ministers when speaking for 300 million people. This impact on world opinion has not been sufficiently pursued. ASEAN recognition has been limited primarily to its efforts in global economic issues; similar credit could be given to ASEAN if they were to agree on a common stand in political matters. Even a globe-circling ASEAN Secretary-General, representing not just a secretariat but six vibrant nations, could contribute to transforming ASEAN into a respected spokesman for the concerns of mankind.

But success in attaining recognition for external endeavours has also pro-

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duced some negative side effects. Attention has been frequently directed towards intra-regional progress which, by comparison, has been much less glamorous. It has also created an aura of economic infallability in reaching high growth rates which cannot be sustained forever. Yet, high expectations overseas created by such images are frequently not met, whether they concern infrastructure, communications, or industrial prowess. Foremost, however, is the unfortunate misperception abroad that anything happening in the non-communist part of Southeast Asia can be equated with ASEAN. The term is now being used as a collective noun covering all sins of omission of single countries. Thus, we are confronted with an ASEAN debt, an ASEAN trade balance, or an ASEAN inability to guarantee protection for intellectual property rights, when in fact these deficiencies should be credited to national accounts.

Perhaps it is not even fully realized in ASEAN capitals how frequently mere localized incidents reflect on the organization as a whole — at least in the minds of foreign observers and the media. There are many such incidents — for example, the Malaysian action of sending the Boston Symphony Orchestra home, the Singapore action of curtailing distribution of the *Wall Street Journal*, the Thai action in the United Nations Security Council condemning the United States for its retaliatory attack against Libya, the Indonesian expulsion of Australian journalists, or the ASEAN action of excluding the European Community from post-conference ministerial talks on Pacific co-operation. Without questioning the sovereign right of the ASEAN member states to determine their own policies, the cumulative effect is debilitating for ASEAN's image. Foreign officials and their taxpayers often feel puzzled by attestations of friendship, by exhortations for support, and by assurances of kinship while government leaders in Southeast Asia publicly reject Western norms and forms of democracy. A greater mutuality of understanding, a more balanced reciprocity, and a realistic awareness of the interconnectedness between national action and ASEAN reception abroad, could further enhance co-operation.

Since the Nineteenth Ministerial Meeting in Manila in 1986, the view prevails that ASEAN is finally moving away from its preoccupation with Indochina (to the detriment of Thai interests) towards an alignment on such positions as the prevention of drug trafficking and the nuclear-free zone.[7] Still, uniformity in ASEAN's external relations will confound the optimist and depend upon a gradualist approach.

There is a serious paradox in this situation. The efforts of ASEAN foreign ministers have given the association a high rating in world opinion. It has brought admiration, dialogue partners from among the industrialized countries, project funding, and preferential trade agreements. However, what it did not produce was greater intra-regional co-operation, an increased trade flow or implementation of joint industrial plans. A severe critic once compared ASEAN in this respect to a soap bubble, glistening beautifully on the outside but being empty inside. For ASEAN, it remains an attitudinal problem.

Ever since the creation of ASEAN in 1967, its proceedings have been domi-

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nated by the foreign ministers in accordance with the Declaration (Article 3a). Inevitably, this has placed an emphasis upon international issues, external relations, and the illusory propagation of ASEAN as a corporate entity, dealing as an equal with other national actors. Only in 1975 did ASEAN economic ministers meet for the first time to give priority to intra-associational matters. This engendered a conceptual dispute over the method by which ASEAN could best advance: extra-regional activity or improvement from within. Instead of finding an acceptable compromise, some cursory administrative adjustments were made while the underlying disparity in viewpoints remains unresolved to this day. The consequence of such a competitive relationship between ASEAN foreign and economic ministers has proven unexpectedly deleterious: it has led to developmental stagnation and organizational stalemate.

The Bangkok Declaration not only sanctioned the special position of the foreign ministers, but it also gave them responsibility for policy and co-ordination. Their role in foreign relations accorded them the privilege of "formalization, supervision or termination of negotiations with other governments and international organizations", regardless of whether the subject was commercial, monetary or political. An obvious interest of the economic ministers in international economic and trade issues made a collision between the two ASEAN ministerial meetings unavoidable. Structural changes which would support an elevation in the status of economic ministers would require amending the Bangkok Declaration, simply unthinkable under present conditions.

The *Task Force Report*, in its detailed 66-page findings, addressed itself to the problem. It recommended the establishment of an ASEAN Council of Ministers, that would incorporate all ministerial meetings, to be convened twice a year as the top policy and decision-making body of ASEAN.[8] No agreement has been reached on this innovative proposal, a concept which has been successfully practised in the European Community.

Performance in International Fora

Active participation by ASEAN in international organizations could bring its concerns to the forefront of world attention. This requires, of course, a common identity for focusing on essentials that have been agreed upon. In the past, this has been the Achilles' heel of joint ASEAN enterprises. Unfortunately, there is no adequate example in international custom: other regional organizations have been equally unable to consistently rally their members behind advantageous issues. ASEAN could very well be a trend-setter if it were to agree on a unified foreign policy framework. But this is easier said that done because of the diverse preferences of the ASEAN member countries.

The most commendable effort so far has been in the United Nations where ASEAN has concentrated upon gaining support for Democratic Kampuchea. It has used varying tactics for securing a U.N. General Assembly majority. Prior to the U.N. meeting in the fall of 1985, ASEAN agreed to disperse its members on a

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mission of proselytization. Malaysia agreed on concentrating on the Organization of Islamic Conference, the Philippines on Latin America, Singapore on Commonwealth nations, Indonesia on the African continent, and Thailand on the United States and Europe. Particular attention was to be given to "wavering votes" and "former abstainers", in the Soviet bloc and Africa. Formation of special missions was disregarded in favour of a continuing effort. The Kampuchean coalition that year received 114 votes out of a 159-state U.N. membership.

As in any political body, voting in the United Nations is rarely a straightforward reaction but rather the result of a compromise which reflects voting on other topics. When an Arab challenge was mounted against Israel's credentials, it had implications for the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea's (CGDK's) bona fides. ASEAN unity was in trouble. A similar dilemma arose over a showdown vote against the exclusive "Antarctica Club", which, by extension, could have endangered African votes for ASEAN's Kampuchea effort. To avoid an erosion of support, ASEAN organized another diplomatic campaign in 1986. This time a special delegation, with a Thai chairman and an Indonesian representative, went on a two-week political safari to East Africa. Malaysia led another mission to West Africa.[9] Brunei focused on the Middle East, and a Philippine official went to Latin America.

The U.N. Assembly vote in 1986 added only one state to the majority (115) while the opposition number remained the same (21). It is time for ASEAN to switch tactics for obtaining greater bargaining power. The laudable move suggested by the former Philippine Acting Foreign Minister, Pacifico A. Castro, that ASEAN should apply for U.N. observer status, deserves serious consideration. The European Community has already taken the initiative for such a collective status. Once accredited, an ASEAN spokesman could articulate major ASEAN concerns in addition to the voices of member-state representatives.

Many other international fora are available for ASEAN to further its objectives. One, of course, is the European Economic Community which is also an ASEAN dialogue partner. Organizationally, the relationship has been placed on a firm footing with regularly scheduled meetings at various levels. Yet, the results are less than satisfactory. This disappointing performance must simply be credited to disinterest in each other. The European Community has its own internal problems catering to the economically disadvantaged among its members. There is also the impression that ASEAN has developed a strong predilection for its Pacific partners, even to the extent of excluding the European Community from some of the discussions following the annual ministerial meetings.

In August 1986, both parties completed a survey on European business attitudes concerning ASEAN.[10] The findings offered an explanation for low European investments in Southeast Asia. Foremost, European businessmen regarded internal trade barriers and the complexity of investment regulations to be primary obstacles. Other impediments to penetrating the ASEAN markets were the diversity of rules governing the establishment of companies, local participation and the repatriation of profits. These survey revelations were by no means startling. They

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point to the fact that ASEAN is not a single market where one member country could be used as an export base without encountering new tariff barriers. Consequently, direct imports from the home country have been found to be more economic.

In international organizations where ASEAN is represented by its members, the association has frequently reverted to a statement by a single spokesman, a practice which should be used more widely. When the new round of multilateral trade negotiations began in Uruguay in September 1986, Malaysia's Minister for Trade and Industry was on hand to explain ASEAN's position. According to GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) statistics for 1985, ASEAN trade accounted for US$137 billion or 3.5 per cent of world trade, with US$64 billion for imports and US$73 billion for exports. Despite this rather respectable balance, ASEAN's major trading partners were unilaterally chastised for "increasing protectionist and trade-distorting measures" and taking "frequent recourse to harassment tactics", as well as "disposing of their surplus agricultural production in the name of food aid".[11] Foreign observers at the conference were dismayed by the lack of a conciliatory tone and the apparent absence of an appreciation of trade barriers within ASEAN itself. The strident and uncompromising attitude of Malaysia may not have reflected ASEAN sentiments in its final formulation.

Other avenues for international intercourse have been opened to ASEAN. At the summit of industrialized nations in Tokyo in May 1986, ASEAN not only sent a detailed dossier to the Japanese Government with its concerns and recommendations, but it also gave an oral briefing and a written statement to President Reagan when he visited Bali in April. ASEAN has also made use of certain functional organizations such as the Association of Tin Producing Countries, and similar groups for rubber and palm oil interests, among others. At this level, ASEAN consensus was often missing, particularly because not all member states were always directly affected parties.

More problematic for ASEAN is its collective representation in politically oriented organizations such as the Non-Aligned Movement. Members would be expected to reject association with any existing bloc and to act independently in their own foreign affairs. As a consequence, the anomaly exists that members vote against industrialized nations at the United Nations while accepting their aid, trade, transfers and investment almost as a matter of right. However, there is ambivalence in ASEAN about membership in the Non-Aligned Movement as opposed to adherence to non-alignment. Vietnam and Cuba are full members while Thailand and the Philippines are not. The movement has become somewhat of a status symbol for the Third World. It devoted a resolution to ASEAN's proposition for a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), but discussion soon got embroiled in non-communist versus communist issues, to the embarrassment of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. The concept of non-alignment remains an element of cohesion for ASEAN but not the movement itself.

A measure of insecurity has also been revealed in ASEAN's stand on Pacific economic co-operation. Since 1980, a private effort has been under way to bring

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Pacific Rim countries into a closer rapport on issues of common concern. This was soon followed by the setting up of a Standing Committee for the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC). A tripartite group of businessmen, academics and government officials in a private capacity has been meeting regularly to devise means for co-operation and co-ordination. The Chinese now have a fully accredited representative (as has Taiwan) and the Soviet Union has a temporary observer status. In addition, all the free market societies of East Asia, ASEAN, and its five dialogue partners are members of the Standing Committee. But definition of membership remains a problem as much as the absence of substantive government support. For this reason, Japan and the United States, in recognition of a growing interdependence, hope to elevate Pacific co-operation to an inter-governmental level, with ASEAN as the political centre-piece.[12]

The subject was first formally broached at the ASEAN Annual Ministerial Meeting in 1984, when basic elements of co-operation were agreed upon. Indonesia took the initiative for, among other reasons, reaching beyond the frustrating confines of ASEAN to a more comprehensive arena for diplomatic activity and recognition. A working committee was formed in January 1985. It formulated a programme for human resources promotion and its executive agencies. In February 1985, ASEAN foreign ministers expressed satisfaction with the progress, and stipulated that human resource training and expertise would essentially be for transfer to South Pacific Island states. Yet, any jubilation for new co-operative ventures was obviously premature.

Just prior to embarking on his trip to the 1985 Kuala Lumpur Annual Ministerial Meeting, Professor Mochtar speculated: ASEAN considers any plan for a Pacific Basin Community as too difficult, too expansive, and rife with political problems. "ASEAN intends to preserve its present status."[13] However, his objective was for ASEAN as a group to meet with Pacific Rim countries among the dialogue partners (which excluded the EEC and the United Nations Development Program). At the subsequent Foreign Ministers Meeting, Malaysia turned down the proposal: "Our understanding was that it would be a loose and informal arrangement, with cooperation developing gradually. Indonesia wants a formal relationship too early". Dr Mahathir was anxious to avoid any hint of a new strategic economic advance which would make ASEAN overly dependent. In response, Professor Mochtar publicly criticized the existing six plus one format of bilateral project negotiations as "exhausting, repetitive, involving too much travel, and providing benefit only for tourism". The message was clear: ASEAN needed to forge new links in the Pacific basin before losing the initiative to others.

ASEAN's *modus operandi* required unanimity, and the disagreements were shelved in favour of dropping further Pacific approaches while pursuing human resource development which would include the South Pacific nations as beneficiaries. Inter-regional co-operation could prove more advantageous to ASEAN. It opens new horizons, explores new markets, creates new affinities, all within the framework of ASEAN capabilities. Speaking with one voice in existing international fora has already brought excellent results inasmuch as the organization's

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potential was recognized and its organizational achievements respected. Building a broader community in the Pacific is the primary interest of others; ASEAN may first prefer an expansion from within.

The Territorial Element in ASEAN Membership

The issue of membership creates the greatest possibility for causing foreign antagonism towards ASEAN based on the "rejected suitor" theory. Ambiguous entry requirements have encouraged outsiders to seek admission, but subsequent public rejection by communiqué neither raises the quality of diplomatic protocol nor the self-esteem of the applicant country's leadership. An awkward situation ensues which can tarnish future relations. It can be prevented by a precise and formal explanation of ASEAN's future intentions.

As it stands now, there is Article 4 of the Bangkok Declaration, then an informal agreement on procedures after a new member has been selected (applied to Brunei's entry in 1984), and many in-house memoranda as well as individual statements on the subject of membership. Let us examine the sentiments behind these expressions which could endanger ASEAN's reputation unless an entry policy is announced clearly and publicly. For instance, Article 4 of the 1967 Declaration states that "the Association is open for participation to all states in the South-East Asia region subscribing to the aforementioned aims, principles and purposes." The phrase "South-East Asia region" is curious since a simple "Southeast Asia" would have sufficed. Officials who attended this first meeting explained that the term "region" was to imply a wider geographic interpretation.

Conditions necessary for the existence of an entity described as a region, and the arrangements and intensity of possible elements, have never been agreed upon. However, there is some consensus as to regional characteristics. These include a geographic proximity, a cultural and social compatibility, a security and economic interdependence, and an affinity in political orientations. Few if any of these indicators were present at the inception of ASEAN, but some have and others may develop over time. Geographically alone, the organization is spread over two oceans, and its maritime character lacks compactness and contiguity.

Was ASEAN to be universalistic or selective in its membership? This question has never been answered except by practice and demonstration. Universality requires a more precise definition of the geographic confines of a region which would be arbitrary in any case. Selectivity, on the other hand, seeks quality judgments including similarities in government and the economic system, ideals of cultural homogeneity or religious solidarity, and perhaps common historical experience.[14]

The universalist principle was clearly evident in 1967, when a large number of countries were approached, such as the Indochinese states and Burma, as well as Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Australia and New Zealand. Conversely, however, Singapore was originally omitted but eventually invited at its own insistence, according to a senior official who was involved in these initial organizational steps. But this early

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universalist impulse soon faded and the rule of essentiality prevailed. The latter implied that countries would be admitted to membership only if they could contribute to the welfare of the association within the framework of the Declaration's principles. But views were influenced by the dictates of unanimity.

Former President Marcos stated, on 5 May 1981, that he would personally not oppose the acceptance of new members although he was aware that ASEAN would like to strengthen itself first internally. Dr Thanat Khoman, former Deputy Prime Minister of Thailand, also indicated in May 1981, that he was not adverse to admitting new members "particularly since ASEAN had already decided to admit . . . Brunei and Papua New Guinea in the next two years". When former Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman suggested, in January 1986, that Australia and New Zealand be admitted as members, then Foreign Minister Tengku Rithauddeen countered that this was out of the question since "ASEAN was created for and by Southeast Asia". Finally, in July 1986, Dr Mochtar seemed to voice the present consensus: "I think it is enough for ASEAN to have six members now . . . A new member will not automatically make ASEAN more effective".[15] If such a categorical statement were to be included in a future communiqué of an annual ministerial meeting, it could avoid further speculation and possible embarrassment.

Exclusivity of membership was temporarily relaxed with the admission of Brunei on 7 January 1984. During the preceding years, Brunei had been an observer at ASEAN ministerial meetings while still a British protectorate. Informal impact statements were prepared by most ASEAN member countries, explaining Brunei's wealth in oil and natural gas as well as its need for infrastructural development in which existing members might be involved. The Sultanate, in return, expected equal status and mutual respect from its neighbours, insurance of sovereignty and territorial integrity — a must for a small, bifurcated state with a population of 220,000. Negotiations on terms of entry were largely confined to procedures: an application for membership was received by ASEAN's Standing Committee in early 1983 for later consideration. It contained the assurance that Brunei would "subscribe or accede" to all declarations and treaties of ASEAN. Obligations would be fulfilled "according to ability". Brunei was informed that it would be accepted as a full member after receiving its independence. During the admission ceremony in Jakarta, Brunei signed a Declaration of Adherence. Missing from the procedures was an understanding of Brunei's contribution to solving problems associated with the harmonious development of an enlarged ASEAN. Presumably, the problems had to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis.

An earlier, but unsuccessful attempt was the case of Sri Lanka. The state had been invited in 1967 and, according to Colombo sources, again in 1976, to join ASEAN but it had deferred a decision because "of South Asian regional sensitivities". In 1981, however, Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ramasinghe Premadasa, made a concerted attempt at admission. He visited all the ASEAN member states, and publicly declared that his country would be willing to join "if invited". Philippine Foreign Minister Romulo responded "we have never invited anybody . . . if

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. . . they will apply, we will consider the application''.[16] The trouble, of course, was that neither side wanted to make a commitment without prior guarantees.

When Sri Lanka later submitted its application, a decision was postponed by ASEAN's foreign ministers for lack of a consensus. The Philippines was for it in principle, as was Thailand which did not want ''discrimination for geographical reasons.'' Indonesia was non-committal at the time, with Singapore and Malaysia against admission. Finally, one year later (1982), ASEAN's Standing Committee, under the chairmanship of Singapore, agreed to reject Sri Lanka's application because the country was ''outside the geographic area''. Apparently, the underlying fear was that it would become embroiled in South Asian problems.

Similar considerations seemed to prevail in the most recent overtures made by Papua New Guinea (PNG). In 1976 (and long before Brunei), the PNG had acquired ''official observer'' status. The progressive involvement continued when it became a ''special observer'' in 1983, and Prime Minister Somare made a commitment in 1984 to join ASEAN ''if and when invited''. ASEAN's 1985 concession to give the PNG membership in three ASEAN committees, and Prime Minister Wingti's efforts in 1986 to strengthen bilateral contacts with the establishment of embassies, culminated in the PNG's proposal to become a signatory to ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Co-operation. The latter was rejected in preference to an arrangement with Indonesia. Despite informal expressions of support, an ASEAN consensus is still lacking, and there is little likelihood of a change in this position in the near future.

ASEAN's primary concern seems to be a possible dilution of its regional identity, particularly since the PNG is also the leader of the South Pacific Forum, another regional grouping. Rejecting the PNG application for this reason is difficult to explain since some ASEAN states are themselves members in extra-regional entities (for example, Malaysia and Singapore are not only members of the Commonwealth but also of the Five Power Defence Arrangement involving Australia, Britain and New Zealand). Consequently, it seems more likely that the lack of enthusiasm is generated by Indonesia's censure of the Free Papua movement and the 10,500 dissidents being given sanctuary in the PNG. The situation remains not only unsettled but could progressively worsen. If the PNG's evolutionary participation in ASEAN should suddenly stagnate for an indefinite period, the PNG might eventually contemplate the rejection of its observer status for lack of reward, a step which would reflect negatively on ASEAN's doctrinaire exclusivity.

One way out for ASEAN would be to introduce a new principle of involvement, that of an associate member.[17] It could confer certain rights and mutual obligations, define common actions and special procedures to accommodate this new relationship. For island states in the South Pacific, for instance, it could mean new trade and financial benefits as well as duty-free treatment. For some countries which are currently dialogue partners, an associate status could further regularize joint activities with ASEAN, and give possible commitments a more binding authority. It could also provide mechanisms for negotiations and the settlement of

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disputes, should they arise. Of course, details concerning the mutuality of benefits would have to be explained in greater detail.

Being an associate member could avoid the pitfalls of the current observer status as well as the rejection of applications for full membership. In addition, the present rather ephemeral dialogue process could receive more substantive meaning. The basis for the new status would be a legal instrument between both parties that would eschew false expectations on both sides. The European Community has successfully applied this arrangement under Article 238 and Articles 131–36 of the Rome Treaty. ASEAN might benefit from a study of this membership variation.

Ambiguities in the Dialogue Process

As much as the selection of new members can detrimentally affect the perception of ASEAN in its immediate regional environment, so can relations with dialogue partners cause negative repercussions in the more distant world of the industrial powers. Unlike in the membership question, ASEAN laboured hard to devise the format and content for the dialogue process in which potential rewards could be significant and imminent. Complete satisfaction with the returns of the effort has so far evaded mutual endeavours. Singled out for examination below are some of the elements of the process which need more serious consideration.

Communicating with the developed nations for the purpose of advancing economic co-operation was an afterthought. The Bangkok Declaration made no reference to this opportunity; it was left to the Bali summit meeting of 1976 to enunciate the urgency of developing common approaches to individual economic powers.[18] The primary objectives were to improve market access, to remove trade barriers, to facilitate technology transfers, and to reach commodity agreements. Yet, actual operations also sought to obtain aid and assistance packages while building "a long-term, complementary economic relationship". The process of co-operation with industrialized nations, however, predates the Bali meeting.

Relations with the EEC had been institutionalized as early as 1972, followed by Australia in 1974, Canada and New Zealand in 1975, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1976, and finally Japan and the United States in 1977. This number of seven dialogue partners has remained fixed ever since. Over the years, an intricate machinery has been developed for ASEAN relations, with each partner requiring more than fifty meetings per year at various levels.[19] While these contacts invariably generate worthwhile information, it was unavoidable that they also entailed duplication. Today, the results are no longer regarded as cost effective, and a search has begun for viable alternatives which may culminate in some resolution at the forthcoming year-end summit in Manila. The time has passed when ASEAN is satisfied with the mere symbolism of such joint contacts.

Malaysia's Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir, was the first prominent voice to air grievances publicly. When addressing the ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting in February 1985, he said that the dialogue had "not achieved meaningful results"

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and implored the trading partners "to adopt a more serious attitude." Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah was more specific: "ASEAN has to be more selective in its dialogue with other countries", particularly when they prove "no longer beneficial to the grouping". Foreign Minister Rithauddeen at the time noticed "a sense of restlessness within ASEAN on the progress of economic cooperation with our partners".[20]

When pinpointing the trouble, Mr Lee Kuan Yew warned Washington in 1986, "that if it kept neglecting the interests of members of the Association . . . it could lead to fractious and querulous relations". Apparently, criticism revolves around an over-concentration of U.S. investments in oil exploration in Indonesia and Malaysia, a poor record in transfer of technology, rising protectionism, and a lack of U.S. support for price stabilization schemes. At the Seventh U.S.-ASEAN Dialogue in Singapore, 8–9 May 1986, the shortcomings of the process were reviewed, ending in an agreement to strengthen the consultative mechanisms. Yet, this may not be enough.[21]

ASEAN imposed the stricture that any aid or assistance given to the organization "should not be at the expense of existing bilateral arrangements". In the initial phase of development, such an injunction was certainly necessary, but does it still serve ASEAN interests today? Enhancing the viability of the regional organization and improving joint endeavours could now be of greater advantage to individual members. It is also a question of consistency. ASEAN uses the collective approach to obtain benefits from international commerce. It insists on being treated as one regional entity regarding implementation of the U.S.' GSP (Generalized System of Preferences) scheme. Is it not a retrogressive step to require that bilateral aid be given preference?

Dialogue partners have their own misgivings. They also want to see a greater effectiveness of the process, and a measurability of progress at the regional level. They realize that the political content of the talk frequently outweighs the economic substance of co-operation. A short cut through the maze of structural arrangements is also desired, and could be achieved if policy discussion were to be conducted only at the post-ministerial meetings of all foreign ministers, leaving the negotiations and follow-up to the ambassadorial committees of ASEAN in the capitals of the trading partners. This would eliminate the expensive and time-consuming rotational fora, a saving that could be invested in more meaningful projects. However, officials of any country like to travel at government expense, and since they have to provide the arguments for curtailment, decisions may be postponed.

ASEAN meetings with dialogue partners are always attended by representatives of all six member states. While it is legally correct, it is financially extravagant. Since ASEAN's existence is based upon a Declaration and not a treaty, it lacks a corporate identity which other regional organizations possess. Admittedly, it may be politically troublesome for ASEAN to give itself a new charter. Nevertheless, there may be considerable advantages for considering such a measure, even if it is limited to basics. Trading partners can negotiate more expeditiously

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with one ASEAN representative. Potentially, foreign diplomats could be accredited to ASEAN — another way of limiting travel costs and expanding beneficial contacts. The position of ASEAN's Secretary-General could be transformed from being responsible only for the Secretariat to becoming a spokesman for the organization itself. Agreements could be signed by one person, instead of six, and world attention would be focused to a greater extent on ASEAN itself than is the case now.

In line with this forward projection of ASEAN would be the establishment of resident ASEAN economic missions in the capitals of the dialogue partners. Business communities require information on a regional scale; an ASEAN development fund needs its own advocate, and ASEAN interests could benefit from a continuing representation. This would not necessarily replace the current functions of ASEAN ambassadors but it would recognize the fact that the primary duties of ambassadors are to their own countries. An alternate method would be to authorize an ASEAN project, initially funded by the dialogue partner but eventually from private sources, which would create a U.S.-ASEAN Center for Communication and Cultural Exchange in Washington, D.C. An ASEAN official could be seconded to such a centre for a certain period. The tasks of such a centre would be more comprehensive than those of a trade mission, and its advantage is that of local financing.

This raises the question of ASEAN projects. They are independently formulated by the various ASEAN committees and ultimately, after passing through various co-ordinate channels, they end up as a topic for discussion in the seven ASEAN-Dialogue Partner fora. But four aspects of this procedure need to be considered. The first is that dialogue countries will tend to monetarily support only those projects which satisfy their own criteria, and these may not always be identical to those of ASEAN. Secondly, projects are proposed in a policy vacuum. Priorities should be determined by ASEAN to enhance a common, regional goal. Thirdly, the time-consuming process and the dependence upon the trading countries' national budgets frequently bring projects to fruition after the need for them has largely dissipated. Instead, some second-ranking proposals are finally implemented. Fourthly, much time is devoted to project analysis in annual dialogue meetings where it would be more important to explore policy and pending agreements.[22] Technical discussions could well be left to already existing technical agencies.

A number of countries, intrigued by the success of ASEAN and the pace of development in member nations, have expressed an interest in linking themselves to the dialogue process. ASEAN's official criterion of mutual benefit could have been satisfied in most of these cases, but ASEAN's invariably negative response may have had other motivations. In 1978, India and ASEAN established the first rudimentary committees for co-operation. When, in the following year, Vietnam invaded Kampuchea and created the Heng Samrin regime, India recognized the new satellite state despite ASEAN's forceful disapproval. Further relations between the two parties were abandoned, and it was only in 1986 that Prime

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Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to the region refurbished an old relationship.

South Korea, first rebuffed by ASEAN in 1978, again sought the status of a dialogue partner in 1982. When Dr Mahathir visited Seoul the next year, he declared that Malaysia backed the application, and that he was not aware of any opposition from other ASEAN members. But he spoke too early. His own Foreign Minister corrected him two years later: "ASEAN does not want to increase the membership of its dialogue partners. However, it welcomes South Korea's participation in projects under a human resource program . . . ASEAN is too busy dealing with existing dialogue countries".[22] Consequently, and with much greater gain, South Korea devoted its energies to operating bilaterally in the region; for the time being, ASEAN will have to take a back seat.

The year 1987 started with somewhat of a surprise: the Soviet Union revealed that it had asked for formal talks with ASEAN about becoming a dialogue partner. Ever since Mikhail Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech in July 1986, which heralded a more positive Soviet approach to its Asian relations, Soviet diplomats in Southeast Asia had been stumbling over each other to establish closer links with ASEAN members. Within the first two months of 1987, Thai Foreign Minister Siddhi Savetsila agreed to visit Moscow in May, and Soviet invitations were also delivered in the other ASEAN capitals.

Singaporeans have been asked to invest in joint ventures in the USSR. The island states exports to Russia, with an almost 4:1 surplus, consisting primarily of repairs to Soviet vessels in Singapore shipyards. High-level Soviet delegations have been visiting the region almost weekly and, among other subjects, offer barter deals in which ASEAN has not shown a particular interest.[23] Already, Thai rice travels via Moscow to Hanoi. Malaysia admitted that the Soviet Union is too important a member of the international community to be disregarded or be treated with indifference. ASEAN will have a difficult time deciding how best to deal with Soviet dialogue overtures. The present format will not be too amendable, but once the process has been decentralized to the capitals of the trading partners, a penetration of the East European market could offer useful dividends for ASEAN trade. But for the dialogue process in general to survive present misgivings, some drastic changes are required.

Reversing Course: From Stagnation to Dynamic Progress

ASEAN has become a fixed point on the canvas of international observation. But its prismatic quality, well defined in the 1970s, is diffused today. The past seven years have not been kind to the reputation of the organization. The longer it remains in their view, the more carefully will observers tend to scrutinize it. Despite a world presence now, they seem to discern a shallowness in its substance and a reluctance on its part to take corrective measures. The world has been watching for twenty years, and the danger is that it may stop watching.

But while the evolution of a regional organization remains essentially the responsibility of its members, extra-regional powers also share this responsibility

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as far as it concerns the global dimensions of security and stability. In this respect, ASEAN dialogue partners have shown an insufficient sensitivity in their co-operation to ensure that the Association continues in a position to make its global contributions.[24] An opportunity to redress past passivity on both sides arises when ASEAN Heads of Government meet for their third summit in December 1987. On this occasion, a grand design for the future can take shape which could also inspire the industrialized countries to renew their efforts for more substantive co-operation.

Senior officials of ASEAN have been meeting frequently to prepare an agenda as well as relevant documents for approval at the summit. However, there is some concern that initiatives may be limited to improving existing patterns of co-operation without taking some daring steps to invigorate the organization. President Aquino provided the underlying rationale for new parameters of joint action. "ASEAN should stress regional interests in its decision-making process", she declared, "and regional interdependence should not be overshadowed by calculations of national costs and benefits".[25] In a comprehensive foreign policy review, Thai Foreign Minister Siddhi Savetsila went further by suggesting to devise "collective responses to economic challenges," to "demonstrate a political will . . . to make commitments", to minimize great power rivalry in the region "by influencing a favourable configuration", and by inducing an acceptance "of a code of conduct". Finally, he contended that "structural changes in the world economy require structural adjustments". If the summit can transform these general tasks into workable solutions, it would set another milestone in the history of ASEAN. But there are additional topics worthy of consideration.

As indicated earlier, there could be some precepts of foreign policy around which ASEAN member governments could unite, in addition to the Kampuchean question. Participation in international fora could usefully be expanded, perhaps even with ASEAN in an observer status. Membership requirements will have to be publicized, including reference to the principle of selection. Creating associate members may be one way of circumventing the demand for expansion in the number of full members. The dialogue process also begs review, including ASEAN economic missions abroad and a determination concerning a fundamental charter for acquiring an ASEAN legal identity.

For many years, the private sector in ASEAN has operated at the fringe of the Association, and the full potential of its contribution has been procedurally suppressed. If need be, a non-governmental regional assembly could be established under the auspices of the ASEAN Chamber of Commerce and Industry to formulate its own plans for regional development. A contact already exists with ASEAN committees and the economic ministers, but it is for a message delivery rather than consultation, for a hearing rather than influence on decisions or implementation.

Economic issues will undoubtedly be favoured on the summit agenda but will it include the ASEAN-U.S. Initiative (AUI) and the concept of a common market? It was in 1985 that Mr Brock, then U.S. Trade Representative, proposed a free

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trade area arrangement between the United States and ASEAN (AUI). ASEAN deferred a decision and the United States began exploring this issue with Canada. However, should ASEAN be prepared to accept the AUI in principle, perhaps one of the member states could try the idea of a pilot project.

Pursuance of a regional common market could be more complicated.[26] The Philippines and Malaysia introduced the topic at the economic ministers meeting in August 1986. All seemed to like the attempt of removing intra-regional trade barriers except Indonesia whose vast domestic market could be swamped with goods from neighbouring countries. Jakarta preferred a gradual policy of trade liberalization. Singapore soon sided with Indonesia and, in February 1987, they were joined by Brunei. Such united opposition may scuttle any plans for an early consideration of a common market unless some variations in the concept can be found and accepted. Still, it may at least be worthwhile to study possible consequences of an implementation. The ASEAN market is valued at US$70 billion and foreign investors, according to a recent EEC survey, could be attracted by a single market for the area. As ASEAN national economies accelerate in their industrialization efforts, friction among member states is bound to increase. A harmonization of policies leading to a common market could initiate the desired ASEAN growth.

It may prove impossible for the summit to avoid political and security questions. At the United Nations in October 1986, Foreign Minister Siddhi raised an interesting possibility, that of a regional warning system, established and maintained by the United Nations. But why subject a good idea to the chance of a veto in New York? ASEAN may want to initiate its own regional conference on confidence and security building measures.

There is no doubt that the December summit can and will change the perception of ASEAN either way. For proceedings in Manila to make a positive impact, ASEAN Heads of Government will have to take the risk of drastic action. It is easy to succumb to organizational inertia and natural political caution. ASEAN's prospective image must be one of energy and inspiration which could attract additional global resources. Its twentieth anniversary message should be a vigorous introduction to future achievements but not an epitaph for past accomplishments.

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2. Inherent ASEAN vulnerabilities are explained in greater detail in Hans H. Indorf, *Impediments to Regionalism in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984).
3. Singapore's Foreign Minister Dhanabalan's proposal followed his Prime Minister's suggestion of "5–1" made in 1982. So far, only Singapore has made use of this principle of not participating in projects which are not advantageous to itself without forfeiting the benefits of membership or later project participation. Obviously, the element of sacrifice for the common good is totally missing. See *ASEAN Newsletter*, No. 15 (May–June 1986).
4. Dr Mahathir is quoted by *ASEAN Newsletter*, No. 7 (January–February, 1985), p. 3; President Aquino in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 10 July 1986, p. 15, and in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Asia and Pacific, Daily Report* (hereafter cited as *FBIS:AP*), 28 August 1986, p. A2; and Professor Mochtar in *FBIS:AP*, 8 December 1986, p. N1.
5. *FBIS:AP*, 2 January 1987, pp. J1, N1, P1; ibid., 5 January 1987, pp. O2–O3.
6. *FBIS:AP*, 18 December 1986, p. N1. In M. Rajendran, *ASEAN's Foreign Relations* (Kuala Lumpur: Arenabuku, 1985), the author devotes a whole chapter to collective action (pp. 201–11) but fails to prove the existence of an ASEAN foreign policy.
7. There seems to be no urgency in finding common approaches but the realization is taking hold that joint efforts in foreign affairs could further improve ASEAN's negotiating position on trade issues. A Kuala Lumpur radio commentary on 2 July 1986 elaborated this point. See *FBIS:AP*, 9 July 1986, p. O2.
8. Submitted to the Sixteenth Annual Ministerial Meeting, its selected publication was only approved the following year. See *Joint Communique of the 17th Annual Ministerial Meeting* (Jakarta, 10 July 1984). The "Council" recommendation appears in the *ASEAN Task Force Report* (Jakarta: ASEAN National Secretariat 1983), p. 57, para 96–98.1.
9. Relevant information can be found in *New Straits Times*, 11 June 1985, p. 13; *Joint Publication Research Service* (S.E.A.-86–143), 18 August 1986; *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 20 September 1984, pp. 38–39; and *Washington Post*, 22 October 1986, p. A32. Mr Castro's suggestion was made in the Second ASEAN Standing Committee meeting, 6 November 1985, as reported in *ASEAN Newsletter*, No. 12 (November–December 1985), pp. 6–7.
10. An elaboration can be found in Hans H. Indorf, "Political Dimensions of Inter-Regional Cooperation: ASEAN and the EEC", in *Asia Pacific Community*, No. 19 (Winter 1983), and *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 14 August 1986, pp. 102–3.
11. The speech by Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah was published in *Foreign Affairs Malaysia* 19, No. 3 (Kuala Lumpur: Min. of Foreign Affairs, September 1986): 83–85; *FBIS:AP*, 1 May 1986, p. A5; and ibid., 4 November 1986, p. A1.
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23. The astonishing about-face certainly did not have its origin in Kuala Lumpur. See *FBIS:AP*, 19 July 1985, p. O1. Dr Mahathir's remarks were made at a press conference during his visit to South Korea in 1983.
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The Challenge to ASEAN Political Co-operation

LAU TEIK SOON

Political co-operation among the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) seeks to achieve certain general political goals. These include, firstly, the promotion of a good-neighbour policy — the political GNP; secondly, strengthening the political will to co-operate in various fields on a bilateral and regional basis; thirdly, the enhancement of cohesion and solidarity within ASEAN; and fourthly, the advancement of the concept of regional unity and eventual integration.

There are sound bases for political co-operation among the states in ASEAN to succeed. They have experienced a common colonial and historical past and were influenced by European colonialism and the Japanese Occupation. These events have left different imprints on the ASEAN societies, but all of them have learnt useful lessons from their contacts with external powers.

A common legacy of the colonial period is the basic format of a parliamentary democratic system which has been built upon by the governments concerned. They are attempting to develop various democratic institutions which suit their individual national characters.

Another basis for political co-operation is the development-oriented economic strategy of the present governments. Such an approach emphasizes a free-market economy, the active role of foreign investment and technology, and the effective and maximum utilization of the natural and manpower resources of the country.

Ideologically, there is the common perception that the main internal threat to the existence and survival of their societies is communism. Each has banned the communist party from open political activity and has not legalized it as a political party. The ASEAN states have been threatened by communist rebellions, insurrections and infiltration. The problem still exists today and the ASEAN governments have co-operated to deal with this threat. Apart from sharing experiences in counter-insurgency operations, they have, on a bilateral basis, improved joint exercises to pursue the communists located along their common borders.

Finally, another basis for political co-operation in ASEAN is the agreement among them that decisions on issues affecting the region should be made through a process of consensus and that disputes should be resolved through peaceful means. This is embodied in the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation signed at the Bali summit in February 1976.

As in other types of co-operation among ASEAN members, one should define

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the possible areas for political co-operation. Some of the issues are not new; nevertheless they require constant attention and focus. Prospects for political co-operation in ASEAN include the following: understanding and respect for the political system of each country, support for the government and leaders, strong backing for the state which is threatened by an external power, and finally, co-ordination of views and policies on various international matters.

Each of the ASEAN states has developed its own particular political system. In general terms, while they have all opted for a form of parliamentary democracy, each has its own peculiarities. These are the result of certain national factors such as its cultural traditions, indigenous political history and the constraints necessary in a modern society in order to maintain political stability and foster national unity. For these reasons, the political systems in the ASEAN states have certain built-in constitutional, legislative and administrative restrictions on individual freedom and association. For example, in the multiracial society of Malaysia and Singapore, it is seditious to advocate certain policies which deny the rights of the various racial, religious and linguistic communities. Under the Internal Security Act in Singapore, a person could be detained without trial if he espouses a Marxist or racialist programme. In most of the ASEAN states, certain political issues cannot be subjects for public debate. In Indonesia, all political parties and various associations must adopt the national ideology, that is, *Pancasila*, as the philosophical framework for their goals and activities. In Malaysia, Islam as the official religion, Bahasa Malaysia as the sole official language, and the preservation of the Sultanate are permanent and non-debatable features of the political system. Likewise, in Thailand, it is King, country and Buddhism, and in Brunei, it is the Sultanate and Islam as the state religion.

One striking characteristic of the political systems of the ASEAN countries is the dominance of the power élites in the political process and this is likely to remain for another five to ten years at least. In brief, the dominant political élites are the military and bureaucrats in Indonesia, United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and the Malays in Malaysia, the military and bureaucrats in Thailand, the People's Action Party (PAP) in Singapore, President Aquino and the military in the Philippines, and the Sultanate in Brunei. There is little, if any, prospect for any other political group to replace the power élites in each of the ASEAN countries. Where there is a change, it is likely to occur within the governing bodies. Thus, it is unlikely that a civilian will become either the President of Indonesia or the Prime Minister of Thailand in the near future. Likewise, it is not likely that a non-Malay can be the Prime Minister of Malaysia and a Malay to be the Prime Minister of Singapore. In the Philippines, the recent plebiscite confirmed Mrs Corazon Aquino as the President of the Philippines for the next six years. In the case of Brunei, the core leaders of the government come from the members of the royal family.

This is not to say that there is no move towards a liberalization of the democratic system in the ASEAN countries. Clearly, at the broad mass base level, there are attempts to involve the people in the political process. The citizens have the

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right to vote, to form political parties and pressure groups, to express their views openly and make use of the mass media. They have the right to change the government of the day at the general elections. Additionally, members of the public can participate in various grass-roots organizations and have access to the government leaders through various means, including dialogue sessions and public forums. The expectation, however, is that the general masses must contain their role in the political process within the constraints imposed by the constitution and other legal institutions. Thus, for political co-operation in ASEAN to progress, it is vital that the member states understand and respect the political system of one another. The greater the understanding, the greater the likelihood of success in this field.

Another area for political co-operation is the support for the government and leaders in each of the ASEAN states. Understanding the political system and the development of each country can lead to closer rapport among themselves. The support for a government can be expressed in an international forum where that government comes under criticism or attack from various foreign sources. A good example of this can be taken from Indonesia-Singapore relations. For some time, the Australian mass media had been critical of President Suharto and his handling of the Indonesian economy. On a visit to Australia, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew took the opportunity to comment favourably on the achievements and the progress which Indonesia has made since President Suharto took over in 1966. To put up such a stand for another government is likely to promote not only the good-neighbour policy but also ASEAN cohesion and solidarity.

A vital area for political co-operation is the need to rally around a government under threat from an external power. For example, at the present moment, it is clear that Thailand perceives a direct threat from Vietnam. Hence, all the ASEAN governments are expected to support Thailand on this issue. It is no wonder, therefore, that individually and collectively the other members have looked to Bangkok for any new direction or initiative relating to the Kampuchean issue. Thailand feels directly threatened by the developments in Kampuchea and, if ASEAN members do not stand behind it wholeheartedly on this matter, then it is not possible to strengthen political co-operation.

Finally, there is the co-ordination on foreign policy issues. A good example of this is the ASEAN agreement on the proposal for the creation of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality in Southeast Asia (ZOPFAN). Obviously, they agree that there is a need to minimize great power conflicts and external intervention in the region. It is in their national interests to agree on a common platform relating to the presence of major powers in the area.

Some possible areas for political co-operation in ASEAN have been identified and some examples have been cited to illustrate the kind of policies and actions which should be pursued. What then are the challenges to political co-operation in ASEAN?

Firstly, there are those factors which may undermine the bases for political co-operation; secondly, there is the perceived or real threat of one member from another; and thirdly, the foreign policy orientation of a state may be against the

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interests of another. There are other issues which can be subjects of discussion; however, these are the three main ones which shall be touched upon in this paper.

The main challenge to the parliamentary democratic system comes when there is a drift on the part of an ASEAN member towards either a communist or an extremist Islamic system. An example of the former case occurred in Singapore in the early 1960s. Singapore was seen to be taking an extreme left-wing posture or even be in danger of a communist take-over. Such a swing towards the extreme left was manifested in the formation of the Barisan Socialis. At that time, it was felt that the establishment of a so-called Cuba in the island state of Singapore would be against the national security interests of peninsular Malaysia. If Singapore were allowed to be independent, then it could pose a threat to its neighbour. The then Malayan and British Governments felt it opportune to incorporate the island-state into a larger federation. To prevent the emergence of a pro-communist or communist system in Singapore, the Malayan Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, proposed the formation of Malaysia in May 1961.

At present, there is no likelihood of any ASEAN country falling into communist hands. There is a serious communist threat to the Aquino administration in the Philippines. The approach of President Aquino was to seek a peaceful settlement of the dispute through negotiations and ceasefire. Unfortunately, this broke down and communist insurgency has resumed. However, it would seem that the Aquino government has formulated a broad strategy to tackle the communist insurgency — these include economic, social and political reforms and counter-insurgency operations. To undermine the mass base of the communist insurgency, land reforms, democratic elections for the representatives to the Congress, and a development-oriented economic policy which attempts to increase the standard of living of the people at large are being implemented. In Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, there exist the various communist movements but they do not present a real threat to the governments concerned. There are occasional cases of communist attacks and infiltration but they are well contained by the security forces.

Another challenge to ASEAN political co-operation will emerge when any of the member states opts for an extreme Islamic system. But what is the possibility of this occurring in an ASEAN state? For example, does the political trend in Malaysia of late indicate that extreme Islamic forces have gained greater inroads into and influence in the Mahathir administration? In this connection, it is interesting to note the most recent statement by the former Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tunku Abdul Rahman: he stated that certain politicians in Malaysia are using religion as an excuse to form an Islamic government. In the Tunku's view, this would divide Malaysia's multi-religious and multiracial society and undermine the Constitution and democracy in Malaysia. However, there is another view which states that while there may be an increase in the influence of the extremist Muslims on the government in Malaysia, this is not likely to lead to an Ayatollah-type of revolution. This is because the overwhelming majority of Muslims in Malaysia are Sunnis and not Shiites like the Ayatollah and his followers in Iran. It is clear that any advance of the exremist Islamic movement in Malaysian politics, particularly

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the introduction of extreme Islamic doctrines into Malaysian life, is likely to undermine the political co-operation in ASEAN.

Another challenge to political co-operation in ASEAN can come if a government adopts an expansionist attitude which threatens another state. Clearly, since ASEAN's formation, such a situation has not arisen. But one should be reminded of the case of Indonesia under President Soekarno, who attempted to coerce its neighbours to follow a certain line of policy in accordance with his NEFOS (Newly Emerging Forces) ideology. When Malaysia was formed, Indonesia opposed its formation and embarked on what was known as "Confrontation". This episode merely serves as a historical example of how a neighbouring state with an expansionist attitude can undermine political co-operation in ASEAN.

Another area of contention in ASEAN political relations is the tendency of a government to draw a red herring across a trail in order to distract the population from the economic chaos and failures on the home front. Poverty, unemployment, corruption, crop failures and other economic ills lead to considerable resentment and rebellion within a country and a strong opposition may emerge to take on the government of the day. An option for such a government would be to turn to an external bogey and blame a neighbouring state for their economic chaos. Such a thesis was presented during "Confrontation" when President Soekarno, plagued by the economic and political woes within the country, sought to divert national attention by focusing on the threat of neo-colonialism and opposing the formation of Malaysia. Since ASEAN's formation, however, there has been no ASEAN member which has resorted to such a course of action. However, if this were to happen, it would put the strength of ASEAN co-operation to the test.

A more serious challenge to ASEAN political co-operation comes when a state constitutes a potential or real threat to its neighbour in the regional organization. That threat can come in various forms: firstly, direct or indirect interference in the domestic affairs of another state; secondly, an act which is against the national interest of another member; thirdly, resort to force to settle territorial disputes; and fourthly, direct or indirect intervention in the local insurgency of a neighbouring state.

Respect for the sovereignty of each state must be observed by all ASEAN members. Unfortunately, in recent times, there have been cases of such infringement, specifically the interference in domestic affairs. For example, there was the recent incident relating to the visit of the Israeli President to Singapore. The occasion was entirely an internal matter of the Singapore Government. Yet, various Malaysians including prominent politicians opposed the action of the Singapore Government and conducted themselves in an irresponsible manner by demonstrating and even advocating various measures which could only be regarded as threatening to Singapore. Whether the measures suggested were adopted or not was immaterial. What mattered was that Singaporeans perceived that the Malaysians were violating their sovereignty and interfering in their internal affairs. Another example of interference by some Malaysian political leaders is their comments on Singapore's policies relating to procreation and military service, specifically the

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role of Malays in the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). The remarks were regarded as constituting an indirect interference in the domestic affairs of Singapore. These are immediate examples that come to mind. Such instances could make political co-operation more difficult.

A more significant problem is the resort to force to settle rival claims over a territory. Malaysia and the Philippines are engaged in a territorial dispute over Sabah. In 1968 it was thought that the Philippines under President Marcos would despatch an expeditionary force to Sabah in order to bring about a rebellion within the state. The so-called Corrigidor Incident and subsequent constitutional annexation by the Philippines led to not only a break in diplomatic relations between Malaysia and the Philippines, but also a standstill in ASEAN co-operation. Fortunately, of late, both governments have accepted the view that this issue should be resolved through negotiation and quiet diplomacy rather than through force or publicity in the mass media. Both parties could resort to the mechanism for the resolution of the issue provided for in the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation.

Another challenge that ASEAN political co-operation could face is the intervention by a member in the insurgency problem of a neighbouring state. In both Thailand and the Philippines, there are the Muslim insurgencies which are directed at the governments of Bangkok and Manila and which are aimed at achieving a degree of autonomy for the Muslim population. These are essentially the domestic affairs of the countries concerned. However, there are Islamic groups in some parts of Malaysia which seek to support the cause of the Muslim insurgents.

Finally, there is the question of the foreign policy orientation of an ASEAN state which may threaten the national security interest of another member. Presently, there is close collaboration among the ASEAN states relating to various foreign policy issues. In fact, it is standard practice for one ASEAN government to inform its colleagues before it embarks on a new foreign policy initiative which may affect the national interest of the others.

The challenge to ASEAN political co-operation can be seen if a member moves towards some kind of alliance with the perceived adversary of another state. Malaysia and Indonesia perceive China to be the long-term threat to their national security. Clearly, if an ASEAN state were to move towards closer collaboration with Beijing or sign some kind of treaty alliance, including military co-operation, this would certainly weaken ASEAN unity. Likewise, if another ASEAN state moves towards close co-operation with Vietnam or co-operates on certain security matters, this will be regarded as detrimental to other ASEAN members. If the ASEAN state were to work closely with Vietnam to deal with the so-called China problem, then this action would be interpreted as a threat by Thailand which sees Vietnam as a danger to its national security. The cohesion and solidarity of ASEAN could be fragmented.

Relations between the ASEAN states and other countries outside the region are also significant. An issue which is pertinent to this discussion on ASEAN political co-operation is the recent proposal by some ASEAN states to promote a nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia. While, in principle, it is agreed that the

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presence of nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia constitutes a danger to national security, the adoption of such a proposal would undermine the treaty commitments which some ASEAN states have with external powers. For example, Thailand and the Philippines have military alliances with the United States. The ships of the U.S. Seventh Fleet have to visit the bases in Thailand and the Philippines. In fact, the U.S. Seventh Fleet visits other ASEAN ports as well. If the adoption of the nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia means that there will be opposition to the visits of nuclear-armed or nuclear-equipped ships of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, then this will be unacceptable to some of the ASEAN states.

Since ASEAN's formation in 1967 and particularly since the Bali summit in 1976, there have been improvements in the various areas of political co-operation. The political GNP or good-neighbour policy has grown: the ASEAN states are on good terms with one another despite periods of stress and strain. Though political difficulties exist, they have not been allowed to undermine good bilateral relations and ASEAN co-operation. Nevertheless, it has often been said that the lack of progress in the economic field is the result of the lack of political will on the part of the ASEAN governments. It is the author's view that political will can only result from greater political co-operation, particularly in the area of political GNP. If political will is weak, it implies that much more effort must be devoted to the promotion of political co-operation, both on a bilateral and regional basis.

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ASEAN's External Trade Relations in 1987: Entering a Growing Environmental Turbulence

DORODJATUN KUNTJORO-JAKTI

Growing Global Interdependency and ASEAN's Position

It is generally recognized, even by the most sceptical observers, that during the last three decades the world economy has become much more interdependent, integrated, and internationalized. The trend towards global interdependency is so strong that, perhaps, not too far in the future, we will all live in a "world without borders". Indeed, all indications point to the fact that by the beginning of the twenty-first century no nation or region will be able to survive economically in complete isolation from others. One implication of the trend is that the global environment may strongly condition the effectiveness of a national economic policy. It must also be stated that very important political and military implications of interdependence do interact with and are frequently a function of economic interdependence.

One very important indication of this growing global economic interdependency is of course the growth of international trade compared with the growth of gross domestic product (GDP). As stated by the World Bank: "Trade as a function of national income grows with it; but if trade grows at a more rapid rate than income, this indicates greater reliance on outside markets for the domestic product as well as on outside sources for domestic consumption and production".[1] The data on the growth of world exports of goods and non-factor services at constant prices, and the world GDP annual rate of growth in real terms for the period 1950–80, do indicate that the ratio of world exports to GDP rose from 12.2 per cent in 1960 to 21.8 per cent in 1980. A more detailed analysis of the data indicates, furthermore, that the number of countries for whom the trade GDP ratio has increased over that period has persistently risen. This trend occurs for all categories of countries: industrial countries, oil-exporting countries, and non-oil exporting developing countries.

The extraordinary and unprecedented growth in international trade is also accompanied by an equally rapid growth in services; and by an even faster growth in international travel. As a consequence of the rising interdependency, in particular because of the progressive liberalization of capital transactions, a major impetus has also been given to the rapid growth of international capital flows. Trade interdependency, thus, is accompanied by financial interdependency among all categories of nations since 1960. As the same time, this increasing global interdependence is manifested also in both the widening and deepening of economic

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contacts and interchange among nations. Thus, in the last two decades there have been large-scale movements of labour — unskilled, semi-skilled, and skilled, some legal and some illegal. The rapid growth of TNCs (trans-national corporations) has also been made possible by the growing interdependency causing in turn the spread of knowledge, technology and managerial skills in the world; and, eventually, the spread of industrialization to countries outside the West and Japan, including the developing Third World states.

The rapid rise of global trade and financial interdependency which has occurred since the 1960s has enabled the ASEAN economies to grow more rapidly than the industrial countries of the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development). It is not surprising, therefore, that the share of ASEAN in world trade should have expanded during the rapid global economic growth of the 1970s. The market economies of ASEAN, as a matter of fact, remain one of the fastest growing regions in the world in the period of world recession which started in 1979 and which continued practically unabated up to the present. As a consequence of the rapid growth of their GDP and international trade by 1981, all the ASEAN countries were categorized by the World Bank as "middle income economies", that is, when Indonesia finally joined the ranks after going through a rapid growth period of the First Five-Year Plan, the Second Five-Year Plan, and part of the Third Five-Year Plan. In general, all the ASEAN economies have practically out-performed the middle income category.

ASEAN has been able to reach this extraordinary growth position because of several factors:

1. The ASEAN countries have the available natural resources and they are willing to sell them. As a consequence, ASEAN has emerged as one of the world's most important exporters of primary products, such as rubber, tin, coffee, palm oil, rice, tapioca and copra, several kinds of other minerals, as well as crude oil, petroleum and natural gas.
2. The ASEAN countries have adopted the system of private enterprise with its reliance on market forces, supported by a heavy emphasis on economic openness to meet international standards of economic efficiency and the use of the criteria of comparative advantage as a guide to resource allocation.
3. The ASEAN countries have maintained a strict standard of financial stability brought about by sound macro-economic policies. They have adopted this stance in combination with a favourable foreign investment policy, and most importantly, with a liberal system of capital movements.
4. The ASEAN countries have been able to maintain a favourable political situation strongly conducive to economic development, even if there have been the usual tensions from time to time.

In the last two decades, the rapid growth of exports in the ASEAN economies has enabled imports to rise in an extraordinary fashion, most importantly to support the growing ambitions and efforts at industrialization of the ASEAN governments. Throughout the late 1960s up to the beginning of the 1980s, therefore, ASEAN imports of capital and intermediate goods from the industrial coun-

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tries rose dramatically, at first to achieve domestic production of previously imported labour-intensive goods (import substitution). By the middle of the 1970s, however, most of these ASEAN import-substitution industries had begun to export some of their products, and not merely to utilize their unutilized capacity but, as a matter of policy, to diversify their operations and earn higher profits. Starting at that time, and in more earnest at the beginning of the 1980s, there was a move among some of the ASEAN countries to foster heavy and chemical industries on the basis of relatively well developed natural resources. This move to the upstream side of the industrialization process, as can be expected, fuelled their determination to push exports even harder to finance the rapidly increasing industrialization-linked imports.

One important consequence of such a development strategy is that the ASEAN domestic economy, including its drive for industrialization, became plugged into the international economic system. ASEAN's success increasingly depends on the economic performance of the industrialized nations and the further expansion of world trade. The ASEAN domestic economy, as a matter of fact, has been increasingly sucked into the international division of labour. Despite the fact that ASEAN's share of exports of primary products still plays a dominant role, the successful efforts to diversify exports have enabled ASEAN's total exports and imports to expand rapidly. At the same time, the growth rates of exports and imports of such major trading partners as Japan and the United States were lower or merely equal to the average growth rates for the world as a whole. On the other hand, the increasing imports of capital and intermediate goods of the ASEAN countries have enabled exports from both the United States and Japan to ASEAN to grow faster than their domestic demand or exports to other regions. Throughout the shift from the easy import-substitution industrialization stage to that of export diversification, the capital inflow to ASEAN played a major role in meeting the rapidly rising financial requirements. Thus, during the whole period of rapid growth, the ASEAN economies enjoyed the use of all kinds of capital inflows — ODA (Overseas Development Assistance) and other official flows, direct or portfolio investment, other long and short-term banking flows, and export credits. It is quite to the point, therefore, when one observer came up with a statement, that: "Much of ASEAN's economic growth has been fuelled by debt and induced by trade".

A study of economic interdependence in the Asia-Pacific region has proven, by using the inter-regional I-O table for 1975, which covers ASEAN, Korea, Japan and the United States, how the emerging international division of labour among these countries has brought on trade conflicts — a phenomenon requiring the co-ordination of industrial policies. The phenomenon, evidently, has created the "competition and complementarity" feature of the international division of labour in the region, which is predicted to continue for a long time.

The "competition" as a feature of the international division of labour emerges as a consequence of the growing rivalries between export industries in the developing economies and the import-competing domestic industries in the

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developed countries. The "complementarity" feature, on the other hand, emerges as a result of the growing dependency of those export industries in the developing economies on the imports of capital and intermediate goods from the developed countries. The intensified competition coupled with complementarity has brought about two types of conflict. In the developed countries, the growing competition posed by the export products from the developing economies has raised protectionistic sentiments. In the developing economies, on the other hand, the growing dependency on imports from the developed countries has created growing balance-of-payments difficulties or bilateral account deficits with specific countries.

As the global economy has slowed down since 1979 and hit the Asia-Pacific economies, these mutually reinforcing processes have created a critical situation in the economic relationships between these countries.

Intra-ASEAN Trade and Economic Co-operation

As many inside and outside ASEAN have observed, during the period of rapid growth and growing involvement in the international division of labour, and despite serious efforts by ASEAN leaders to mould a closer co-operation after the 1976 ASEAN summit at Bali, intra-ASEAN trade remains minimal. By 1984, with a steady increase of the step-by-step trade liberalization pursued under the PTA (Preferential Trading Arrangement) scheme, intra-ASEAN trade had reached a level of 20.9 per cent and 20.3 per cent for exports and imports respectively in total ASEAN trade. Under the scheme, the number of trade commodities/products covered by the across-the-board tariff cut jumped from 71 to 18,468 items as at June 1986. In addition, the value ceiling for the tariff-cut items has been continuously increased from US$50 thousand to US$1 million, and then to US$2.5 million; while the margin of preference has been increased from 10 to 20 per cent, and then to 25 per cent. Efforts to widen the PTA coverage are also continuously being made by reducing the number of items excluded. It is noted further that intra-ASEAN trade has grown in proportion to the total at a faster pace in the case of the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei; at a somewhat moderate pace in the case of both Singapore and Thailand; but suffered a decline in the case of Indonesia. The proportion of intra-ASEAN trade will be even lower, however, if trade with Singapore is excluded.

To those who are critical of ASEAN's progress so far, the rather low proportion of intra-ASEAN trade indicates the existence of a fundamental difficulty encountered in the PTA scheme. The fundamental problem lies in the fact that the economic structure of the ASEAN countries, excluding Singapore, is basically similar. Therefore, they are in competition rather than in complementarity to each other. In addition, the different levels of economic development among the ASEAN countries have often created obstacles in the attempt to expand economic co-operation beyond trade. The report submitted by the Task Force set up by the Fifteenth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting held in 1982 to appraise and review the

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progress of ASEAN, and to identify policy measures that would maximize the attainment of ASEAN goals and objectives and new directions for future ASEAN co-operation, generally agreed with the observation that co-operation in the trade and economic fields remains mediocre or worse. Furthermore, ASEAN co-operation has had an important record of performance in the "pooling of resources", but has been very limited in the "sharing of markets". ASEAN co-operation seems to be more successful and produces more concrete results externally. It is through the success of such external endeavours that ASEAN has earned acceptance and respect as a regional grouping. Through a show of combined strength, ASEAN has been able to negotiate with the industrialized nations on a more equal basis and thus achieve better results in long-term economic co-operation.

Various reasons have been put forward for this slow progress in intra-ASEAN economic co-operation:

1. ASEAN at this stage is only committed to building up the conditions and institutional structures for practical and efficient economic integration without defining what such integration really means. ASEAN has not set targets and a time-frame for economic co-operation and projects are generally undertaken more on an *ad hoc* basis.
2. ASEAN decisions are reached by consensus and, in the process, great care is taken to account for the national interest of every member country while avoiding any attempt at forcing the pace of co-operation which might be counter-productive and lead to unnecessary friction.
3. ASEAN's outward orientations, in combination with the basic fact of the lack of internal complementarity between its individual members' economies, have often obliged them to downgrade efforts to create closer economic co-operation between them. ASEAN's development strategies and economic structure make it heavily dependent on industrialized countries for markets, technology and investment.
4. Intra-ASEAN co-operation in trade is not rewarding enough when compared with trade with the industrialized countries. The gains in dollar terms are often much less than exports of the same volume to the industrialized countries. In addition, in its present form, it provides little scope for expansion and cannot help solve existing and future economic problems. Most importantly, also, the infrastructure to provide the links between the ASEAN countries is still underdeveloped. Trade routes are more readily available between ASEAN and the United States, Japan, and Europe than between members of ASEAN themselves.

By the beginning of the 1980s, in the midst of the slowing down of growth in the industrialized nations and the turbulence of the global economic environment, ASEAN found itself still without a strong network of economic relationships to be used as a dynamic compensating element to support its sagging externally-linked economic growth. ASEAN faces the fact that the step-by-step approach to closer regional co-operation may no longer be appropriate in the face of a rapidly

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changing international economic environment, and yet the task of changing this approach of *musyawarah-mufakat* has proven to be quite a formidable one. The ASEAN countries also seem unable still to resolve the problem of balancing the regional priorities with national priorities. Regional priorities are given importance only if they coincide or are supportive of national priorities.

As all the ASEAN countries are now facing major problems in sustaining their growth records in the decades ahead, it is appropriate to heed the warnings that unless something is done to give substance to ASEAN co-operation all will find it very difficult to follow in the footsteps of ASEAN's fast-paced neighbours.

Challenges Ahead

The growth of the world economy has slowed down substantially. After averaging more than 5 per cent in the 1960s, global growth dropped to 4 per cent in the first half of the 1970s, to 3.5 per cent in the second half of the 1970s, and to about only 2 per cent in the first half of the 1980s. More seriously, analyses abound indicating that the sharp decline is based upon permanent changes in underlying growth potentials and is thus likely to persist. It is not merely because of temporary factors and/or faulty policies and, therefore, a recovery towards previous levels can still be realistically expected. According to one much discussed analysis, within the last decade or so, three fundamental changes have occurred in the very fabric of the world economy:

1. The primary-products economy has come "uncoupled" from the industrial economy.
2. In the industrial economy itself, production has come "uncoupled" from employment.
3. Capital movements rather than trade (in both goods and services) have become the driving force of the world economy. The two have not quite come uncoupled, but the link has become loose, and worse, unpredictable.

Earlier, in 1983, another analysis had presented a preliminary but very insightful study on the causes of these permanent, rather than cyclical, changes. And, even though it is much too early to guess what the world economy of tomorrow will be like, both analysts are strongly of the opinion that these changes will continue as the economic dynamics have decisively shifted from the national economy to the world economy.

Meanwhile, over the short-term, practically all of the developing countries — including ASEAN — are faced with a daunting problem, that is, the detachment of the link between growth in world output and growth in world trade. For decades, one of the more consistent features of the world economy has been the link between growth in output and growth in trade. Now, that link is at risk, and there is a distinct possibility that even as world output picks up again, trade will stagnate. The trade growth of almost 9 per cent in 1984 fell to 3.2 per cent on an annual basis in 1986, and thereafter continued to decline steadily when measured on a quarterly basis to 0.2 per cent by the end of 1987. More importantly, rising

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protectionistic sentiment and the imposition of import quotas on manufactures, the fall in commodity prices, and the continuing deterioration in the terms of trade of indebted primary product exporters, including oil exporters, has made world trade prospects even more dependent on trade between the industrialized countries.

It seems for ASEAN, therefore, attempts to relinquish ties with the advanced industrialized nations, no matter how gradually it is envisaged, might not be feasible. On the contrary, ASEAN might find itself in an even more serious dialogue with its trading partners to obtain guarantees for all the relationships it had enjoyed so far with the United States, Japan, and Europe in the hope of maintaining a reasonable growth in the future. Apart from the long-recognized facts of the lack of complementarity between their economies and their continuing outward-looking policies, ASEAN — like all the developing countries — is now forced to recognize that the very turbulence of the global economy has led to greater integration. This is caused by the rapid growth of international credit and capital markets which started in the 1970s and continues unabated up to the present.

The link between ASEAN and the industrialized countries, as a matter of fact, is getting even closer now as ASEAN strives hard to expand its export of manufactures, among other things as part of its efforts to diversify its economies and reduce its dependency on exports of agricultural and mining commodities/products. In the face of global turbulence, ASEAN has to strive even harder to expand its share in world exports. Thus, ASEAN has to find a balance between attempts at exploitation of external markets and of internal markets, while reducing the heavy load of maintaining the trappings of an excessively import-substituting industrialization strategy.

In particular, from the viewpoint of Indonesia, in recognition of its weak industrial structure and the difficulties encountered in developing resource-based and labour-intensive heavy industries, there is a strong interest in jointly building a global market for ASEAN commodities/products. The growing turbulence in the world economy only strengthens Indonesia's determination to safeguard its access to the world market, in particular to the markets of the United States, Japan, and Europe. Perhaps, like the other ASEAN members, Indonesia also considers the complete sharing of markets impractical because of the differences in the perception of the process of economic development and the limited degree of complimentarity among the ASEAN economies.

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The Challenge to ASEAN Economic Co-operation

BERNARDO M. VILLEGAS

Introduction: Meaningful Economic Co-operation: What It Entails

No form of economic co-operation between two or more countries can be truly meaningful unless it involves substantial market sharing and resource pooling. Market sharing allows domestic industries to free themselves from the constraints of a limited market at home. Resource pooling permits them to improve their specialization, lower their costs and enhance their competitiveness in the world market.

There are four levels at which different countries can pursue meaningful economic co-operation with one another. The first is by establishing among each other a free trade area. In a free trade area, participating countries agree to dismantle trade barriers against each other, and in effect allow each other's goods to move freely within their territorial boundaries. The desired result is that these countries' industries gain access to a larger market than they would otherwise have had, enabling them to achieve economies of scale and improve their competitiveness against industries outside the region. The region's consumers, incidentally, also benefit from the lower cost and more efficiently produced goods.

Beyond the free trade area, there is the second level: the customs union. In a customs union, participating economies agree not only to trade freely with each other, just as countries do in a free trade zone, but also to impose a common external tariff wall against imports from other countries. With this arrangement, high-tariff member states, for example, Indonesia, need not worry about goods from outside the union finding their way past their shores via prior entry in low-tariff member states, for example, Singapore.

Moving on, we have the third level, the common market. A common market possesses all the features of a customs union, with the addition of complete labour resource mobility within the union's member states. Here, the concept of resource pooling is realized, as manpower is allocated according to where it can be most efficiently used. If the ASEAN region were to become a common market, both Brunei's labour shortage and the Philippines' unemployment problems could be simultaneously solved through unhampered manpower exports. In the long run, wage costs of all the ASEAN member states would be equalized.

Finally, we have the full economic union — the ultimate in economic integration. Here, the member states agree not only to trade goods and services freely with one another, but also to unify their economic policies — trade, monetary, fiscal, and so forth. The full economic union is what most existing unions aspire to

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achieve eventually, as it binds separate economic entities into an integrated and stronger whole. As one can see, ASEAN is clearly miles away from arriving at this stage, if it gets there at all.

ASEAN was formed in 1967 with the primary goal — and again I say, *primary* — of forging meaningful economic co-operation among its member states. In 1987, the organization will be twenty years old, and definitely no longer an infant bloc. But, ASEAN has so far failed to even reach the very first stage of meaningful co-operation — that is, establishing a free trade area.

An Assessment of ASEAN's Progress at Forging Intra-Regional Economic Co-operation

The volume of paper flowing from lower level working groups, consultative bodies, study groups, and seminars conducted by and on ASEAN leaves one with the impression that the region is overflowing with co-operative undertakings. A broad survey of these files, however, will quickly reveal that beyond the impressive bureaucratic paraphernalia, there have only been three agreements among ASEAN's members to date that come close to promoting substantial market sharing and resource pooling among them. These are: (1) the Preferential Trading Arrangement; (2) the ASEAN Industrial Complementation Agreement; and (3) the ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture Agreement of 1984.

The Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) provides for all ASEAN member states to grant 50 per cent discounts on existing tariff rates for ASEAN products on the PTA list. This concept is commendable, considering that it is one step in the direction of establishing an ASEAN free trade area. But most of the 18,000 terms included on this list to date are minor and possess little trade potential. Many of the items, in fact, are sourced outside the region. Thus, the PTA has done little to increase intra-ASEAN trade from previous levels. Neither has it stimulated the growth of new and/or stronger industries within the region.

Secondly, we have the ASEAN Industrial Complementation Agreement (AIC). Under this scheme, ASEAN industries are to develop horizontal linkages in certain industries — for example, automotive — in order for them to achieve greater economies of scale. This scheme, clearly designed to promote meaningful resource pooling among ASEAN industries, was enthusiastically received by representatives of member states. However, it practically lost its purpose when member states began going their separate ways in building their own automotive industries. One does not need to mention names in this case because everyone knows which countries were involved.

Finally, we have the ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture Agreement (AIJV). The AIJV agreement, which specifies preferential treatment for goods sourced from firms that are jointly set up by at least two ASEAN member states, does provide the region with a basic framework for market sharing and resource pooling. But again, the specified discount on tariff rates — 50 per cent — still falls short of

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promoting full market sharing. The procedures for setting up an AIJV are also rather cumbersome.

All told, one cannot help but get the impression that ASEAN's leaders are simply not determined enough to arrive at meaningful intra-regional economic co-operation. Indeed, the prevailing mentality among ASEAN leaders seems to be one of aversion to meaningful intra-regional economic co-operation; as if doing so would be tantamount to surrendering a portion of their respective national sovereignties. This is strange, considering that economic co-operation is supposed to benefit the co-operating parties as a whole and individually. But it has so far limited ASEAN's economic role to acting as a lobby group against U.S. or Japanese protectionism.

Why the Stalemate?

After twenty years of ASEAN's existence, it has become obvious to all the world that, despite the countless meetings, the sophisticated feasibility studies, and the highly visible proclamations, economic co-operation within ASEAN has proceeded at a snail's pace. When the Philippines proposed that the ASEAN region be converted into a free trade area in 1979, response among the other member states was lukewarm. At that time the organization agreed to conduct a feasibility study on this matter only in 1982 — a whole three years later. Again, one cannot help but wonder about the seeming reluctance on the part of ASEAN to step up efforts at economic co-operation.

Popular notion has long suggested two reasons for the current stalemate. The first has to do with the so-called non-complementarity of the ASEAN economies. The second involves the lack of political will among ASEAN leaders to subordinate narrow national interest to broad regional concerns.

The allegation that the ASEAN economies are more competitive than they are complementary has a grain of truth in it. Save for Singapore, ASEAN's member states are largely resource-based economies that are heavily reliant upon a few major commodities for their exports. Some of these commodities — such as the Philippines' coconut oil and Malaysia's palm oil — directly compete with one another. So then, it is asked, how can meaningful co-operation be achieved under such a situation — when economies produce practically the same type of goods and compete for the same markets?

This argument, appealing as it may sound, is an oversimplification of the issue. For it ignores the well-known doctrine of comparative advantage, which ensures that a complementary relationship can be achieved even between similar economies, for as long as they agree to trade freely among themselves. The case of the European Common Market is living testimony to this, as its original members were all at a similar stage of development and technological advancement, and produced similar products when they decided to band together.

Even at this moment, thousands of ASEAN businessmen are trading with one another and taking home handsome profits. They do not get intimidated by such

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talk that their countries are more competitive than complementary. For they realize that within the six countries of ASEAN, there will always be certain things that Singapore can do better than the rest, certain resources that Malaysia has in abundance that the rest do not possess, and certain labour advantages that the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia enjoy over the other member states.

There are some prominent examples of the application of the theory of comparative advantage to ASEAN states. A number of Malaysian firms are very active in the Philippines in the growing of cacao and rubber. Although Malaysia within the ASEAN region pioneered the production and export of these plantation crops, the experience of the last five years have convinced Malaysian firms that the island of Mindanao in the Philippines is better endowed with the ideal conditions for growing cacao and rubber. Another reason that Malaysians are increasingly investing in rubber plantations in the Philippines is the acute labour shortage that the rubber industry in Malaysia is facing. Thus, although Malaysia and the Philippines produce similar commodities, there is significant room for complementation.

Academicians, analysts and government officials should not fall into the trap of over-analysing these economies on paper, especially on superficial levels. Practical businessmen know how to spot an opportunity with any trading partner. Perhaps we should follow their lead.

The second popular notion has to do with national interest supposedly conflicting with regional interest. This argument is strange for the distinction between regional and national interest is an unnecessary if not a mischievous one. What benefits the region as a whole should ultimately benefit ASEAN's individual members. If at any time one member feels its national interest is being left out in the others' definition of regional interest, then it can easily bolt the association.

In fact, there is no real conflict between regional and national interest. Rather, the conflict is between short-term interests versus long-term gains. Most of the ASEAN leaders are well aware of the benefits of closer economic co-operation in the long run, but they are afraid to face the political consequences of economic adjustment and dislocation in the short-run.

It is a pity that this kind of situation exists. For a long time, all the ASEAN leaders enjoyed terms of office that extended for indefinite periods of time. Thus, unlike the case in many other countries, they did not have to sacrifice long-term development goals for short-term showcase projects and policies that re-electionists often have to consider to win votes.

What then could be the real reasons that ASEAN's efforts at economic co-operation lack the determination necessary for their success? Could it be simply misconceptions on the part of ASEAN's leaders, rather than divergent philosophies?

Perhaps misconceptions are partly to blame, as our earlier discussion may have shown. But there is yet another reason, one that does not speak too well of each member's past economic performance, despite their relatively high growth

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rates. Just the same, though, it is one that brings forth new hope for the coming years.

In the decade and a half after ASEAN was founded in 1967 each member state enjoyed unusually high rates of economic growth. The external environment was most favourable — commodity prices hit record levels, world trade expanded at a brisk pace, and foreign creditors were relatively liberal in lending money. This combination of circumstances was tailor-made to ASEAN as a whole, such that even countries that did not deserve to do so — for example, the Philippines — grew by at least 6 per cent.

With growth coming almost effortlessly, there was little pressure among the ASEAN states to co-operate with one another. What is likely is that most of the ASEAN leaders were lulled into a confident complacency; into a careless attitude reflective of the words, "With what I'm achieving now, who needs co-operation? In fact, who needs the others?" The point is most succinctly illustrated by the number of times that ASEAN heads met together since the association's inception in 1967 — twice. On both these occasion, transcripts will reveal that discussions were practically confined to political issues.

In sum, it can be said that the slow progress in ASEAN economic co-operation is largely due to: 1) differing philosophies on the part of different member states, some of these philosophies being products of popular misconceptions; and 2) lack of political will, fostered either by complacency during the high-growth period of the 1970s, or by fear against the short-run costs of economic adjustment.

Economic Prospects for the ASEAN Region in the Years Ahead

The rest of the 1980s and perhaps even until the early 1990s, does not look very promising for the ASEAN countries. Market conditions for commodity exports, including oil, are bland; and world trade is expanding at a very slow pace.

Most of the region's economies have already been hard hit by the change in the environment. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei suffered from falling prices as well as shrinking markets for primary commodities. And the Philippines, because of internal problems, saw its per capita income shrink to 1975 levels. Even Singapore, for two and a half decades the region's star performer, was not spared by the world recession.

Thailand, so far the least hit by the slowdown in world trade, managed to grow by 4–5 per cent yearly during the first six years of the 1980s. But this, economic historians note, is significantly below its average for the past two decades.

Glancing at the latest five-year development plans, every ASEAN country, with the conspicuous exception of the Philippines, has scaled down its growth projections for the next five years to an average of one half of the post-1960 historical growth averages. So far every single member of ASEAN is off to a poor start in meeting these already lowered targets. In 1986, the Philippines grew by 0.1 per

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cent, Singapore by 1.9 per cent, Malaysia and Indonesia by less than 1 per cent, Thailand by 3 per cent and Brunei by no more than the rest. Ironically, the region that used to outperform almost all others in the world is now growing at below-average rates. Sadly, the implication here is undeniable — that with the possible exceptions of Singapore and Thailand, ASEAN's past growth can be attributed more to favourable external conditions, than to conscious internal efforts.

Unfortunate though this realization may be, it brings forth a light of new hope — that the harder times ahead may just be the catalyst needed to speed up ASEAN efforts to co-operate with one another.

Suggested Measures to Speed up Economic Co-operation within ASEAN

For whatever it is worth, one can cite here some of the more sensible suggestions that have been made so far on how to promote greater ASEAN economic co-operation.

The first measure that will go far in increasing intra-ASEAN trade is to allow ASEAN firms to use ASEAN currencies when trading with one another. This measure will not only speed up intra-ASEAN transactions, that would have been made with U.S. dollars anyway, but, given that some of the member states now experience a foreign exchange shortage, this measure could even generate increased intra-ASEAN trade.

This measure is supported by the ASEAN banking council, and now awaits favourable action from the Central Banks of the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia. Singapore, Malaysia, and Brunei permit the use of any currency that is acceptable to their private traders.

Secondly, ASEAN member countries should have uniform investment rules, at least for AIJVs, so that rule differences do not create a bias against setting up AIJVs in certain countries. As they are now, the investment rules in the six ASEAN countries logically dictate that all AIJVs should be set up in Singapore, where they will bear the least cost. This is unfortunate, considering that other countries, such as the Philippines and Indonesia, need the new investments more desperately.

The third measure is to allow free movement of ASEAN-sourced raw materials and manpower within the region. This would lead to improving the competitiveness of each member's user industries, while maximizing the comparative advantages in the processing and use of ASEAN raw materials and labour. There are understandable fears on the part of one or two countries in implementing such a policy, for it risks depriving a large number of their agricultural workers of their source of livelihood, at a time when domestic unemployment is a major problem. The policy can be implemented on a gradual basis, however, so that the new opportunities that will arise from it can offset the displacements with a minimum lag.

Finally, ASEAN should develop special trading arrangements with the United States and/or Japan, or any country or group of countries, for that matter, that

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can serve as a ready market for ASEAN products, as well as an efficient supplier of goods needed by the region's industries and consumers. This last suggestion may be a bit forward looking, as it assumes that ASEAN first gets its act together. Nevertheless, it is a reminder of the possibilities that lie in store should the member-countries succeed in forging stronger intra-ASEAN economic ties and more competitive ASEAN industries.

Summary of Proposals

Along the general guidelines enumerated above, the following are concrete proposals that have been made in several conferences and workshops in recent months.

1. In exploring special trading arrangements with the developed countries (such as the United States, Japan, or the EEC), the ASEAN countries can jointly organize trade fairs in the major foreign cities. When the target audience is made up of small and medium-scale investors from the developed countries, much can be gained from the preparation of brochures, pamphlets and other informational materials that are printed in Japanese, English, or other European languages.

2. Management personnel, especially at the middle level, should be allowed free movement within ASEAN. The member countries have managers with significantly varying types of specialization. For example, the Philippines has a surplus of very talented marketing and finance executives that it can and does share with other ASEAN countries. It lacks, however, production-oriented executives in manufacturing and agribusiness ventures. Thus, the Philippines can benefit from Singaporean, Malaysian or Thai production-oriented managers in such sectors as food processing, wood processing, cacao and rubber farming. Likewise, expertise accumulated through the years by the Singaporean in housing and construction technology can be very valuable to the efforts of the Philippines and Indonesia to solve their serious urban housing problems.

3. As suggested by a senior Filipino executive in the ASEAN-Japan Economic Council recently, there should be organized as many product, commodity and service groups as possible to discuss ASEAN co-operation among government, quasi-government and state trading organizations. Where no co-operation is feasible, the working group terminates after the first meeting.

4. The same Filipino executive suggested an approach that he termed "accommodation". Within a domestic economy, underground or clandestine activities can constitute a significant portion of the gross national product (GNP). At the international level, there can also be a thriving underground economy. Some countries have tolerated such underground activities as a temporary solution to the problems of acute mass poverty, as shown in the recent experience of the Philippines. One way to broaden the base for increased intra-regional trade in ASEAN is for governments to "tolerate" or "accommodate" some of these unavoidable underground activities. For example, Menado — a major city in Indonesia — is very much closer to Davao City in the Philippines than to Jakarta.

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Trade between Davao and Menado can be allowed greater freedom, without the need for a total restructuring of tariff rates in the two countries. A related proposal is to allow tuna fish caught in Indonesian waters close to the Philippines to be processed in the canning facilities in the island of Mindanao. The same arrangement can be applied to copra grown in Northern Indonesia that can be processed in the coconut oil mills of Mindanao. Some innovative way of giving official recognition to the so-called "black economy" may be a step closer to the ideal of a free trade area.

5. In the wooden furniture industry, joint-venture manufacturing activities with investors from Japan, Korea or Taiwan can be enhanced if there can be greater intra-regional trade on raw materials (such a rattan) and access to auxiliary industries such as adhesive or paint manufacture.

6. As suggested in the Fourth Pacific Economic Co-operation Conference, there can be activities for regional co-operation in livestock and feed grain within the Asia-Pacific region. A Study Programme, launched in New Zealand on 30 June–2 July 1986, will focus on the economic feasibility of further development of livestock and feedgrain industries, especially in the ASEAN region. The ASEAN countries can co-operate in persuading such countries as Japan, Korea and Taiwan to liberalize their imports of food and feed products.

7. Finally, there can be a wider sharing of the experiences of both governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) within ASEAN on such socio-economic issues as land reform, co-operative development, the inculcation of healthy work attitudes, and other productivity-raising measures. For example, there is a private foundation in the Philippines that has developed effective programmes for improving the work habits of blue-collar workers. Such techniques may be equally applicable to the predominantly Malay populations of Indonesia and Malaysia. There should be greater interaction among the PVOs or NGOs of the ASEAN countries.

Conclusion: An ASEAN Common Market by the Year 2000?

The meeting of ASEAN representatives in Manila in 1986 featured talks about an ASEAN Common Market by the turn of the century. The proposal was made by the new Philippine economic ministers, who realized how important economic co-operation would be to rebuilding a devastated economy. Unfortunately, the proposal was hastily brushed aside by representatives from the other ASEAN member states. Will history continue to repeat itself as regards the region's efforts to forge closer economic co-operation?

Meaningful economic co-operation, as was earlier defined, cannot be achieved without substantial market sharing and resource pooling within a given region. We have seen how one, two or three of ASEAN's members have always been adverse to the idea for one reason or another. And this deadlock will continue to prevail as long as the nations' leaders cling to different notions and

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philosophies, rightly or wrongly, about how economic development can best be achieved for their respective countries.

For the moment, ASEAN has not quite passed the first step of achieving meaningful intra-regional economic co-operation, which is arriving at a common understanding of the issue, and agreeing on certain necessary assumptions. Overcoming this hurdle, unfortunately, will entail reorientation and re-education. Unless a start is made now in readiness for the Manila summit, we will have to be content with an ASEAN that is just another political bloc.

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Security Co-operation in ASEAN

KHONG KIM HOONG and ABDUL RAZAK ABDULLAH

Ever since the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed in 1967, questions of security have become an ever increasing issue, despite rhetoric to the contrary. ASEAN was set up primarily to promote co-operation among members in the socio-economic field. However, ASEAN leaders, then and now, have been tacitly preoccupied with security issues. One can argue that security co-operation has been far more successful than in economic matters. The fact that ASEAN could galvanize the support of the majority at the United Nations over the Kampuchean issue is indicative of the importance of the role of security in ASEAN. The concept of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), although Utopian in nature, is yet another example where notions of security have proved to be significant. At present, the proposal for the setting up of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) in Southeast Asia sits high on the ASEAN agenda.

As we approach the end of this decade, there is every indication that security issues will continue to play a very significant role in ASEAN. It has been said that security is one element that could either unite ASEAN or lead to the breaking up of this regional organization. There are many challenges to ASEAN security co-operation and it is these elements that this paper will primarily focus upon.

Let us first define some key concepts. The word "security" has a wide range of meanings and connotations, far more encompassing than the term "defence". It is defined by one scholar as, "the protection and preservation of the minimum core values of any nation: political independence and territorial integrity".[1] There are various levels of security, ranging from individual and national security to international and regional security. In the context of ASEAN, both national and regional security are of paramount importance. However, there is no doubt that national security is far more important than regional, although the latter could well contribute to the preservation of the former and vice versa.

Co-operation can generally be defined as, "a joint or collaborative behaviour that is directed toward some goal in which there is common interest or hope of reward".[2] The goal here is, in the present context, the attainment of security of the states concerned. The other key factors are, firstly, common interest and, secondly, hope of reward. As we will later discover, there is no real consensus among the ASEAN states on these two pertinent elements of co-operation.

What then do we really mean when we talk of ASEAN security co-operation? It is important to remember at the outset that ASEAN was and still is a socio-

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economic-based regional organization. The various types of security co-operation among the ASEAN states are conducted outside the framework of ASEAN. Therefore, when one talks about ASEAN security co-operation, one is really talking of the six individual states, as sovereign and independent nations, co-operating with one another in the security field.

When ASEAN was first formed, critics dubbed it as an organization formed primarily to replace the now-defunct SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization). SEATO was an organization based on a collective security system. It was very much tied to the United States and Western security systems. It must be remembered that SEATO, although nominally a Southeast Asian organization, consisted of only two states belonging to the region, that is, Thailand and the Philippines.[3]

ASEAN, on the other hand, is made up of only Southeast Asian states — six out of a possible ten states. It is also an organization which is not tied to the United States, although some individual states have security treaties with Washington. Factors such as these, together with the fact that ASEAN members are basically Western-oriented countries, with strong anti-communist proclivities and ideologies, have led critics, notably from the communist countries, to label ASEAN as a military pact. Just take one example: the People's Republic of China at one time called the ASEAN states "the lackeys of U.S. imperialism".

There are basically two types of co-operation presently being conducted among the ASEAN states or involving some ASEAN states. They are bilateral and multilateral co-operation. Bilateral security co-operation is either being conducted by two ASEAN states, such as the naval exercise (SEATHAMAL) series involving Malaysia and Thailand, or between one ASEAN state and an external power, for example, exercises being conducted by Thailand and the United States, under the framework of security treaties signed by the two countries. A recent exercise involving the two countries, code-named Cobra Gold, saw the participation of some 10,000 Thai troops. At present, there is no multilateral co-operation being carried out among the ASEAN states. However, ASEAN states are involved in multilateral exercises with external powers. One good example is the exercises conducted under the framework of the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA), the signatories of which are Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and Great Britain.[4] Exercises such as those involving the air forces of the members are conducted on a regular basis. For example, in November 1985, the air forces of Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore held an air defence exercise to test the capability and reliability of the Integrated Air Defence System (IADS).[5] Britain also participated by sending personnel to the exercise.

Bilateral security co-operation among the ASEAN states exists in two forms. Firstly, in the form of joint border committees, for example, that between Malaysia and Thailand; and, secondly, those which cover all areas, conducted mainly in the form of joint manoeuvres, encompassing operations on land, sea and air. The joint border committees were set up primarily to deal with common border security problems, particularly the various insurgency movements which are

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found along the common border. The Malaysian-Thai Joint Border Committee, which met in February 1987, has been in existence throughout the 1970s. The 1976 border agreement between Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur provides for "a combined task force headquarters and combined as well as unilateral operations".[6] However, an agreement had been signed very much earlier, in March 1965, between the two countries, which resulted in the birth of the General Border Committee (GBC) and the Regional Border Committee (RBC). The latter basically implements policies that are formulated by the GBC, which was primarily formed to co-ordinate operations between Malaysia and Thailand to meet the communist threat, mainly from the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM). Various combined exercises have been conducted against the CPM, for example, under the *Cahaya Bena* joint anti-insurgency operation. Co-operation between the two countries under the GBC framework has been enhanced over the years to encompass a wider range of areas, including smuggling of firearms or drugs, and in the field of development. Socio-economic co-operation between Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur has also taken place, mainly in the form of joint projects, for example, the Takbai ferry service to Kelantan. Such projects are indicative of the awareness on the part of both governments of the importance of non-military factors in combatting insurgency movements.

There have, however, been problems of mutual suspicions between the two countries and these have tended to result in the temporary curtailment of joint operations along their common border. Malaysia's major internal enemy is the CPM which hopes to overthrow the government by force and proclaim a communist government. Although their tactics have changed since the period of the Emergency (1948–60) their goals and strategy have remained unchanged. Apart from various areas in Peninsula Malaysia, such as in the state of Pahang, the CPM elements are found mainly along the Thai-Malaysian border. The Thais, on the other hand, not only face the CPM (which is aimed primarily against Malaysia and not Thailand), and the remnants of the Thai communist movement, but also the Islamic-based insurgency movement, known as the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO). This organization seeks autonomy from Bangkok and has taken up arms against the government.

Apart from the lack of consensus on the border threat in recent years, the fact that each perceives the other as supporting the opposing insurgency movement, has tended to diminish co-operation between the two countries. Until such suspicions are removed, bilateral border co-operation will remain at the present level, or may even deteriorate.

The Malaysia-Indonesia Joint Border Committee has tended to be far less controversial. Both Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta revised their 1972 security arrangements in November 1984 to include joint naval and air patrols along their common borders and in the Straits of Malacca. According to the 1972 agreement, security was limited to the border areas between Sabah and Sarawak of East Malaysia and Kalimantan. The old agreement also defined the common enemy as communists operating along the long border separating these two areas. The new

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agreement expanded the common enemy to include smugglers, drug traffickers and counterfeiters.[7]

Apart from the joint border committees, there are other forms of bilateral security co-operation among the ASEAN states. All of them conduct bilateral exercises with each other, except between Malaysia and the Philippines. These two countries, as a result of several problems, mainly over the Sabah issue, have not yet done so.

Bilateral military exercises have tended to be conducted far more frequently and successfully in the air and at sea, rather than on land. This is understandable as domestic and local sensitivities towards the presence of foreign troops must certainly be taken into consideration by the host states concerned.

The ASEAN states have some common military hardware, particularly among the air forces. Almost all the ASEAN states have the *Northrop* F-5 and the A4 *Skyhawk* fighter bombers. Three of the ASEAN states, Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia, are acquiring the sophisticated General Dynamics' multi-role F-16s, which will greatly enhance the capabilities of their respective air forces. The F-16s will certainly be a match for the MiG-23s, currently being deployed in Vietnam.

In the ASEAN ground forces, there also exist some common weapon systems. For example, four ASEAN states deploy the British *Scorpion* light tanks, while two possess the French AMX-13. In the navies, almost all the ASEAN states deploy the combat-proven *Exocet* missiles for their fast-strike craft. It must be noted, however, that these common weapon systems exist among the ASEAN states as a result of coincidence, rather than a grand plan of co-ordinated weapon acquisitions among the six states.

There are numerous advantages to be derived from common weapon systems. This can, perhaps, be best illustrated by comparing the position of the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) forces and the Warsaw Pact countries. The latter, for example, deploy in their ground forces the following main battle tanks (MBT): the T-54/55, T-62, T72 and the T-80. All the members can operate these MBTs, and also use the same ammunition. On the other hand, NATO forces have a wider range of MBTs deployed by its member countries. The British use the *Chieftain* and their latest MBT, the *Challenger*. The Americans deploy their M-60s, and the M-1 *Abrams*, while the Germans have their *Leopard* 1A1 and *Leopard* 2. One can just imagine the enormous problems of compatibility and other related problems. In as far as the ASEAN states are concerned, it can be argued that they have a good basis and foundation for co-operation in the military field.

The various bilateral security co-operation projects presently being conducted by the ASEAN states are geared towards the external environment. The exercises are mainly conducted against potential external adversaries. As stated earlier, one important element determining co-operation is the presence of common interests among the parties concerned. However, because of various factors, there seems to be a lack of consensus among the ASEAN states as far as their external interests

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are concerned. This is manifested in the threat perception of the various ASEAN countries. Again, taking NATO and the Warsaw Pact as examples, it is clear that NATO members, be it Britain, or West Germany, all perceive the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact as the source of the main threat. On the other hand, the Soviet Union along with the other members of the Warsaw Pact, perceive the United States and the NATO alliance as most threatening to their security.

There are many challenges to ASEAN security co-operation, one of which is this question of common threat perception. In ASEAN, the lack of an agreement of the main threat has further hindered co-operation in the military field among its members. Internal threats notwithstanding, the ASEAN states perceive the following countries to be major security threats to their respective states: Vietnam, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC).

The ASEAN states can be conveniently divided into basically two camps in as far as threat perceptions are concerned. On the one hand we have Malaysia and Indonesia and, on the other, we have Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines. It must be pointed out here that this classification is only for convenience and that the camps are not exclusive in nature.

To take one example, if one examines the various statements made by the leaders, both political and military, one can conclude that Malaysia feels threatened by all the communist states, that is, Vietnam, the Soviet Union and the PRC. However, it has been generally recognized that the PRC is the source of the main threat, but mostly quoted as the long-term threat. This is so because of the recognition that Beijing at the present time does not have the capability to pose a major threat to Malaysian security although it has the potential to do so in the long run.

Malaysia's uneasy experience with China is a well-known fact. Since historical times, China had cast its long shadow over Southeast Asia and the Malay peninsula. The ascendency of communism in China and the subsequent policies and actions of Beijing have caused great concern to the Malaysian leadership and the population in general. For the past three decades, China was reported to have given not only moral but also material support to the Communist Party of Malaya. The party was after all set up in the early 1930s under the auspices of the Chinese as well as the Comintern. The CPM's full-scale revolt during the Emergency was both a traumatic and a bitter experience for Malaysia — something that it will not forget easily. As a result of the close association between the CPM and Beijing, Malaysia views the latter as interfering in the internal affairs of the country. The fact that the CPM leadership resided and still resides in China is certainly a testimony of China's role. It must also be pointed out that Malaysia experienced another upsurge of communist activities in the mid-1970s, with the assassination of high-ranking security personnel as well as the blowing-up of the national monument — a symbol of Malaysia's victory over the communists. Therefore, although the communists are at present maintaining a low profile, it is in the very nature of the war, that is, guerrilla warfare, that the potential for another upsurge remains likely in the future. And it is in this context that Malaysia constantly views

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Beijing with much suspicion. Moreover, China's refusal to renounce the CPM is another factor reinforcing Kuala Lumpur's perception.

There are also other factors that have helped to point the finger to the PRC. The ethnic element and its implications are one factor.[8] In the words of Tun Hussein Onn, the former Malaysian Prime Minister, "China, not the Soviet Union, is more of a military threat in Southeast Asia . . . Communist China may be good now but it is in our interest to be careful".[9]

The threat from the Soviet Union is often identified together with Vietnam. Since the signing of the Treaty of Friendship in 1978, which is tantamount to a defence alliance between the two countries, Moscow has been increasingly seen as being together with Vietnam. Apart from the Hanoi connection, Moscow in itself has not been as threatening as Beijing. This is based on three factors. Firstly, the Soviets do not have a long history of contacts with Malaysia. The various factions of the CPM in Malaysia are reported to be all pro-China. Therefore, the potential for Soviet influence among these movements seems to be marginal at most. However, the Soviets are known to have tried to influence the top leadership without much success. The case of Siddiq Ghouse, an aide of the present Prime Minister, is the most celebrated one. Secondly, the ethnic factor would work against the Soviets. None of the ethnic groups have any penchant for Moscow. Thirdly, the Soviet Union has not played a direct and important role in Southeast Asia. The idea of Soviet domination in this region is still somewhat blurred.

However, Vietnam is seen as a possible threat to the security of Malaysia. As a result of many potential areas of conflict between the two countries, Hanoi is sometimes seen as the immediate threat. The Malaysian armed forces apparently began expanding, both in terms of military hardware and size, after the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea. The PERISTA programme, which witnessed, *inter alia* the twofold increase in the size of the armed forces, was basically a reaction to this invasion. Scenarios involving Vietnam as the possible enemy have been worked out by military planners. Soviet presence as well as assistance to Hanoi have been a constant preoccupation with some Malaysian leaders. The Chief of the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF), Lt. General Datuk Mohamad Ngah Said, views the presence of Soviet-made MiG-25 fighter aircraft in Ho Chi Minh City as a threat to regional security. However, the threat is not seen as an immediate one. According to the him, Vietnam might try to penetrate the air defence at Terumbu Layang-Layang (an atoll in the South China Sea presently occupied by the Malaysian army, but also claimed by Hanoi) when they have enough aircraft in Kampuchea.[10] Such factors as the disputed islands as well as Vietnam's close proximity to Malaysia, make Hanoi an obvious source of threat.

However, as China is perceived to be the main threat, the Vietnamese are often seen as a possible counterweight to Beijing's influence especially in view of the present Sino-Vietnamese conflict. In these circumstances, the Malaysian leadership is keeping its options open *vis-à-vis* Hanoi, although the Kampuchean issue seems to be a stumbling block to the improvement of relations between the two countries.

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Malaysia's threat perception, particularly towards China, is shared by Indonesia, which links the 1965 attempted coup by the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) directly to the support of the People's Republic of China. Indonesia, which had been the only ASEAN country to have diplomatic relations with China then, has since 1965, become the most antagonistic among the ASEAN members. To date, it has been unwilling to re-establish diplomatic ties with Beijing. Jakarta still views China's potential at subversion to be the most serious threat to its security, especially in view of the ties between the PRC and the banned PKI, and the intransigence of the former to disavow moral support to the latter.

In as far as the Soviet Union and Vietnam are concerned, Jakarta, though it has publicly warned of the possible threat from these two countries, feels that it should not alienate them to the extent of giving China a free hand in the region. The constant contact between Jakarta and Hanoi, especially the regular visits of the Indonesian Foreign Minister to Hanoi, is indicative of the generally stable level of relations between the two countries. Jakarta seems to be acting as the mediator between ASEAN and Hanoi. The recent visit by the Soviet Foreign Minister to Jakarta is also reflective of the recognition of the former of the latter's standing *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

The second group, consisting of the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore, is somewhat different in its threat perceptions. These countries generally see the Soviets and the Vietnamese as the most threatening. The Philippines, somewhat more isolated from the Southeast Asian mainland, does not see China as the major threat even though diplomatic relations with Beijing were only established in the mid-1970s. As Manila is tied militarily with the United States, it has tended to leave external threats to the responsibility of the latter. There is no doubt that internal political problems are far more urgent to the Manila government.

Thailand's present threat perception has been greatly influenced by the Kampuchean conflict. As a result of the spillover effects of the Kampuchean conflict, Bangkok views the Vietnamese as the most immediate external threat to its security. The numerous border skirmishes in which Thai villages along the border have been attacked, with heavy casualties, are a stark reminder of the danger. Hanoi claims that their main purpose is to destroy camps belonging to the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) forces, particularly the Khmer Rouge faction. The CGDK forces have made use of Thai territory as sanctuaries to conduct military assaults against the Vietnamese as well as the forces belonging to the Heng Samrin government. Until such sanctuaries are removed, the Vietnamese threat will continue to be real for Thailand. It is worth remembering that a similar situation existed in Kampuchea before the Vietnamese blitzkrieg invasion when, *inter alia*, the constant border conflicts between Hanoi and Pol Pot's Kampuchea were used as a pretext for the former's aggression.

As a result of the Vietnamese threat, Bangkok has sought foreign assistance, mainly from the United States and China. The Vietnamese threat has also served as a justification for Thailand's purchase of the F-16s. The close co-operation between Bangkok and Beijing has been viewed with much anxiety among some

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ASEAN states. As a result of this nascent relationship, China has supplied Thailand with some military hardware, including Type-59 MBTs.

Singapore, while virulently anti-communist in its domestic policy, has come to recognize the limited capability of the People's Republic of China in terms of conducting subversive and military actions. The Singapore Government has advanced the idea that economic growth under the free enterprise system and a high standard of living can help to dampen the appeal of communism. What it fears perhaps is not subversion through ideology but the use of military might to impose a new regime — as the Vietnamese had done in Kampuchea. The burgeoning Soviet navy, especially with new-found facilities in Vietnam, has further strengthened this view. According to one Singapore scholar, "Vietnamese aggression against an independent Kampuchea is seen as a violation of a cardinal principle of peaceful coexistence", and that, "more directly, the Vietnamese aggression threatens the security of Thailand and in turn the rest of ASEAN, of which Singapore is a member".[11] Like Thailand, though not as explicitly, Singapore is also relying on the Americans and the Chinese to exert themselves in the region, so as to stop Soviet and Vietnamese "imperialist" designs in Southeast Asia.

Apart from the lack of consensus on a common threat, mutual suspicions seem to pose a much more fundamental challenge not only to ASEAN security but also to its unity. Although these mutual suspicions are sometimes down-played for the sake of ASEAN unity, they nevertheless constitute a constant and disturbing factor in the relations among the ASEAN states. Among such divisive issues with ASEAN are the problems between Malaysia and Thailand, as already illustrated earlier, and the mutual suspicions in both Malaysia-Philippines and Malaysia-Singapore relations.

The case of Sabah has been a recurring issue in relations between Kuala Lumpur and Manila. Apart from this traditional element, recent developments have tended to worsen an already cool friendship. The Manila government faces various insurgency movements and among the more threatening is the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), an Islamic-based organization active in the southern islands. It is often perceived that the Malaysian Government has tended to be rather sympathetic towards the Moros and the state government of Sabah, in particular, has been accused at various times in the past of having supplied arms to the rebels. It would be interesting to know what the present situation is in this highly volatile state of affairs, given the political instability of Sabah itself.

Recently, there was an upsurge of piracy in the area around East Malaysia and the surrounding islands. In one case, when the port of Lahad Datu was raided some observers alleged that the pirates were members of the Philippine Constabulary. Such recurrent suspicions have tended to make security co-operation between the two countries difficult.

Malaysia-Singapore relations have tended to be cool ever since the island state was expelled from the Federation. A wide range of developments have contributed to the present level of relations, made worse by several recent events. The case of Tan Koon Swan and the Herzog visit have certainly not helped in promoting

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relations between the two countries. Singapore's military, which is proportionately as well as technologically superior to that of Malaysia, has been viewed with a certain amount of reservation by Kuala Lumpur. Finally, the racial element has also become a thorny issue between the two countries.

It is clear that such mutual suspicions will somewhat hinder any real development towards full security co-operation among the ASEAN states. The removal of all such encumbrances, if not some, must first occur before any concrete steps can be taken. Moreover, the ASEAN states find it difficult to even agree on the level of co-operation. It is possible that some ASEAN countries are content with the present loose level of security co-operation. Of the six ASEAN states, Singapore has indicated that it would certainly like to see the development of more security co-operation among them. Its Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, has stated that his country and Indonesia have conducted various joint exercises bilaterally, but, "at a later stage the exercises may become trilateral and later quadrilateral; the ideal would be multilateral exercises encompassing all the ASEAN members".[12]

Despite the above optimistic scenario, it is probable that none of the states truly believes in the creation of a collective security system within the ASEAN framework. Such a system could well be counter-productive by setting off a reaction on the part of Vietnam and perhaps the Soviet Union. If that were to happen, then the second important element of co-operation, as earlier stated in the definition of co-operation, the hope of reward, would also be absent.

If we can assume hypothetically that the ASEAN countries can agree on security co-operation in the form of a defence pact, one should ask some pertinent questions. For example, against whom would the pact be directed: against China, the Soviet Union or Vietnam? Should the Americans be brought in? Will Malaysia send its combat troops to defend Bangkok? Some have argued that even if such a defence pact is forced, ASEAN is not strong enough to stand against the more numerous and experienced Vietnamese People's Army (VPA). Table 1 gives a comparison of manpower between the armed forces of Vietnam and the ASEAN states. This, of course, only gives the numbers. Important factors such as technology, level of preparedness, morale, and so forth, will have to be taken into consideration when one is really comparing two opposing forces.

There are other challenges to ASEAN security co-operation but these are of a temporary nature. Economic rivalry in times of recession will certainly not create a conducive milieu for security co-operation. Nevertheless, the degree of importance of this factor will depend very much on the duration of the present economic slow-down. It may not, however, have a long-term effect on ASEAN security co-operation.

Another important element is, of course, the internal domestic situation in the ASEAN states. A change of government, especially towards a radical one, could certainly become a threat to the already loose unity of ASEAN. A more nationalistic government could also pose problems. However, there are indications that domestic problems can be contained and that they will not greatly affect ASEAN because of the common belief that the organization itself is based on a

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TABLE 1
COMPARISON BETWEEN ASEAN AND VIETNAMESE (SRV) ARMED FORCES, 1986

	Army	*Navy*	*Air Force*	*Total*
BRUNEI	3,380	470	200	4,050
INDONESIA	216,000	38,000	27,000	281,000
MALAYSIA	90,000	9,000	11,000	110,000
PHILIPPINES	70,000	26,000	17,000	113,000
SINGAPORE	45,000	4,500	6,000	55,500
THAILAND	166,000	42,000	48,000	256,000
Total ASEAN	590,380	119,970	109,200	819,550
Total SRV	1,000,000	40,000	15,000	1,155,000*

* Excluding about 50,000 in Laos and 140,000 in Kampuchea, plus about 100,000 in the Air Defence Force.

SOURCE: *The Military Balance 1986–1987* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986).

loose framework which can accommodate changes.

In view of the fact that ASEAN is not a supranational body with decision-making powers, ultimately it is the individual national member itself which would decide what form the thrust of ASEAN policy should take. Thus far, the members have only agreed to a loose framework in the security field. Problems within ASEAN, primarily the mutual suspicions, are fundamental to ASEAN's unity and they must be solved before any real security co-operation can take place. Nevertheless, ASEAN has so far been successful in distinguishing between bilateral relations among its members and regional co-operation. It has also not allowed such problems to interfere in ASEAN affairs. There are indications that the coming decade will not witness any fundamental changes in the move towards the enhancement of security co-operation among the ASEAN states, particularly, in the form of multilateral exercises. The Kampuchean issue, which has helped to bring ASEAN closer, is already eight years old. It would seem that ASEAN needs another major crisis to bring its members even closer. There is no telling what sort of crisis might erupt in the future and how it would affect the potential for ASEAN security co-operation.

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The Challenge of Co-existence: ASEAN's Relations with Vietnam in the 1990s

SUKHUMBHAND PARIBATRA

From the Past to the Present

The fall of Saigon in April 1975 was both a cause and a reflection of the changes in the pattern of international relations that had prevailed in Southeast Asia since the arrival of the colonial powers in the middle of the nineteenth century. For over a hundred years the region had been almost completely dominated by great power politics, as one extra-regional major actor after another sought, sometimes achieved, but always failed to establish on a permanent basis, its own preferred order or framework for the conduct of international relations in the region. But, with the American failure in Vietnam and the consequent reduction of the American role and commitments in Southeast Asia, it was clear that while external power involvement would remain a fact of life for Southeast Asians, no single extra-regional major actor would be in a position to exert a predominant influence over the region and the pursuit of the regional states' own interests, demands and aspirations would have a much more significant impact upon international politics.

The most important set of relationships among the regional states is that between the members of the non-communist Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on the one hand, and the communist Indochinese countries, namely Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, on the other. In these relationships, the key issue is the one raised by the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in December 1978. For, at stake is not only the future of Kampuchea itself, but also the question of power distribution both in Indochina and in Southeast Asia as a whole.

This so-called Kampuchean conflict was brought about by a combination of trends and forces. At one level, it emanated from a crisis of legitimacy in Kampuchea itself, where the Pol Pot regime between 1975 and 1978 sought to consolidate its power through the use of violence, both internal and external. At another level, the conflict stemmed from historical and ethnic antagonisms, geopolitical rivalries, doctrinal differences, and clashes of aspirations in certain dyadic relationships among regional (or quasi-regional) states, namely, between China and Vietnam, Vietnam and Kampuchea, and Vietnam and Thailand. At the third level, the conflict was caused by the triangular relationship between the United States, the Soviet Union and China; all three see the distribution of power in Indochina and Southeast Asia as an important, if not a key, issue affecting their security interests, and consequently each seeks to extend its influence in the region or at least to deny the others the opportunity of doing so.

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The Kampuchean conflict, in turn, is the key issue affecting the relationship, already characterized from the beginning by mutual suspicions and threat perceptions, between Vietnam and ASEAN, comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and, from January 1984, Brunei. In 1975, having just emerged from three decades of war against colonial and "neo-colonial" powers, Vietnam saw ASEAN as an implacably anti-communist grouping of states, a mere Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in disguise, and hence no more than an instrument of U.S. imperialism. Although Hanoi's public attitude towards ASEAN as a collectivity softened in 1978, it continues to harbour suspicions towards the organization in general because of the latter's opposition to its occupation of Kampuchea, and towards Thailand in particular for being a "Trojan horse" for external "imperialistic" powers. ASEAN, for its part, was alarmed by the victory of North Vietnam over the South, which raised the possibility of a militarily strong Vietnam becoming, as termed by one veteran observer of regional affairs, "a twentieth-century Prussia in Southeast Asia",[1] and even more so by the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in 1978, which brought the total number of Vietnamese troops present in countries contiguous with Thailand to more than two hundred thousand. While ASEAN's diplomacy towards Vietnam has sometimes been conducted with a degree of flexibility, especially on the part of two of its members, Indonesia and Malaysia, the group's continued insistence upon Vietnam's withdrawal from Kampuchea as a "non-negotiable" condition reflects clearly its collective perception of Vietnam as a threat.

Upon closer examination one can see that one dimension of the prevailing relationship between Vietnam and ASEAN is the interaction between two very different and clearly conflictual conceptions of the preferred regional order or framework for the conduct of the region's international relations. These differences are partly revealed by the two sides' respective policies towards the Kampuchean conflict, and they in turn further contribute to its complexity and intractability.

Where Vietnam is concerned, the main assumptions underlying its conception of the preferred regional order seem to be threefold. Firstly, there is the firm conviction, derived from Marxism-Leninism, that while the final triumph of socialism cannot be doubted, the forces of imperialism in the short run constitute grave dangers which are omnipresent and must be constantly and vigilantly guarded against. Secondly, there is Hanoi's long-held belief that the three countries of Indochina are strategically interdependent, that Vietnam cannot attain security unless and until Kampuchea and Laos are free from the threat of imperialism. As Vo Nguyen Giap concluded in 1950 during the war against France:

> Indochina is a single strategic unit, a single battle-field, and here we have the mission of helping the movement to liberate all Indochina. This is because militarily, Indochina is one bloc, one unit, in both the invasion and defense plans of the enemy. For this reason, and especially of the strategic terrain, we cannot consider Vietnam to be independent so long as Cambodia and Laos are under

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imperialist domination, just as we cannot consider Cambodia and Laos to be independent so long as Vietnam is under imperialist rule.[2]

Thirdly, related to this perception of Indochina being security interdependent seems to be the belief that, while Vietnam's national interests are and should be of paramount concern, Hanoi is the torch-bearer of values which are universal, transcending the narrow confines of its own national boundaries, and that in a broad sense this role as the torch-bearer of universal values entails a responsibility for helping to foster, develop and safeguard the revolution in Laos and Kampuchea. As many have pointed out, this belief has not always been consistently and enthusiastically embraced,[3] and indeed the broadening of the revolutionary arena from Vietnam to the whole of French Indochina in 1930 was brought about at the instigation of the Comintern and contrary to the wishes of many party members.[4] But the exigencies of the war against France and the United States necessitated an extensive role for Vietnam in the development of, first, the Lao revolutionary movement and then the Kampuchean revolutionary movement, and this discharge of responsibility seems to be the experience which strengthened Hanoi's predispositions towards universalism and, with it, towards claiming some degree of tutelage over the two revolutions.

These beliefs induce Vietnam to see "solidarity" with the three Indochinese countries as being the *sine qua non* of its security, and "special relationships" between Hanoi on the one hand and communist Laos and Kampuchea on the other as being the key element of regional order in Southeast Asia. As stipulated in the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the former in July 1977 and with the latter (under the new Heng Samrin regime) in February 1979, this solidarity is to be maintained by the interlocking of the three countries' economic and security systems. As Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea and continued troop presence there and in Laos suggest, this solidarity is enforceable by Hanoi's military power, and for the two countries the applicable principle is that of limited sovereignty. While Vietnam seems to be flexible as to the kind of framework for conducting relations with ASEAN, Indochinese solidarity is non-negotiable, to be maintained at any cost, be it military (on the Sino-Vietnamese border and in Kampuchea), political-diplomatic (dependence on the Soviet alliance), or economic (limited access to Western market, technology and capital). Furthermore, acceptance of both the form and the substance of the prevailing "special relationships" is the precondition of any future dialogue with ASEAN aimed at reducing or managing the conflict and promoting co-operation between the two sides.

In contradistinction to this concept of order based on military and political diktat, ASEAN's order is envisioned to be based on consensus. As evident in the Bangkok Treaty of 1967, the declaration of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in Kuala Lumpur in 1971, the Bali accords, and other documents, in the view of ASEAN the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference are to be closely cherished and guarded, and the practice of

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applying military power for political purposes, be it by regional or extra-regional actors, to be carefully circumscribed and, if possible, avoided.

Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea in pursuit of its concept of order and the cluster of developments directly related to it, namely, the growing Soviet-Vietnamese security ties which ultimately led to the Soviet presence at the former U.S. base at Cam Ranh Bay, the Sino-Vietnamese border war and the Vietnamese efforts to wipe out Khmer resistance forces both in 1979 and in 1980, presented challenges to ASEAN at three related levels.

At one level, the presence in Kampuchea and Laos of up to 250,000 Vietnamese troops, generally thought to be battle-hardened and well-armed, posed threats of intervention and subversion, most notably to Thailand which for geopolitical and historical reasons considers the trans-Mekong region, comprising most of the land areas of those two countries, most crucial for its security. Furthermore, the invasion and the subsequent Vietnamese campaign to wipe out the resistance sent droves of refugees across into Thailand, whose early attempts to manage the security dimension of the problem merely served to provoke a major incident with the Vietnamese at Non Mark Moon in June 1980.

At another level, the Vietnamese invasion nullified ASEAN's efforts to find a *region-wide* order based on consensus. Between 1967 and 1975, although its achievements were recognized to be modest, ASEAN made progress towards a more co-operative framework of relations among members in two ways. One was intra-organizational conflict management; the other was the development of the common notion, as evident in the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality declaration in Kuala Lumpur in 1971, that relations with great powers should be conducted in ways that would ultimately reduce their roles and at the same time confer benefit on regional states.

Between 1975 and the end of 1978 ASEAN attempted to extend this fledgling co-operative framework of relations to encompass the three Indochinese countries. Immediately after the fall of Saigon, there was a great deal of uncertainty and alarm among the ASEAN members. This concern became exacerbated by Vietnam's declaration of support for armed insurgencies in non-communist Southeast Asian countries and its refusal to accept or deal with ASEAN as a collective entity, thus rejecting more or less explicitly all the premises contained in ASEAN's quest for its own regional order. However, after a long and laborious process, a semblance of such order was established between ASEAN and Vietnam, as most evident in the joint communiqués issued during Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong's tour of ASEAN in September-October 1978. The rules of the game agreed upon were coexistence based on respect of one another's rights, non-interference in one another's internal affairs and settlement of disputes; an understanding that further co-operation can and should be developed through dialogues and expanded trade, economic and various functional relationships; and an implicit "promise" to consider further "the desirability of Southeast Asia being an area of peace, independence, freedom and neutrality".[5] No one in ASEAN

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believed that such rules would be binding or sacrosanct, but compared to the relations prevailing in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Saigon, the improvement was substantive and significant and consequently there was a good deal of justifiable optimism concerning the future prospects for a region-wide order based on consensus.

The invasion shattered these prospects. Instead, there seemed to be every possibility that a militarily induced redistribution of power in Indochina might lead ultimately, via the route of military intervention, political subversion or other forms of pressure, to a Southeast Asian regional order based more or less exclusively on Vietnamese diktat.

Furthermore, the Sino-Vietnamese border war and the growing presence of the Soviet Union in Vietnam which followed the war meant that the trend was towards more and not less great power involvement in the region. This in turn raised the spectre of Southeast Asia being embroiled once more in the geopolitics of extra-regional rivalry, especially that between China and the Soviet Union, which not only made the resolution of the Kampuchean problem immensely more difficult, but also rendered somewhat redundant the notion that somehow a regional order could and should be constructed in isolation from such a rivalry.

At the third level, the expansion of Vietnam and the increasing roles of the two communist great powers, China and the Soviet Union, posed what might be termed a psychological challenge. It was not simply fear of communism, although, as Jorgensen-Dahl among others has pointed out, fear of communism has always been a crucial factor in the organization and development of ASEAN.[6] It was also uncertainty whether the recently found sense of common purpose, as evident during and after the Bali summit in February 1976, could survive this new storm over Indochina.

Between 1967 and 1975 regional co-operation was an aspiration rather than an operational reality for ASEAN whose members were divided by a number of differences and conflicts and strove unsuccessfully to forge a common political will to transcend these differences and conflicts. As a result of the communist victories in Indochina, a new sense of identity and purpose emeged in the organization but was still largely fragile and untested.

After Vietnam invaded Kampuchea, the ASEAN countries were at one in their refusal to legitimize Vietnam's attempted *fait accompli*, but were still divided on how, how far and at which price they should deny this *fait accompli*. As evident from the meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers in Bangkok in January 1979 and from the "debate" surrounding the "Kuantan Principle" announced in March 1980, ASEAN was far from being firmly united. Significant differences could be discerned within its ranks between the "hawks", who wished to pursue relentlessly a policy of attrition to end Vietnam's dominance over Kampuchea, and the "doves", who saw that Vietnam was not an intrinsically hostile state, has legitimate security concerns in Kampuchea and, if truly independent and "satisfied", has an indispensable part to play in the containment of China and in the final fulfilment of the ZOPFAN ideal. Given that the sense of common purpose within

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ASEAN was still unproven, what was at stake was not only the policy towards Vietnam and the Kampuchean problem, but also the future of regional co-operation as a whole.

The Vietnamese incursion into Thailand at Non Mark Moon in June 1980 was a crucial turning point in that it served to provoke Thailand and brought about a concerted set of responses, the substance of which, though modified and adapted in parts over time, still largely endures.

ASEAN's overall objectives in the Kampuchean problem reflect its conception of regional order. Firstly, it seeks to enhance Thailand's security against direct or indirect threats from Vietnam. Secondly, it seeks to promote a balance of presence and interests among great powers, which is perceived to entail ultimately a curtailment and reduction of Soviet and Chinese influence in Southeast Asia. Thirdly, ASEAN seeks to bring about a more co-operative framework of relations with Vietnam.

A settlement of the Kampuchean problem is seen as a *sine qua non* of the achievement of these overarching objectives. While the ASEAN countries have modified their stance concerning the identity of those who have the right to participate in the governance of Kampuchea, they continue to insist that the final settlement should contain the following elements: Vietnam's withdrawal from Kampuchea; the establishment of a free, neutral, independent, and democratic Kampuchea; and some sort of international guarantees to preserve such an arrangement in that troubled land.

To realize these objectives, ASEAN employs a strategy which, again despite modifications and adaptations to suit the prevailing exigencies, has remained substantively unchanged since 1980. This strategy is one which assumes political, diplomatic, military and economic dimensions and which contains three interlocking components. The first of these is political, diplomatic and economic isolation of Vietnam through the forging and maintaining of broad anti-Hanoi coalitions in the international arena. The second is application of military pressure, as a means of both compellence and deterrence, on Vietnam without ASEAN becoming directly involved; this is achieved through co-operation with the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) and through support of anti-Vietnamese Kampuchean resistance groups. The third component is formulation of modalities deemed necessary for negotiation and settlement with Vietnam; these include decisions concerning the forum, participants, preconditions and terms of negotiation and settlement.

ASEAN's endeavours have proved successful to a certain degree. For one thing, the group has developed and maintained a level of solidarity in words and deeds which could not have been predicted, even by the most optimistic of observers in 1967 or indeed 1979. For another, it has succeeded in persuading the international community to accept the Kampuchean conflict as a crucial international issue, to support its position in the question, and by extension to recognize it as an actor of some eminence on the stage of international diplomacy. And lastly, ASEAN has made a substantial contribution towards preventing Vietnam

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from asserting an unchallenged mastery over Kampuchea and in ensuring that significant political and economic costs are inflicted upon Hanoi as a price of its occupation of that country.

However, it is evident that ASEAN's endeavours have not been sufficient to force the Vietnamese to withdraw their military presence from Kampuchea. On the contrary, despite its obvious economic difficulties and the sometimes highly effective operations conducted by the Kampuchean resistance deep in the country's interior, Hanoi has been able to maintain its position, retaining its power to take the strategic initiative and to stage major offensives when deemed necessary and appropriate, as seen in the 1984–85 dry season and perhaps also in the latest one in 1987. In other words, so far, ASEAN has not been able to translate its obvious political, diplomatic and economic superiority into decisive military assets on the battlefield.[7]

From the Present to the Future

Southeast Asia as a region may be on the threshold of a period of uncertainty. An era of more complex but uncertain changes and challenges, brought about by developments which have been taking place since the mid-1980s, are now strongly in prospect as the end of the present decade approaches. There seem to be three clusters of such developments relevant to the issue of ASEAN's future relations with Vietnam.

The first is the transformation of the relationships between the United States, the Soviet Union and the PRC. The bitter, cold war-like tensions existing in the late 1970s and the early 1980s, both between the United States and the Soviets and between the latter and the PRC, as well as the anti-Soviet Sino-American alignment that these tensions generated, have given way to attempts to bring about *rapprochement* in the mid-1980s.

In this respect, the improvements in the relations between Moscow and Beijing have been most dramatic. Propelled by their respective concerns with the domestic economic situation and fears of isolation in the uncertain game of great power politics, the two have adopted a lower-risk, lower-cost foreign policy, initiated frequent bilateral political exchanges, put forward concrete proposals to resolve their differences — including the highly contentious border problems, and rapidly increased their bilateral trade. The recently held border talks, the first in almost a decade, and the agreement that there should be another in 1988, seem to indicate that the process of dialogue and negotiation between the two socialist rivals will be maintained in the years ahead.

However, this process of transformation is still evolving, and its directions and implications are by no means clear at this juncture. This uncertainty is likely to remain at least until the position of the present Soviet leadership becomes much more secure and the imminent leadership changes in the United States and the PRC have been completed.

The three great powers are to some degree involved closely in the affairs of

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Southeast Asia. This evolving process of transformation inevitably raises a number of questions pertaining to the future of the region:

- Will the U.S.-Soviet *rapprochement* lead to another round of *détente*? If so, what will be its impact, particularly on the American role in Southeast Asia?
- How far will the Sino-Soviet *rapprochement* develop? Will it ultimately fail to produce a concrete settlement because the differences are too vast? Or will it lead to a series of agreements, including one which brings about a significant reduction or cessation of Moscow's support for Hanoi, as demanded by Beijing? Or will the process of *rapprochement* lead to an "agreement to disagree" where the Kampuchean conflict is concerned, leaving the two sides to pursue their present policies while their other differences are settled? If China and the Soviet Union are able to reach an understanding on a wide range of issues, will Beijing tilt towards Moscow once more? If so, what will be the impact, especially on Hanoi and its relations with the United States and the ASEAN states?
- How will the Sino-American co-operation evolve? Will the two develop a significant security relationship, and if so, what will be the impact on ASEAN and Vietnam? Or will the two great powers be unable to maintain the present level of understanding and co-operation, and if this is the case, what will be the consequences for the region?

The second cluster of developments is the growth of protectionist sentiments, particularly in the United States, both caused by and further contributing towards the continuing malaise in the world economic system. If the present trends continue, it is certain that the open economies of the ASEAN countries will be adversely affected. The questions are: "How far?" and "With what implications?" For ASEAN, the economic ties that truly bind are with the non-communist industrialized nations, but it is not difficult to envisage a situation in which the ASEAN countries become so exasperated with protectionism in the West and Japan, that serious conflicts arise between the two sides and they become much more responsive to the Soviet Union's economic overtures, which seem to have increased considerably since the Gorbachev initiative in Vladivostock in August 1986. It is not inconceivable also that the ASEAN countries may seek to enhance the trade relationship with Vietnam and Laos for the same reason. It is significant that Thailand, which along with Singapore is the most hardline ASEAN member in the Kampuchean issue, in recent months has strongly criticized its U.S. ally, increased trade with Moscow, initiated moves which would open up trade with Laos, and considered the option of trading with Vietnam.[8] The question is: If ASEAN enhances its economic exchanges with the countries on the other side of the Kampuchean divide, will such a process in the long term lead to changes in the political and diplomatic relations between the two sides?

Moreover, the protectionist trends in the world economy, signifying as they do decreased market opportunities and increased competition among producers of similar goods, may have an adverse impact on ASEAN's solidarity. Despite its professed intentions, economic co-operation has never been the regional

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organization's forte, and in a restrictive economic climate the members may find themselves competing for the same markets, especially where commodities are concerned. In such a situation the ASEAN countries' own considerable protectionist sentiments may be unleashed upon one another. If so, the crucial question is whether or how far intra-ASEAN economic competition will have spillover effects on the group's political and diplomatic co-operation, particularly in the Kampuchean question.

The third cluster of developments is concerned with the issue of political succession in the regional states. Where ASEAN is concerned, it is likely that the next five years or so will see leadership changes in all the member countries, with the exception of Brunei. The questions relevant to the present discussion are numerous. Will such leadership changes generate domestic instability and, if so, what impact will it have on regional security in general, and on ASEAN's relations with Vietnam in particular? Will the Philippines' domestic conflicts, for example, make the U.S. position in that country untenable and reduce the American role in the region? Will Thailand's internal problems, that are certain to arise out of succession questions, induce a more hardline policy as a means of unifying the country and enhancing the legitimacy of the new leaders, or will they force Bangkok to become more pliant and accept Vietnam's position in Indochina? Will the new ASEAN leaders have the same level of commitment to the regional organization and its policy towards the Indochinese neighbours as their predecessors? Will the post-Suharto regime, for example, try to forge what for long has been feared in other ASEAN capitals, namely, a Jakarta-Hanoi axis? Will the post-Prem leadership in Thailand attempt to develop an extensive and overt security relationship with the PRC, thus creating a competing Bangkok-Beijing axis, or will it try to come to a sort of *modus vivendi* with Hanoi?

The issue of political succession in the ASEAN countries is rendered more complicated by another aspect of generational change, the growing role of "technocrats". The increasing complexity of the regional economies requires the art and science of management of the manifold functional problems that arise as part and parcel of the development process. This in turn has helped to precipitate the rise of a class of highly educated, often highly motivated "professionals" whose main shared concern is to apply their acquired knowledge, skills and experience in the pursuit of excellence in their respective fields of competence. The growing role of technocrats does not mean that all decisions, political or otherwise, will be taken by them; indeed in "key" questions affecting national security, these technocrats may exert little or no influence. But it does mean that in the ASEAN countries there exist groups of influential individuals whose propensity is to devalue both the ideological and the political contents of major policies, and to stress the need for pragmatic, functional approaches to policy formulation. In the context of ASEAN's relations with the Indochinese countries, it is not inconceivable that such groups may argue and press for more economic interactions in the near future. In this sense, the efforts of the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) to purchase more electricity from Laos' Nam Ngum Dam in recent

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months may be but a forerunner of things to come. If greater economic exchanges between ASEAN and the Indochinese countries take place, the question is whether this economic process will have political and diplomatic consequences in the long term.

However, it is on the Vietnamese side that the issue of political succession is one of greater immediacy. Age and human mortality, years of economic mismanagement, and the existence of mass poverty were factors which precipitated economic reforms in Vietnam, beginning in mid-1985, and changes in the top leadership of Hanoi, both in the party and government structures, between July 1986 and February 1987. Although some old faces remain and there still exist differences concerning how and to what extent these reforms should be implemented, the replacement of the ideological old guard with the more progressive, younger leaders indicates that Vietnam is now committed to the task of reforming its ailing economy.

Unclear, however, are the implications of these leadership changes in Hanoi, paralleled by similar but less extensive reshuffles in Vientiane and Phnom Penh, for the former's policy towards the Kampuchean conflict. Again numerous questions arise: Will Vietnam's economic pragmatism, in combination with Gorbachev's preference for a lower cost, lower risk foreign policy, lead to a more flexible, more compromising Kampuchean policy? Or are the Vietnamese attempting to introduce economic reforms *and* simultaneously maintain their hardline posture *vis-à-vis* the Kampuchean question? Is the promotion of General Le Duc Anh, generally thought to be the main architect of the present policy, a confirmation that the policy will not change, or is it but a first, disguised step towards a more flexible position? If Hanoi does not change its Kampuchean policy and continues to be denied access to Western markets, technology and capital, can its economic reforms ever succeed, and if these reforms cannot succeed, will the failure in the end bring about a more realistic appraisal of the costs of the military occupation of Kampuchea? If the Vietnamese leaders wish to change their policy, how can they do so without a) endangering their positions in the power structure of the country, b) losing "face" internationally, and c) diminishing Vietnam's security. Furthermore, how can they convince their adversaries of their good intentions at a time when faith in Vietnamese goodwill is a fast diminishing, if not exhausted, commodity?

The foregoing developments, and the questions that they raise, make the task of predicting ASEAN's relations with Vietnam in the next decade an almost impossible one. For this reason it may be more useful to project a number of possible scenarios for the 1990s and try to assess the likelihood of their taking place, as well as their implications.

Some Future Scenarios

Scenario A envisages a military resolution of the Kampuchean conflict by Vietnam in defiance of all opposing forces from within and outside the region. The main elements of this scenario would be:

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— The destruction, incapacitation or capitulation of all Kampuchean resistance forces, particularly the Khmer Rouge.
— The continued stationing of large Vietnamese forces around major Kampuchean urban centres, on the Thai-Kampuchean border, and on the Sino-Vietnamese border.
— Intensified efforts to consolidate the present PRK regime *and* Vietnamese political control over it, perhaps involving the presence of a large number of Vietnamese political, economic and military advisors within the Kampuchean party and government structures.
— Intensified efforts to consolidate political, ideological, military and economic ties among the three Indochinese states.
— Extensive Soviet economic and military assistance and, in return, an expanded Soviet military presence throughout the three Indochinese countries.

From ASEAN's perspective, this scenario is a most unhappy one. Treating with Vietnam is never an easy endeavour, but it would become an impossible task if it has achieved a military solution in Kampuchea. Negotiations to bring about rules of the game to manage the conflicts and promote co-operation between ASEAN and Vietnam are likely to prove fruitless. Thailand would feel acutely threatened and would seek a closer security relationship with the PRC, the only great power which has in recent years demonstrated its capacity and will to use force against the Vietnamese in pursuit of its goals. Indeed, this scenario would also mean that great power involvements in regional affairs would sharply increase, with the growing Soviet influence in Indochina provoking countervailing measures on the part of the Chinese. Ultimately, Southeast Asia could become a heavily armed region, with all the regional states seeking rapid increases of their military capabilities and all the extra-regional states, especially the PRC, seeking to supply them with arms. Shared security interests would help to preserve ASEAN's solidarity, but the price in terms of regional order and stability would be very high indeed.

This scenario, however, is an unlikely one. For, firstly, the Kampuchean resistance forces have developed a great deal since the Vietnamese invaded the country in 1978–79, and in all probability cannot be destroyed or incapacitated easily. To attempt to do so, Vietnam will have to increase its force level in Kampuchea, which will be possible but difficult, as long as it has to deploy more than half of its troops to protect the Hanoi-Haiphong area from the PRC. It will also have to stage offensives against critical targets deeper in Thai territory, including the KPNLF (Khmer People's National Liberation Front) "Site 2" camp (with a population of 160,000), the Sihanoukist "Site B" camp (with 42,000 men), and the Khmer Rouge "Site 8" camp (with 30,000 men), thus risking an escalation of violence against Thailand and the PRC.

Secondly, the present Gorbachev leadership is unlikely to provide Vietnam with a *carte blanche* to bring about a military solution in Kampuchea. For the Soviets, while the benefits of a Vietnamese victory under these circumstances will be ambiguous at best, the costs in terms of economic burden, their global image

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and their relations with the PRC will certainly be high. The truth is that Moscow does not have to increase substantially its political, military and economic "investments" in Vietnam, for it already has what it wants from its ally, namely, the use of the bases at Cam Ranh Bay and Danang as a part of its global strategy.

Thirdly, a Vietnamese military solution in defiance of the PRC is an unlikely eventuality. For Beijing, the present policy of applying pressure on Hanoi is basically a low-cost, low-risk one. Thus, if Vietnam seems to be on the threshold of a military victory in Kampuchea, the PRC still has the option of increasing the pressure without making the costs to itself unacceptable. This can be done directly, on the Sino-Vietnamese border, or indirectly, by rapidly strengthening the Kampuchean resistance. Further pressure can be applied on Laos through the dissident minorities in that country, an option which has never been taken up by Beijing but which could be implemented easily, given the fact that many of those minorities can be found in southern China. Confronted by the prospect of a Vietnamese victory, Thailand is likely to offer its fullest co-operation where both the Kampuchean resistance and the minority movements in Laos are concerned.

Although unlikely, this scenario at the same time cannot be ruled out. One reason is that time may not be on the side of the Kampuchean resistance forces, relying as they do on charismatic but aging leaders. Another reason is that there is no love lost among the three resistance groups and a break-away by the two non-communist groups to join hands with the present PRK leadership will not be impossible, thus leaving the task of confronting Vietnam to the militarily strong but internationally discredited Khmer Rouge. Thirdly, the PRC is at present in the throes of another domestic upheaval, albeit not on the scale of the Great Leap Forward or the Cultural Revolution, and because of this, the conduct of its foreign policy may not be as consistent or effective as under normal circumstances.

Scenario B envisages a Vietnamese military solution in Kampuchea, as in Scenario A, but with the difference that the Soviet Union and the PRC both give their tacit consent prior to the fact. The assumption here is that the process of *rapprochement* between the two communist great powers leads not only to the resolution of their differences, but also to a diplomatic alignment or collusion on major security issues.

From ASEAN's perspective, this scenario is the worst possible one. For it has all the undesirable elements of Scenario A and more. In effect, what is resurrected is the formidable cold war/Vietnam War communist coalition, comprising the PRC, the Soviet Union and Vietnam, which this time would not be opposed to the same extent by the United States or kept away from the border of Thailand by the existence of a neutral Laos and Kampuchea.

But happily for ASEAN, this scenario is highly unlikely. For one thing, the conflict of security interests between the Soviet Union and the PRC is real, extensive and hence very difficult to resolve. For another, from China's perspective, one pre-condition of the Sino-Soviet alignment would be the existence of a weak, not a strong Vietnam on its southern flank. Thirdly, close collusion between the two communist powers would mean the sacrifice of the "U.S. card", which both

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at present deem highly valuable. It would perhaps also mean a more difficult access to Western and Japanese markets, technology and capital, which are needed for their domestic economies.

Scenario C envisages a resolution of the Kampuchean conflict on ASEAN's terms: Vietnam's withdrawal from Kampuchea; the establishment of a free, neutral, independent, and democratic Kampuchea, and some sort of international guarantees to preserve such an arrangement. Such a resolution not only would safeguard Thailand's security, but also would open up the possibility of ASEAN's realizing its own conception of regional order in the longer run. As discussed above, it would make possible discussions with Vietnam concerning the ways and means of managing future conflicts and of promoting co-operation. Moreover, such a resolution would facilitate ASEAN's search for a balance of presence among the great powers, which in turn would be the first step towards making the concept of ZOPFAN a concrete reality.

There is no doubt that from ASEAN's point of view Scenario C is the most desirable. The question is whether it is likely.

There seem to be three possible ways of reaching a resolution of the Kampuchean conflict on ASEAN's terms, none of which corresponds to the prevailing realities. One is war. A major military victory by either the PRC or ASEAN (Thailand) or both can force the Vietnamese to give up their designs on Kampuchea. But, even assuming that somehow it can prevail over Vietnam's strong defence forces, China is unlikely to risk a major war, being vulnerable on its northern flank; indeed, there is no evident need for the PRC to venture waging such a war, for its policy of attrition is damaging to Vietnam and can be kept up indefinitely. Neither ASEAN nor Thailand has envisaged or will envisage going to war with Vietnam to "recover" Kampuchea.

Another way is the collapse of Vietnam's position in Kampuchea, brought about by China's and ASEAN's policy of attrition. This is more feasible than the way of war, but still unlikely. There is no doubt whatsoever that Vietnam is suffering economic hardship and that this predicament has been brought about in part by its Kampuchean policy. But Hanoi's track record suggests that it is prepared to suffer and make vast sacrifices to achieve its goal, that if it has a "breaking point", no adversary has been able to find it yet through four decades of revolution and war. Indeed, if economic hardship were a crucial factor in Vietnam's decisions concerning peace and war, then it would have withdrawn from Kampuchea some time in the early 1980s after its economy had plunged to its lowest ebb.

The third way is the collapse of Vietnam's position in Kampuchea, brought about by the withdrawal, or at least a substantial reduction, of Soviet assistance. The present Gorbachev leadership seems to be dynamic and unafraid to implement new ideas and reach out to new horizons. The Vladivostock statement and the conduct of Soviet foreign relations in its aftermath reflect the Soviet Union's desire to de-emphasize the importance of its military power and put higher priority on more active and "constructive" diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region, as indicated by

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the recent tour of Southeast Asia by Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. For these reasons, Soviet pressure on Vietnam to withdraw cannot be entirely ruled out. But, however genuine Moscow's desire to be "constructive" may be, the fact is that it has limited option where the Kampuchean conflict and Vietnam are concerned.

One reason is that the logic of the Soviet Union's global geostrategic rivalry with the United States means that the former's overriding priority is not the reduction of regional tension or the creation of a "favourable" image in Southeast Asia, but the preservation and upgrading of its base structures in Vietnam. Accordingly, its commitment to bringing about an accommodation in Kampuchea is far outweighed by its desire to preserve a stable relationship with Vietnam and avoid any conflict which may upset this relationship. Another reason is that as a matter of "face" and strategy, the Soviet Union could not afford to let the Vietnamese position collapse; far from being an "omnipotent patron", Moscow is no more than a helpless Gulliver trapped by bonds of commitment to its small ally, whom it has to provide with aid and succour. Indeed, it is significant that in his Vladivostok statement Gorbachev continued to give Hanoi full military and diplomatic support and interpreted the Kampuchean conflict as one between China and Vietnam. For the foreseeable future, the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance and Soviet political, diplomatic, military and economic assistance to Vietnam are facts of life for Southeast Asians.

Scenario D envisages the continuation of the present impasse. Vietnam continues to occupy Kampuchea, but is unable to eliminate the Kampuchean resistance groups and secure the international community's approbation of the PRK and of the "special relationship" between the PRK and itself. The forces opposed to Vietnam's occupation are able to maintain their political, diplomatic and economic isolation of Vietnam, consequently inflicting upon the latter a good deal of hardship, but are unable to apply sufficient military pressure to wrest the initiative on the ground from Vietnam and force or negotiate a Vietnamese withdrawal. According to this scenario, all the major parties still fail to find common assumptions concerning the appropriate power distribution in Indochina and concerning the rules of the game which would govern their relations with one another.

This scenario seems to be the likeliest one.[9] One reason is that for all the major actors concerned, barring the Kampuchean groups, the present status quo affords them a modicum of security without their having to pay unacceptable costs. Another is that no player has *both* the capacity *and* the will to try to dictate an outcome based more or less exclusively on its own security interests. In other words, for all the main parties involved, that is, again with the exception of the unfortunate Kampucheans, the conflict belongs to the vast grey area between a minor irritation, which has no bearing on their security, and a war of survival, which demands unlimited struggle and sacrifice.

Where the ASEAN countries are concerned, many see the prevailing situation as being the "second-best solution", a tolerable interim arrangement which, though obviously not affording the maximum degree of security, has great

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benefits. A resurgent and expansionist Vietnam is contained and pressured at costs acceptable to themselves, and consequently the *option* of bringing about a region-wide order through consensus is preserved. Moreover, as discussed above, the continuing existence of the conflict acts as a centripetal force for the regional organization, a platform for promoting dialogues with third countries, and a mechanism for orchestrating international support for the group, its ideals and its individual members.

However, while the continuing impasse up to now has conferred benefits on ASEAN, it is not certain that in the longer run the prolongation of the present situation will be advantageous to the regional organization. One possible adverse consequence is increased great power involvement in the region. Here, the most dramatic development is likely to be the consolidation of the Sino-Thai alignment, as indicated by the recent announcement of the purchase by Thailand of fifty to sixty T-69 tanks from the PRC.[10] Another is a growing division within ASEAN, particularly between Thailand and Indonesia whose threat perceptions tend to be divergent. Yet another consequence is the preservation of the conditions which could precipitate a major border war between Thailand and Vietnam: these include the close proximity of the opposing forces, the presence on Thai soil of a large number of Kampuchean refugees, bona fide or otherwise, and the structural weakness of the Thai defence system.[11]

Scenario E envisages a political settlement between ASEAN and Vietnam. The main elements thereof are as follows:

— Immediate withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Thailand's border and phased reduction of Hanoi's military presence in Kampuchea.
— The disarming and disbandment of the Khmer Rouge.
— A new constitution in Kampuchea and an internationally supervised general election involving three parties, namely, the PRK group and the two non-communist Kampuchean resistance groups, and leading to the setting up of a tripartite government.
— A series of agreements and protocols between ASEAN and Vietnam, regarding a) the status of Kampuchea as an independent, sovereign nation, b) the time-table for complete Vietnamese withdrawal, and c) ways and means of controlling conflict and promoting co-operation between ASEAN and Vietnam.[12]

From ASEAN's perspective, this scenario, though less attractive than Scenario C, where most, if not all, of ASEAN's objectives are fulfilled, still has considerable benefits to offer. For one thing, Thailand's border will be rendered more secure. For another, a semblance of order will be established in ASEAN-Vietnam relations. And thirdly, it is likely that the roles of the PRC and the Soviet Union will not increase beyond the present level.

The main obstacle to this type of settlement will be the PRC. Thus, if it is to take place, it will have to be preceded by a Sino-Soviet and a Sino-Vietnamese *rapprochement*. The first is already ongoing; the question is whether the second can be brought about at the same time.

Here perhaps one can venture to be optimistic. For such a settlement, while accepting Vietnam as the most powerful state in Indochina, would act also as a

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constraint against it. Furthermore, normalized relations with the Soviet Union *and* Vietnam would greatly increase Beijing's security and allow it to turn its full attention to the task of modernization. And above all, this settlement does not foreclose China's option of reapplying military pressure on its border with Vietnam at some future date, if deemed necessary and appropriate.

Policy Implications

Extrapolating from the foregoing discussion, one can perhaps rank the various scenarios in *descending* order of 1) likelihood and 2) desirability from ASEAN's point of view, as follows:

Likelihood	*Desirability*
1. D	1. C
2. E (?)	2. E (?)
3. A (?)	3. D (?)
4. B/C	4. A
	5. B

The rankings, of course, are arbitrary and much uncertainty remains, especially concerning the placement of Scenario E. In the order of likelihood, Scenario E is placed second on the assumption that the PRC can somehow be persuaded that its interests would be best secured through compromise rather than a policy of attrition. And in the order of desirability, Scenario E is again placed second on the assumption that there are a number of adverse long-term consequences for ASEAN arising out of the present situation. There is little doubt that these assumptions can and will be questioned and rejected by many.

But if, and it is only an "if", the two rankings correspond to the present and future realities, what is ASEAN to do? Clearly, it should not hastily abandon its present policy, for the continuation of the impasse is preferable to a number of other scenarios. At the same time, however, it should not foreclose the option of trying to reach some sort of political settlement which may be both feasible and preferable to the prevailing situation. This, in turn, means that there is a need to revitalize the dialogue with Vietnam, to endeavour to keep the process of negotiation going despite the numerous problems and pitfalls, and to keep a more open mind about the options and alternatives at ASEAN's disposal. In other words, what is required is statesmanship of the highest order.[13]

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ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific in the 1990s

LEE POH PING

I shall not in this paper discuss the various concepts of an Asian-Pacific community as put forward by scholars and non-scholars alike. Such range on the one hand from the widest one that any nation that has any conceivable relation with the Pacific Ocean can be members, and on the other to one that would confine membership to the market economies of the five advanced nations of Japan, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, the newly industrializing countries (NICs) of South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong, the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Papua New Guinea and the countries of the South Pacific. Nor will I trace the various developments towards the concrete realization of this Asian-Pacific community. Such developments have been primarily in the non-governmental sphere (since 1984, the ASEAN states have initiated a governmental dialogue between their foreign ministers and their counterparts from the five advanced countries of the Asia-Pacific, a dialogue known as ASEAN Plus Five), though such efforts have not led to anything remotely comparable to the European Economic Community or even anything resembling the cohesion of ASEAN. The literature is reasonably plentiful on both and is quite accessible.[1]

Nor will I discuss the political aspects of any proposed Asian-Pacific community not only because it is controversial — some fear that it could be turned into an anti-communist bloc or even a military alliance after the fashion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)[2] — but because all the excitement generated about the Pacific century derives not from politics but economics. At any rate, I do not foresee any profound transformation of the political balance now maintained by the United States and the Soviet Union in the Asia-Pacific, though there may be varying degrees of adjustment of the relative strengths of both in the 1990s.

And indeed, proponents of the Pacific century have waxed eloquent on the economic aspect! On a somewhat hyperbolic level, some predict that the late twentieth and the twenty-first centuries will see the global centre of economic gravity shifting to the Pacific just as in the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century this gravity had moved to the Atlantic from the Mediterranean where it had begun. This talk of a vast quasi-Hegelian movement, with the time of progress perhaps implied though not explicitly stated, is a particular addiction of some Japanese writers[3] somewhat caught up with the notion of their nation as being in the forefront of world history. On a more specific level, many refer to the

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spectacular economic performance of Japan, the East Asian NICs and to some extent ASEAN before the recent recession, as proof of the great economic vitality of the Asian-Pacific region, a vitality all the more impressive compared to the rather sluggish Western European economies, especially after the oil shock of 1974.[4]

I subscribe to this economic view. I take as the basic argument in this paper that what essentially matters in the Asia-Pacific in the 1990s and which will have a profound influence on the ASEAN states, are the economic developments in the two giant nations of Japan and the United States and their relations with each other.

This is not to deny that there are also star performers in South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong. These have made tremendous economic gains and already are on the threshold of becoming industrial economies. But their advance is ultimately dependent on the supply of critical technology[5] and market from Japan and the United States. Though some, particularly South Korea, may strive for independence from both, it is unlikely that they can be completely successful by the 1990s, though South Korea may become an increasingly serious competitor to Japan. It is also unlikely that Australia and New Zealand will be in the forefront of technology in the Asia-Pacific in the 1990s. If anything, many probably see the critical task for Australia and New Zealand as enmeshing themselves in the Japanese-dominated Asian economies in a way that will avoid economic dependence or becoming a mere quarry to the Japanese. The position of the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) in any Asian-Pacific community is uncertain. Despite its interest in participating in some of the dialogues, its ideology, unless substantially modified, presents problems of accommodation to the Asian-Pacific market economies. Moreover, it is of such size, strategic weight and potential economic influence that its relationship with ASEAN merits more detailed treatment than is possible here.

These economic developments pertain essentially to the creation of post-industrial or high technology economies, now already under way in the two Pacific giants. If the Pacific century is about anything, it is about the high technological development of micro-electronics, computers, optic fibres and so on, and their application to the traditional industrial activities of the manufacture of cars, ships, and so forth. In this, both have a headstart over Western Europe. Much has been written about this post-industrial or information age. Suffice it for us to consider three authoritative and influential views which have the greatest bearing on the developing countries, especially ASEAN. Two are Japanese and the other American.

The first is found in a Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI) sponsored study.[6] This posits the argument that a new industrial society is in the process of formation which will significantly alter the structure of the world economy. Based essentially on computers and micro-electronics, this new society will change the relationship between labour and the means of production whereby the proportion of workers involved in planning and development will increase compared to those directly engaged in production. This may reach an eventual stage when the

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knowledge, experience and information held by workers themselves are the essential means of production, and manual labour as such is done away with. For example, a textile factory may be so computerized and robotized that all that is essentially needed are people who can manage the computers. Then the separation between the means of production and labour, such a marked feature of the first Industrial Revolution and the basis of so many social theories of alienation, Marxist or otherwise, will be reversed. Both will be integrated again. Such a development will profoundly alter the structure of comparative advantage among nations and the international division of labour.

Pursuing the same line but put in a different way, certain circles in the Japanese Ministry of Finance,[7] use the word "softnomics" to describe the economy of the information age. Accordingly, there are two economic systems, the "hard" one of the industrial age and the "soft" one of the pre- and post-industrial ages. The advanced countries of the West and Japan have gone through the "hard" phase, characterized by the extreme exploitation of the earth's resources. Such exploitation, if carried on indefinitely poses potential dangers to the survival of the earth. Two examples are mentioned of the effects of industrial activities: the vast and irreplaceable destruction of the forests of the world, thus increasing the dangers to the earth of heightened carbon levels, and that of the increased heat which could melt the polar ice caps and elevate sea levels. The implication is that developing countries should not indiscriminately adopt the "hard" phase. Such dangers can be avoided by adopting a post-industrial information economy which will need less raw materials as it involves the miniturization of the production process. Present standards of living will still be maintained, if not increased, by this information economy. This is also preferable to a pre-industrial "soft" one where modernization does not occur at all.

The third view is propounded by an American scholar, Peter F. Drucker.[8] In an article in the New York-based *Foreign Affairs* journal entitled "The Changed World Economy", he sees three profound developments: 1) a structural decline in the prices of commodities; 2) there is an uncoupling of industrial production from employment; and 3) there is perhaps now a symbolic economy in which financial movements may not be directly related to trade in goods and services. This particular article has wide currency in élite circles in Malaysia and possibly in the rest of ASEAN.

From the above, it can be seen that ASEAN faces two developments of great significance to it, that of a world economy moving against the producers of commodities, and that of the diminishing need for cheap labour on the part of the advanced countries. There is yet another challenge, that of the fall-out from the strained Japanese-American relations, as expressed in the huge deficit Americans suffer in bilateral trade relations with Japan. These strained relations may be the result of the more successful adjustment of Japan to high technology or to other reasons.[9] Whatever they may be, it behoves the ASEAN countries to consider the possible scenarios and outcome as these two giants wrestle with each other.

The existence today of a huge American deficit in the balance of trade

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between the United States and Japan (about US$60 billion in 1986) and an even bigger global deficit has led many Americans to question the wisdom of maintaining a free trade policy and the concomitant open American market. It may be that the root cause of this deficit lies in declining American competitiveness and not alleged unfair Japanese trading practices. It may be that other countries such as West Germany, Taiwan and Korea are also contributory. But the country which has been most salient in American eyes is Japan, particularly as the Americans who have been most vocal are those in industries most affected by Japanese competition. And such voices have in no way been stilled by the continuing huge deficit despite Japanese market-opening measures and the rise of the yen. The danger exists, as exemplified by the Jenkin's Bill over which Congress only narrowly failed to override the presidential veto, and the Gephardt Bill which sought to legislate against Japanese and other imports, that American law-makers may come to the conclusion that the only way to reduce this deficit and save American jobs is to shut out Japanese imports. The consequence of this would be disastrous. Japan and other affected countries will retaliate. The casualty will be the post-war economic order, with the likely scenario of ensuing trading blocs with Japan dominating East and Southeast Asia, the Americas under the United States, and Africa under Western Europe. We may see the resurrection of what was thought obsolete: imperialism and spheres of influence.

Such a scenario, however, is not a foregone conclusion because of a very keen awareness among the Japanese and many others that something must be done to prevent this, and because the United States has not lost out in everything. It is still strong in commercial aviation and services, for example, and not everyone will bet that Japan will beat the United States in the high technology race. What is more likely and is now already happening to some extent, is a United States pursuing narrow economic interests irrespective of whether the interests of other countries which may be allies or friends are hurt in the process. Recent examples come to mind, such as the subsidized sale of American rice in the world market, estimated by some to affect possibly as many as one million Thai farmers, and the subsidized sale of sugar and wheat to communist countries which has been perceived in Australia as damaging to its national interests. There is also the generally hard-nosed attitude in American negotiations with Korea and Taiwan, where the United States is taking a tough stand on textile import limitations, intellectual copyright, market-opening measures, insistence on the removal of export clauses in joint-venture agreements between these countries and Japan, and so on. The United States may have a case in many of these steps and may have to respond to domestic political exigencies. But such an attitude contrasts sharply with the attitude of the 1950s and 1960s when the United States would not only not resort to such steps where allies and friends were concerned but would probably not even have contemplated them. We remember then the American encouragement of economic development among its friends and allies, not to mention the existence of all manner of economic aid. That probably is a bygone age, while it is likely this tough American attitude will continue for some time.

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Another likely scenario is a realization on both sides that Japan and America are so intertwined that there is a limit to which either side can push the other without bringing the whole house down. In order to prevent this, both sides may find it expedient to arrive at mutual agreements that may pay very little heed to the interests of other countries, and attempt to overcome protectionist pressure by acting against countries of lesser global economic consequence. Already there is talk in certain circles of an American-Japanese condominium in managing the global economy. A recent article in the influential journal *Foreign Affairs* coined the term "bigemony" to describe this joint condominium.[10] This is not to suggest that such "bigemony" already exists, but the situation is best described by the Asian proverb that when elephants fight or make love, the grass beneath them are trampled upon.

Keeping in mind such scenarios, how should ASEAN respond? One option proposed is to emphasize self-reliance, to depend less on foreigners to produce the needed goods and services. Exactly how this can be done, given the present limited economic co-operation and the competitive nature of many of the ASEAN economic activities, is often not spelt out. A logical extreme of this will be an autarchic economy or the delinking of the ASEAN economies from the international economy. Given the fundamental nature of the challenge to the ASEAN economies and the purpose of this conference to consider broad ASEAN paths in the 1990s, a discussion of this theoretical possibility is not out of order.

The attraction of an autarchic economy is that ASEAN will be master of its own economic destiny, and not be subject to outside powers which may have little concern for the interests of ASEAN. Yet, is it realistic? It will be instructive first to consider two near Asian examples, Burma and China. In the decades after World War II, Burma decided to isolate itself from the world economy, choosing a path called the "Burmese Road to Socialism". This policy was further made possible as the geopolitical designs of the two most important powers to Burma, China and the United States, fitted well with this isolation. Yet, the cost has been an extremely low standard of living (Burma recently declared it was one of the poorest countries in the world) despite the possession of abundant natural resources. There are now increasing doubts within Burma itself of the wisdom of this policy.

The failure of the Chinese autarchic experiment is even more evident. China detached itself from the international capitalist economy when the communists took over, and, with the advent of the Sino-Soviet conflict, also from the international socialist economy dominated by the Soviet Union. This autarchy found its extreme expression in the Cultural Revolution. It was thought that with its immense population and resources together with its strategic weight, the Chinese could pull this off. It was therefore a most spectacular turnabout when Deng Xiaoping in 1979 made the decision to open the Chinese economy to the West and Japan. This decision was brought about not least by a realization that the Maoist self-reliant policy had not brought China anywhere near the economies of the advanced countries, and that countries with some racial and cultural affinity to China, such as Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and, of course, Japan, are streaking

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ahead economically because they do not have autarchic economies.

The second problem is whether it is strategically possible, given that Southeast Asia possesses abundant natural resources which, despite the changed world economy, may still be needed by the advanced economies. A good example is oil, a fuel which is unlikely to be obsolete by the 1990s and for which there might even be a shortage then. Moreover, Southeast Asia is not unimportant geopolitically to the big powers now present. For example, the Straits of Malacca, through which more than 80 per cent of Japanese oil needs derived from the Persian Gulf pass through, is important to Japan while the American bases in Clark Field and Subic Bay in the Philippines are integral to the present American Asian-Pacific strategy. In addition, the Chinese may fear that Southeast Asia, particularly Indochina, could be used by a hostile superpower, such as the Soviet Union against it. By the same token, the Soviet Union may find Southeast Asia, and especially Indochina, useful against China. All these do not mean that the big powers may not change their strategies in the 1990s or that they may not be able to achieve their geopolitical designs with an autarchic ASEAN economy. This latter is, however, extremely unlikely as far as the United States and, even more so, Japan are concerned.

Even if the strategic circumstances were not unfavourable, an autarchic economy would necessitate massive involvement by the state apparatus. Quite apart from the possible political problems which might arise, it is questionable whether the state has the will and capacity to do so in the present age. There is a worldwide trend to reduce state involvement in the economy — privatization is the catchword here. And this is happening in countries of varying ideological colour. In the ASEAN countries, where the state has been involved, it is with the purpose of "restructuring", that is, to enable certain disadvantaged economic groups to participate more fully in the modern international economy, not shut themselves from it. Moreover, the present globalization of many national economies, wild currency fluctuations and so on make it difficult for any state to control its own economy even if it wanted to. In this connection, it is relevant to note that one of the conclusions of a recent discussion between Henry Kissinger and ASEAN leaders was that the world economy is going out of control.[11]

The second option for ASEAN is to embark on industrialization (taking a "hard" path) and rely less on commodities. This will make ASEAN less subject to the violent fluctuations of the prices of commodities. However, quite apart from the internal problem of ASEAN's ability to industrialize, the export of manufactured goods will likely encounter protectionism in America as posited in the foregoing second scenario. Nor will Japan act as a significant market in the 1990s. The other alternative is the ASEAN market. Quite apart from the fact that it is not as rich as either Japan or the United States, the ASEAN countries are still in the process of discussing about further economic co-operation. It remains to be seen whether a common market or even a free trade zone can be achieved by the 1990s.

The third option is to go into the high technology or the softnomics path. Then ASEAN will be with the wave of the future. However, the problem will be even more difficult for ASEAN than in the second option. It first involves a double

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leap, from a pre-industrial economy to a high-technology one, which will probably also be costlier. It is also not likely that ASEAN, with the possible exception of Singapore, can attract the kind of Japanese and American investment that can lead to a high technological economy.

Finally, the ASEAN countries can remain as they are, relying again on their commodities, and try to ride the present recession through. But, if the Drucker argument is right, this will not work in the long term.

Given such, it is quite likely that the ASEAN countries will adopt a mixture of the last three options in the 1990s, a mixture of the "hard" path, softnomics and continued reliance on commodities. Thus, all the ASEAN states will try to industrialize, with Malaysia and Singapore in the forefront, while Singapore will also attempt to go into high technology. All but Singapore will probably continue producing commodities. Where the emphasis will be or how it is mixed will depend very much on the paths the two Pacific giants take. It is thus appropriate now to consider ASEAN's relations with them in the Asian-Pacific context. To do so, one should distinguish between explicit attempts to create an Asian-Pacific organizational structure after the fashion of the United Nations, EEC or whatever, from that of the initiation of steps through dialogues and meetings to influence Japanese-American relations for the profit of ASEAN, or to limit damage.

The former path is unlikely to be fruitful at this juncture. Any attempt at organization creation carries with it a definition of membership. This is somewhat undesirable to ASEAN at present as it could take on a narrow political and economic colouration which may clash with ASEAN's professed aim of neutrality or with ASEAN's relations with other economic groups such as the EEC. It might also pose problems for ASEAN itself whether it should enter as a group or individually — a formal statement either way may not harmonize with the spirit of ASEAN cohesion which rests less on formal criteria than on consensus building. In addition, the distribution of power, realistically speaking, would likely be weighted towards Japan and the United States in any formal organization.

The latter path may be more desirable. In this respect, ASEAN should work with and encourage as many of the non-governmental Asian-Pacific dialogues as possible and also engage itself governmentally, as in the ASEAN Plus Five. What viewpoint should ASEAN convey in such dialogues?

ASEAN should first make both powers aware of the crisis in its economy brought about by the structural decline of commodity prices, the recession this has induced and the possible eruption of social and other tensions which have been kept under control by high economic growth. It may be too much to ask for price stabilization schemes, but awareness should at least be stimulated.

Secondly, in the movement towards high technology both countries, especially Japan, will find many of their "hard" industries uncompetitive. Such industries could be relocated in the ASEAN countries. Of course, the ASEAN countries themselves should undertake the kind of economic reforms conducive to the receipt of such and other investment.

Thirdly, the ASEAN countries should aim at some damage limitation. Efforts

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should be made to persuade the Americans that it is to their long-term interest and also ASEAN's to allow the continual access of ASEAN manufactured goods, for while protectionism may be the short-term answer to political exigencies, the ultimate victim will be the international trading system. It should also urge the United States not to undertake the kind of rice subsidy which will have a tremendous negative impact on rice farmers in Thailand. In addition, continued efforts should be made to persuade Japan to open its market further.

And fourthly, efforts should be made to persuade Japan to divert some of its funds now floating in the international economy or used for the purchase of American treasury bonds together with American and Japanese real estate, to some kind of a Marshall Plan for ASEAN.[12]

Finally, what cards can ASEAN play? Probably not too many. Two may, however, be considered. The advent of high technology notwithstanding, ASEAN still has a population of about 300 million people who constitute a market of not inconsiderable significance, particularly as they have the purchasing power of medium income countries. Natural resources will still be abundant, with many still needed for the international economy of the 1990s. In addition, ASEAN has a reasonably cheap skilled labour force which will still be needed despite high technology. For example, we are told that robots and computers have taken over many of the functions of humans in manufacturing but exactly in what functions and in what ways they affect labour cost have not been adequately spelt out. Thus, in the manufacture of cars, for example, robots can probably do welding and painting more efficiently than human labour. Yet, there are many sophisticated functions such as the insertion of the fuel pump that robots cannot adequately handle. Human labour is still needed. In addition, the differential in the wage rate may be so great in some cases (for example, the average wage for labour in Japan is about ten times the average wage in Thailand) that manufacturers can be quite easily influenced by this to postpone further computerization and robotization. Moreover, developments in international finance, specifically changes in the exchange rate of relevant currencies, can further reinforce the importance of cheap labour. The striking example is the revaluation of the yen (or endaka as the Japanese call it). Since the G-5 meeting in September 1985 in New York, the yen has appreciated more than 40 per cent to the American dollar. This has put a tremendous strain on the Japanese economy and has almost played havoc with its small and medium industries. These industries are finding it difficult to cope and have rushed to invest in South Korea, Taiwan and other suitable ASEAN countries.

In addition, the participation of ASEAN gives the community a "developmental" aspect.[13] For any community or international organization to have global significance, those advanced countries which advocate this should not only invite some developing countries as members for window dressing but should set aims that are of some meaning to the latter. It is for this reason that the original proposal of a Pacific community of the five advanced countries, the United States, Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, did not go very far as it would then be a grouping of rich countries only. Moreover, the smaller advanced countries,

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such as Australia and New Zealand, together with Korea will be most keen to have ASEAN as members or participants, for then they will not be so overwhelmed by Japan and the United States. It may be that the "development" theme is holding less enchantment in America than was the case in the 1950s and 1960s, but for Japan it may have some effect. And this may be in two ways. Japan is now fighting a battle to maintain free trade or at least free trade according to GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) rules. Any support it can get from ASEAN will be helpful. Secondly, Japan will soon emerge as a great power not only in the economic sense but also in the sense of one with international responsibilities attached to it. ASEAN by virtue of proximity, relative importance to the Japanese economy and some strategic value, is a good candidate for Japanese developmental efforts. If such be the case, there may yet be hope for ASEAN in the Asia-Pacific in the 1990s.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. The literature on the Asia-Pacific concept is legion. It consists of reports to senate, committees and government, proceedings of conferences, scholarly articles, personal views, contributions to journals and so on. The following are some of them:
   a) Hugh Patrick and Peter Drysdale, "An Asian-Pacific Regional Economic Organization: An Explanatory Concept Paper" (Prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, July 1979). This gives a very comprehensive treatment of the subject.
   b) "Interim Report on the Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept" (translated from Japanese) by the Pacific Basin Cooperation Study Group under Saburo Okita, a committee established by the late Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira (14 November 1979). Okita, one of the strongest proponents of the Pacific community, was once Foreign Minister of Japan.
   c) Lawrence Krause, "The Pacific Economy in an Interdependent World" (Brookings Institution, October 1978). The article underlines the increasing economic interdependence of the countries in the Pacific, particularly in trade terms.
   d) Sir John Crawford and Greg Seow, eds., *Pacific Economic Co-operation: Suggestions for Action* (Heinemann Educational Books [Asia] Ltd. 1981). This collection of articles represents a wide variety of views.
   e) *The Pacific Community Concept: Views from Eight Nations* (Tokyo: Japan Centre for International Exchange, 1980). This is a collection of papers from a conference organized by the Japan Centre in 1980.
   f) Dick Wilson, "The Pacific Basin is coming together", *Asia Pacific Community* (Tokyo), No. 30 (Fall 1985). It is a useful discussion of the various moves towards a Pacific Basin community.
   g) Hiroshi Matsumoto and Noordin Sopiee, eds., *Into the Pacific Era; Southeast Asia and Its Place in the Pacific*, Proceedings of a Conference held in Kuala Lumpur in 1984 (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Strategic and International Studies, 1986).
2. There were fears privately expressed by some that the interest of President Reagan in the earlier years of his administration in the Pacific concept was due to the possibility of some kind of security arrangement against the Russians. See also "Towards a Pacific Basin Community: A Malaysian Perception" by Tan Sri M. Ghazali Shafie in Crawford and Seow, op. cit.
3. One of the more well-known is Jiro Tokuyama.

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4. Lawrence Krause, op. cit.
5. For an argument along this line, see Kenichi Ohmae, *Triad Power, The Coming Shape of Global Competition* (New York: The Free Press, a Division of Macmillan Inc., 1985).
6. Yasusuke Murakami and Yutaka Kosai, eds., *Japan in the Global Community: Its Role and Contribution on the Eve of the 21st Century* (Roundtable Discussions on Japan in the Global Community, organized by Ministry of International Trade and Industry [MITI] and distributed by University of Tokyo Press, 1986).
7. See Yuichiro Nagatomi, counsellor for Research and Planning, Ministry of Finance, "Japan's Course and Indonesia's Future" and "Japan's Informationalization and Emerging Service Economy and Its Implications for U.S.-Japan Relations" (Publications of the Institute of Fiscal and Monetary Policy, Ministry of Finance, Tokyo, Japan).
8. Peter F. Drucker, "The Changed World Economy", *Foreign Affairs* (New York), Spring 1986.
9. Many Japanese are wont to view this bilateral strain as basically a problem of restructuring the world economy. Japan has demonstrated competitiveness in many manufacturing industries while the U.S. competitiveness in this regard is declining. On the other hand, the United States is demonstrating continued strength in services. Therefore, some basic adjustment in this could solve the present problem. Many Americans are inclined to a different view — that the United States is losing to Japan because of the absence of a "level playing field", that is, Japan is enjoying an unfair advanage. Moreover, many Americans have this probably unjustified nightmare that their "strength" in the services are those of manning hamburger stalls, sweeping Toyota factory floors and so on and are understandably not thrilled with such an adjustment.
10. "Economic Imbalances and World Politics", *Foreign Affairs* (New York), Spring 1987.
11. See the report in the *New Straits Times*, Kuala Lumpur, 7 March 1987, on the outcome of the discussions between Henry Kissinger and ASEAN leaders in a roundtable discussion organized by the Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Kuala Lumpur.
12. One of the Japanese propohents of a Japanese Marshall Plan is Saburo Okita. See "Japan — Saviour of the Developing World", *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), 17 July 1986.
13. Saburo Okita himself is of the opinion that the Pacific community cannot proceed without ASEAN membership.

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DOCUMENTATION

Extracts from the Joint Communiqué of the Twentieth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Singapore, 15–16 June 1987

Third ASEAN Summit

The Foreign Ministers reviewed the progress of the preparations for the Third ASEAN Summit to be held in Manila from 14–16 December 1987. They took note of the Report of the Chairman of the High Level Steering Committee (HLSC) on the progress of the Summit preparations. They agreed that efforts should be intensified to ensure that the Summit will provide new impetus towards qualitative improvements in intra-ASEAN economic cooperation, the strengthening of the ASEAN machinery, the intensification of ASEAN cooperation at all levels, and the enhancement of ASEAN's international economic relations, particularly with its Dialogue Partners.

The Foreign Ministers noted that new initiatives for the strengthening of ASEAN economic and functional co-operation, external relations and the ASEAN machinery have been proposed and that the relevant Issues Committees of the HLSC are actively examining these proposals. They also agreed that concrete measures should be devised to channel the energies of the youth towards the strengthening of the political commitment to ASEAN of future generations.

The Foreign Ministers were pleased to note that the Summit has generated widespread interest not only among ASEAN Governments but also in the private sector, research institutions and academic circles. In particular, the Group of Fourteen of the ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry and the research institutions in member countries have organised a series of seminars and conferences aimed at identifying and recommending new initiatives for consideration at the Summit. In this regard, the Foreign Ministers expressed their appreciation for the keen interest shown by the private sector in pursuing closer ASEAN cooperation.

Situation in Kampuchea

The Foreign Ministers examined the situation in Kampuchea and expressed their deep concern over Vietnam's continued illegal occupation of Kampuchea. The Foreign Ministers reiterated ASEAN's conviction that Vietnam's military occupation of Kampuchea constituted a flagrant violation of the fundamental principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. Vietnam's military occupation of Kampuchea, now in its ninth year, also violated the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states and the right of the Kampuchean people to self-determination. The invasion and occupation of Kampuchea by Vietnam continue to pose a grave threat to peace and stability in Southeast Asia, thus endangering international peace and security.

The Foreign Ministers viewed with concern Vietnam's continued reliance on a military solution in Kampuchea. They deplored the Vietnamese artillery attacks on civilian refugee camps along the Thai-Kampuchean border and Vietnamese violation of Thailand's sover-

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eignty and territorial integrity through military incursions. They condemned Vietnam for its occupation of the hills at Chong Bok inside Thailand and called on Vietnam to withdraw its troops from Thai territory. The Foreign Ministers also reiterated their full support for Thailand's actions in the exercise of its legitimate right of self-defence and reaffirmed their solidarity with the Government and people of Thailand.

The Foreign Ministers once again called for a comprehensive political settlement in Kampuchea based on a total withdrawal of foreign forces, the restoration of Kampuchea's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, self-determination for the Kampuchean people under U.N. auspices and the achievement of national reconciliation in Kampuchea. They called on Vietnam to accept an independent, neutral and non-aligned Kampuchea.

The Foreign Ministers reaffirmed the validity of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Joint Appeal for Kampuchean Independence of 20 September 1983 and reiterated their support for the CGDK's Eight-Point Proposal of 17 March 1986 as a constructive framework for negotiations. They urged Vietnam to reconsider its rejection of the Eight-Point Proposal. They also called upon the international community to continue to support the Proposal.

The Foreign Ministers reaffirmed their support for the CGDK under the Presidency of Samdech Norodom Sihanouk. They were heartened by the military successes achieved by the nationalist resistance forces against the Vietnamese occupation.

The Foreign Ministers also recorded their warm appreciation to the international community for its continued support of the CGDK. They saw the overwhelming support for the Resolution on the Situation in Kampuchea at the 41st UNGA as clear evidence of the international community's disapproval of Vietnam's continued occupation of Kampuchea. The Foreign Ministers also expressed their gratitude to the President of the ICK, His Excellency Leopold Gratz, for his untiring efforts in helping to find a solution to the Kampuchean problem. Recognizing the important contributions made by the ICK Ad Hoc Committee, they also expressed their sincere thanks to its Chairman, His Excellency Massamba Sarre of Senegal, and to all its members for their commitment to a peaceful settlement.

The Foreign Ministers recorded their gratitude to the U.N. Secretary-General, His Excellence Javier Perez de Cuellar, for his commendable efforts in the search for a comprehensive political settlement to the Kampuchean problem in accordance with the relevant UNGA resolutions and also to the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs in Southeast Asia, His Excellency Raffeeudin Ahmed. The Foreign Ministers reiterated their belief that the U.N. has an important and constructive role to play in the search for a political solution to the Kampuchean problem.

The Foreign Ministers reviewed the diplomatic efforts of ASEAN to help achieve a comprehensive and durable political settlement for the Kampuchean problem. They reaffirmed ASEAN's commitment to continue efforts in seeking such a solution in accordance with the relevant UNGA resolutions on the situation in Kampuchea. In this regard, they expressed their appreciation to the Foreign Minister of Indonesia, His Excellency Professor Dr Mochtar Kusumaatmadja for the useful role he has played as ASEAN's interlocutor with Vietnam and his endeavours to explore and broaden the options available for a settlement to the Kampuchean problem.

The Foreign Ministers were of the view that Vietnam's basic position on Kampuchea has not changed, despite its recent attempts to give the impression of flexibility. This was also evident in Vietnam's outright rejection of the CGDK's Eight-Point Proposal. They deplored the lack of any genuine effort so far on the part of Vietnam for a political settlement as called for by an overwhelming majority of countries in the United Nations. They

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hoped the new leadership in Vietnam will show a willingness to find a political settlement to the Kampuchean problem.

The Foreign Ministers called on the international community not to forget the plight of the Kampuchean people in their just struggle against the Vietnamese aggression. They called on all countries, including the Soviet Union, to urge Vietnam to settle the Kampuchean problem peacefully.

Indochinese Refugees

The Foreign Ministers reviewed the refugee situation and expressed deep concern over the serious plight of Kampuchean refugees and displaced persons uprooted because of the continuing Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea. The Ministers deplored the shelling and firing into civilian camps at the Thai-Kampuchean border. They recalled in particular the Vietnamese shelling on 31 May 1987 of the United Nations-assisted Site 2 camp on Thai soil in which seven Kampucheans were killed and several wounded. They condemned the Vietnamese military incursions into Thai territory. These incidents have caused casualties not only to the civilian Kampuchean population but also to the Thai villagers living near the border.

The Foreign Ministers noted that since the invasion of Kampuchea in 1978, hundreds of thousands of Indochinese refugees have fled their countries and have taken temporary refuge in the ASEAN countries. They were gravely concerned that while resettlement in third countries was slowing down, the influx of Vietnamese refugees and illegal immigrants by sea to the ASEAN countries, especially Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines and Indonesia has continued unabated.

The Foreign Ministers were in agreement that the responsibility for the continuing exodus of Indochinese refugees and illegal immigrants and their suffering and hardship lay with Vietnam. They called on Vietnam to put an end to the exodus of refugees and illegal immigrants to the neighbouring countries. To emphasise their grave concern over the seriousness of the refugee problem, the Foreign Ministers issued a Joint Statement on 14 June 1987.

The Foreign Ministers appealed to the international community to continue to render assistance in relieving the plight of the Indochinese refugees and displaced persons, especially those living along the Thai-Kampuchean border who have the greatest and the most urgent need for such international assistance while the conflict in Kampuchea continues. In their view, these refugees and displaced persons should ultimately be resettled in third countries or voluntarily repatriated to their countries of origin. While the Foreign Ministers reaffirmed the continuing adherence of the ASEAN countries to the generally accepted humanitarian principles, they also reiterated the understanding that there should be no residual refugee problem in the ASEAN countries.

The Foreign Ministers thanked the United Nations Secretary-General for his continuing support and humanitarian role in helping to alleviate the plight of Indochinese refugees and displaced persons. The Foreign Ministers also commended the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for his assistance and continuing efforts in the Indochinese refugee resettlement programme and in the screening of Laotian refugees in Thailand. They also commended the UNHCR for organising the Orderly Departure Programme (ODP) from Vietnam which is one of the means of resettlement of the refugees in third countries. They also recorded their sincere gratitude to the former U.N. Secretary-General's Special Representative for Coordination of Kampuchean Humanitarian Assis-

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tance Programmes, Mr Tatsuro Kunugi, for his outstanding contribution. They welcomed his successor, Mr S.A.M.S. Kibria to the post and assured him of their cooperation. The Ministers also reiterated their deep appreciation to the United Nations Border Relief Operation (UNBRO) for its commendable contribution, in cooperation with the World Food Programme, the Office of the UNHCR, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and other organizations and voluntary agencies concerned, towards relieving the sufferings of the Indochinese refugees and displaced persons.

ZOPFAN

The Foreign Ministers reaffirmed ASEAN's determination to pursue efforts towards the realization of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in Southeast Asia, while recognizing that the Kampuchean problem remains an obstacle to the attainment of this objective. They recalled the mandate of the Senior Officials and the Working Group on ZOPFAN to continue with the consideration of the concept of a Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) as a component of ZOPFAN, with a view to drafting as soon as possible a treaty on the SEANWFZ, taking into account all its implications. The Foreign Ministers noted with appreciation the work done so far by the Working Group and the Drafting Committee on the drafting of the treaty and requested the Senior Officials to continue their consideration of the subject in all its aspects.

Review of ASEAN Cooperation

The Foreign Ministers reviewed the progress made in ASEAN cooperation and noted with satisfaction the extensive programmes and activities carried out in the past year to promote ASEAN's objectives. The Foreign Ministers also noted the preparations made for the Third ASEAN Summit.

The Foreign Ministers expressed their appreciation to other ASEAN Ministers for their continued efforts to promote further cooperative endeavours within their respective areas of responsibility. They noted with satisfaction that a number of ministerial meetings were held, particularly the 18th ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting, the 6th Meeting of ASEAN Labour Ministers, the 6th Meeting of ASEAN Economic Ministers on Energy Cooperation, and the 8th Meeting of ASEAN Ministers of Agriculture and Forestry. These Meetings resulted in many decisions being carried out and several projects being implemented, thus contributing to further enhance ASEAN cooperation.

The Foreign Ministers noted the progress that was achieved in ASEAN economic cooperation. Among the achievements were: the improvement made to the ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures (AIJV) Scheme; the conclusion of the Agreement On Preferental Short-listing of ASEAN Contractors to promote the development of the construction industry in the ASEAN region; the Agreement by ASEAN's Central Banks/Monetary Authorities to extend the ASEAN Swap Arrangement by another five years and the doubling of the available credit line from US$100 million to US$200 million, or US$40 million per member country; the proposed establishment of an ASEAN Tourism Information Centre in Kuala Lumpur and continued efforts to promote ASEAN as one tourist destination; the establishment of an ASEAN-EC Energy Management Research and Training Centre in Jakarta; the establishment of the ASEAN Poultry Disease Research and Training Centre; and the Upgrading of the ASEAN Reinsurance Pool to a Corporation with an initial paid-up capital of US$3 million.

The Foreign Ministers noted with satisfaction the continued intensive cooperation in

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the socio-cultural and scientific fields. The number of projects implemented by the ASEAN Committees on Culture and Information, Social Development, and Science and Technology accounted for a majority of cooperation activities in ASEAN. The activities involved a wide spectrum of ASEAN participants covering youth and women, researchers, scientists as well as social, cultural, media, educational and health workers. These activities have further promoted ASEAN awareness and a sense of regional identity among the ASEAN peoples.

The Foreign Ministers signed the Supplementary Agreement to Amend the Basic Agreement on ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures (BAAIJV) which raises the minimum margin of tariff preference for AIJV products from 50% to 75%.

The Foreign Ministers were of the view that the 20th Anniversary of ASEAN marks a significant milestone in its history and noted that various activities would be carried out by member countries on this auspicious occasion.

Cooperation with Dialogue Partners

The Foreign Ministers noted that further progress had been made in ASEAN's cooperation with its Dialogue Partners, namely, Australia, Canada, the European Community, Japan, New Zealand and the United States. They further noted that a number of new projects were implemented under UNDP funding. They expressed their appreciation for the cooperation that the Dialogue Partners and the UNDP had rendered to ASEAN's development projects which produced concrete and positive results. The Foreign Ministers stressed that in the conduct of its dialogues with the developed countries, ASEAN would continue to attach great importance to commercial and industrial cooperation, market access, investment and technology transfer. They expressed the hope that further progress would be made in these areas.

The Foreign Ministers expressed satisfaction with the successful conclusion of the 6th ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting (AEMM VI), Jakarta, October 1986. The substantive and frank exchange of views at that Meeting on political and economic issues of mutual interest had contributed to a better understanding of each other's positions. They stressed the importance of the AEMM VI decision to establish the Joint Investment Committees in the ASEAN capitals and expressed the hope that these Committees would contribute to the promotion of European investments in the ASEAN region.

The Foreign Ministers reviewed the ASEAN-Japan Dialogue relations and expressed satisfaction that ASEAN and Japan had signed a Memorandum of Understanding to extend the Agreement on the ASEAN Promotion Centre on Trade, Investment and Tourism (APC) for a further period of five years beginning from May 1987. They are confident that the extension would facilitate the increase of Japanese investment in ASEAN, promote access of ASEAN products to the Japanese market and increase the flow of Japanese tourists to the ASEAN region.

The Foreign Ministers expressed the view that Japan could play a greater role in the economic development of ASEAN and in facilitating closer ASEAN economic cooperation. The Foreign Ministers noted that the large trade surplus and foreign reserves of Japan would enable it to assume such a role. Japan could also help to facilitate the flow of Japanese investments to ASEAN through the provision of attractive financial assistance and incentives for its private sector. The Foreign Ministers welcomed Japan's readiness to help promote industrial development in ASEAN through the provision of favourable financing support. The Foreign Ministers were confident that the enhanced Japanese role in ASEAN economic cooperation, together with the liberalisation of Japan's import policy,

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would enable ASEAN to significantly increase its trade and economic ties with Japan.

The Foreign Ministers noted the firm action taken by President Ronald Reagan in vetoing the Jenkins Bill and in resisting other protectionist legislation in the Congress. They, however, felt that in the light of the persisting budget and trade deficits in the United States, protectionist pressures in the Congress would continue to threaten ASEAN's export interest and could force the U.S. Administration to take protectionist measures against ASEAN's exports. They urged that protectionism should continue to be resisted in the interests of all concerned.

The Foreign Ministers recalled the decision of the ASEAN Economic Ministers in August 1986 to continue to explore the ASEAN-U.S. Initiative (AUI), and the discussion between ASEAN and the United States at their 7th Dialogue in Singapore in May 1986. They noted that an ASEAN memorandum on the AUI had been presented to the U.S. side at the 7th Dialogue and that ASEAN senior trade officials and Assistant USTR had held exploratory technical discussions during the 20th COTT Meeting in November 1985. The Foreign Ministers agreed that the matter should be pursued further.

The Foreign Ministers noted with satisfaction that the UNDP had allocated US$9.8 million for ASEAN's development projects under the 4th Cycle (1987–91), and that a number of projects had been implemented, with several new project documents signed in the past year.

International Economic Issues

In reviewing the international economic environment, the Foreign Ministers noted the weak economic growth of the developed economies and the adverse effects it had on the growth and development prospects of the developing countries. They expressed grave concern over the proliferation of protectionist policies, pressures and measures in developed countries, the continued depressed level of commodity prices; the instability of exchange rates; and the lack of a comprehensive solution to the world debt situation. The Foreign Ministers expressed the hope that these obstacles to growth in both the developed and developing countries would be addressed seriously and expeditiously by the international community with the view to arriving at appropriate solutions for sustained global economic growth.

The Foreign Ministers noted that despite the successful launch of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, the developed countries had failed to observe the stand-still and rollback commitments undertaken at Punta del Este. The Foreign Ministers were concerned with the increased tendency to resort to unilateral and bilateral measures outside the framework of the GATT in settling trade problems and disputes. This had led to a weakening of the GATT and the increased danger of trade wars. The Foreign Ministers emphasised the importance of maintaining and strengthening the open trading system as embodied by the GATT. They called on all countries to actively support the GATT and to strengthen the rules of international trade through cooperative efforts in the Uruguay Round.

The Foreign Ministers further called on developed countries to remove all agricultural subsidies and other measures which distort trade in agriculture and to allow the principles of comparative advantage to apply.

The Foreign Ministers reiterated the importance of commodity earnings to developing countries. The current situation of depressed commodity prices had severely affected the terms of trade of ASEAN and other developing countries. The Foreign Ministers called for concerted international action to arrive at practical solutions to ensure stable and more remunerative commodity prices.

The Foreign Ministers expressed their concern over the adverse effects of fluctuating

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exchange rates on the growth of world trade and the difficulties created for developing countries, particularly in the planning and execution of their debt servicing, debt management and trading activities. The Foreign Ministers called for international action to ensure stability of currency markets.

The Foreign Ministers viewed with concern the continuing debt problem in many developing countries. They expressed regret that a comprehensive solution to the debt burden of the developing countries had still not been found. This has threatened the international financial system and affected the growth prospects of both developed and developing countries. The Foreign Ministers called for urgent international action to rectify the situation.

The Foreign Ministers noted the growing trend of developed countries to invest in other developed countries to overcome trade barriers. They reiterated the need for a greater flow of investments from developed countries to developing countries. The Foreign Ministers also expressed their concern that the lack of investments would reduce the transfer of technology to the developing countries.

The Foreign Ministers reiterated their support for the forthcoming UNCTAD VII. The Conference would provide an opportunity for developing and developed countries to discuss the problems which hamper growth, to work closely together to arrive at solutions for the revitalisation of the global economy and to create a more responsive environment for sustained growth and development of developing countries.

Afghanistan

The Foreign Ministers agreed that the occupation of Afghanistan by foreign forces is of grave concern to the international community and continues to be a major source of international instability. They reiterated their call for the total withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan and the restoration of the inherent right of the Afghan people to freely determine their own destiny. They were of the firm view that a sovereign, independent and non-aligned Afghanistan is essential for regional and global peace and stability. They also reiterated their support for the U.N. Secretary-General's efforts to bring about a comprehensive political settlement of the problem.

SOURCE: *Twentieth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (Speeches/Joint Communiqué)*, Singapore, 15–16 June 1987.

Joint Soviet-Vietnamese Statement, Moscow, 22 May 1987.

General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, Nguyên Vân Linh, stayed in the Soviet Union on an official friendly visit May 17 through 22, 1987 at the invitation of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Talks were conducted between General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev and Nguyên Vân Lihn. . . .

The indepth exchange of views, held in the atmosphere of traditional friendship and

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mutual understanding, confirmed the common approaches of the CPSU and the CPV to pressing questions of socialist construction and international politics.

When informing Nguyên Vân Linh of the life of the Party and the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev noted the crucial nature of the present stage in the development of Soviet society, the depth and consistency of the process of renewal started on the initiative of the CPSU.

Nguyên Vân Linh expressed the feelings of profound admiration of the CPV and the Vietnamese people for the services to mankind of the peoples of the Soviet Union and their tremendous contribution during the past 70 years to the struggle for peace and socialism.

The Vietnamese Communists, all Vietnamese people are inspired by the profound revolutionary restructuring drive effected in the USSR in accordance with the course of the 27th CPSU Congress and the January 1987 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee. It embodies the creative force of Marxism-Leninism and gives the fraternal Parties valuable experience which can be used by them with due account for the specific conditions of their countries.

Nguyên Vân Linh spoke about the fulfilment of the decisions adopted by the 6th CPV Congress, the process of renewal that has started in the country in the sphere of economic management and is directed at an all-round stabilization of the socio-economic situation, the creation of prerequisites for a gradual expansion of the scale of socialist industrialization and at advancing the country.

Mikhail Gorbachev spoke highly of the creative, realistic course of renewal worked out by the 6th CPV Congress, confirmed the Soviet Union's support of this course and wished the Vietnamese people a successful fulfilment of the decisions of the Congress.

The talks centered on questions of bilateral relations.

The Soviet and Vietnamese people treasure friendship and fruitful interaction between the CPSU and the CPV, the USSR and the SRV which have a long glorious history. The Soviet Vietnamese brotherhood has formed under the influence of the ideas of the Great October Socialist Revolution the light of which was brought to Vietnam by the outstanding Communist of the Leninist school Ho Chi Minh and his dedicated associates. Having passed the trial of lengthy revolutionary struggle the fraternal relations of the two nations are becoming increasingly closer. Nguyên Vân Linh expressed the sincere gratitude of the CPV and the Vietnamese people to the CPSU and the Soviet people for the invariable support of and the big and generous assistance to the SRV in the struggle for national liberation, in the cause of building socialism and defending the homeland. He confirmed that the further strengthening of cohesion and all-round cooperation with the Soviet Union is the cornerstone of the foreign policy of the Communist Party of Vietnam.

The leaders of the CPSU and the CPV expressed the resolve of their Parties to expand cooperation at various levels, make an indepth study of each other's experience, perfect Soviet-Vietnamese relations on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism, the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and the SRV, the 10th anniversary of which will be celebrated in 1988, the Declaration of 1985, the long-term programme of developing economic, scientific and technical cooperation between the Soviet Union and Vietnam. The Sides specially emphasized the importance at the new stage of the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty which accords with the interests of building socialism and communism in the two countries, the cause of peace in South-East Asia, the Asia-Pacific region and in the whole world.

It was stressed that the growing scale of Soviet-Vietnamese interaction, the new approaches to questions of the socio-economic development of their respective countries

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worked out by the 27th CPSU Congress and the 6th CPV Congress persistently demand an increase in the effectiveness of cooperation in the direction of socialist integration, the international division of labour, coproduction and specialization of production, and a more active use of the principles of socialist economic management.

In the coming years, Soviet-Vietnamese economic cooperation will be concentrated on the production and processing of agricultural produce, the output of consumer goods, the development in the SRV of the power industry, transport as well as the machine-building, electronic, chemical and mining industries, on the full utilization of the existing production capacities and labour resources. Agreement was reached on the vigorous development of cooperation not only on the interstate level but also on the level of ministries and enterprises.

The Sides will search for new highly effective forms and fields of cooperation, in particular they will set up joint amalgamations and enterprises, will take the necessary measures to modernize enterprises built with the USSR's technical assistance and ensure their operation to full capacity.

Cooperation in the scientific-technical field will be expanded, first of all, to ensure the three major economic programmes determined by the 6th CPV Congress, and also in the training of scientific managerial personnel and skilled workers.

A number of agreements on questions of Soviet-Vietnamese economic cooperation were signed during the visit.

The Sides agreed that the Soviet Union will help Vietnam in working out a long-term economic development programme.

The Soviet and the Vietnamese leaders declared for the adoption of a number of additional measures to develop economic ties between Vietnam and the Soviet Far East.

Agreement was reached on the setting up of an Intergovernmental Soviet-Vietnamese Commission of Cultural Cooperation, and on increasing exchanges between the creative unions of the two countries. The Days of Soviet Culture in the SRV (1987), devoted to the 70th anniversary of the Great October Revolution, and the Days of Vietnamese Culture in the USSR (1990), timed to coincide with the 45th anniversary of the proclamation of Vietnam's independence and the centenary of the birth of President Ho Chi Minh, are to become major events.

The Sides will continue interaction in the training and retraining of specialists in the field of culture, the study of the Russian language in Vietnam and the study of the Vietnamese language in the Soviet Union.

Mikhail Gorbachev and Nguyên Vân Linh confirmed the principled line of the CPSU and the CPV of further strengthing the unity and cohesion of the socialist community, of developing to the maximum the initiative, vigour and creativity of each party and country. They noted the definitive importance of working meetings held by the top leaders of fraternal Parties for working out agreed-upon directions of mutual cooperation and the common course of the socialist community countries in international affairs. The participants in the talks spoke for further perfecting the mechanism of conferences of Central Committee secretaries of the fraternal Parties, for making other forms of the multilateral cooperation of socialist countries more effective.

The USSR and the SRV will further closely interact in the interests of deepening socialist economic integration, fulfilling the Comprehensive Programme of Scientific and Technological Progres of CMEA Member-Countries Through the Year 2000 and perfecting CMEA activities.

The Soviet Union will take an active part in drawing up within the framework of the

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Council for Mutual Economic Assistance of a specialized programme for helping the national economic development of Vietnam, Mongolia and Cuba and in its efficient implementation.

The exchange of opinions reaffirmed the identity of views held by the CPSU and the CPV on pressing international problems, the determination of the Soviet Union and Vietnam actively to interact to strengthen international peace and general security, and their solidarity with people's struggle for national independence and social progress.

Mikhail Gorbachev spoke about the activities of the CPSU and the Soviet state to promote Soviet initiatives for lessening international tensions and about the Soviet Union's practical steps to affirm a new mode of political thinking in world affairs and develop relations of goodneighbourliness and cooperation in Europe, Asia and other parts of the world. An assessment was given of the present stage of Soviet-US relations and the course of the talks on nuclear and space arms in Geneva. Stress was laid on the fundamental significance of a Soviet proposal for eliminating the Soviet and US medium-range missiles from Europe and embarking on talks without delay for reducing and subsequently eliminating operational-tactical missiles stationed on the European continent.

Nguyên Vân Linh reiterated complete support by the CPV and the Vietnamese people for the new and important peace initiatives of the USSR. He said that the Soviet Union, pursuing a Leninist foreign policy, is the principal motive force in efforts for easing tensions, eliminating the threat of nuclear war, and enhancing peace and security throughout the world.

The leaders of the CPSU and the CPV expressed resolve to do everything to break the dangerous trend in world development, stop the arms race on Earth, prevent its extension to outer space, and make sure that the enormous funds now spent on military purposes are directed instead at solving urgent problems, above all, in developing countries.

The Soviet Union and Vietnam are firmly committed to the idea of turning the Asian-Pacific region into a region of peace, stability, good-neighbourliness and cooperation through joint efforts by all states of the region and an all-round approach to the problems of ensuring its security. The realization of this goal would be facilitated by a just political settlement of existing conflicts, the non-buildup and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region, a scaling down on naval activities in the Pacific, the implementation of practical measures to establish nuclear-free zones, cuts in armed forces and conventional armaments, and the creation of an atmosphere of mutual trust.

Both Sides stressed the importance of reducing tensions in South-East Asia as soon as possible. The Soviet Union supports the resourceful policy of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea directed at improving the political climate in South-East Asia and developing friendly relations with the ASEAN countries and other nations in the Asian-Pacific region.

The USSR and Vietnam are at one with the national reconciliation policy of the government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, whose realization would meet the vital interests of the Kampuchean people and their right to decide their destiny themselves and would help restore peace in the country. The internal problems of Kampuchea should be solved by the Kampuchean people themselves.

The Soviet Union and Vietnam believe that the search for ways of settling the international aspects of the Kampuchean problem by political means should be conducted with regard for realities in the region and with the involvement in this or that form of all sides concerned. The Soviet Union and Vietnam are resolutely for giving Kampuchea its lawful place in the United Nations and other international organizations.

The Soviet Union invariably supports efforts by the working people of the Socialist

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Republic of Vietnam, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and the People's Republic of Kampuchea to lay the foundations of socialism, protect the independence and national sovereignty of their countries, and strengthen their fraternal alliance and all-round cooperation, which is an important factor for peace and stability in South-East Asia.

The leaders of the CPSU and the CPV stressed the constructive nature of the Afghan government's policy aimed at achieving national reconciliation and a political settlement of the situation around the country, and of the Afghan people's efforts to build a sovereign, independent and non-aligned Afghanistan.

The participants in the talks pointed to a desire by their countries to normalize and improve relations with the People's Republic of China, which would be a major positive factor for stronger stability in Asia and in international life in general. They would also welcome China's active involvement in the search for ways of solving the complex problems of the Asian continent. The Soviet Side supported Vietnam's initiative for holding Vietnamese-Chinese talks with a view to settling contentious issues as soon as possible.

The conviction was expressed during the talks that improvement in the situation on the Korean Peninsula would be facilitated by the realization of the proposals by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for resuming a dialogue between the North and South of Korea and creating a nuclear-free zone there.

Solidarity was reaffirmed with a proposal by the Mongolian People's Republic for creating a mechanism to exclude the use of force in relations between states in Asia and the Pacific.

The USSR and Vietnam attach much importance to the Delhi Declaration and the principles recorded there for building a world free from nuclear weapons and violence and think highly of India's contribution to resolving regional and general international problems in the interests of stronger peace and stability on the Asian continent and throughout the planet. . . .

SOURCE: *Pravda*, 22 May 1987. English version in *Moscow News* (supplement), No. 23 (7 June 1987).

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China and Southeast Asia: The Problem of a Perceptional Gap*

CHANG PAO-MIN

It is usually not a difficult task for scholars to identify the general constraints and/or opportunities a country faces in dealing with another, nor for the country itself to be aware of them, although the relative weightage assigned to them may differ from one scholar to another. However, in the case of China's relations with Southeast Asia, this task cannot be readily accomplished, because of a perceptional gap between the sides that has been wrought by recent history. To put it bluntly, China may well have a perception of Southeast Asia and its own presence in the region which is quite at variance with how Southeast Asian countries see themselves in relation to China and China's role in Southeast Asia. To be sure, it is no less a gross oversimplification to consider China as having only one perception with regard to all Southeast Asian countries than to assert the existence of one uniform view of China shared by all Southeast Asian countries. Nor is it possible to disregard the different patterns of change in various Southeast Asian countries over the past twenty years or to forget the issues of contention that have recently come to divide Southeast Asian countries on this matter. Nevertheless, in spite of the cultural and political diversities of Southeast Asia and China's growing awareness of them, it is still possible, and indeed necessary, to speak of, and identify, a general gap in mutual perceptions which underlies the complexities of their relations. And unless and until such a gap is sufficiently narrowed or, at least, each is aware of the other's thinking, policy-making will be based upon erroneous assumptions and will also generate unnecessary ill-feelings and even open tension, which cannot serve the interest of either party. The following represents at least a Southeast Asian view on the causes and nature of such a perceptional gap and its implications for China's relations with Southeast Asia.

The Origins of Divergent Perceptions

Before examining the emergence of differences in perception between China and the Southeast Asian countries, it is perhaps pertinent to summarize briefly their traditional images of each other. For centuries before the mid-nineteenth century, China was the dominant political force in East and Southeast Asia, if not also the most radiant centre of civilization in this part of the world, because of its more advanced level of technological and cultural development and its highly sophisticated political organization. As a consequence, Southeast Asian countries were more or less attracted to China as a source of inspiration and political legitimacy.

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And China also considered Southeast Asia as its natural sphere of influence. Such mutually congruent outlooks were concretely manifested in the now well-known tributary system whereby virtually all Southeast Asian countries voluntarily paid homage and tribute to China as their suzerain in exchange for Chinese protection and assistance in times of need or crisis. In the case of a number of mainland Southeast Asian countries, China in fact did intervene from time to time, both politically and militarily, either at the invitation of local governments to restore internal order, or on its own initiative in order to maintain stability and peace in the border areas.

Nevertheless, China's relations with Southeast Asia during this early period were both stable and cordial, mainly because of China's actual detachment from its tributary states. Although China made no pretence of concealing its Sino-centric world outlook and took a genuine interest not only in pacifying the so-called "barbarians" but also in spreading its Confucian culture southward whenever the opportunity arose, the kind of influence China wanted to cultivate was mainly cultural and only nominally political, and it also adopted an essentially *laissez faire* attitude towards these Southeast Asian countries as long as they did not pose a security threat or cause trouble for China. In other words, China was more interested in attracting Southeast Asian countries through the demonstrated superiority of its political and social organization and way of life, and through its own exemplary conduct, than in seeking political or economic domination or territorial aggrandizement through the use or threat of force. As a result, Southeast Asian countries were basically in awe, but not in fear, of China. After all, though more advanced in political and social development, China was not very different ideologically from the Southeast Asian nations, as both practised some kind of monarchical system. Economically, there was also a free flow of goods between China and Southeast Asia. Although the volume of trade was insignificant, the two sides were complementary to, rather than competing with, each other in their production and supply of goods. As a consequence of all these, China's image in Southeast Asia was respectful and benign, and its very limited presence was also welcomed by the Southeast Asian countries.

The expansion of Western colonialism into Southeast Asia and the concomitant decline of the Chinese Empire in the middle of the nineteenth century ushered in a new era that brought the tributary system to an abrupt end and China's political influence in Southeast Asia to its lowest ebb ever. Quite ironically, however, China's contact with Southeast Asia during the ensuing 100 years or so did not cease but, in fact, expanded rapidly except that it was now at the non-governmental level. This was a result of a long stream of migrants arriving in Southeast Asia seeking a haven from the ravages of political turmoils and economic hardships. Such Chinese migrants eventually numbered several millions by the beginning of the twentieth century, thereby sustaining a stable flow of goods and people between China and Southeast Asia. With the inauguration of the anti-Manchu revolutionary movement in China in the late nineteenth century, the Chinese in Southeast Asia became a valuable source of financial and political

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support which was actively cultivated, first by the revolutionary leaders, and then by the new Republican government throughout the first half of the twentieth century in both its domestic endeavours and foreign policy ventures. As a matter of fact, having established the first republic in Asia and still in the process of freeing itself from Western imperialism and colonialism, the Republican Chinese government consistently championed the cause of all colonial and dependent peoples in Asia. By actively propagating the idea of nationalism and political independence, and by lending moral and even material support to the Southeast Asian peoples in general, and a few embryonic nationalist movements in particular, China actually became rather involved in the shaping of the destinies of the Southeast Asian countries.

China's benevolent attitude towards the Southeast Asian peoples somehow converged with the Chinese government's close ties with ethnic Chinese communities in Southeast Asia in the early 1940s, when the struggle for liberation in Southeast Asia against Japanese military occupation and colonization was linked up with China's war of resistance. Moreover, during those years, the ethnic Chinese played a central role in co-ordinating the efforts of resistance against Japan in China and Southeast Asia, and also made valuable financial contributions to the Chinese government. As a result of the seemingly ever expanding political and other linkages between China and ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia, China's relationship with Southeast Asia acquired a new dimension whereas its perception of the region remained very much unchanged. Indeed, through the vast network of well organized and politically articulate Chinese communities, Southeast Asia was seen very much as a region of Chinese influence which could be readily mobilized to support major political and economic undertakings in China whenever necessary. At the same time, China clearly considered itself as the leading force, if not also the model for emulation, in the anti-colonial, anti-imperialist struggle in Asia, and as such also continued to hold on to its traditional image of Southeast Asian countries as natural followers of China.

Unfortunately for China, the persistence of the traditional Chinese view of Southeast Asia during this period was not matched by the continuity of the Southeast Asian image of China. In fact, as a consequence of the submerging, if not suppression, of the indigenous Southeast Asian views throughout the period of Western colonialism, China could not have possibly recognized the existence of a separate Southeast Asian perception of China, which was after all formless and not articulated. But with the benefit of hindsight one can say that Southeast Asian perceptions of China did undergo subtle but important changes during the period. The decline of the Chinese empire and its inability to ward off Western imperialism in general and to come to the rescue of any Southeast Asian country in particular, quickly disillusioned the Southeast Asian peoples and undermined the status of China as their teacher and protector. The Western colonial powers with their superior military might were now unmistakably the new focus of admiration and model for emulation. The suspension of official contacts between indigenous political authorities in Southeast Asia and China certainly destroyed effectively whatever governmental linkages remained between them for more than a century,

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thereby also alienating Southeast Asia from China. Although China's prolonged struggle against imperialism and, subsequently, its self-assumed leadership role in the decolonization campaign did inspire the Southeast Asian peoples and even sow the seeds of some anti-colonial movements in the region that were to spring up at a later date, China's words were not always matched by its deeds, particularly towards the end of World War II and in its immediate aftermath, which brought further disappointment to Southeast Asia.[1]

The political distancing of Southeast Asia from China was further aggravated by a process of estrangement of Southeast Asian peoples from the ethnic Chinese living among them. Though tolerated by the various colonial administrations, the steadily growing influx of Chinese migrants into Southeast Asia was viewed by the local peoples with increasing misgivings, as it inevitably disrupted the life-style, took away the jobs, and threatened the local culture of the indigenous peoples. The fact that the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia often played the role of middleman between the colonial administration and the local people and made a profit out of it further constituted a source of resentment. Since ethnic Chinese were invariably closely identified with the Chinese government in this period and formed closely knit communities of their own, they were increasingly seen by the indigenous peoples as an alien group not assimilable into the local culture and population. From time to time, the colonial authorities in fact deliberately fanned the barely dormant anti-Chinese sentiment as a way of keeping Chinese influence within manageable bounds. Hence, the recurrence of anti-Chinese riots throughout the first half of the twentieth century, which was a vivid illustration of the emerging gap in perceptions and therefore an indicator of the winds of change. Ironically enough, it was during World War II, when China's relationship with the ethnic Chinese communities was closest, that local resentment of them also became most intense. This, of course, was also partly because the Chinese were deliberately pitted against the local peoples by the Japanese occupation authorities. Whatever the case might have been, the perceptional gap between Southeast Asian peoples and China further widened.

But, generally speaking, although China's status and image in Southeast Asia underwent considerable decline and change during this long but crucial period, the resulting perceptional gap between China and Southeast Asia did not affect adversely their relationship, as neither posed a challenge or a threat to the other. Beset by internal turmoils and threatened by foreign conquest, China, throughout the century ending in its final victory over Japan, could not have done any harm to its southern neighbours. Ideologically and politically, China was at least still compatible with the Southeast Asian countries. And though anti-colonial and anti-West in orientation, the new Republican regime in its actual policies basically accepted the status quo in Southeast Asia. In fact, the focus of China's attention and interest was the ethnic Chinese and the role they could play in China, not the various colonial governments operative in Southeast Asia. And it was precisely because of China's actual disinterest in Southeast Asian affairs *per se* that its strong ties with the ethnic Chinese communities were tolerated by the colonial

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authorities, which in turn were more concerned with the volume of Chinese immigration than the potential threat a weak China might pose to their security.

The Widening of the Perceptional Gap

With the end of World War II in 1945 and particularly with the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, a long succession of far-reaching political developments began to unfold themselves in China and Southeast Asia, which tended to widen further the perceptional gap between them. First devastated by a bloody civil war, then militarily and diplomatically blockaded by the United States for more than twenty years, and finally engulfed in a ten-year-old disastrous Cultural Revolution, China was almost completely cut off from Southeast Asia for three decades. In fact, as a result of its active support for the U.S. policy of containment, most of Southeast Asia became a hostile force posing a direct threat to China's security. Countries in the region which had hitherto been referred to by China only in friendly tones were now turned — for the first time ever — into targets of derogatory criticisms and vehement condemnations. As most channels of communication with Southeast Asia were closed to China, virtually all population movements between them also stopped. The immediate result was a rapid process of isolation and estrangement of China from Southeast Asia.

But if China was at most angered by Southeast Asia's hostility to itself, Southeast Asia was clearly shocked by events in China. The rise of a Marxist regime in China and its close alliance with the Soviet Union altered the essentially benign and inward-looking character of the Chinese nation. It not only rendered China ideologically and politically very incongruous with its Southeast Asian neighbours, but also made it a menacing and destabilizing force in the entire region. The long series of armed conflict between China and its immediate neighbours, starting with the Korean War and culminating in the prolonged Second Indochina War, along with the upsurge of communist insurgency activities in many parts of Asia, merely demonstrated to Southeast Asia the militant and aggressive nature of all communist regimes, among whom China unmistakably belonged. In fact, China not only openly propagated its revolutionary model but also lent eager support to all the insurgent movements in Southeast Asia in its campaign against American imperialism. The large proportion of communist insurgents in Southeast Asia who were ethnic Chinese and who also identified themselves with China only supplied further evidence of the ulterior motives China entertained in Southeast Asia. All these developments both startled the Southeast Asian countries and alienated them from China. Indeed, for the first time in centuries, China became an immediate and serious threat to Southeast Asia and such threat was also acutely felt. In the eyes of Southeast Asia, China was never the same again.

While the external posture and policy of China left many Southeast Asian governments in great anxiety, the almost constant political upheavals in China's internal scene also began to cast doubts on its appeal to the millions of so-called "overseas Chinese" still sentimentally attached to their motherland. With the

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exception of only a few years in the first decade of the communist regime, events in China repeatedly caused disillusionment among ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia who otherwise saw China in a rather favourable light. News of poverty, starvation, political persecution, and sheer lawlessness, particularly during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, spread far and wide in Southeast Asia. The mistreatment of at least half a million of "returned overseas Chinese" and over ten million Chinese who had overseas connections[2] during the Cultural Revolution years certainly shattered the last hopes of those who still entertained illusions about China, thereby producing a devastating effect upon their thinking about China and the nature of the communist regime.

The repercussions of such recurrent political turmoils in China, however, were not confined to the political or foreign policy arena, but also manifested in the economic and technological development of the country, which was repeatedly retarded in spite of apparent progress made in certain selected areas. Although the overall effects of China's socialist construction were by no means all negative, the standard of living began to fall steadily behind its neighbouring countries and, by the early 1980s, a huge gap had been accumulated in the level of income between the Chinese in China and the peoples in Southeast Asia, particularly the ethnic Chinese. On the other hand, because of the prolonged distrust and periodical harassment of the so-called bourgeois elements, particularly the intellectuals and the professionals, cultural and technological development was also seriously hampered. The net result of all this was a big discrepancy in living conditions by the late 1970s between China and the advanced nations in the West which could not be easily bridged. In the eyes of the Southeast Asian countries, therefore, China was clearly no longer a source of inspiration, much less a model of development for them.

Parallel to these developments in China was a whole series of events taking place in the Southeast Asian countries themselves, which only reinforced the trend of Southeast Asia's disenchantment and disassociation from China. By far the most significant development in the post-war period has been the rapid decolonization process throughout Southeast Asia and the emergence of many independent states. With the sole exception of Thailand which has been an independent kingdom for centuries, all the Southeast Asian countries have won political independence from their Western colonial masters in the post-1945 period. Because of the prolonged colonial rule and, in a few cases, the protracted armed struggle towards political independence, all these states have been extremely jealous of their newly won sovereign status and rights. One implication of this strongly nationalistic outlook is simply that no Southeast Asian country wants once again to become politically subordinate to, or closely identified with, another outside power, much less on an unequal basis, be it patron-client or suzerain-vassal in nature. In fact, precisely because of their weak material foundation, such states have often had to make a deliberate effort to ward off any sign of foreign interference. Viewed in this context, a China which was communist in nature and aggressive in policies was

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certainly the number-one country which all Southeast Asian states wanted to keep out of the region.

But that was not all. Because of the much enlarged territories and, therefore, the artificial boundaries these states possess, compared with their historical predecessors before the intrusion of the West, as well as the heterogeneity of their populations, all the newly emerged Southeast Asian states have also had to embark upon a crash programme of nation-building, in order to achieve a higher degree of societal integration. The social and political dimensions of this process of change have invariably entailed the streamlining of the educational system, the adoption of a national language, and the inculcation of a common sense of identity, all of which clearly have had an immediate impact on the orientation of some 18 million ethnic Chinese scattered all over Southeast Asia,[3] particularly the younger generation. Almost invariably, the usage of the Chinese language was discouraged and the traditionally Chinese language schools either closed down or transformed. Although this process of integration was by no means a smooth one, it did make significant progress with the passage of time, thanks to the isolation of China during this period, and to the perseverance of the Southeast Asian governments themselves. The greatest success was registered in Thailand and the Philippines, where it is already impossible today to identify the boundaries of the ethnic Chinese community or to distinguish the Chinese clearly from the indigenous people. In Indonesia, all the Chinese have even adopted local names as well as mastered the local language. The Chinese in Malaysia and Singapore have also become used to using Bahasa Malaysia and English, respectively, as the language of communication in their daily life, and an unmistakeable local identity has already emerged.

As a result, everywhere in Southeast Asia, an entirely new generation of ethnic Chinese have grown up who, though culturally aware of their Chinese roots, are intellectually, politically and even linguistically cut off from China completely. Even the older generation have struck roots in the countries of their residence because of the prolonged suspension of contacts between China and Southeast Asia and the impossibility of returning to China for retirement or burial as their forefathers traditionally did. In their case, despair has often been added to disillusionment in their thinking about China.

Although economically, Southeast Asia did not progress as much as some countries in Northeast Asia during this period, the developmental process was at least stable and fruitful, with the consequence that all the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) had by the end of the 1970s achieved a living standard higher than China's.[4] Incidentally, the most successful experience was found in Singapore, a country with a predominantly Chinese population. Because of its able and dedicated leadership, as well as its excellent geographical location and small size, Singapore was able to surge ahead of other Southeast Asian countries and to achieve a per capita income next only to Japan in the whole of Asia, and almost 18 times higher than that of China. The next most successful country was Malaysia, also with a large ethnic Chinese population, whose per capita income was about seven times that of China.[5] It is perhaps significant that

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that the two countries which have moved furthest from China, at least economically, also happen to have the largest Chinese population in Southeast Asia. The widening economic gap, therefore, also definitely has a clear impact upon their perception of China.

The distancing of Southeast Asia from China as a result of three decades of divergent developmental processes and mutual hostility, therefore, has not only been political in nature, but also acquired a firm social and economic basis. However, whereas major changes in Southeast Asia's perception of China during these years have been based as much upon a constant awareness of events in China as upon the changing environment in Southeast Asia, China has not been equally well informed about developments in Southeast Asia and the steadily widening gap between them. Because of China's self-imposed isolation during the ten Cultural Revolution years, and particularly its suspension of all foreign contacts and all studies related to Southeast Asia and the "overseas Chinese", a time lag has inevitably developed in China's understanding of Southeast Asia. In fact, with the benefit of hindsight again, it can even be argued that the hostility China displayed towards Southeast Asia during the 1949–76 period reflected merely its indignation at and opposition to the intrusion of a hostile outside power, namely, the United States, into what China considered to be essentially its sphere of influence, rather than any deep-rooted enmity China harboured towards Southeast Asia itself. Indeed, from the Chinese perspective, the anti-U.S. struggle was no more than a continuation of the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggle which China had carried on and led since the mid-nineteenth century. The persistence of an essentially traditional attitude towards Southeast Asia on the part of China, therefore, constituted a sharp contrast to the almost entirely new image of China developed in Southeast Asia, thereby resulting in a serious problem of perceptional gap between the two sides.

China in Southeast Asia: Limitations and Opportunities

The end of the Cultural Revolution in China and the conclusion of the Second Indochina War in Southeast Asia appeared to have ushered in a new era in relations between China and Southeast Asia. Indeed, with the introduction of a long series of economic reforms in China, the country's opening to the outside world, and the normalization of its diplomatic relations with most Southeast Asian countries, China and Southeast Asia were in a position to embark upon a new course of co-operation which could only benefit both sides. However, it has been ten years now since China implemented its new policies and made its first overtures to Southeast Asia. Yet, progress has been slow in the two-way communication and contact, and many potentials have remained unrealized. The crux of the problem clearly lies in the persisting divergent perceptions of the two sides. Whereas China has been eager to establish close ties with the Southeast Asian countries, the latter are not convinced of China's good intentions. As a result, in spite of all the opportunities available, China–Southeast Asia relations are still full of pitfalls. The basic

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problem is that China may well still be acting on a set of old assumptions and expectations which are no longer congruent with the actual conditions in Southeast Asia. To put it bluntly, what is seen by China as its opportunities or assets in dealing with Southeast Asia may well be actually its limitations or liabilities from the Southeast Asian perspective. And as long as this is the case, China is bound to continue to encounter many serious difficulties in Southeast Asia.

One such perceived asset is clearly the long historical ties between China and Southeast Asia dating back to the early centuries of the Christian era, which the former still openly values as a basis for developing its relationship with the latter. Yet, in a post-colonial era, such historical ties can only remind Southeast Asia of the past patron-client relationship between them and, therefore, the inequality of status and power that it symbolizes, which no Southeast Asian country still cherishes. In a few cases, such historical ties remind the Southeast Asian countries of the military might and political muscle that could be brought to bear upon them, in spite of the generally benign nature of China's earlier presence in the region. At any rate, if the long historical ties make China nostalgic about its past grandeur and cultural superiority, they must also imply the relative insignificance and even inferiority of the Southeast Asian countries. Indeed, it may be no more than a habit or friendly gesture for China to speak of the "brotherly" relations between China and its smaller neighbours, but such references can be very irritating to Southeast Asian countries, as they necessarily imply a superior position for China and relegate its neighbours to the inferior position of younger brothers. What Southeast Asian countries expect at the very least is a genuine equality that can only be based upon the norms and practices of the contemporary state system. What China has for centuries taken for granted, even if only implicitly, is therefore not acceptable to Southeast Asia, and must be discarded explicitly.

Another perceived asset is China's external posture and policy orientation, particularly its intention to act as the spokesman of the Third World and the leading crusader against imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism. This is also one of the historical roles China has continued to play with a sense of mission and a good deal of pride. And in championing the cause of the Third World nations in general and in struggling against superpower hegemony in East and Southeast Asia in particular, China somehow believes it is performing a noble deed and a valuable service to its neighbours and, as such, is bound to win their support and admiration. However, while they are in principle sympathetic towards China's endeavours and certainly wary of either superpower seeking political domination in the region, the Southeast Asian countries do not see the success of China's policy necessarily advancing their best interests. This is simply because the very process of ridding Southeast Asia of superpower interference would leave China — the natural geographical neighbour of Southeast Asia — the dominant power in the region, a situation which the Southeast Asian countries clearly do not want to promote. Indeed, the very size and population of China already make it the greatest potential threat to Southeast Asia, no matter how much it disclaims its ambitions. And given the long era of China's pre-eminence in the region and the recent history

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of its aggressiveness, it is certainly not inconceivable that China will once again seek to reassert its dominant position in Southeast Asia. Viewed in this context, the very preaching of the anti-hegemony cause by China need not at all render it more lovable to Southeast Asia. On the contrary, it may well conceal, from the Southeast Asian perspective, China's true ambition to expand its own political influence in the region.

The widespread fear of China becoming an imperialist power itself by virtue of its giant size and huge population, as well as its traditional patronizing attitude towards Southeast Asia, has been clearly reinforced by its communist character. This is particularly so in view of the support China has rendered in the past to the communist insurgent movements in the region and the links it still maintains with them. For a period of time this was also considered by China as an asset which could be exploited to its advantage. Although Beijing has already recognized the different political orientation of the Southeast Asian countries and therefore the drawbacks of maintaining a dual track relationship with them, China simply cannot shed its communist nature which continues to constitute a major source of concern for its neighbours. Since, ideologically, China at present is very different from — indeed incompatible with — Southeast Asia, the liberalization of its domestic scene since 1978 has added new anxieties to Southeast Asia's old fear that a communist China may soon become also a powerful China, with all the undesirable implications for Southeast Asia. This is so particularly in view of the most recent developments which showed that economic and political reforms have not made and will not make China less communist and more like its Southeast Asian neighbours. Therefore, its argument that a successfully modernized China will enhance the stability in Asia and promote the cause of peace is far from convincing to the Southeast Asian countries. Indeed, from their perspective, it could only augment the potential threat China always poses to their security, particularly if it remains communist in character. Even in the most unlikely case that it should one day abandon communism, a united, modernized and powerful China still constitutes a real political threat and a major economic challenge to Southeast Asia.

The third major asset perceived by China is the presence of 18 million ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia — the largest concentration of ethnic Chinese in the entire world — which Chinese governments since the fall of the Manchu Dynasty have always taken pride in referring to. From the Chinese perspective, the large number of ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia still serves as an important bridge between the two sides and functions as a lubricant in their relations. At the same time, the rich financial resources of the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia can also be tapped to aid in China's modernization programme. Yet, since most Chinese in Southeast Asia are already a very different breed from their forefathers and are also no longer politically or ideologically attracted to China, any attempt made by China to appeal to their ethnic and cultural consciousness is unlikely to strike a responsive chord among them today and may well become counter-productive as it may offend their sense of identity and pride. In fact, most of those Chinese in Southeast Asia who have entered into some kind of business with China have

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done so purely out of utilitarian considerations rather than any sense of identification with or commitment to China.

Moreover, precisely because of the close ties that have once existed between the Chinese government and the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia, any enthusiasm shown about them by China and any effort made to win over their hearts and minds can only be seen by the indigenous Southeast Asians as a sinister attempt on the part of China to sabotage the still ongoing nation-building process in various Southeast Asian countries and to undermine their national security. Consequently, the mere mention of the possible contribution of ethnic Chinese to China's developmental programmes is likely to evoke suspicions and even alienate the indigenous governments. In fact, since the overwhelming majority of the Chinese in Southeast Asia are already full-fledged citizens of their countries of residence, the very use of the term "overseas Chinese" by China has become quite objectionable to all the Southeast Asian governments. In some Southeast Asian countries, the ethnic Chinese are actually under greater constraints than their indigenous counterparts in dealing with China, as a result of special precautionary measures taken by the local governments. Therefore, in trying to capitalize on the cultural affinities and linguistic skills of the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia, China may well be unwittingly performing a disservice to both the "overseas Chinese" and the Southeast Asian countries and also getting itself into more trouble than it can imagine.

It appears, or at least one can argue, that whatever discrepancies in perceptions may still exist are insignificant, and that China is nowadays already well aware of the anxieties and aspirations of Southeast Asia. Indeed, not only has China always insisted on the five principles of peaceful coexistence as the basis for normalization of its relations with other countries, particularly its Southeast Asian neighbours, but it has also since 1976 repeatedly and specifically disavowed any ulterior intentions in the region. Moreover, it has supported the Southeast Asian countries in their efforts to establish a zone of peace and neutrality in the region and, recently, it has endorsed the nuclear-free concept for the Southern Pacific. On the issue of the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia, China, since 1978, has also reiterated its opposition to the practice of dual nationality and reaffirmed its policy of encouraging the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia to adopt local citizenship and to pledge their allegiance to the local governments. In 1980 China even promulgated a new law on nationality which makes the acquisition of Chinese nationality a complicated process accessible only to those who do not possess any other nationality. Moreover, since 1976 the Chinese government has considerably loosened its links with the communist insurgent movements in Southeast Asia by confining Chinese support for all other communist parties to the ideological and moral level. All these policies and postures are encouraging signs of China's intention to accord Southeast Asian states the status and respect due to them and have been welcomed by them.

Nevertheless, the evidence is unfortunately far from conclusive, and there are also causes of anxiety and alarm for Southeast Asia. For one thing, China's

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territorial claims in the South China Sea are clearly exhorbitant from the Southeast Asian standpoint, as they approach the shorelines of as many as five Southeast Asian countries. China's general but enthusiastic appeal to all "overseas Chinese" to assist in China's modernization in the late 1970s, and particularly China's active support for the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam in its dispute with the latter, have somewhat rekindled old fears among the Southeast Asian countries.

China's large-scale punitive war against Vietnam, a major Southeast Asian state, in 1979, in order to "teach Vietnam necessary lessons", and its hardline stance on Vietnam since then, also reflect, in the eyes of the Southeast Asian countries, the century-old patronizing attitude of China, which they are very wary of, however justified the war may have been from the Chinese perspective. China's unwillingness to cut off completely its ties with communist parties in the region also generates the suspicion that there may have been only a temporary lull, not a permanent decline, in China-inspired and China-supported insurgency activities in the region. Indeed, China's continuing military involvement in the Third Indochina War and its unswerving support for the ruthless Khmer Rouge as the mainstay of the anti-Vietnamese coalition cannot but raise doubts about China's long-term intentions in Southeast Asia.

The discrepancies between words and deeds and the conflicting evidence, therefore, suggest that China is either not yet adequately aware of the perceptional gap that exists between itself and Southeast Asia or has still not completed the process of shedding the historical baggage it has been carrying. But whatever the actual situation may be, the Southeast Asian countries cannot rest assured. And as long as this is the case, China's overtures to and presence in Southeast Asia will always be greeted with some misgiving. Although the Southeast Asian countries ought to learn at least as much about China as China does about Southeast Asia, unfortunately the onus is on China to prove its clear conscience, if only for the sake of past experience. And precisely because of the periodical swinging of China's policy pendulum from one extreme to the other over the past forty years or so, it seems that no amount of assurances can convince Southeast Asia of China's good intentions or the stability of its current politics.

All this appears to suggest that there are serious constraints but few opportunities for China in dealing with Southeast Asia. Indeed, one can argue that among all the regions of the world, Southeast Asia constitutes the problem area for China as far as policy-making is concerned. Only with ample goodwill and political perseverance, as well as an extra dose of diplomatic sensitivity will China be able to tear down the barriers which have appeared over the decades and inject new confidence among the Southeast Asian countries. Indeed, only by maintaining some degree of political detachment can China move closer to Southeast Asia, and only by ensuring some degree of internal stability will it appear safe to Southeast Asia. To be sure, not all the constraints will disappear nor can they all be removed no matter how hard China tries. It is no exaggeration to say that the burgeoning of new opportunities for China will lie only in the recognition and removal of such constraints.

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

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1. In spite of China's well propagated stand against colonialism throughout the first three decades of the Republican era, the Nationalist government began to waver on the issue of national self-determination after becoming a close ally of Britain, France and the United States during World War II, and eventually acquiesced in the reassertion of colonial control by the three countries in Southeast Asia following the war.
2. This is according to a conservative estimate. See Stephen Fitzgerald, *China and the Overseas Chinese* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp. 5, 69. The majority of the "returned overseas Chinese" are believed to have come from Southeast Asia.
3. Estimation of the ethnic Chinese population in Southeast Asia has acknowledgeably become increasingly difficult and meaningless as a result of the integration process. The figure of 18 million is reached by calculating on the generally accepted base figure of 12 million in 1965 with a 2 per cent annual growth rate.
4. *Asia Yearbook* (Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review, 1981–82).
5. Ibid.

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ASEAN's Prospective Security Role: Moving Beyond the Indochina Fixation

TIM HUXLEY

As the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) enters its third decade, this paper seeks to assess what has in practice arguably constituted the Association's most important role. The intention is not only to establish that the enhancement of broadly-defined regional security has been a crucial objective for ASEAN since its earliest days, and to discern the various dimensions of this collective endeavour, but also to attempt to broaden the debate concerning the Association's future security role.

ASEAN was not the first attempt at international co-operation within Southeast Asia, but it has certainly been the most successful. In the early 1960s, the ASA (Association of Southeast Asia, linking the Malayan Federation, the Philippines and Thailand) failed to become an effective organization because of its limited membership and prestige, especially in terms of Indonesia's absence. MAPHILINDO, announced in mid-1963, included Indonesia together with Malaysia and the Philippines, but was quickly thwarted as a device for regional co-operation by the almost simultaneous onset of Sukarno's policy of *Konfrontasi* (Confrontation) against Malaysia.

The emergence of Suharto's "New Order" in Indonesia in 1966 enabled a *détente* between Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur: this situation of reduced intra-regional tension was a vital permissive factor facilitating the formation of a new regional grouping. A more positive impetus for the inception of ASEAN sprang from the prevailing turbulence elsewhere in the region: the conflict in Indochina was turning Southeast Asia into a cockpit of great power rivalry. At the same time, the end of the regional British military presence could be seen not far ahead, with important implications for the security of Malaysia and the now sovereign city-state of Singapore. There were strong incentives for a fresh attempt at formalized regional co-operation. Although economic, social and cultural co-operation were stressed as the central objectives of ASEAN, from the beginning the Association also represented a political *entente* between non- (indeed, anti-) communist states in a region clearly "threatened" by communist-led revolutionary pressures, from both within and without.

The specific political motives of the five ASEAN states in joining the organization nevertheless varied widely. Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman hoped that ASEAN would become an organ for the "collective political defence" of the region, so that for Bangkok a policy of regional co-operation could supplement, and eventually replace, its alliance with the United States. Indonesia

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wished to break out of the self-imposed isolation resulting from *Konfrontasi* and Sukarno's steadfast avoidance of any co-operation with "neo-colonialism". While itself aspiring to some sort of regional leadership, Jakarta also wished to use ASEAN to provide regional cohesion in order to minimize opportunities for great power manipulation or domination, and especially to serve as a bulwark against a perceived threat of Chinese expansionism. Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore all wished to direct Indonesia's energies, while satisfying Jakarta's desire for regional pre-eminence. Kuala Lumpur and Manila also saw ASEAN as a convenient structure for enhancing their own national prestige after the failure of ASA. In addition, Manila hoped that ASEAN membership would enhance the Asian identity and trading links of the Philippines as a counter-balance to a continuing close relationship with Washington. Singapore saw ASEAN as an opportunity to associate with its larger neighbours on an equal basis and to stress its Southeast Asian (rather than Chinese) identity.

ASEAN and Security before 1975

So, from the beginning it was clear that ASEAN had not only important political overtones, but also an implicit security role. Its primary objective of furthering socio-economic progress was clearly aimed at eliminating social and economic deprivation in order to undermine the appeal of communist revolution as an alternative to the market economy *status quo.* ASEAN's members implicitly subscribed to the Indonesian ideal of "national resilience", under which internal security would be based on what has been described as

> ... a total national development effort, sustained by a strong national spirit of ideology that overcomes partisan divisiveness and social unrest, brings tangible technocratic leadership, and rejects alien ideologies.[1]

Another aspect of ASEAN's security role was as a mechanism for overcoming the legacy of its members' recent disputes with each other. Although tensions between various members remained, to a greater or lesser degree these were subdued by the common interests which the ASEAN states perceived in working together.

The Bangkok Declaration which established ASEAN in 1967 also talked of the Association as being "open for participation to all states in the South East Asian region". Although it seemed ever less likely, as the Vietnam War continued in the late 1960s and early 1970s, that the Indochinese countries could be brought into ASEAN, in its earliest days it was evident that its founders thought that ASEAN might be a useful tool for cementing and coping with whatever post-war situation emerged in Indochina.

The final sense in which ASEAN was, from its earliest days, intended to perform a security function related to the role of extra-regional powers in Southeast Asia. The Bangkok Declaration asserted that foreign military bases in the

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region were of a purely temporary nature, and established "security from external interference" as an objective. However, the ASEAN states found it hard to agree on how to achieve this objective – a problem which slowed ASEAN's progress in political co-operation in its early years. Ultimately, ASEAN's collective suggested solution to the problem of external interference was the ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality) proposal, outlined in the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of November 1971.

When the then Malaysian Prime Minister Tun Razak first proposed ZOPFAN in 1970 it was evident that he envisaged the neutralization of Southeast Asia under the guarantee of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. But the right of neutralized states, if their neutral status was violated, to demand the aid of guarantor states paradoxically had the potential to facilitate interference by the major external powers in the region. Particularly for this reason, by the time of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration, the emphasis of ZOPFAN had moved away from the idea of "neutralization" towards the vaguer concept of a "zone of neutrality", de-emphasizing the role of external guarantors. But even so, ASEAN's members continued to harbour a variety of reservations relating to ZOPFAN, and since 1971 there has been very little movement towards implementing the proposal. After the communist victories in Indochina in 1975 it was also clear that ZOPFAN faced the additional hurdle of an incipient trend towards the solidification of two opposing ideological blocs in Southeast Asia.

ASEAN and Communist Indochina

Although the 1975 communist victories arguably complicated the outlook for the implementation of ZOPFAN, they did inject new urgency into ASEAN's deliberations. Between 1967 and 1975, ASEAN had provided its rather diverse membership with a forum in which they developed a habit of consultation and made significant progress towards overcoming earlier intra-regional suspicions. But despite many optimistic years, it took the psychological jolt provided by the collapse of non-communist Indochina to trigger more tangible economic and political co-operation. In 1975, and thereafter, the ASEAN governments saw, or claimed to see, the Indochinese communist states as posing a wide variety of security threats. But although the ASEAN governments portrayed their security concerns with Indochina in terms of direct military threat, or indirect threat through insurgency supported by Vietnam, Cambodia or Laos, or the possibly dangerous consequences of the Indochinese refugee outflow, the issues that they were much more concerned about in reality were considerably less tangible. Vaguer security concerns relating to changes in the regional balance of power, together with the broad political, social and economic challenges apparently posed by communist Indochina were more central to the ASEAN governments' threat perceptions. These concerns were reflected in ASEAN's response to the new phenomenon of an Indochina under communist control.

After the fall of Phnom Penh and Saigon in 1975 there was a period of

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intense consultation between the ASEAN governments, culminating in the Association's first summit meeting of heads of government, in Bali in February 1976. At the summit, the ASEAN leaders emphasized their agreement with the idea that economic and social development and co-operation were essential weapons with which to face the new regional challenge. This consensus was reflected in the formal public statements issued by the meeting, which enshrined more explicitly than the Bangkok Declaration the idea that security could be attained through the enhancement of national and regional resilience. Thus, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia expressed a determination to strengthen national resilience in "political, economic, socio-cultural as well as security fields" and to "cooperate in all fields for the promotion of regional resilience". In the principal resolution of the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, the ASEAN members agreed to "eliminate threats posed by subversion ... thus strengthening national and ASEAN resilience". Moreover, under the Declaration, the ASEAN states adopted a "programme of action", involving measures to enhance political, economic, social, cultural and security co-operation. However, security co-operation in a military sense was only encouraged on a bilateral basis.

The second principal asset of ASEAN's efforts to adjust to the new regional environment from 1975 involved an attempt to reduce the security threats perceived in the new situation, by integrating communist Indochina into a system of regional order. Quite apart from the fact that Hanoi's hostility towards ASEAN as an organization (which it saw as potentially an American-backed anti-communist alliance in succession to SEATO) indicated that Vietnam would not want to join ASEAN, the main trend of thought within the Association was by then opposed to any expansion to include Indochina. But despite the fact that ASEAN's members had decided, in effect, to maintain the Association's non-communist ideological purity, the possibility of an amicable and co-operative relationship between the two segments of an ideologically-divided region was left open. For this reason, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia set out a basic code for inter-state relations in the region, stressing the inviolability of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Importantly, the Treaty was "open to accession by other states" — a clear intimation that it was intended as a mechanism for building links between ASEAN and the Indochinese states.

Although the 1975 communist victories certainly encouraged the ASEAN governments to think anew about how they might use the Association to enhance their individual and collective security, it is by no means clear that the flurry of ASEAN meetings and communiques in 1976 and 1977 led to either any significant strengthening of ASEAN's "resilience" or more comfortable relations with communist Indochina. While the ASEAN economies, and average per capita incomes, continued to grow fairly rapidly until the early 1980s, this did not necessarily imply that these countries made significant progress towards conquering the socio-economic problems which undermined their "national resilience". In particular, there was little indication of any noteworthy amelioration of Indonesia's, Thailand's or the Philippines' basic rural problems of landlessness, indebtedness

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and unemployment, or of any improvement in the incomes and living conditions of their rapidly growing urban populations. Regional disparities in wealth also remained stark within these countries.

Another problem was that ASEAN's declaration of willingness to co-operate failed to win over the Indochinese communist regimes in the 1975–77 period. Hanoi sharply criticized Indonesia for its role as the "main prop" of the United States' alleged new strategy of using ASEAN to rally regional anti-communist forces to thwart the progress of what the Vietnamese called the Southeast Asian "revolutionary movement".[2] The clearest indication of Hanoi's continuing unwillingness to become involved in a new regional order on ASEAN's terms came in August 1976, when Laotian and Vietnamese delegates at the Non-Aligned summit in Colombo attacked ASEAN's ZOPFAN proposal, claiming that it was designed to "resuscitate the past" by camouflaging an intensifying American "war of aggression in Indochina".[3] With the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Thailand, Vietnam and Laos had little reason to feel militarily insecure in relation to ASEAN, but the latter was collectively far stronger by almost every non-military indicator. This may have influenced the Vietnamese and Laotian regimes, acutely conscious of their post-war weakness (especially in economic terms), to impress on ASEAN members that, for the foreseeable future at least, only bilateral relations would be possible.

So, by the end of 1977, ASEAN had only patchy success in establishing co-operative working relationships with the Indochinese states. This was due not only to caution, suspicion and hostility on the Indochinese side, but also to the lack of consensus within ASEAN that communist Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia were potentially trustworthy or reliable partners. Relations between non-communist and communist Southeast Asia were, however, dramatically affected by the intensifying conflict between Vietnam (supported by the Soviet Union) and Cambodia (backed by China). By 1978 this conflict had profoundly altered the attitudes of the Indochinese states and their big power allies, apparently removing much of the ambivalence in their attitudes towards ASEAN and its members. In particular, Vietnam appeared not to demand such a major role in determining the ground rules for relations within the region. But although this led to some limited improvements in relations between particular ASEAN and Indochinese states, it also reinforced ASEAN's caution in dealing with its communist neighbours.

The members of ASEAN were all careful not to be drawn into the emerging conflict in Indochina on one side or the other, and displayed an impressive ability to co-ordinate their responses to the Indochinese countries' attempts to improve relations. This ASEAN co-ordination was evident in the five governments' refusal to enter into "Treaties of Peace and Friendship" with Vietnam and their determination to move Hanoi's PIN (Peace, Independence and Neutrality) proposal closer to ASEAN's own ZOPFAN concept. But there were nuances in the individual perspectives of the ASEAN members, reflecting their divergent strategic perspectives. Whereas the concern of Indonesia, Malaysia and to a lesser extent the Philippines with China as a serious, though long-term, security threat inclined

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them to empathize (if not sympathize) with Hanoi, Thailand (mainly because of the Vietnamese threat to Cambodia's independence) and Singapore (because of intensifying Soviet-Vietnamese relations) tended more towards the Chinese view of Vietnam as a danger to regional security. As long as a balance of power existed within Indochina, this intra-ASEAN divergence of outlook did not threaten the diplomatic cohesion of the Association. But these differences foreshadowed the deeper division which emerged within ASEAN, at times straining its unity, after the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia at the end of 1978 overturned the Indochinese balance.

The Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia from early 1979 provided ASEAN with what might be described as its "finest hour". Certainly, political co-operation began to take priority over economic co-operation for the Association. But although the Cambodian issue provided the ASEAN members with an extremely important focus for political co-operation, the failure of both the July 1981 International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK) and the subsequent cobbling together of a coalition of the three main Cambodian resistance groups to break the deadlock highlighted the dangers of a continuing stalemate for ASEAN. It was arguable that ASEAN's Cambodian policy had become counter-productive in security terms for several reasons:

1. it was distracting ASEAN from its original aims, especially the construction of national and regional "resilience";
2. it was contributing to the growth of militarism, at the expense of the development of responsive political systems, in the ASEAN countries;
3. it was damaging the prospects for peaceful coexistence and co-operation in the region, by dividing Southeast Asia into mutually antagonistic non-communist and communist blocs;
4. it threatened the political cohesion of ASEAN, especially by frustrating Indonesia's wish to reach a settlement with Vietnam;
5. it increased Chinese influence and Soviet interference in the region, while at the same time fostering a dangerous level of political, economic and military dependence by individual members of ASEAN on the United States;
6. it risked a military confrontation with Vietnam; and
7. it exacerbated Indochina's refugee problems.

Finally, ASEAN's Cambodian policy did not necessarily promise an eventual settlement which would be in the interests of its members — especially if the Khmer Rouge were to regain power.[4]

Divergent Strategic Perspectives within ASEAN

To recapitulate, ASEAN's ambitions in relation to a "security" role have had four dimensions:

1. the building of national (and ultimately regional) "resilience" through socio-economic development;

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2. the maintenance and enhancement of close political links (including bilateral military co-operation) and economic relations between the members of ASEAN;
3. the construction of peaceful and co-operative relationships with the rest of Southeast Asia; and
4. the exclusion of unwelcome great power influence (especially in military terms) from the region.

However, while there has been a high degree of consensus (at least at a declaratory level) within and between the ASEAN governments that the first two dimensions are desirable objectives, there have been wide divergences within the Association concerning the means of achieving the third and fourth. In brief, there have been "regionalist" and "globalist" strands in ASEAN thinking about security since the mid-1970s. The Indonesian and, to a lesser extent, Malaysian governments, together with elements in Bangkok and Manila, have been relatively sympathetic towards Hanoi's conception of regional order (involving in particular a substantial Vietnamese role in Cambodia and Laos) and have been concerned (at least in principle) to exclude the military influence of all extra-regional major powers from Southeast Asia. To a large degree this attitude has been conditioned by a continuing concern with China as a threat, which would be best resisted by regional countries (of whatever ideology) acting in unison. On the other hand, the "globalist" Singaporean viewpoint, generally shared by the dominant military and political groups in Thailand, sees Vietnam as a dangerous, expansionist power closely allied with the Soviet Union. The "globalist" response has been to attempt to link non-communist Southeast Asia to the Western (and Chinese) anti-Soviet alliance. The "globalist" viewpoint is not immediately concerned with China, at least under its present pragmatic and technocratic leadership, as a threat: indeed, Singapore and Thailand have both encouraged Beijing to aid Cambodian resistance to Vietnam's occupation, with Bangkok entering into a *de facto* strategic alliance with the People's Republic of China (PRC) against Hanoi.

So far, the tension generated by these divergent strategic perspectives within ASEAN has been tempered by Indonesia's willingness effectively to subordinate its vision of an ideal regional order so as to maintain the unity of ASEAN, which Jakarta sees as potentially an extremely useful framework within which to exert its regional (or at least sub-regional) leadership in the longer term. The perceived need to bolster Thailand's security has overcome Malaysia's doubts about ASEAN's present stance on the related issues of Cambodia and alignment with extra-regional powers, which sits uneasily with Kuala Lumpur's earlier leading role in espousing ZOPFAN.

Can ASEAN do more for Regional Security?

Given that 1987 is the twentieth anniversary of ASEAN's founding and that the Association's first summit meeting for a decade will be held in December with the aim of injecting new energy into the regional grouping, it seems appropriate to ask how ASEAN might be used more effectively by its members as a vehicle for

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enhancing their individual and collective security in the future, in each of the four dimensions mentioned above.

Equity and resilience. In the first place, there is perhaps too much complacency concerning the problem of socio-economic inequity in the four larger members of ASEAN. This has important security implications. For various reasons (including the impact on local communist morale of the inter-communist conflict in Indochina), communist insurgency has declined as a problem for the Thai and Malaysian governments since the late 1970s. But, fed by the resistance of landowners to agrarian reform, revolutionary forces in the Philippines continue to gain strength despite the ouster of Marcos. Moreover, huge social and economic inequalities remain in Indonesia, Thailand and (to a lesser extent) Malaysia: these could provide a fertile breeding ground for insurrection in the future. These potential security problems might be pre-empted by appropriate social and economic policies, but such strategies might require fundamental shifts in the allocation of government resources.

It has been widely suggested that ASEAN's third summit meeting should be used to revitalize the economic dimension of ASEAN co-operation, particularly in order to help the Association's members overcome the present economic recession. From the point of view of security, it might seem that any economic co-operation (such as increased intra-ASEAN trade) is useful *if* it helps to increase the production of wealth which will eventually "trickle down", uplifting the welfare and prosperity of the whole population. But this is a very big "if": there is good reason to doubt that this "trickle down" approach is working effectively. Moreover, it seems fairly clear that the concern (at least at the declaratory level) of the ASEAN governments to promote social justice has been insufficient to ameliorate significantly the phenomenon of wide income disparities in the four larger countries of ASEAN.[5]

Bearing in mind the security implications of their developmental problems, ASEAN should do more to assist its members to expedite their rural and agricultural development. One keen observer of the ASEAN scene has suggested that the ASEAN agenda for economic co-operation should be expanded "in a manner that will contribute directly to the welfare of groups at the bottom and in the peripheries of their societies".[6] More intensive and effective pooling of information and ideas on development might be an appropriate first step in this direction.

Intra-ASEAN tensions. In terms of the relationships between the various ASEAN countries, no effort should be spared to negotiate solutions to chronic long-term problems, such as the festering Philippine claim to Sabah. Greater efforts should be made to pre-empt acute, short-term problems in bilateral relations (such as that which arose over Israeli President Herzog's visit to Singapore in late 1986) by consultation in advance. In both cases, it may be necessary to sacrifice short-term domestic political benefits in order to achieve more stable intra-ASEAN relations.

One extreme manifestation of lingering suspicions and competition for

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status within ASEAN is the suggestion of an "arms race" phenomenon. Certain members of ASEAN apparently purchase sophisticated weapons systems either for reasons of prestige or as a deterrent against other ASEAN members. The most recent example might be the acquisition of F-16 fighter aircraft by Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia. Such an arms race was evident even a decade ago, when Ron Huisken suggested that

> ... the nations of Southeast Asia should establish a procedure whereby each state contemplating a significant acquisition of weapons should submit to every other state a detailed statement describing the weapon, the number to be acquired and the reasons for the proposed acquisition, and invite reactions. Such an exchange, if done honestly, would contribute to mutual trust and confidence and would inhibit the introduction of weapons that would ... precipitate a round of similar or offsetting acquisition.[7]

Although there would obviously be serious difficulties in implementing this scheme, it could do much to prevent the diversion of scarce resources to possibly redundant arms purchases. Buying sophisticated weapons is not always the most cost-effective means of enhancing security, especially if the most serious threats are from within rather than outside. Most of the ASEAN governments are anxious to contain (if not reduce) their defence expenditure during the present recession, and a multilateral arms control initiative could be an effective means to this end. Co-operation between the ASEAN members on this issue, which might be co-ordinated by an "arms control cell" attached to the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta, could do a lot more for their long-term security (in the widest sense) than the expansion of the present level of military co-operation between individual members to involve a multilateral, institutionalized military pact, as advocated periodically by interested parties inside and outside the region.

At the bilateral level, military co-operation (involving the exchange of military intelligence, sending officers to each other's staff colleges, and joint exercises) between the ASEAN members performs a useful "confidence-building" role by reducing suspicions concerning the possibility of military adventurism within non-communist Southeast Asia. Some leading ASEAN politicians and military men[8] have called for the intensification and even institutionalization of military co-operation between the ASEAN members. But such a course of action could prove counter-productive, especially if individual ASEAN members maintained their security links with the West, thus resuscitating Hanoi's earlier apprehensions that ASEAN is effectively an enlarged version of SEATO, the earlier U.S.-backed military alliance in the region. Other objections to substantially increased intra-ASEAN military co-operation include the divergence of threat perceptions within the Association, and the existence of lingering suspicions and latent animosities between various member states. ASEAN is not yet a "security community" in the Deutschian sense: it would surely be premature to institutionalize multilateral co-operation while the use of force by one ASEAN state against another remained a possibility, however vague.

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ASEAN and Indochina. Any proposals for new ASEAN initiatives in relation to security in the third and fourth dimensions are likely to be more controversial than those made in terms of advancing national and regional resilience through greater socio-economic equity and intra-ASEAN confidence-building, given the range of strategic outlooks within ASEAN. Nevertheless, in relation to the construction of harmonious relationships with non-ASEAN Southeast Asian countries, there are grounds for suggesting that ASEAN should fundamentally reappraise its policy towards Vietnam's role in Cambodia and the status of the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) regime. Although very significant drawbacks have clearly accompanied ASEAN's established Cambodian policy since the early 1980s, it has usually been argued that a radical change of course promises new dangers and only uncertain benefits. But there comes a time when the cost-effectiveness of any policy should be reviewed, and after almost nine years of practically fruitless lobbying against Vietnam's subjugation of Cambodia it would perhaps be in order for ASEAN to assign a greater weighting in its calculations to the potentially enormous political, economic and security benefits that might flow from normalized relations with Vietnam and the PRK.

ASEAN's Cambodian policy is in danger of being overtaken by the course of events. The Cambodian resistance's armed struggle has fared reasonably well in 1986 and 1987, but it is still virtually inconceivable that it could ever pose a serious threat to the survival of the PRK regime in the absence of a substantial escalation of the conflict (which would require the wholehearted support of the resistance's external supporters). On the other hand, the CGDK (Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea) appears as fragile a creation as ever, especially since Prince Sihanouk's decision to take a year's leave from his leadership position following persistent attacks by the Khmer Rouge on his forces. Sihanouk has argued repeatedly that the Cambodian stalemate can only be resolved by negotiation, and he could well be tempted into an independent settlement with Hanoi and the PRK.[9] Since 1985 the balance of power within the PRK leadership has begun to tilt away from former "Khmer Vietminh" cadres (who had spent the years 1954–70 in Hanoi) and towards former Khmer Rouge, "independent communists" and technocrats lacking a pre-1979 communist background. With the addition of even a token number of Sihanoukists, the PRK's political complexion would be quite different from that of the "baggage train" regime installed by Vietnam in 1979.[10] Although it will almost certainly need to maintain a sizeable military contingent there to help maintain security and assist the build-up of the PRK's own army, Vietnam appears confident that it will be able to withdraw the majority of its forces from Cambodia by 1990.

For all these reasons, a strong case can be made that ASEAN should adopt a more realistic attitude towards negotiating a solution to the Cambodian problem. Notwithstanding Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar's recent efforts to revive the idea of a "cocktail party" involving all Cambodian factions as the first step towards a negotiated settlement, it seems fairly clear that the Association lacks effective instruments either to force or to cajole Vietnam away from effectively

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dominating Cambodia. Hanoi has successfully installed a malleable (if not totally acquiescent) regime, which may well prove able to maintain itself in power after 1990 even in the absence of a massive Vietnamese military presence. While the Vietnamese undoubtedly wish to reduce the costs involved in controlling Cambodia, these will lessen as the expansion and increased effectiveness of the PRK's own armed forces allow Hanoi to scale down the size of its expeditionary force,[11] and as the developed countries escalate their economic relations with Vietnam despite ASEAN's protests.[12] However, it may not be too late for ASEAN to work out some form of agreement with Vietnam and the PRK whereby the latter's sovereignty is recognized in exchange for a role in the Phnom Penh administration for the non-communist resistance and perhaps even some Khmer Rouge elements. Such a solution, while essentially of a face-saving nature, would by no means imply that ASEAN and its allies in the developed world had "abandoned" the Khmers. By linking the Indochinese countries more closely to the rest of Southeast Asia through active diplomatic and, more especially, economic relations, ASEAN (together with the West and Japan) could exercise considerable indirect influence over the future of Cambodia.

The proposed "cocktail party" or informal meeting between the Cambodian factions could be a first step towards a resolution of the diplomatic stalemate, but probably only in certain circumstances. In the first place, the Cambodian resistance should realize that it cannot use the talks to *force* a Vietnamese military withdrawal, although the gradual, phased pullout which Hanoi apparently plans could, of course, be recognized and integrated into any agreement. Secondly, it still seems that Khmer Rouge participation in the proposed meeting could prove a stumbling block. Although the PRK has indicated that it may be willing to accept Khmer Rouge involvement in the talks, provided that certain unacceptable personalities including Pol Pot and Ieng Sary are excluded, it still seems that the Khmer Rouge themselves are unwilling to negotiate with the Phnom Penh regime. ASEAN should pressure the Khmer Rouge to participate in the "cocktail party"; if this pressure fails, then the Association should be prepared to support negotiations initially involving only the non-communist resistance and the PRK. If the first round of informal talks was successful in the sense of producing an agreement to continue talking, the Khmer Rouge might be persuaded to participate in subsequent rounds.

In the absence of a far-reaching *détente* with Moscow and/or Hanoi, Beijing would probably oppose any solution to the Cambodian problem in which its ally, the Khmer Rouge, was not closely involved. Nevertheless, ASEAN should use all instruments at its disposal to convince China to at least not object to a settlement along the lines suggested here. If Washington is truly happy to follow ASEAN's lead on the Cambodian issue, then it should be willing to join with the ASEAN governments in attempting to persuade Beijing to acquiesce in a solution falling short of China's original optimal goal. Recent developments indicate that the U.S. administration has pressing needs of its own (notably to resolve the "missing in action" issue) which may propel it towards normalized relations with Hanoi.

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Moreover, Jakarta could use the "carrots" of increased trade and normalized diplomatic relations with Indonesia to help entice the People's Republic of China into revising its position on Cambodia; it would be important to provide Beijing with some compensation for the loss of its close strategic relationship with Thailand, which presumably would no longer be necessary from Bangkok's viewpoint if the Cambodian stalemate was broken.

Extra-regional Powers and ASEAN. Finally, ASEAN needs to revitalize its policy of working to exclude unwelcome intrusions of extra-regional great power influence. Since the late 1970s Southeast Asia has unfortunately been drawn again into global great power rivalry, mainly as a result of the eruption of the Third Indochina War. This state of affairs is clearly detrimental to ASEAN's goal of Southeast Asia's security being managed by the regional states themselves. But there are several ways in which the impact of the intrusion of extra-regional powers might be reduced.

Apart from assessing seriously the possibility of a change of direction on Cambodia as a means of reducing Soviet influence in Vietnam, ASEAN could work actively towards the removal of both the long-established U.S. naval and air presence in the Philippines and the relatively recent Soviet military toehold in Vietnam. A major plank in the platform of "pro-bases" Philippine politicians is that Manila's ASEAN partners support the present arrangements. The other ASEAN members should emphasize to the Aquino administration that they are not in favour of a continuing U.S. military presence at Clark Air Base, Subic Bay and other Philippine bases after the present bases agreement expires in 1991, *provided* that Hanoi and Moscow concurrently arrange for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Cam Ranh Bay. The Soviets have hinted that such a deal might be possible,[13] and Washington has acknowledged that it cannot maintain its bases in the Philippines against Manila's will.[14] Of course, Vietnam would be extremely reluctant to jeopardize the very substantial economic assistance it receives from the USSR. But ASEAN could do much to soften the blow by not only opening up its own economic relationship with Hanoi, but also by withdrawing its opposition to Western and Japanese aid and trade. Having negotiated the removal (perhaps in stages) of the U.S. and Soviet military presence from their Southeast Asian bases, ASEAN and the Indochinese states would then be in a position jointly to declare a Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone (SEANWFZ), along the lines of the recently established South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone. It would certainly be premature, and perhaps pointless, to declare such a zone while nuclear-capable superpower ships and aircraft still operate from regional bases.

The superpowers are not the only extra-regional powers capable of introducing nuclear weapons to Southeast Asia or otherwise impinging militarily on the region. In recent years, there have been signs that the United States and the Soviet Union will soon be joined by China, Japan and India in having the capability to project naval and air power into Southeast Asia. Although only China of these latter powers is so far a self-declared nuclear power, as the ability of these three countries to project military power (especially at sea) grows, so ASEAN will

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be affected, almost willy-nilly. Although the Chinese navy is unlikely to acquire aircraft carriers "until well into the next century" and has a long way to go before it constitutes a real "blue water" force, Beijing will almost certainly expand its capability for naval operations in the South China Sea in the short to medium term.[15] Japan's air force and navy are now committed to defending sea lanes up to 1,000 nautical miles from Tokyo, with maritime reconnaissance aircraft patrolling as far south as the Philippines and Guam. Japan's capability to project sea and air power will grow substantially as Tokyo's defence expenditure increases in the late 1980s and 1990s,[16] and the Japanese Foreign Minister's recent dismissal of ASEAN's SEANWFZ proposal as a "sentimental exercise"[17] may have indicated more than merely a concern that the United States' strategic interests should not be damaged. The Indian Navy continues to expand its capabilities, both quantitatively and qualitatively. According to one recent assessment, "the buildup goes well beyond local defence requirements and provides ... a force projection and surveillance capability far superior to that possessed by any other Indian Ocean littoral state". Recent reports indicate that New Delhi may soon acquire (from the USSR) its first nuclear-powered submarine, and that by the year 2000 India will deploy at least two carrier task groups, with one based on the east coast, facing Southeast Asia.[18] Of course, China, Japan and India probably harbour no intentions of aggressively intruding on the waters or interests of ASEAN, but many students of strategy agree that the possession of military capability may sometimes mould the political will to use that capability.

If the Cambodian problem was resolved, there would be little need for Thailand to develop further its burgeoning strategic relationship with Beijing. But the ASEAN members, acting together, could also take more positive steps to ensure that the region is not adversely affected by the activities of peri-regional medium powers. The initiation of dialogues on strategic perspectives with these powers and the exchange of observers at naval exercises might be useful confidence-building measures in the first instance.

Some of these suggestions as to how the security role of ASEAN might be strengthened may appear over-optimistic. In particular, the propositions concerning relations with Indochina and extra-regional powers are likely to appeal far more to "regionalist" sentiment in Indonesia (and to a lesser extent, Malaysia) than to the "globalist" perspective dominant in the less non-aligned ASEAN partners. However, unlike the suggestion that ASEAN should fulfil its security role by becoming a military pact, the suggestions made here are broadly in line with the original spirit in which ASEAN was set up twenty years ago and the Kuala Lumpur Declaration issued in 1971, as well as with the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord which emerged from the Association's first summit in 1976. In 1987, as in 1967, 1971 and 1976, the regional environment is turbulent and unpredictable. Now, as then, the ASEAN members stand a much better chance of overcoming the challenges to their security if they act collectively rather than individually. Given their sometimes divergent

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strategic perspectives, the development of ASEAN's security role may require some difficult compromises in the future. But most significant past efforts to further regional co-operation, not least the establishment of ASEAN in the first place, have required heaps of faith.

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4. For a lengthier discussion of these points, see Tim Huxley, "ASEAN and Cambodia: The Hazards of Stalemate", *Asia Pacific Community*, No. 30 (Fall 1985).
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6. Ibid., p. 32.
7. Ron Huisken, *Limitations of Armaments in Southeast Asia: A Proposal*, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 16 (Canberra: Australian National University Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1977), pp. 46–47.
8. Including Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore, and General Sumitro, at one time senior defence adviser to Indonesia's Minister of Research and Technology. See Michael Richardson, "ASEAN extends its military ties", *Pacific Defence Reporter*, November 1982, pp. 55–57.
9. Sihanouk now claims that he will support "any proposal" to end the Cambodian conflict. *Straits Times*, 6 August 1987.
10. For further details, see Tim Huxley, "Cambodia in 1986: The PRK's Eighth Year", in *Southeast Asian Affairs 1987* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987).
11. There are already indications that Vietnam's reduced military effort in Cambodia is allowing Hanoi to plan cuts in the size of its armed forces. *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 9 May 1987.
12. ASEAN's objections to Japanese and Western economic relations with Hanoi might, incidentally, be more convincing if certain of the ASEAN members themselves had refrained from trading with Vietnam and the People's Republic of Kampuchea.
13. See interview with Fleet Admiral N. Smirnov, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, *Australian*, 1 June 1987.
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17. *Bangkok Post*, 21 June 1987.
18. N. Lee and A. Hinge, "The Naval Balance in the Indian-Pacific Ocean Region", *Naval Forces* 8, No. 11 (1987): 171.

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Access to Southeast Asian Waters by Naval Powers: Some Problems and Ambiguities

LEE YONG LENG

The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea and the cumulating legal trends since the beginning of the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) in 1973, together with economic and political pressures, might create problems for peacetime missions of the naval powers. In the early 1970s some writers saw these trends which would eventually be codified into the Convention as "a kind of *de facto* arms control"[1] while others discounted the whole thing and said that when vital interests of the naval powers were involved such legal trends and other legal inhibitions would merely become a scrap of paper across the opening of a missile tube.[2]

Although the major naval powers have not signed, let alone ratified the 1982 Convention, it is generally believed that their naval interest is well served by the 1982 Convention. Some of the agreements in the Convention which are of particular relevance to proponents of naval mobility are: the twelve-mile territorial sea with a right of innocent passage; transit passage through straits; the validation of the archipelagic concept, but including the right of archipelagic sea-lanes passage; and the confirmation of the traditional freedoms on the high seas.

An extension of the territorial sea to twelve miles is not ideal from the naval viewpoint because, historically, naval mobility has been served by the doctrine of the freedom of the seas which gives warships unhindered movement outside the narrow limits of the territorial sea, whereas, within territorial seas, the movement of foreign warships and aircraft is governed by the concept of "innocent passage". This gives surface warships the right to transit, without prior notification, but "innocence" requires that the transit is not prejudicial to the "peace, good order, or security" of the coastal state. Submarines and aircraft are not given the same freedom: innocent passage does not embrace the right of aircraft overflight or of submerged submarine transit.

The aim of the naval powers during UNCLOS III was, therefore, to try to stop the further qualitative and quantitative creep of the territorial sea. The main threat of a creeping territorial sea is the restriction of warship access through straits where passage had previously been "free". Given the strategic importance of "free and unimpeded passage" through straits, it was a major interest of the naval powers to maintain or even improve upon the rules formulated before UNCLOS III.

At UNCLOS III, the naval powers failed to prevent the extension of the territorial sea to a distance of twelve miles but there was no closing of any international straits. This change is more than compensated for by the extension of

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the "transit passage" provision to straits. It is, in fact, a major gain on what had existed previously, since it permits both submerged transit and overflight, and transit not merely in the high seas corridor but anywhere within the straits. In general, the 1982 Convention has validated the freedom traditionally enjoyed by the naval powers, thus achieving a compromise between traditional naval interests and the current political and economic aspirations of the coastal states.

Southeast Asian Seas

In the strategic context of Southeast Asia, especially in view of its fragmentation by seas, some of these agreements are not only relevant but also of special importance to the naval powers. This paper will discuss some of these agreements, especially Part II (Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone), Part III (Straits Use For International Navigation) and Part IV (Archipelagic States) of the Convention, in relation to the Malacca Straits and the archipelagic concept and also examine some of the ambiguities and problems which may arise from the interpretation of specific articles in the Convention.

The importance of the Malacca Straits, commercially and militarily, is well known. Passage through the Straits is shortest between the northern Indian and the north-western Pacific Oceans. It is the most time-effective and cost-effective route for vessels with an under-keel clearance of at least 3.5 metres. Table 1 gives the relative distance to Yokohama via the Malacca Straits and the alternative straits.[3] Moreover, since it lies athwart the ASEAN group of states with their abundant resources and high growth rates, it is to be expected that the importance of the Malacca Straits will increase with growing demand for resources and increasing trading links between ASEAN and the developed countries.

TABLE 1
RELATIVE DISTANCES TO YOKOHAMA

	Persian Gulf	*Capetown*	*Mombasa*	*Calcutta*	*Rotterdam*	*Black Sea*
Malacca	100	102	100	100	100	100
Sunda	109	100	104	118		
Lombok	118	104	112	127		
Ombai-Wetar	123	106	116	132		
Bass	180	130	132	222		
Panama					111	147
Cape of Good Hope						164

SOURCE: M. MccGwire, "The geopolitical importance of strategic waterways in the Asian-Pacific region", *ORBIS* (Fall 1975), p. 1070.

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The major naval powers see the Straits functioning as an important sea link between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. It serves as a major trade route for traffic plying between Europe and the Middle East on the one hand, and East Asia on the other. In particular, it is a vital link for Japanese imports of crude oil originating from the Persian Gulf. Although the VLCCs (very large crude carriers) of 200,000 tons dwt and above usually transit through the Lombok–Makassar Straits on their way to Japan (because of its deeper channel), they often use the Malacca Straits on their return trip so as to cut down costs for travelling the extra 1,000 miles. Their emptied storage tanks make transit through the Malacca Straits both technically and legally possible. It is, therefore, a very busy straits and the volume of traffic — with an average of 227 ships per day — is very heavy (see Figures 1 and 2).

However, the Malacca Straits is set within the Southeast Asian "shatterbelt" which is caught between the contending interests of the major powers.[4] The major powers are interested in a shatterbelt because of its strategic position, more so if it commands a strategic straits such as the Malacca Straits. The political and economic fate of the Southeast Asian shatterbelt is, therefore, of vital concern to the major powers.

The major naval powers see the Malacca Straits facilitating the rapid deployment of naval forces from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean and vice versa. The Straits can therefore play an integral role in the strategies of the superpowers where freedom of access to these oceans is of the utmost importance. This will allow them to shift their naval forces in the shortest possible time to crisis spots regardless of whether it is in a defensive or offensive capacity.[5]

The coastal states of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore were not unaware of the security problem resulting from the growing superpower rivalry in the region but they were also concerned with the problems of safety of navigation and pollution. It was with all these problems in mind that the foreign ministers of the three coastal states met on 16 November 1971 in Kuala Lumpur to consider the question of passage through the Malacca Straits and their status in the matter.

Earlier, in August 1969, Malaysia had declared a territorial sea limit of twelve miles, instead of three miles, thus conforming with Indonesia's which had been declared earlier in 1957. The significance of this act was that the Straits became part of the territorial seas of these two states. The international argument that emerged revolved around the question of freedom of navigation and access to foreign fleets. The objective of the 1971 meeting was to arrive at some consensus, in the hope of making a unified stand on this matter of international concern. There was full agreement between Indonesia and Malaysia, and a partial agreement with Singapore. The Kuala Lumpur Declaration contained three main points. All three states agreed that:

1. they were solely responsible for the safety of navigation through the Malacca Straits and that a co-ordinating body, comprising only themselves, be established to see to this;

FIGURE 1

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FIGURE 1
STRAITS OF MALACCA



SOURCE: Lee Yong Leng, *Southeast Asia and the Law of the Sea* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1980), p. 52.

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FIGURE 2
THE ALTERNATIVE STRAITS



SOURCE: Adapted from Lee Yong Leng, *Southeast Asia and the Law of the Sea*, p. 51.

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2. the problem of safety of navigation and the question of internationalization of the Straits were two separate issues.

On the third point, Indonesia and Malaysia agreed that the Straits was not an international straits although they recognized its use for international shipping "in accordance with the principle of innocent passage". Singapore expressed its reservations over this point, by simply pointing out that it took note of the position of the other two states.

The Kuala Lumpur Declaration evoked strong international response, both for and against, particularly regarding the issue of the "international" status of the Straits. Later, Indonesia and Malaysia declared that tankers of more than 200,000 tons and warships would not be allowed to transit through the Straits but instead would have to use the Lombok–Makassar alternative.[6]

Fortunately, good diplomacy prevailed and the issue was defused in 1974 by stressing the technical-economic dimensions rather than the politico-military ones. It was realized then that it would be better to leave the issue for discussion at UNCLOS III which was about to begin in 1974, a decision that also helped to remove a stumbling block to further ASEAN solidarity.

At the end of UNCLOS III there was broad agreement on guaranteed transit through international straits. Transit passage in the 1982 Convention is defined as "the exercise in accordance with this part of the freedom of navigation and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of the Strait between one area of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another area of high seas or exclusive economic zone. However, the requirement of continuous and expeditious transit does not preclude passage through the Strait for the purpose of entering, leaving, or returning from a State bordering the Strait, subject to the conditions of entry to that State".[7]

However, Section II (Transit Passage) of the Convention can give rise to some disagreement. Although Article 38 (Right of Transit Passage) grants "all ships and aircraft" the right of transit passage, there is room for dispute in particular cases. For example, the passage of a warship or warships through the Malacca Straits should be "solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit", but it is for the strait states of Malaysia and Indonesia to determine whether the passage violates the provisions of the Article. The onus also falls on the strait states to determine whether ships and aircraft operating under this right fulfil the duties specified in Article 39, that is, to refrain from "any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of States bordering the strait, or in any manner in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations".

Transit passage also does not allow "research or survey activities" without prior authorization but most warships, especially submarines, are involved in survey and research activities of one kind or another. The problem for strait states such as Malaysia and Indonesia is whether they have the capability to determine that a violation has taken place. It can become a source of dispute between them and the naval power if their interpretation is not accepted by the latter who might

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quote Article 44 (Duties of States Bordering Straits) in which the right of transit passage is strongly protected by the provision: "There shall be no suspension of transit passage".

There are two other potential problems related to the transit passage concept. One is that there is no definition of "straits used for international navigation" and one wonders whether "transit passage" is applicable to straits which are rarely used by foreign warships and merchant ships. It would have been useful if the Convention had listed the straits "recognized as used for international navigation".

A second problem is that the Convention is silent on submerged passage. There would have been less room for dispute if an express right of submerged passage had been written into the text. The two superpowers were concerned that an innocent passage regime would pose a risk to the invulnerability of their submarines particularly those that were involved in strategic nuclear deterrence (SSBNs). Since SSBNs play a determining role in modern strategy, any threat to them would also be a threat to strategic stability in general. Therefore, if SSBNs were required to transit straits on the surface, they would give the game away. Within Southeast Asia in the 1960s and 1970s it was thought that only the Indonesian straits of Ombai-Wetar and Lombok were of critical value as they connected SSBN operating areas. However, the increased range of submarine-launched ballistic missiles has diminished the strategic significance of straits for SSBN transit. Both superpowers now have missiles that can reach their targets without having to leave their home waters. Although the straits regime may not be as vital to SSBN passage today, the problem is what will the strait states do if the naval powers take it as understood that submerged passage is included in this right of transit passage. In the case of Indonesia, would it have the capability to stop submerged passage or to know of submerged passage of submarines through the Ombai-Wetar and Lombok straits? In the geopolitics of the real world it is not difficult to conclude that when there is such a problem it will be settled on the basis of might is right, that is, in favour of the naval power.

In busy straits such as the Malacca Straits, it is only natural that strait states will want to exercise more control to prevent accidents and pollution. This has already been done in the case of the Malacca Straits. On the other hand, naval powers are fearful that, in time, such controls may become more restrictive and take on more and more the characteristics of air traffic control at busy international airports.

It is expected that with growing dangers from accidents, pressure will be placed not only on the concept of innocent passage but also on transit passage. As it is, there is already some restriction on the access of some types of vessels through the Malacca Straits (tankers of more than 200,000 tons dwt are not allowed to transit the Straits). Furthermore, pressure on innocent passage is also expected to come in the not too distant future from the proliferation of zones of one kind or another. In ASEAN waters, there is already in existence the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) which includes the Malacca Straits and the archipelagic states of Indonesia and the Philippines. Up to now, it has been

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part of the rhetoric of ASEAN meetings but, in practice, the states involved are not in a position to tell the major powers in the region what to do in their proxy conflicts. Coming up over the horizon is the Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone (NWFZ) concept which will be discussed at the ASEAN summit in December 1987 in Manila. If it is ever legitimized, it may be easier for coastal states to identify foreign nuclear-powered ships and impede their passage.

In cases when relations between the strait states and the naval power are strained, such restrictions can be expected to be enforced with more vigour. Although the strait states may not be able to prevent the naval power from moving its ships through the straits, the latter will have to face increased risks and costs in exercising passage, as, for example, in August 1987, when the U.S. navy escorting Kuwaiti tankers sailed through the Strait of Hormuz into the Persian Gulf. The strait states may not have the wherewithal to stop the naval power but they can easily make it more risky by sowing mines, as was done by the Iranians with great effectiveness, and, in consequence, may call into question the mission of the naval power.

The Archipelagic Concept

The Indonesians had security in mind when they proposed their archipelagic concept. They were fearful that if they did not take the necessary steps to insulate themselves with wider stretches of sea, their inner lanes of defence would be easily penetrated by the fleets of the superpowers. They were anxious about their territorial integrity, for they knew that they were, politically and militarily, a weak state, characterized by a fragmented but extensive mid-ocean archipelagic territory with a large and unevenly distributed population. For this reason, they also saw the Malacca Straits in the context of their archipelagic concept because it provided a routeway into the internal waters of their archipelago. The Indonesians were, therefore, determined to seek international recognition for the archipelago concept as a means of underpinning the security of the state and, as early as 13 December 1957, made a declaration to that effect.[8]

To the Indonesians, the large expanse of land and water enclosed by the baselines comprise the Indonesian fatherland or *Tanah Air* (literally meaning "land and water"). The notion of *Tanah Air* is the basis for the state doctrine called *Wawasan Nusantara*, which is translated as "Archipelagic Concept" but should be considered more as a geopolitically determined national outlook. The Archipelagic Concept, or *Wawasan Nusantara*, is therefore a plan for national survival and development and understood to mean that "the seas and the straits must be utilized to bridge the physical separations between the islands, regions, and the manifold ethnic groups; this is also the case with our air space".[9]

The Philippine Government was just as determined that the archipelagic principle would be internationally recognized and as early as 1955 promulgated their archipelagic principle, and in 1958, together with Indonesia, made a formal proposal at the 1958 Law of the Sea Conference. Although the Philippines was

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not successful then, they persisted and, in the UNCLOS III sessions, continued to press hard for the principle. They argued that the "basic consideration of unity" justified the claim and that its "land, waters and people formed an intrinsic geographical, economic, and political entity and historically had been recognized as such".[10]

The two mid-ocean archipelagic states of Indonesia and the Philippines have, therefore, employed straight baselines in connection with their archipelagic principle. Essentially, the archipelagic principle as advocated by Indonesia and the Philippines is a claim to depart from the normal method of drawing baselines from which the territorial sea is measured. Instead of accepting the normal baseline they want the right to draw straight baselines connecting the outermost points of the outermost islands (Figure 3). The waters enclosed by the straight baseline boundary would be "archipelagic waters" in which the state would have sovereignty, though innocent passage for vessels would be recognized. The two archipelagic states of Indonesia and the Philippines enacted legislation in 1960 and 1961 respectively, which provided for the drawing of straight baselines connecting the outermost points of the outermost islands of their mid-ocean archipelagos. Although the baselines were proclaimed long before the present rules were proposed and codified in the 1982 Convention, these original baselines did conform to the Convention rules with one minor exception.

Geopolitical Implications

From the geographical point of view, the most dramatic result of the archipelagic concept is the transformation of the fragmented island states of Indonesia and the Philippines into compact states. In a way, such a view is consistent with the old Southeast Asian concept of the unity of the seas, which views the seas as uniting rather than dividing the separate parts of island Southeast Asia. The change in the geography of Southeast Asia is also seen in the creation of states with land and sea units; in the case of Indonesia and the Philippines the sea units are larger than the land areas. This harks back to the old pre-European Southeast Asia when political power was organized in units of sea rather than of land, except that in today's context the outward limits of the two sea states are not vague spheres of influence as in days of old but are delimited precisely by maritime boundaries.[11]

Maritime nations were unhappy not only over such large areas being converted into archipelagic waters but also because the areas of high seas over which the archipelagic states wished to extend their sovereignty would be larger than their total area of land. Straight baselines surrounding compact archipelagos of small islands or one or two large islands with several small islands do not give rise to much concern as they do not diminish the area of the high seas significantly. In the case of Indonesia and the Philippines, which comprise large islands, large areas of the high seas are transferred to the status of internal waters. For example, Indonesia's straight baseline system of 8,167.6 nautical miles, proclaimed on 18 February 1960, encloses 666,000 square nautical miles of internal waters, involving

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FIGURE 3
STRAIGHT BASELINES OF INDONESIA AND THE PHILIPPINES



SOURCE: Lee Yong Leng, "The Archipelagic Concept and its Impact on Southeast Asia", *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography* 4, No. 1 (1983): 37.

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five baselines in excess of 100 nautical miles, and the Philippines' straight baselines, measuring 8,174 nautical miles, encloses 148,921.5 square nautical miles of internal waters.[12]

Maritime nations, and naval powers in particular, were concerned over the claims of these two archipelagic states because they lie athwart important sea and land routes between Japan and Europe and control not only the Malacca Straits but also other important straits in the region, such as the Sunda, San Bernardino and Surigao straits. If restrictions were ever placed on them, much international commerce would be seriously disrupted. As noted above, so far only tankers in excess of 200,000 tons dwt have been restricted from using the Malacca Straits – such tankers are diverted to an alternative but longer route (950 miles and 3 days more) through the Lombok straits.[13]

At the UNCLOS III discussions, one of the main issues was to decide on precise criteria for determining what was and what was not an archipelagic state. Two sets of criteria were proposed: a maximum and minimum land to water ratio within the baselines, and a maximum length for the baselines. At the end of UNCLOS III, these two safeguard elements were introduced into the 1982 Convention: 1) a proviso that within the straight baselines, there must be included the main islands "and an area in which the ratio of the area of the water to the area of the land, including atolls, is between one to one and nine to one", 2) "the maximum length of baselines is prescribed as 100 nautical miles, though three per cent of the total number of baselines can exceed this length up to a maximum of 125 nautical miles".[14]

Another important issue at UNCLOS III was the nature of the right of passage through and over the enclosed archipelagic waters. There was a similar conflict of views as in the case of international straits. The archipelagic states proposed that a right of innocent passage should apply, but the maritime powers wanted a regime of free transit. Again, after much discussion, there was general agreement over navigation and overflight. This is reflected in the 1982 Convention which provides not only for the right of innocent passage through archipelagic waters but also for archipelagic sea lanes and air routes through and over which all ships and aircraft can enjoy "archipelagic sea lanes passage". These sea lanes and air routes are to traverse the archipelagic waters and adjacent territorial sea and should include "all normal passage routes used as routes for international navigation and overflight through archipelagic waters".[15] Archipelagic sea lanes passage is defined as the "rights of navigation and overflight in the normal mode solely for the purpose of continuous expeditious and unobstructed transit between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone".[16] This is rather similar to the concept of "transit passage" used in connection with "international straits".

On the other hand, Article 58 (Right of Innocent Passage) gives archipelagic states such as Indonesia and the Philippines the right to "suspend temporarily in specified areas of its archipelagic waters the innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the protecion of its security". In other words, each

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state determines what is "essential" for its security, and Article 58 could be used by both Indonesia and the Philippines to limit navigation in specific instances. If this is the interpretation of the provision, then it does limit the force of Article 53 (Right of Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage), which gives archipelagic states the right to designate sea lanes and air routes for the passage of "all ships and aircraft".

Article 53 is also silent on submarines, so it is not clear whether the right of archipelagic sea-lanes passage includes submerged transit as well as the right of overflight. Since this provision is open to subjective interpretation there is again scope for dispute here. However, the cynical will say that archipelagic states such as Indonesia and the Philippines do not have the facilities to detect and intercept the vessels of naval powers so that it is likely that naval power interest will ensure in practice that what is not prohibited is permitted.

However, apart from this problem of submerged passage, the 1982 Convention has satisfied the naval powers on the matter of the rights of passage through archipelagic waters. Archipelagic waters can be looked at as a special version of the straits issue. Although the potential problems are there the prospects of these problems becoming serious are not as great as in straits.

Conclusion

Although there is room for interpretation and dispute over some of the articles on straits and archipelagic waters, the provisions as a whole do not adversely affect the military requirements of the naval powers. The text on straits and archipelagic waters is relatively precise and a good compromise between the interests of the naval powers and the strait and archipelagic states. It is unlikely that the ambiguities and sources of dispute in the military domain will amount to anything serious in practice. Some writers believe that what is more likely is the possible challenge to the "undetermined" aspects of the matter, such as the transit of foreign warships in the territorial sea without prior notification to, or consent of, the coastal state.[17] But whatever it is, naval powers safeguarding the naval interest will assess the situation by what happens in practice. And what happens in practice will depend on the way coastal states choose to interpret the Convention and on the way the naval powers respond in their operational practices. In the Southeast Asian context, despite the fact that military uses of the sea remain controversial, it is unlikely that the strait and archipelagic states of Southeast Asia will go out of their way to provoke confrontations in the maritime environment.

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ASEAN and SAARC Revisited: More Lessons

MICHAEL ANTOLIK

A recent article compared the origins and development of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), seeking to analyse SAARC's prospects by drawing some lessons from new experiences of ASEAN.[1] This complementary essay will attempt to amplify and give different shades of emphasis to the conclusions drawn in that ground-breaking study. Some comparison between South Asia and Southeast Asia as case-studies on regional co-operation will also be made.

The primary lessons drawn from the ASEAN experience were presented as: pursue goals that are simple and workable rather than grandiose show-case items; work through an indigenized system for planning. A second set of observations relates to decision-making style. The ASEAN experience argues for informality, frequent discussions, patience — progress will take time — and the use of public exposure to draw in non-governmental groups to promote co-operation. All of the above can well serve as guidelines for SAARC interaction.

Underlying such mechanics, however, a more important factor was discussed: "There was not only the political will to submerge some of the differences for the sake of peace and stability within the sub-region but the members also saw clearly their unity as beneficial in relation to third countries."[2] Common political will is explained by a convergence of interests which must precede and be the foundation for the diplomatic mechanics in a political process. To illustrate this, remember that ASEAN's predecessor, the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), incorporated many of the rules, procedures, and guidelines that supported ASEAN interaction in the first ten years; but it lasted barely three years before conflicting individual national and regime interests rendered it moribund. Consequently, the questions of importance to SAARC members — how and why ASEAN members came to possess the political will to co-operate — are best explained by a discussion of the interests common to the ASEAN governments.

A first observation is that the motivating interests of the states have varied at different times during the history of their association. As different internal and external situations have prevailed, different ASEAN case-studies and different lessons can be drawn. A first case is the post-formation era which well illustrates that one important commonality uniting the ASEAN members was an "external threat", which at a general level meant communism.[3] To emphasize and lend strength to this factor, it should be noted that in the early years, unlike today, there was a shared focus on one threatening factor, Maoist China, which was equated

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with subversive communism. This common perception was built on several states' experiences with Chinese-supported insurgencies and intensified by the extremism and violence of the Cultural Revolution then taking place in China. Concurrently, Vietnam's struggle with the United States contributed to the shared fixation on China; war made it seem unlikely that Vietnam could be an immediately threatening actor.

After 1970 a new era began. When the violent phase of the Cultural Revolution ended and the U.S.–Vietnam peace talks had begun, divisions over the source of danger appeared within the ranks of ASEAN. Unity was no longer so easily based on the fear of a threatening actor but now rested on a common fear of a power vacuum. The imminent U.S. and European withdrawal resulted in the consensus that the local states, if they were to avoid becoming the "cockpit of the great powers" (a favourite ASEAN phrase), had to become more involved in the changing order of the region. These small powers, realizing their limitations, decided on a "preventive medicine" approach of solidarity. Unity would deny an external power the opportunity to gain entry or influence by exploiting differences. Thus, ASEAN launched its first diplomatic act of solidarity, a joint initiative to create in Southeast Asia a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). So to complement the observation that South Asian nations feel no unifying external threat, the ZOPFAN era teaches that, firstly, ASEAN states have long lost this compelling sense, and that another situational difference prevailed: ASEAN members faced the challenge resulting from great power withdrawal and regional destabilization.

While an "external" threat played an important role at the time of ASEAN's foundation, and indeed this analysis, by pinpointing China, makes it more potent, one cannot use the "push" force of an external actor to explain continuing ASEAN cohesion. Rather, one must now ask what has kept ASEAN together despite members' different, opposing threat perceptions. Might it be the pull of regionalism? That can be taken to mean effective ties of common race, religion, life-style, language, and culture. If so, since ASEAN nations do not have such bonds, the explanation does not satisfy. And even if they did, there is not much encouraging evidence for the determining power of these ties. South Asia itself stands as the best example of countries sharing so much in common but still finding co-operation elusive. Regionalism may also be used to describe a co-operative process based on participants' belief that solidarity will bring benefits, such as the belief in the "preventive medicine" approach. This pull plays a role in ASEAN interactions today but, because results have been mixed and uneven, not so strongly that events do not regularly reveal that the governments' priority is for national interests. ASEAN's successes are better explained by describing how and what benefits are consistent with, if not supportive of, these interests. Mindful that strength of commitment will be directly related to this convergence, a second guideline is to search for essential and tangible, not marginal or speculative, achievements of ASEAN interaction.

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Using this approach, consider the much-noted sign of solidarity, the "collective foreign policy stands" taken on the Kampuchean issue. Such joint-action phenomena ought not to be read as the result of an underlying socio-cultural unity or common ideological orientation or shared political will to act collectively *per se* or a belief that moral persuasion will roll back an army of occupation. On the contrary, some commentators have reflected that the collective stand has required much accommodation by Indonesia and Malaysia who prefer to deal with Vietnam; they worry that the persisting Kampuchean issue may actually pull ASEAN apart. President Suharto addressed a special foreign ministers' meeting in May 1984 to assuage these very cleavages. Taking this concern into our analysis alters the perspective, encouraging us to view the issue from the inside out.[4] The Kampuchean policy stand can be better appreciated if it is viewed as good management of internal ASEAN division wherein states have come to accommodate their foreign policies.

This foreign policy paradox brings us to the heart of the ASEAN *raison d'etre* and a fruitful area to search for lessons about converging interests. Rephrasing the question about the "collective foreign policy stands", we can ask: despite differing threat perceptions, why do these states act jointly on an external issue; are they then accommodating foreign policy so as to preserve their intramural association and co-operation? If so, why is this co-operation valued if it is not against an "external" threat? A partial answer begins with the meaning of "external" threat. It was noted that governments perceived "the most serious threat ... to be the threat to internal stability through externally-supported subversion". "The premise [is] that the enemy, whoever it was, would not march in to take over a territory militarily."[5] Subversion is a commonality among ASEAN members; all governments have and still face challenges on this front. Externally-supported subversion in general means that the insurgency receives access to aid and sanctuary beyond the reach of the government it works against. If subversion is to find such external support, especially sanctuary, it would have to be in a neighbouring state, and since most of the ASEAN governments have only each other for neighbours, the implication is that the ASEAN states are most concerned with neighbour-supported, that is, intra-ASEAN subversion. The actual ASEAN story has been quite the opposite. Governments have helped each other by not giving aid and sanctuary to subversives against their ASEAN neighbours; in several cases they have found ways to work together against the problem. This is the co-operation that has resulted in the peace and stability in the sub-region.

An emphasis on such benefits gives a more complete explanation for ASEAN co-operation than their common attitude towards communism. Some notable subversive movements in Southeast Asia are Muslim-orientated, and one finds that governments of Muslim societies have refrained from supporting such subversives and have come to the aid of neighbouring non-Muslim governments struggling to curtail Muslim insurgency and secession. Such co-operation faces ideological domestic obstacles but the ASEAN governments have been motivated by mutually realized benefits derived from the renunciation of interference in their

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neighbour's territory. In the words of Singapore Foreign Minister Dhanabalan: "We all decided many years ago that it is better to cooperate with each other than to undermine each other."[6] ASEAN co-operation rests on a commitment to intramural accommodation, a concept practised in its members' rejection of what Singapore's Rajaratnam called "competitive interference".[7] The benefits have been secure borders, control of terrorism, and curtailed secessionism, all of which are building blocks of what is called the intramural peace and stability in the sub-region. The benefits have been all the more appreciated as the region exhibits the opposite situation of intense competitive interference and confrontation along the Indochina border.

Rejection of competitive interference, the determining characteristic of ASEAN, is an important precondition for regional co-operation and a lesson for SAARC. Helping subversives or insurgents against a member of the Association, as when India air-lifted materials to Sri Lankan Tamils, would be unthinkable in ASEAN. Non-interference and respect for sovereignty can never be overlooked; India's peacekeeping unit in northern Sri Lanka must be careful not to bruise Colombo's sovereignty if it is to work in an "ASEAN" spirit. Some guidelines from the ASEAN experience for dealing with this type of interdependent problem are: should a state play a role, as Indonesia and Malaysia did with the Muslims of the southern Philippines, that state must await invitation, be careful to speak and act only in the name and under the aegis of the regional association, act only through political and diplomatic means, and of course work towards a settlement that is consistent with the interests of the other government. This will entail support for the territorial and administrative integrity of the partner government; it may require quiet diplomacy to convince the insurgents to remain within the political entity. Denying aid and sanctuary from official and private sources will be the most effective means of communicating this message to the insurgents as well as earning the trust of the partner government.

The ASEAN experience teaches that appreciation of peace and stability, the basis of political will to co-operate, is derived from ASEAN members' past negative experiences with transnational subversion. The same question posed about SAARC members: "How could there be any 'pull' factors when each country feared its own neighbours — neighbours that were prospective members of a regional grouping?"[8] has yielded a different response when asked about ASEAN. ASEAN members have come to a clear sense that they need each other because they can hurt each other. "We have seen the enemy and it is us." South Asian nations realized this also — there is a SAARC — but not to the degree that ASEAN members have. Despite the fact that both areas have known wars and insurgencies, South Asia perhaps more than ASEAN, it is only the ASEAN partners which have eschewed the politics of confrontation while South Asia continues along this path. Regionalism may indeed be peculiar to its own region.

Certain differences may make ASEAN an unsuitable regional model for SAARC. Firstly, India dominates South Asia to a degree that no state does in Southeast Asia. Not just militarily, geographically, and demographically, but also

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economically India is the hegemon. In ASEAN, though Indonesia is the largest state, power is more diffused — not all are dwarfed by the largest, even the smallest enjoy the compensations of economic clout — and states can feel more confident. On this factor of power distribution alone, SAARC might better gain some lessons from a case-study of the Organization of American States (OAS), in which the region is dominated by one state and smaller states have sought to use the regional organization to influence the hegemon.

Regarding subversives, ASEAN members find themselves in a much more multilateral, security-interdependent situation than do SAARC members. Several clusters of states are locked into what could become mutually destructive, insurgency competitions wherein aid by one government could be countered by similar support. The Straits area interlocks four members; northern Borneo another four. Malaysia finds itself tied in such relationships with all its ASEAN partners. India, the geographic core of SAARC, does not find itself in such a vulnerable situation. In only one sense does South Asia approach the type of deterrence stalemate seen in ASEAN and that is not in transnational subversion but in the India–Pakistan nuclear relationship.

Besides security interdependencies, another difference reflects the fact that the past has been kinder to the ASEAN states. While Indonesia did wage war on the new Malaysian Federation, that confrontation did not last long, did not cost many lives, nor result in lost territories. The termination was carefully arranged and both sides were allowed to preserve their national honour. Compare this to the wars of South Asia in which hundreds of thousands died, lands were lost, and religion-based ideology divided a nation into rival states. In the case of ASEAN, the erstwhile enemies of *Konfrontasi* are not so divided and have found they can at times and at a general level bolster their relationship with socio-cultural commonalities. SAARC must, especially in the core India–Pakistan relationship, overcome the obstacle of negative past interactions.

The geographic structure of power is different in the two cases. As has been noted, both areas have a core state which shares security-significant borders with all other members: ASEAN's Malaysia and SAARC's India. Yet, in the case of SAARC, the core state separates other members from each other. Because the other members only share a border with the core state, the necessity for contact is lessened and the chances of any real interdependent security interests with other SAARC partners is unlikely. Consequently, involvement with the others will only be at the most general and very loose level of speculative regionalism, much as Thai–Philippine or Singapore–Philippine relations are within ASEAN. Furthermore, isolation of the smaller members allows the already most powerful state one more advantage in dealing with them.

A second structural difference is the geographic relationship between the dominant power and the second power. In ASEAN, Indonesia and Thailand are geographically separated by the core state while India and Pakistan are contiguous — if not overlapping — neighbours divided by the set of past negative interactions discussed above. Indonesia and Thailand do not face these obstacles

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to co-operation. Only in recent years, through ASEAN, have they developed regular contact and that has been in a positive milieu. For centuries they had inhabited the different spheres of archipelagic and mainland Southeast Asia, spheres which for the most part were politically exclusive. As a result of this heritage, neither state sees the other as a rival for an area which is important to its security or pride. A second dimension to the Indonesia–Thailand relationship, absent from the India–Pakistan case, is their common interest in the stability of the core area, Malaysia. Preventing that state's destabilization and the loss of a secure border area are motivations which bind both states in a joint partnership.

The size, capabilities, and policies of the core state have had an important impact in the ASEAN case. While Malaysia is smaller than several neighbours and vulnerable to externally-supported insurgency on all fronts, it is not so weak as to be a problematic power vacuum in the sub-region. Having weathered the communist Emergency, *Konfrontasi*, and subsequent domestic crises over thirty years and shown endurance, Malaysia is treated as a significant actor by its neighbours. Moreover, as vulnerability to insurgency is a mutual condition, Malaysia's co-operative policies have won it respect and gratitude. Consequently, diplomacy has been aided; the state's successes have given it self-confidence enough to apply a dash of deference (at least through the Hussein Onn government) in its foreign policy, a tactic which has assuaged the sensitivities of Indonesia. In sum, ASEAN interaction has been promoted by the structural advantage of a stable, responsible core state which has provided a secure, non-threatening buffer in whose well-being all partners, including the two leading local powers, share an interest.

Perhaps more important to understanding regional or international organization and co-operation is the influence of great-power alignment. SAARC's two major players are given indirect encouragement to continue competition by their great-power patrons. In ASEAN the two key partners, Indonesia and Malaysia, saw the costs and dangers, ended their confrontation and made peace in 1966, thus providing the foundation for the broader ASEAN accord in 1967. On the other hand, India and Pakistan have not yet come to a similar realization that their competition is foolish, futile, or too costly; external support lets both feel that they can still afford it. The importance of the great powers can be further illustrated by noting their ability to foster regional co-operation. In the ASEAN case, after 30 September 1965, all the member governments were non-communist and looked to the West for political, developmental, and military support. Happily and coincidentally, U.S. policy under President Nixon encouraged the development of regional organizations to help manage the post-colonial world. Thus, another factor supporting ASEAN co-operation was the encouragement of a great power to which all were commonly aligned.

SAARC members, on the other hand, are constrained by the divisive influence of the great powers much as opposing great-power alignments have kept the broader Southeast Asian region from accord and kept ASEAN from becoming a fully inclusive regional organization. Vietnam and Laos have not taken up the

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invitation to join ASEAN and have formed their own sub-regional grouping for collective policy-making. This unfinished ASEAN business in Southeast Asia parallels the other challenges faced by SAARC. Great-power alignments divide Vietnam not so much from ASEAN, but from Thailand. War continues in the northern sub-region because aid from great-power patrons allows both to afford it. Like South Asia, other factors are important also to explain the cleavage of suspicion and anxiety. Historical rivals for centuries through the Vietnam war, Thailand and Vietnam must resolve conflicting senses of destiny and security. Ideologically, not religiously, the two are separated by the communist–capitalist divide. Lastly, though a state separates the two, it has not been more than a geographic expression for most of the past centuries. Cambodia, unlike Malaysia, is not strong enough now, just as it was not prudent enough under Pol Pot, to play the role of buffer. Instead, it has become the prize to be fought over, the Kashmir of Southeast Asia. Until Thailand and Vietnam can find a way to re-create that buffer, Southeast Asian co-operation will be blocked by these suspicious, contiguous states playing the game of competitive subversive interference. Perhaps in order to achieve full regional participation ASEAN needs to look for lessons in SAARC's achievement of bringing India and Pakistan into a regular political process that includes the commitment to regular summits.

Returning to the chronology of the origins of ASEAN, it is important to restate that Indonesia and Malaysia came to accommodate first, then a broader regional organization followed. If, as the ASEAN example suggests, the consensus of the regional powers is a significant precondition then a true India–Pakistan accord will be necessary before SAARC can progress. SAARC, after all, is not an independent actor or new collective political animal which will be able to control regional powers. If it is to be like ASEAN, SAARC must be wanted by them as a diplomatic instrument, a forum for consultation, and a symbol of their consensus to reject competitive interference, the meaning and way to peace and stability.

ASEAN teaches the importance of rules of conduct to facilitate diplomacy, the necessity of political will to submerge differences; that the simplest, workable goal is intramural mutual accommodation; and that this goal of rejecting competitive interference will take much energy and constant attention. Achieving success in this area — what is called normal relations — will not be glamorous, or even noticed after a while, but is possible when leaders find the costs of competition too high.

SAARC members may be willing and desirous to follow this process but they must recognize that unlike the ASEAN members they are much more divided by religion-based ideology, historical legacies, the political and geographic structure of their regional system, and great-power politics, the last being the most formidable obstacle to their achieving regional co-operation. A final lesson from ASEAN, in its inability to find an accommodation with Vietnam and expand peace and stability to all Southeast Asia, confirms the strength of all these obstacles.

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The Role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Thailand: Some Preliminary Observations*

JOHN FUNSTON

International relations theorists have long debated the relative salience of international as against national and subnational influences on foreign policy. Few, however, deny that all are important. The following study belongs largely in the subnational category, though the place of the Foreign Ministry within the broader national foreign policy structure is also discussed, and some international influences noted.

The accumulated literature on foreign ministries in developing countries is not extensive, but the work of Boyce stands out.[1] This paper broadly follows his approach, except that the factors he considers have been divided into those which are essentially objective — organization, resources, size, educational profile, and experience — and those concerned with the ministry's *modus operandi* — internal liaison and control, intelligence gathering and analysis, the extent to which decision-making has become personalized, and the overall degree of politicization. In addition, it seeks to explain the ethos of the ministry by reference to the social background of members and the different groups within it. Finally, it considers the actual policy-making role played by the ministry.

Historical Background

The starting point for any analysis of the Thai foreign ministry must include reference to the centuries-old tradition of Thai participation in international politics. From the earliest major kingdom, Sukhothai in the thirteenth century, diplomatic relations have been conducted with neighbouring countries in Southeast Asia and China. In the early sixteenth century Europeans began visiting Thailand, and in 1608, Thailand despatched its first diplomatic mission to Europe.

During these years, foreign affairs was looked after by the Treasury, in particular by a subdivision dealing with ports. The ports department was given a separate identity on 14 April 1875, and this date is now officially observed as the birth of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). A further development occurred in 1882 when the first permanent overseas envoy was appointed, based in London and accredited to most of the Western European countries and the United States. Ten years later, in the major administrative reform of 1892, the ports department was renamed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Krasuang Garn Tang Prathet*) and assumed the normal functions of such a ministry.

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Foreign policy has frequently had a critical bearing on national fortunes. In the fourteenth century, the rise of Ayuthia was facilitated by the weakness of Mongol power in China, but the situation quickly changed as the Ming dynasty consolidated. "The Siamese kings seem to have been aware of this", notes Hall, "for they sent frequent embassies to Nanking, the Ming capital, and sedulously cultivated friendly relations. As diplomatists, the T'ais have never been surpassed".[2] Diplomacy, although not the only factor, also played a major role in enabling Thailand to maintain its independence during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in saving the country from occupation by Japan during World War II, and in avoiding harsh reparations meted out to those who sided with Japan after the war. Diplomatic skills have again been tested by the problems of adapting to post-1975 changes in Indochina, and there is considerable evidence that the challenges are being successfully met. Critics of Thai policy have claimed a willingness to simply capitulate to the stronger power, describing it as "bamboo diplomacy" because it bends with the prevailing wind, but whatever the merits of this argument, it cannot be denied that national interests have generally been well served.

This long tradition distinguishes the Thai Foreign Ministry from its counterparts in most developing countries. Its many notable diplomatic achievements have served to weld a self-confident *esprit d'corps*, and have enhanced its stature in the eyes of the Thai political élite.

Organization, Finance, Size, Education and Experience

The organization of the Foreign Ministry, set out in the Appendix, has undergone many changes over the years, but only three of significance over the last three decades. An important Policy and Planning Division was established in 1973. Four years later, as a result of a joint agreement by members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN National Secretariat Division under the Economic Department was dissolved and reconstituted as the ASEAN-Thailand Department. And in the early 1980s a Military-Political Coordinator was established, though for reasons of bureaucratic convenience this has never been given formal status.

The terminology used to describe the bureaucratic framework differs from that in other countries, but the familiar distinction between "territorial" and "functional" sections applies. If one accepts Boyce's claim that "most medium-sized Western foreign offices would need at least five territorial divisions",[3] then the MFA meets the appropriate requirements. With regard to functional sections, Boyce notes the difficulty in covering such areas as security, communications, research, policy planning, and international law, all of which were at least taken into account. (Some comments on how well these sections actually functioned follow below.) The main responsibility for foreign policy formulation, according to an official ministry publication, rests largely with the Political Department and the Policy and Planning Division.[4]

At the time of writing, a new approach to organization is being planned.[5]

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Its purpose is to try and find a satisfactory means of co-ordinating all aspects of bilateral relations — political, economic and other — a problem that afflicts foreign ministries throughout the world. The Political Department is to be reorganized, somewhat along the lines of the American State Department, into four major bureaux, namely: the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (incorporating Southeast Asia), Bureau of Middle East, South Asia and African Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, and Bureau of American Affairs. Staff currently in the Economic Department and perhaps other departments as well, whose focus is on bilateral relations, will be brought into these bureaux.

In the area of finance, the MFA in Thailand appears to be better placed than its counterparts in most other developing states. Expenditure on the Foreign Ministry in new Commonwealth states, according to Boyce, represents a significant outlay. Generally, in their first three years of operation, and in many cases thereafter, they account for "at least one per cent of total budget outlays, whereas recurrent spending . . . rarely reaches one per cent in the budgets of larger established states".[6] In the Thai case, the figure varied between approximately 0.8–0.9 per cent from the beginning to the mid-1960s, and 0.5–0.6 per cent over the following decade. Absolute expenditure rose nearly every year, but frequently failed to advance as quickly as the overall budget.[7] It is difficult to assess how adequate this was to carry out the functions required of a foreign ministry. But it is perhaps indicative that, though financial problems were frequently noted by MFA interlocutors, it was never raised as a major problem.

Similarly, the Thai MFA is considerably larger than its counterparts in most developing countries. In 1962 there were some 25 embassies and one legation abroad, accredited to 47 countries; by 1966 there were 30 embassies and one legation accredited to 55 countries; and by 1975 there were 39 embassies accredited to 56 countries, and permanent missions to the United Nations in New York and Geneva. Throughout this period there were also about one hundred "diplomatic" officers in Bangkok.[8] In 1983, the total number of officials, including support staff, was 1,048, of whom 56 per cent were based in Bangkok and 44 per cent at 46 embassies, 9 consulates and 3 offices abroad.[9] The latest figures put total staff at about 1,200, with 49 embassies accredited to 110 countries, missions to the United Nations at New York and Geneva, and 13 consulates.[10] This may be compared with Boyce's observation of 23 "new" Commonwealth states at a 1970 conference on diplomatic organization in Singapore, only 4 of which had foreign offices with more than 50 diplomatic staff.[11]

The MFA has generally attracted well-qualified candidates into its ranks. Apart from a brief period after World War II when there was a shortage of university graduates, a bachelor's degree has normally been the minimum entrance qualification. Until about a decade ago, the Ministry selected some personnel with secondary level education and sent them abroad — generally to Britain and the United States — to complete their secondary and university education. Of forty-six senior MFA officials included in a 1963 edition of *Who's Who*,[12] three had only secondary education, twenty-four had a bachelor's degree, nine a master's

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degree, and ten a doctoral degree. Twenty-four of these had some overseas education, including all who completed doctorates. While a degree is normally required for entry into most foreign ministries, such an educational profile compares favourably even with developed countries, particularly in terms of postgraduate education.

After joining the MFA, most officials have pursued a career in it. Other developing countries have found it difficult to retain experienced personnel, both because of greater bureaucratic opportunities outside the Foreign Ministry, and difficulties of working in such an area in politically unstable states. This has not happened in Thailand, largely because of the high prestige of the MFA *vis-à-vis* other government departments, and its relative isolation from political intervention. Thus, unlike most developing countries, Thailand has long had a large pool of experienced foreign policy practitioners from which it can draw.

Modus Operandi

The major problems inherent in analysing the workings of foreign ministries have been succinctly stated by T.B. Millar:[13]

> The role of a foreign office is never easy to determine, and books or articles on it are usually factual without being very informative... they do not tell us how it works, lives, palpitates; what alternatives to existing policy it puts up; which members are listened to and which are not; how reliable are its methods for collecting and assessing information; what are its continuing myths; what effect the office has on its minister and through him on the government... The problem usually is that only the serving officer really knows what is happening and he is forbidden from reporting it.

In spite of those difficulties, the following section attempts to provide some insights into the *modus operandi* of the MFA. It is useful to start by looking at the social background of the members.

The MFA is often considered to be "élitist".[14] Compared with other ministries, it has more than a proportionate number of aristocratic members, and a number of influential families — including Sucharitkul, Devakul, Kasemsri, Bunnag and Jayanama — have played a commanding role in the ministry over generations. This was not achieved by flouting normal public service requirements which included, *inter alia*, recruitment based on competitive examination. It was largely a natural process since the children or relatives of diplomats were likely to have acquired proficiency in such key areas as foreign languages. Members of these families characteristically received an overseas education to tertiary level, usually at Oxford or Cambridge, often obtaining doctorates in fields such as international relations or international law. They then quickly rose through the ranks to top positions in the ministry.

Numerically, most MFA members have not been from the aristocracy and did not receive an overseas education. They have generally, however, come from a privileged social background, attended prestigious private or government schools in

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Bangkok, then completed tertiary education at Thammasat University or abroad. A fairly comprehensive picture of the background of senior MFA officials in the 1960s can be gathered from the forty-six entries in the previously mentioned 1963 edition of *Who's Who*.[15] About two-thirds were born in Bangkok or the adjoining provinces. Thirty-four attended leading secondary schools in Bangkok, no less than twenty-eight at only three schools (Tepsirin, Suankularb and Assumption). Twenty-four attended Thammasat University, but only four went to Chulalongkorn University. Among the twenty-four foreign-educated, half went to France, eight to Britain, and two each to the United States, Japan, Germany and Switzerland. Some studied in more than one country. At least eighteen had served in other government departments before joining the MFA, a surprisingly high figure.

In more recent years some changes have occurred. The introduction of politics courses at Chulalongkorn University in the 1950s led to an increased intake by this university, although Thammasat has retained its dominance. Britain and the United States have become more important than France as venues for an overseas education. Finally, recruitment from other branches of the bureaucracy has become less common. Nonetheless, the broad picture described for the 1960s remains accurate up to the present.

Such privileged backgrounds, together with generous salaries and allowances, and the high prestige associated with a position in the MFA, naturally inclined most members to a rather conservative, anti-communist world-view. During the 1960s, some officials became uneasy about the nature of the U.S. relationship, but none questioned the general thrust of Thailand's then strongly anti-communist foreign policy. They also tended, at this time, to be Western-centric. The most prestigious postings were in the United States or Europe. Most, moreover, saw their role in purely passive terms, that is, to implement policies rather than play any part in devising them.

The Ministry changed in the 1970s as a younger generation, influenced by the increasingly unfavourable trend in Indochina conflicts, and perhaps also by the entry of those educated in Western universities during the radical 1960s, reached senior positions. Officials began to favour a less confrontational approach to neighbouring communist countries, and a less fulsome approach to the U.S. alliance. A concerted attempt was made to elevate the prestige of Southeast Asian posts. And, as discussed below, members of the Ministry increasingly sought ways to influence the formulation of policy. The changes were, of course, greatly aided by the three-year "democratic interlude" from October 1973, but had commenced before then. Partly submerged under authoritarian governments in the second half of the 1970s, they have again been evident since the beginning of the 1980s.

Broad social similarities notwithstanding, there have been, and remain, important divisions within the MFA. The largest faction is the Thammasat group, which for a long time was closely followed by the "Free Thai" group. Many members, including Thanat Khoman, supported the "Free Thai" during World War II, and in 1946–47 some 10–15 Free Thai supporters from the Justice Ministry were transferred to the MFA to ease a critical personnel shortage. Most of them, however,

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had retired by the 1970s. Factions also congregated during the terms of the two long-serving foreign ministers in the 1950s and 1960s, Prince Wan and Dr Thanat. Possibly the most cohesive group, however, has been the "Oxbridge" graduates group drawn from the Ministry's leading families.

There is no evidence that these divisions were so sharply demarcated as to have a significant adverse effect on the Ministry's functioning. People with expertise and ability generally have managed to get to the top. Dr Thanat, during his long tenure, personally sought to promote those of ability, partly through his appointment of personal secretaries,[16] and partly through his general influence over the Ministry. In the 1970s the MFA was affected by changes in the entire bureaucracy, whereby an earlier reverence for seniority was modified and highly qualified technocrats in their thirties and forties advanced to the top positions.

There have been, of course, shortcomings in MFA operations. Dr Thanat's prodigious energies seem often to have precluded the participation of others, particularly on the policy formulation side. On occasion, even his Permanent Secretary was not informed in advance of important policy changes. During Thanat's time, Foreign Ministry members reported a strong preference for serving overseas rather than in Bangkok, where sometimes an atmosphere bordering on fear prevailed. It must be acknowledged, however, that a preference for serving overseas is probably universal among the world's foreign ministries. There have also been problems in areas identified by various writers as particularly difficult for foreign ministries in developing countries: ensuring effective liaison between the home ministry and diplomatic missions abroad, and research and intelligence gathering and processing.[17]

Foreign ministry interlocutors have frequently commented on difficulties, when serving abroad, of maintaining adequate communication with the Bangkok office. This may in part have been due to three problems noted by Boyce, namely, technical communications problems, junior officers in the home department, and political appointees who refused to report directly and regularly to the foreign office.[18] Indeed, *Ambassador's Diary*, a 1,000-page collection of reports sent to the Prime Minister by Bunchana Attakorn while he was Ambassador to the United States in the late 1960s, illustrates this last point. The principal message of the collection, however, is that on several bilateral issues Foreign Minister Thanat asked the Americans not to deal with Bunchana, and did not brief Bunchana on his dealings with the United States. While this might partly be explained by personal rivalry between Thanat and Bunchana, it seems also a further reflection of Thanat's inclination to run the MFA essentially on his own.

On research and intelligence gathering and processing matters, the MFA has long had many skilled diplomats reporting on developments in the countries they were posted to, and a capability to process such reports into policy recommendations.[20] They have not, however, generally had the resources to collect and analyse detailed information on military and political developments in neighbouring communist countries, an area that has been left to the Thai military and intelligence organizations, such as the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), and

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their American counterparts.[21] Given the continuous turmoil in the neighbouring Indochinese countries since World War II, and poor relations between the MFA and the military most of this time, this has been an important limiting factor. But it has become less important in the 1980s as a result of a more co-operative relationship between the MFA, the military and the NIA.

A final noteworthy feature of the internal dynamics of the Ministry is that it has generally controlled its destiny with relatively little pressure from outside. Ambassadors were rarely political appointees, except, until recently, to Washington, and, until the 1970s, to military-led governments, such as Taiwan, South Korea, and the former Republic of Vietnam. If political appointees wished to stay beyond the expiry of their first appointment, which happened only rarely, they were integrated into the Ministry. No political appointments were made in the three years after October 1973, and there have only been a handful since.

There have been few instances of outside intervention in any other form, the major exception occurring after October 1976 when military leaders intervened to suspend three senior officers. All were subsequently reinstated, though Anand Panyarachun, a former Permanent Secretary, resigned shortly thereafter, becoming probably the only MFA official to resign because of external political interference. Indeed, with only a few exceptions, most recent foreign ministers, until Air Chief Marshal Siddhi Savetsila in 1980, were drawn from MFA ranks.

MFA Policy-Making Role

It is an accepted characteristic of states influenced by the Westminster system, as Thailand has been to a considerable extent, that foreign policy is handled largely by the executive. The primary means by which the MFA might be expected to assert its influence, according to these conventions, would be through the Cabinet.

There is evidence that successive Thai governments have taken the Cabinet's foreign policy role seriously. In the 1960s and 1970s, for instance, key issues relating to Thai-U.S. relations, the security situation in Indochina, and Thai aid for the Republic of Vietnam, all came before it.[22] More recently, the Cabinet endorsed the important decision to establish a War Reserve Stockpile in Thailand.[23] It is nonetheless clear that the approach to the Cabinet was to inform rather than to consult, or to seek its endorsement as a means of gaining more general support. In most cases the Cabinet learnt of policy changes well after these had taken place.[24] This, indeed, was scarcely surprising: the Cabinet is a large, unwieldy body including deputy ministers as well as ministers, and works as a consensus institution whereby members defer to issues brought forward by colleagues so that they in turn will not face opposition when advancing their own proposals.

In the absence of the Cabinet having an effective policy role, the amount of policy influence exercised by the MFA has depended largely on its relationship with the Prime Minister and the military. The Prime Minister occupies a powerful, supra-legal position in the Thai political arena. It has long been accepted, though

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it seems now to be coming under question, that he has a discretionary decision-making power which does not require endorsement through the normal channels. In addition, within his department is the National Security Council (NSC), the highest advisory body on security issues, and the NIA, the top intelligence organization, both of which have responsibilities for international as well as domestic issues.

The influence of the military on foreign policy is derived in part from the position of the Prime Minister, as this office has generally been occupied by an active or recently retired officer, and through its dominant voice in the NSC, and until recently the NIA.[25] Three additional factors have reinforced the military's importance. Firstly, in the 1960s and 1970s it was able to conclude important military agreements on its own, such as those allowing the stationing of U.S. planes and troops in Thailand. Secondly, it has long been committed to a doctrine of forward defence, involving various covert efforts to strengthen sympathetic neighbouring governments, weaken unsympathetic ones, or establish relations with prospective alternative governments. In the case of Laos, for instance, up to 20,000 Thai troops were involved in an ultimately futile attempt to prevent victory by the communist Pathet Lao. Formal endorsement for such actions seems not to have been sought, at least until recently.[26] Finally, and more generally, the military itself strongly believes — and has had some support in wider circles — that foreign policy should be viewed essentially as a security issue. Senior military officials have thus followed international events closely, and used both formal and informal avenues to influence policy.

Until the student-led overthrow of General Thanom's government in October 1973, successive military-led governments ensured the dominance of military influence on foreign policy making. As already indicated, MFA officials did not generally disagree with the policies adopted, and indeed Foreign Minister Thanat was an effective and often outspoken defender of his staff. But they were irked by exclusion from the decision-making circle. Thanat's impatience was expressed by several threats to resign, and two attempts to secure a position on the bench of the International Court.[27] However, in areas that were not of major interest to the leading military figures — such as Europe and the ASEAN members — the MFA had a free hand. The promotion of regionalism in Southeast Asia, particularly through ASA and ASEAN, and Thailand's mediating role over Indonesian "confrontation" of Malaysia, were important initiatives crafted by Thanat.

After October 1973 the military was forced to withdraw substantially from the political field, its influence through the NSC was reduced,[28] and the MFA was the organization the new political leaders turned to for advice on foreign policy. The impact of this change was perhaps blunted during the interim Sanya period by this government's commitment to holding over major decisions for its elected successor. Nonetheless, the move towards a more independent, less anti-communist foreign policy, which had been advocated in an MFA submission to the Cabinet in late 1972,[29] had begun.

After the Kukrit government came to power in 1975, the MFA came to play an even more important role. Foreign Minister Chatichai, a member of the

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Ministry from 1960 and a Deputy Foreign Minister under Thanom, was both a polished diplomat and a powerful figure in Thai élite politics in his own right. Not personally oriented towards policy matters, he had a close rapport with members of the Ministry and effectively gained approval for the advice they presented him. Fortunately, MFA views were substantially in accord with those of Prime Minister Kukrit, who was also anxious to play a major foreign policy role.

Another important development during this period was the appointment of Anand Panyarachun as Permanent Secretary of the Ministry, following his recall from the United Sates in the wake of the Mayaguez affair. For perhaps the first time the position of Under-Secretary was held by a highly able official who was an activist by temperament. This both helped consolidate the dominant role of the MFA in foreign policy-making, and prompted a strong negative reaction from the military. As already noted, Anand was one of those suspended from the Ministry by military leaders after the October 1976 coup.

The situation did not change markedly after the Seni government came to power in May 1976. Bhichai Rattakul was the first Foreign Minister to come from a non-MFA/military/bureaucratic background, but quickly established a relationship of mutual respect with senior advisers in the Ministry. He had a deep interest in policy matters, and played an active role in this area. Like his predecessor, he was a man of considerable influence in Thai élite circles, which in turn accrued to the MFA. Bhichai's position was enhanced by Prime Minister Seni's willingness to delegate problems in this area to him. However, Bhichai's role, and the short interlude of MFA dominance in the foreign policy field, came to an abrupt end with the military coup on 6 October 1976.

Following the coup, morale in the MFA dropped to perhaps its lowest point ever. This was particularly so in the initial weeks, before the reinstatement of the three suspended senior officials. In addition, many in the Ministry had shared the excitement of the "democratic interlude", and found it difficult to represent the right-wing Thanin administration with equal enthusiasm. The new policy of confrontation towards Indochina and all communist countries — a reflection of the view of the Prime Minister and some of his military backers — went against the policy of moderation and caution which the Ministry had successfully pursued over the preceding three years. Foreign Minister Upadit Pachariyangun was recruited from the Ministry, but was generally viewed as a loner by his colleagues. He had an important, and perhaps eventually moderating influence on policy implementation, but there are no indications that he sought a policy role for himself or the Ministry as a whole.

When General Kriangsak Chomanan seized power a year later, Upadit was retained, but the Prime Minister increasingly acted as his own Foreign Minister, both formulating policies and implementing them. The policies were very similar to those followed before Thanin, but not because of any major input from the Foreign Ministry. Rather, Kriangsak seems to have been guided primarily by his own quite extensive background in international affairs, and by a small group of military advisers, particularly in the Supreme Command.

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The real change for the Foreign Ministry came with the first government headed by General Prem Tinsulanond, in April 1980, and the appointment of ACM Siddhi Savetsila as Foreign Minister. Recently retired from a military career in international relations intelligence, and as Secretary-General of the NSC from 1975, Siddhi combined a strong understanding of foreign affairs with excellent military links and a desire to enhance the role of the MFA. He also had the complete trust of Prime Minister Prem, with whom he had attended school, and was given a free hand. Ministry officials welcomed the change and improved morale quickly became evident by the more forceful manner in which Thai interests were defended. Foreign policy — particularly that relating to the conflict in Cambodia — was brought out of the "twilight zone",[30] and repeatedly defended before journalists, scholars, and the general public.[31] Thanat, when he was Foreign Minister, had at times engaged in similar activities, but there was no precedent for the active involvement of senior and middle-ranking officers in such events. No dramatic changes of policy were introduced, though internationally, Thailand sought to project its influence to a larger audience — reflected in an expansion of diplomatic relations with smaller Third World countries and its successful election to the United Nations Security Council at the end of 1984 — and attempts were made to modify diplomacy to give a new focus to economic issues.

But Siddhi's most notable contribution was to largely end the rivalry and separation of the military and the MFA. His own dual allegiance to the military and civilian camps,[32] and concern that unco-ordinated statements by both sides would put Thailand at a public relations disadvantage *vis-à-vis* Vietnam, were the main motivating factors. One of the first important steps was the appointment, in the early 1980s, of Major General Charan Kullavanijaya — brother of the well-known General Pichit Kullavanijaya — as Military-Political Co-ordinator. General Charan, who works in the Foreign Ministry, reports directly to Siddhi, and accompanies Siddhi on virtually all his travels, has proven adept at liaising between the two sides. *Ad hoc* committees involving senior MFA, military and NIA officials have also been set up occasionally, such as at the time of the military conflict between Thailand and Laos over the sovereignty of three border villages in 1984. More recently, high-level weekly meetings have been instituted between the MFA, the Army, the NSC and the NIA,[33] and lower level meetings have become even more frequent.

Co-ordination has at times been less than perfect, even when consultation has taken place. In the three villages' dispute with Laos, for example, then Army Commander-in-Chief General Arthit and the NSC made the initial running, with senior officials also involved,[34] but the return of Siddhi from overseas soon led to a more conciliatory approach, and eventual reversal of earlier pledges to garrison troops in the villages to construct a road through the area. More recently, Siddhi was reported to have ordered the revocation of restrictions imposed by the NSC on internal travel of diplomats from ten socialist and Muslim countries, some two weeks after these came into effect.[35] But differences such as these have become the exception rather than the norm, and in each case an apparently amicable

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solution has been reached. The military appears to have accepted that the new arrangements do not disadvantage it, notwithstanding its less conspicuous role, and encroachments on its powers by the reorganization of the NSC in the 1970s and the recent "civilianization" of the NIA.

Conclusion

The Thai Foreign Ministry, largely by virtue of its long tradition, high prestige, and relative affluence, has not faced the same problems in areas such as size and quality of personnel, and financial support, as most of its counterparts in developing countries. Other problems in such states, including difficulties associated with internal liaison and control, intelligence gathering and analysis, personalized decision-making and politicization, were present from time to time, but not usually to an extent that was severely disabling.

Nonetheless, the MFA played no major role in policy formulation until the early 1970s because of military domination of this field. Ministry officials were prepared to accept this because of their basically conservative outlook, reflecting well-to-do backgrounds, and perception of their role as involving policy implementation rather than formulation. By the early 1970s a more activist, less cold war group had emerged. It played a dominant role in policy formulation during the "democratic interlude", but after this was largely by-passed till the end of the decade.

In the 1980s MFA influence on policy formulation again became important. This was in part due to the decline or the "civilianization" of the NSC and NIA, but more importantly it reflected the efforts of Foreign Minister Siddhi to develop a co-operative relationship between the military and the MFA. A unique stage in Thai foreign policy has thus been reached, where MFA influence on policy is not simply in inverse proportion to the amount of influence exercised by the military. The extent to which this will survive the eventual exit of Siddhi remains to be seen, but it is unlikely that the habits of consultation and the network of links that have been built up since 1980, and have served both sides so well, would be totally disbanded in favour of a return to the earlier unproductive stand-off.

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APPENDIX

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thailand

MINISTER

Office of the Secretary to the Minister

Military-Political Co-ordinator*

DEPUTY MINISTER

OFFICE OF THE PERMANENT SECRETARY

Legalization

Personnel and Training Division

Supplies and Maintenance Division

Policy and Planning Division

Computer Centre

Institute of Foreign Affairs

Foreign Service Section

General Affairs Division

Office for the Protection of Thai Nationals Abroad

Finance Division

Archives and Library Division

Passport Division

Radio and Telegraph Division

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Europe Division

East Asia Division

South and West Asia Division

Africa and Arab World Division

Office of the Secretary

Americas Division

Southeast Asia Division

DEPARTMENT OF PROTOCOL

Protocol Division

Diplomatic Privileges Division

Office of the Secretary

Reception Division

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* This position does not have formal bureaucratic approval.

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DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

Economic Information Division
Office of the Secretary
Economic Relations and Co-operation Division
International Economics Division

DEPARTMENT OF TREATIES AND LEGAL AFFAIRS

Legal Division
Office of the Secretary
Translation Division
Treaty Division
National Boundaries Section

DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION

News Division
Office of the Secretary
Press Division
Public and Cultural Affairs Division
Broadcasting Division

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DEPARTMENT

International Conferences Division
Office of the Secretary
Social Affairs Division
Political Division
International Development Affairs Division

DEPARTMENT OF ASEAN AFFAIRS

Commerce and Industry Division
Office of the Secretary
Communications, Science and Technology Division
Economic and Financial Policy Division
Society, Culture and Information Division

SOURCE: Thai Government Organisational Directory, 1986.

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

* This is a slightly revised version of a paper presented to the International Conference on Thai Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, 3–6 July 1987.

1. P.J. Boyce, *Foreign Affairs for New States: Some Questions of Credentials* (University of Queensland Press, 1977). Although the focus of this book is on new states, as the title suggests, much of the writing directly addresses or may be taken as relevant to developing states.
2. D.G.E. Hall, *A History of South-East Asia*, 2nd edition (New York: Macmillan, 1966), pp. 165–66.
3. Boyce, op. cit., p. 83.
4. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *The Ministry of Foreign Affairs* (Bangkok, 1975), pp. 8–11.
5. *Nation*, 27 January 1987.
6. Boyce, op. cit., p. 135.
7. The figures are taken from *Statistical Yearbook* produced annually in Bangkok by the National Statistical Office, Office of the Prime Minister.
8. Taken from the section on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the *Siam Directory* (published annually in Bangkok) for 1962, 1966 and 1974–75. There is, however, no formal distinction between diplomatic and non-diplomatic personnel in the Ministry.
9. *Nation Review*, 16 February 1983.
10. The figure 1,200 is mentioned in *Nation*, 27 January 1987, and other data are taken from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Directory*, March 1987. In addition, there were 77 consulates staffed by "honorary" representatives.
11. Boyce, op. cit., p. 81.
12. Khana Rathaphrasasanasart Mahawitthayalai Thammasart, *Krai Pen Krai Nai Prathet Thai 2506* (Bangkok, 1963).
13. T.B. Millar, *Foreign Policy: Some Australian Reflections* (Melbourne: Georgian House, 1972), p. 62.
14. *Nation Review*, 16 February 1963.
15. Khana Rathaphrasasanasart Mahawitthayalai Thammasart, op. cit. There are other biographical sources on senior MFA officials, but these are scattered and cover a small number only.
16. The three personal secretaries appointed by Dr Thanat were Anand Panyarachun, Sompong Sucharitkul, and M.L. Birabhongse Kasemsri, all very junior members at the time who subsequently went on to the highest positions in the Ministry. All, interestingly, were "Oxbridge" educated: Anand at Trinity College, Cambridge; Sompong at Worcester College, Oxford; and Birabhongse at Christchurch, Oxford.
17. Boyce, op. cit., pp. 88–92, and 126–34.
18. Ibid., p. 88.
19. Bunchana Attakorn, *Buntheuk Khong Tut Thai* (Bangkok, 1971).
20. Articles in *Saranrom*, an annual publication of the MFA social club, are an interesting reflection of the international understanding and analytical skills possessed by MFA officials. Recent public addresses by officials (see note 31) are also revealing.
21. The importance of U.S. military and intelligence advice is strongly emphasized in Khien Theeravit, "Kor Sanget Khiawkup Nayobai Tang Prathet Khong Thai", *Sangkhomsat Parithat* 13, No. 1 (January–March 1975).
22. See reports of Cabinet meetings in *Khao Prachasamphan*, June and September 1964, and February and May 1966.
23. *Nation*, 13 April 1986.
24. On one important issue, the question of whether the Cabinet became involved at all remains controversial. Foreign Minister Thanat has claimed that the decision to allow U.S. bases in Thailand for prosecuting the Vietnam war was made without reference to the Cabinet, and he only learnt of it months later from U.S. media reports. ("Phana Taharn Tang Dao Nai Prathet Lae Nayobai Tang Prathet Khong Thai", *Sangkhomsat Parithat* 10, No. 7 [July 1972], p. 30, and *Bangkok Post*, 10 May 1973.) Other contemporary members of the Cabinet, including then Prime Minister Thanom, maintain that the Cabinet was informed at the time the decision was taken.

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25. The NIA was established in late 1985, as part of a move to upgrade the former Department of Central Intelligence (DCI). The DCI, until the 1980s, was led by, and drew a large number of its senior officials from, military officers. The NIA, however, is a civilian organization. *Nation Review*, 4 September 1985.
26. This is somewhat speculative, but is based on the very firm impression gained from interviewing several ex-Cabinet members, that most were genuinely unaware of the details of such covert activities. The closer working relationship between the military and the MFA during the 1980s may have led to changes.
27. In June 1964, Dr Thanat told press representatives that he had already tendered his resignation three times (*Siam Rath*, 2 July 1964, and *Siam Rath Weekly Review*, 9 July 1964). In October 1966 he again told a reporter he would like to resign (*Bangkok World*, 2 October 1966).
28. Membership of the NSC was expanded from nine (seven ministers, the Supreme Commander and the Secretary-General of the NSC) to a somewhat unwieldy size of more than twenty. Some of the new members were drawn from the NSC secretariat — composed largely of young, well-educated, liberal civilians — which began to exercise greater influence in the 1970s. Foreign ministers during the "democratic interlude" did not experience difficulties gaining NSC endorsement for their policies. The NSC remains important — Foreign Minister Siddhi described it as probably the most important forum for deliberations on foreign policy in 1983 (*Nation Review*, 16 February 1983) — but it does not have the dominant role it had in the days of Prime Minister Thanom, and it has become less a tool of the military. It is illustrative that when Squadron Leader Prasong Soonsiri retired as Secretary-General in August 1986, he was replaced by a civilian.
29. The document was mentioned by a senior Foreign Ministry official during a discussion in 1976.
30. A term used by Foreign Minister Siddhi. *Nation Review*, 18 January 1985.
31. See, for instance, the report of an MFA meeting with academics, journalists and others, on the operation of the Foreign Ministry and Thai foreign policy, reported in *Nation Review*, 16 February 1983; and MFA defence of the policy on Cambodia at a seminar held at Chulalongkorn University in April 1985, reproduced in the booklet *Thailand's Policy Towards the Vietnam–Kampuchea Conflict*, Asian Studies Monographs No. 032 (Chulalongkorn University, 1985).
32. After spending most of his life in the military, Siddhi's civilian credentials have been dominated by his successful participation in elections in 1983 and 1986, and promotion to the leadership of the Social Action Party, one of the largest parties, in late 1985.
33. There is a reference to such meetings in *Bangkok Post*, 21 February 1987.
34. *Nation Review*, 30–31 May, and 19 June 1984.
35. *Nation*, 17 August 1986.

John Funston is with Universiti Brunei Darussalam.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Readings in Malaysian Politics. Edited by Bruce Gale. Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 1986. 304 pp. Soft-cover.

Bruce Gale must be commended for his initiative in editing *Readings in Malaysian Politics*, which is a collection of articles dealing with the contemporary Malaysian scene. The book is basically intended for a wider audience beyond the usual academic clientele with a view to helping them refine their understanding of recent political developments.

It carries a very brief Preface by the editor and is divided into four unequal sections, namely, Electioneering, Islam, Ethnicity and Development, and Foreign Policy. Twelve of the thirteen papers included in this volume have actually been published before in reputable journals such as *Asian Survey*, *Man*, *Pacific Affairs*, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, *Ethnic and Racial Studies* and *Modern Asian Studies*. The thirteenth paper, by Chandra Muzaffar on "Islamic Resurgence: A Global View (with Illustrations from Southeast Asia)", is a reprint from *Islam and Society in Southeast Asia*, edited by Taufik Abdullah and Sharon Siddique, and published by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, in 1985. By virtue of this fact alone, the quality of each of the articles presented in this volume can be expected to be high and it certainly is. In their own right too, all the contributors to this volume, without exception, are established scholars who have more than an intimate knowledge of their respective fields of interest. Nonetheless, in a volume of this nature which attempts to cover such a wide range of topics, it is inevitable that some of the papers tend to stand out above others, not only because of their perceptivity and lucidity but also because of their direct relevance to the main focus of the book.

Diane K. Mauzy's paper on "The 1982 General Elections in Malaysia" and the other one on "The Mahathir Administration: Discipline Through Islam", which she co-authored with R.S. Milne, fall into this category of highly authoritative, well-balanced and pleasantly readable papers. With the advantage of hindsight, with the 1986 general elections having been held since she wrote the first paper, it could now be seen how perceptive and accurate she had been in her analysis, particularly in suggesting that unless the National Front non-Malay parties were able to impress their supporters with tangible concessions, "there could be substantial non-Malay voter backlash at the next general elections". The evaluation of Mahathir's administration in the second paper, although by no means exhaustive, is simply brilliant. The subtitling of the paper, however, seems a little inappropriate considering that the Islamic content of the analysis constitute only a third of the article. The last-minute attempt made almost at the tail-end to rationalize that Mahathir's call for discipline and hard work as exemplified in the "Look East Policy" and support for the institutionalization of the teachings of Islam are part of the integrated approach in the direction of "Discipline Through Islam", somehow does not seem convincing.

Bruce Gale's examination of the 1981 and 1982 election campaigns in Sabah introduces us to the hitherto relatively little-known dimensions of politics from the periphery. In view of the more recent political developments in that state, some of the conclusions

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drawn here may now have to be modified, although the paper could still serve as a useful introduction to current Sabah politics.

Marvin L. Roger's first contribution on the "Electoral Organization and Political Mobilization in Rural Malaysia", gives a concise account of the campaign organization, strategies and tactics of the Barisan Nasional, Parti Islam and the Democratic Action Party in rural Malacca and Johor, in the 1978 general elections, with conclusions, however, which may seem obvious even to the non-specialist. His second paper, which assesses the patterns of change in Sungai Raya, a rural Malay community in northwestern Johor, is a much more solid contribution with penetrating conclusions. Likewise, the second paper by Shamsul A.B. on "The Politics of Poverty Eradication: The Implementation of Development Projects in a Malaysian District" is a fine work of sound scholarship providing us with invaluable insights on the dynamics of local politics in Malaysia, much more than his first, "A Revival in the Study of Islam in Malaysia", which is basically discussive. Notwithstanding this, some of his criticisms on the superficiality of Judith Nagata's treatment of the phenomenon of Islamic revival in Malaysia, which is also included in this volume, are not without good grounds. Judith Nagata's urban-rural dichotomy in talking about the *dakwah* movement is particularly suspect. Her rejoinder on "Islam in Malaysia", which tacitly acknowledges some of the limitations of her first paper, if anything, only serves to suspend the debate. Readers will have to look up her other works in order to fully appreciate her analysis of Islam and politics in Malaysia.

One sometimes wonders if great care has really been taken in the selection of papers to be included in this volume. Some of those selected, like Chandra Muzaffar's, and the debate between Shamsul A.B. and Judith Nagata, although interesting in their own way, do not seem to fit into the Malaysian politics bill easily. Lee Poh Ping's analysis of Malaysian foreign policy too, although concise, seems slightly out of step with the other papers which deal primarily and specifically with Malaysian politics. The same goes for the remaining two papers, but their problem is of a slightly different kind; there seems to be an overdose of concepts and jargon, which surely would not appeal to general readers.

It is also a pity that the Preface has not been cleverly used to tie up all the papers presented in this volume into something which would have a clearer focus and a more direct relevance to the topic of the book. A longer Introduction, rather than a brief Preface, would have considerably enhanced the quality and appeal of the book. With a little more work too, some of the minor inconsistencies in the use of terms such as "paper" and "article" could have been avoided. All said, this is still a handy copy for the specialist and the general reader.

Omar Farouk
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Industrialization and Labour Force Processes: A Case Study of Peninsular Malaysia. By T.G. McGee et al. Research Papers on Development in East Java and West Malaysia No. 1. Canberra: Australian National University, 1986.

This volume on manufacturing, labour and urbanization in Malaysia is billed as a set of "working papers", which should not be taken too seriously as the contributions by Australian

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and Malaysian scholars here are more developed than that implies, and more coherent than many edited volumes. The six chapters explore themes of the international context of industrialization, the effects on urbanization and urban-rural exchanges in particular localities (largely Penang and the Kelang Valley), and on the labour force. This is done through a variety of approaches ranging from historical studies to firm-level surveys.

A number of points are of some importance to the current context of planned industrial change in Malaysia. Linge's emphasis on the complexity and uncertainty in the contemporary international context should give pause to framers of the Industrial Master Plan, while McGee's study shows that the semiconductor industry has rapidly absorbed Malays into the urban labour force, contributing to New Economic Policy goals in the context of labour creation dominated by the state and foreign firms. A central dilemma of recent industrialization emerges, in that it has offered advantages in terms of employment (for example, in Warr's examination of industrial enclaves), but produced a fragile and more externally dependent environment for labour (Missen), local firms, and the state and national governments (Kamal Salih and Mei Ling Young on Penang, Chi Seck Choo and Michael Taylor on the Kelang Valley).

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Cory: Profile of a President. By Isabelo T. Crisostomo. Petaling Jaya, Selangor, Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications, 1987. 323 pp.

Writing about the central personality in a revolution, when the values and consciousness of people are changing rapidly, is difficult. Writing history only days or months after events have happened, when the writer is both a close observer and participant of the events, is risky. However, writing about a woman president, popular around the world, of whom admiration and interest are still poured by the media, does have its rewards. In writing this book, the author has thus ventured in the difficult, the risky, and the rewarding.

The reaction to the book would depend on the reader. From the way the book has been written, it seems that the author is trying to address many kinds of readers.

Readers from outside the Philippines, intrigued by the circumstances surrounding the installation of President Corazon Aquino, would most likely find the book a rich source of information and insights hitherto unavailable in their countries. Undoubtedly, the book will contribute to the deepening of whatever appreciation and admiration the buyer of the book already has of the Filipino leader. It will give the outsider, who rarely reads about the Philippines, an opportunity to know and perhaps understand the nation she leads — its political processes, its élites, its predicament.

Academic researchers will have mixed feelings about the book. They will find the footnoting helpful. However, the author slides back and forth between narrative and interpretation. Scholars who are by habit expecting explicit separation between description and analysis, or between description and interpretation, will be disappointed. And yet, had

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the author decided to adopt an academic format, his work would have lost its literary appeal, which it has. There are passages such as:

> The President of the Philippines [Marcos] for the past twenty years must have taken a last lingering look at the Palace, its surroundings, its majesty and sedate splendor, for after all their separation would in most likelihood be final. He could only have experienced a heaviness of heart for it must have dawned upon him at last that the days of power and glory were over.

Without those passages, the book would have been an undramatic narration of very dramatic events. But to the historian and social scientist, they are not even valid descriptions of speech and action. They are verging towards mental construction, that is, towards pure imagination of the author.

The book, therefore, has definite utility as a historical source material, but the researcher must exert extra effort to screen fact from interpretation, and valid from invalid interpretation. For precisely the same reason, a reader with a literary eye would not be fully satisfied. To him, there may be too much of factual details, punctuated by refreshing insights and enthralling painting of events. If the author was aiming at both types of readers, he would probably not fully please both. But perhaps, he may not have been aiming primarily at these types of readers. The wide readership in and outside the Philippines may be his target, in which case the author will probably succeed.

A final note must be made. The world has yet to see almost six years of President Aquino's term in office. We have not seen all there is to know about this woman leader. Besides, the national events that swept her to the presidency are far from over. She will do more things; many things could still happen. In the mind of ex-President Marcos waiting in Hawaii, for as long as he is still alive, the game may not yet be over. To him, "the last days of power and glory" may not yet be, borrowing from the author's words. This is the risk the author takes: describing the forest when you are still too close to the trees, and to the changes still unfolding.

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The Search for a Negotiated Settlement of the Vietnam War. By Allan E. Goodman. Indochina Research Monograph No. 2. University of California, Berkeley, 1986.

This monograph is not likely to advance our understanding of the American role in Indochina very much — which is surprising since it is one of the first two studies in a new monograph series published by the serious-minded Indochina Studies Project at the University of California at Berkeley.

Allan Goodman's monograph is an abridgement of his 1978 study, *The Lost Peace*, published by the Hoover Institution. His analysis is based on interviews done in 1974–75 with more than seventy-five people ("virtually all of the U.S. and South Vietnamese officials who participated in the Vietnam negotiations") as well as the usual documentary research. The strength of the study comes from the interviews. Goodman details differences

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between Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, illuminates American and South Vietnamese negotiating tactics, and describes the competition for influence in the White House among Kissinger and H.R. Haldeman and John Erlichman, Nixon's chief-of-staff and top domestic advisor, respectively.

This is a running commentary, chronologically organized, on the American view of the negotiating process, but it fails to treat systematically at least three key dimensions of the U.S. Indochina role that inevitably affected those negotiations: the changing military situation in Vietnam; the impact of the war on U.S. domestic politics, most particularly the presidential election campaigns of 1968 and 1972; and the international politics of Washington's effort to involve the Soviet Union and China in the search for a negotiated conclusion to the American intervention. Moreover, in this abridged version of his earlier study, Goodman does not draw upon nor evaluate the more influential recent studies of the Vietnam War, such as the books by George McT. Kahin, Gabriel Kolko, and R.B. Smith.[1]

Goodman, associate dean of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, comments on highlights in the progress of the war, but he does not analyse in any consistent way the obviously important relationship between the success of military operations in the field and the negotiating positions of the two sides. Both sides were engaged in a strategy of talking and fighting at the same time, and the success or failure of their troops in the field inevitably shaped their positions at the negotiating table.

The anti-war movement at home also influenced the positions of American negotiators, especially in the years of presidential elections. Goodman barely mentions the campaigns of 1968 and 1972 or the way in which Vietnam became an issue in U.S. domestic politics. When Richard Nixon was elected President in 1968, amidst disruptions by protestors of the nominating conventions and violent confrontations in the streets, it was clear that to be re-elected in 1972, he would have to make substantial progress in resolving the U.S. role in Indochina. This domestic political dimension of the search for a negotiated settlement is also omitted from Goodman's interpretation.

At best, Goodman's study presents only one side of the story. There is no serious examination of the available Vietnamese sources nor any attempt made to identify systematically Hanoi's perception of the negotiating process. Moreover, the international politics of the final settlement is not treated. For example, there is no assessment made of the significance of Nixon's opening to China for achieving a negotiated withdrawal of U.S. forces from Indochina nor of the part that China played. Goodman does not even mention the historic Nixon visit to China in 1972, made at a critical point in the Vietnam negotiations, much less identify the key ways in which the Nixon-Kissinger strategic innovations in U.S. foreign policy linked the opening to China with the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. This is especially surprising since he cites, for example, the work of Tad Szulc and Stanley Karnow, both of whom thoughtfully treated the China dimension of the search for a negotiated settlement in Indochina.

In short, this is a disappointing beginning for the Indochina Research Monograph series. To publish an abridged version of a 1978 study of the U.S. negotiating behaviour eight years later without consideration of the wealth of new materials now available seems

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1. Goodman has, however, reviewed these and two other recently published studies in "Vietnam War Reviewed", *Problems of Communism* (November–December 1986), pp. 97–101.

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incomprehensible.[2] What is the purpose? One expects more from Berkeley's Indochina Studies Project.

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Making Sense of Development: An Introduction to Classical and Contemporary Theories of Development and their Application to Southeast Asia. By P.W. Preston. London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986. 319 pp.

This is at once a useful but rather disappointing book — useful because it offers a very comprehensive and thorough literature review of contending theories of development, but a little disappointing because its economics content is rather thin (and in places wrong), and its promise to apply general development theories to Southeast Asia never fully realized.

The book is divided into four parts. The first is a brief introduction to methodology ("the nature of social theorizing"); the second looks at classical social theory, and includes separate chapters on Marx, Durkheim, and Weber; while the final section draws together the main arguments and examines "lessons for the future". The real meat is in Part 3 ("Contemporary Theories of Development"), which takes up about two-thirds of the book. This section comprises nine chapters which examine bourgeois liberal and Marxist theories of development and a long chapter (about one-quarter of the book) on the relevance of these theories for Southeast Asia. This review will focus on this section and, in particular, on the chapter on Southeast Asia (essentially ASEAN).

The author attempts to review the "bourgeois liberal" (his words) theories of development, but his sympathies clearly lie with the various strains of Marxist theory, which are examined in chapters 10–13. Unfortunately, his own views obscure important components of the development literature, and result in a few gratuitous (and quite unwarranted) backhanders. An example of the latter is provided early on, in the book's summary, when, after correctly associating W. Arthur Lewis with early growth theory, it is asserted:

> The idea of development is conceived narrowly: it is evidenced in economic growth . . . which is called by the application of the technical scientific knowledge of (Western) economic experts (and their co-workers) (p. xiv).

For Lewis to be characterized in this manner is not only wrong, but downright insulting. But, more importantly, the author skates over a large and diverse growth literature, of growing sophistication since the 1950s.

Whatever criticisms might be directed at the literature on growth models and development planning — and there are many — a volume promising the reader an introduction

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2. For example, the material published since 1978 by the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry regarding Hanoi's relations with China since the 1950s presents an entirely new official version of the international politics of the Indochina wars. See E.S. Ungar, "China Studies in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Changes and Implications", *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, no. 16 (July 1986).

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to the subject can hardly ignore these writings. Similarly, the chapter on monetarism is largely misdirected. There are important issues in monetary policy and development in Third World economies, and it is entirely consistent for a broadly-conceived development strategy to also pay careful attention to money supply and policy instruments. Instead, the author gets side-tracked almost exclusively to the Chilean reform programmes.

In the long chapter on Southeast Asia, the author has obviously read widely and he quotes local scholars extensively. But many important development issues receive scant treatment. Which theories are helpful in understanding development in the region? Is dependence a useful concept for the region? (Almost certainly not, but the issue is not examined.) What politico-social factors explain why some countries in the region have adopted better policies than others? The discussion seems to concentrate on Singapore in this chapter: perhaps understandably, since the author worked in Singapore and its literature is more readily accessible. However, writings on and in the other countries are also extensive, and they deserve better attention.

Despite these critical comments, it is a book worth having. It is thoroughly researched and well-written, it provokes a reaction (as it did from this reviewer!), and it attempts to bridge the gap between theory and application.

Hal Hill
Australian National University

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Japan and the Asia-Pacific: Changes in the Policies of Benign Neglect[1]

S. JAVED MASWOOD

Introduction

In recent years, the growth of protectionist sentiments has led to serious doubts as to the future viability of the post-war liberal trading system. Rising protectionist sentiment appears ready to unravel the code of conduct that, in the past, allowed for a steady growth in world trade. Concern for the future is grounded on the belief that if protectionism was left unchecked, not only would international trade suffer but competing blocs would, as in the 1930s, generate hostility and conflict with disastrous consequences. The present crisis and the potentially grim prospect for the future calls for an analysis on how the trading system might be restructured to ensure its continued stability. In particular, this paper will focus on the Japanese role in maintaining system stability, considering that Japan was a principal beneficiary of the liberal trading order. To do so, however, requires an understanding of the essentials of system stability and below, a brief outline of the main arguments is presented before proceeding with the substantive analysis of the Japanese role within the system.

Within the disciplines of international politics, the notion of system stability has been looked at from two different perspectives. For many political realists, the protectionist crisis was essentially a crisis of leadership. Borrowing on Charles Kindleberger's analysis of the Great Depression of the 1930s, they argued that the viability of a liberal trading system depended on effective leadership provided by a political and military hegemon. In the absence of leadership, it was considered not unlikely that the system would gravitate towards overtly protectionist, "beggar thy neighbour", trade policies. Kindleberger, accordingly, attributed the Great Depression to the unwillingness of the hegemon, the United States, to assume leadership in the inter-war years of British decline. The result was that, while all states promised to eschew protectionism, they, inevitably, became locked into a cycle of spiralling trade barriers. Kindleberger's analysis suggested that, had the United States displayed more "economic responsibility", the outcome of world events might have been less cruel.

Leadership, however, is not an altruistic principle but, rather, based on self interest. Since the hegemon possessed the strongest economy it stood to reason that it would be the main beneficiary of a trading regime that allowed it to compete effectively in export markets. This could be expected in the ideal world of *free* trade but, given the reality of states at different levels of economic development,

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free trade was considered impractical. Instead, as Stein observed, the years of free trade were only "periods of *freer* trade".[2] The war-damaged economies of Western Europe and Japan were allowed special concessions to facilitate their economic reconstruction. These took the form of trade protection for their fragile economies and open markets in the United States. Such a system, besides bringing benefits, also imposed costs upon the hegemon although it was still unlikely, as Bruce Russett wrote, that the costs exceeded the benefits, for the United States.

> The gains from an open global economy surely exceeded the costs to the United States. Despite what ultimately proved to be heavy burdens that the United States shouldered to maintain an open economy, the balance sheet for Americans looks favorable when compared with the costs that other powers accepted in decolonization.... The major goods provided by American postwar hegemony — 'stable peace' within much of the industrialized world, a *cordon sanitaire* around the major perceived security threat, a relatively open, expanding, and largely predictable world economy — were obtained in degrees that were not markedly sub-optimal from the American point of view.[3]

Kindleberger's study also underscored the fact that there was no direct linkage between the presence of a hegemonic power and the establishment of liberal trade. In the inter-war years, for example, an inward-looking Congress, arguing forcibly and effectively against "entangling alliances", ensured that the United States would not play a role commensurate to its capabilities in the international system. Thus, lacking direction and control, through either positive inducement or negative sanction, the system drifted rapidly to an outcome that was sub-optimal for all.

However, not all analysts are convinced that effective leadership is an important factor in system stability. Robert Keohane, for example, substituted intra-regime co-operative behaviour for hegemonic leadership.[4] He argued that co-operation was possible because a regime in existence was like a school of good behaviour, that instructed and enlightened the regime members of the positive sum outcome of co-operative behaviour. The iterative game of regime maintenance, he suggested, had a self-reinforcing stabilizer. In his analysis, therefore, co-operation instead of being treated as a dependent variable (as in the Realist tradition) became an independent variable ensuring regime maintenance. The weakness of this was that while co-operation could be assumed in an iterative two-person Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), it was unrealistic to assume that the same dynamic operated in a multi-player PD, even if iterative.

Recently, David Lake, expanding on Kindleberger's classification of regime members, argued that a regime consisted of four different types of players: a hegemon, free riders, regime spoilers and system supporters.[5] A supporter, in his definition, was any large country, lacking the power to assume leadership, but interested enough to contribute to system stability. This power-interest differential applied well to the case of Japan and, indeed, a study of Japanese foreign economic policies since the early 1980s would reveal a strong concern to play a

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positive role in the international trading regime. To the extent that burden sharing was effective, regime maintenance could in future, be based on a joint hegemon–supporter basis. It should be emphasized that while the American economic position within the system had declined, it remained a hegemon and, thus, not totally uninterested in liberal trade. But the earlier consensus on liberal trade had eroded because of the perception that the United States was "unfairly" burdened with the regime costs and that other countries that possessed the capability to play a supportive role had not done so. Burden sharing, in this context, meant essentially the provision of an additional vent for the management of global supply and demand imbalances.

According to Wolf, one of the main functions of a hegemon within a regime was to provide a large "open" market such that temporary supply and demand imbalances generated within the system might be balanced.[6] Without such a balancing mechanism, it was likely that states would be tempted to protect their own economy in order to provide a ready market for domestic producers. Moreover, he argued that if a large, open economy was relatively closed to foreign products, the repercussions would spread all the more rapidly than if a smaller country adopted protectionist measures. One of the factors behind the protectionism in the United States was the perception that Japan, instead of providing easy access to its domestic market, relied on foreign markets, essentially the United States, to balance its own supply and demand imbalances. A test of Japan as a regime supporter would, therefore, depend on two criteria: a reduction in its export dependence, and an activation of its capabilities to act as a supplementary balancer.

Evidence of Japanese support, at least in so far as the former criterion is concerned, can be found in the resolution of the U.S.–Japan automobile dispute of the early 1980s, the market-opening measures, particularly the Action Programme of 1985, demand expansion, and industrial restructuring as outlined in the Maekawa report of 1986. One reason that the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) was willing to implement a voluntary export restraint (VER) on Japanese auto exports was that it would allow American auto manufacturers a breathing space to restructure production lines to meet the changing demand pattern. For Amayo Naohiro, who negotiated the VER agreement, there was a strong parallel between the Tokugawa period in Japanese history (which provided almost 250 years of peace and stability within the country) and the post-war liberal trading system. He argued that just as the merchants of the Tokugawa period supported the *samurai* rulers of the country through generous loans which were often not repaid, the Japanese "merchant-state" today had the responsibility to buttress and revitalize American leadership of the trading system so as to ensure continued stability and prosperity.[7] The later market liberalization programme and demand expansion were similarly motivated by a desire to ease the American burden and balance Japan's international trading account which had emerged as the main destabilizing element within the system, providing ready grist to the champions of protectionism in the United States. The result of these policies, in conjunction with the exchange rate adjustments following the G-5 (Group of

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Five) agreement, was a dramatic increase in imports and reductions in volume-based exports.

These Japanese actions might help to limit the immediate dangers to the liberal trading system but the long-term stability of the system requires that Japan play a more positive role in balancing global supply and demand. In terms of the functions of regime support, Japan is well on the way to fulfilling the first requirement identified above, but the importance of the second factor should not be downplayed. As a supporter, Japan has to supplement the United States as a balancer to ensure that the burden of supply–demand management is not placed entirely on the United States, given its diminished capacity to fill that responsibility. This requires Japan to play a role commensurate with its economic capabilities and open up its economy to, in particular, the regional countries of the Asia-Pacific that rely excessively on the U.S. economy for their export growth. Groups in this category include the Asian newly industrializing countries (ANICs), and to a lesser extent, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

These countries, starting in the early 1960s, had adopted an outward-looking, export-oriented, development strategy that was essentially dependent on perpetuating an internal supply and demand imbalance. The success of this strategy was largely made possible by their ability, however easy or difficult, to penetrate the American market. In recent years, however, it has become apparent that the United States is unwilling to continue in that role alone and that the domestic protectionist sentiment against the ANIC is on the increase. As such, the future stability of the trading system would partly depend on how trade within the Pacific region is managed. The protectionist sentiment is unlikely to decline if the ASEAN/ANIC group, as a collective, is seen simply as having replaced Japan as the "problem" countries. For some, this is inevitable. Robert Wescott of the Wharton Econometric Forecasting Institute, for example, warned that "the Pacific Rim [will be] the next trade battleground".[8]

Most of the ASEAN and ANIC group had consciously implemented an export-oriented growth strategy and, like Japan, they too rely on the United States as their main export market. The Japanese Government has been trying to restructure its economy and economic growth away from dependence on foreign demand to domestic demand but, for most of the other regional countries, this has been much more difficult. Their developmental interests will continue to dictate a steady growth of export trade, given the difficulty of finding the dynamics of growth within their own limited domestic markets. Given this constraint, the challenge is to devise new mechanisms to accommodate their legitimate goals, with the necessity, at the same time, of avoiding disruptions in any one foreign market resulting from excessive dependence. It has been observed that, while in the past much of ANIC exports had gone to the United States and Western Europe, it was time "... to search for possibilities for more active *intra*-Pacific trade".[9] If we include ASEAN exports to those of the ANICs, the trade pattern is more evenly balanced but only because Japan is an important market for such raw material-exporting countries as Indonesia and Malaysia. However, even within

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ASEAN, there is a growing emphasis on the development of manufactured exports and, in so far as trade in manufactures is concerned, the direction of ASEAN trade is very asymmetrical. It is, perhaps, fortuitous for the ANIC–ASEAN group that the United States, so far, has been largely preoccupied with the trade problems with Japan. But to the extent that Japan is successful in reducing trade tensions with the United States, American attention can be expected to be diverted to this other group of countries that is collectively responsible for a large part of the American trade deficit. To understand what Japan can do to avert the potentially destabilizing effect of the regional dependence on the United States, it is necessary to look at the general thrust of post-war Japanese foreign policy and the position therein of the Asia-Pacific region. This will help explain why developments in the region took the particular form they did in the post-war period.

The Regional–Global Divide in Japanese Foreign Policy

In the post-war period, Japanese foreign policy emphasized friendly relations with the United States partly because the latter was important as a trading partner and partly because Japan was dependent on American security guarantees. As such, the attention span of the Japanese Government was largely taken up by the various issues in their bilateral relations. Regional concerns, although not completely ignored, were not accorded a high priority.

According to Watanabe Akio, the historical development of Japanese foreign policy contained a dual emphasis on the themes of regionalism and globalism. However, he observed that Japan "... never succeeded in inventing a satisfactory formula for blending the two different concepts together".[10] For example, although the Anglo-Japanese alliance of the 1920s was based on the delicate balance of collaboration with a global power (Britain) and the recognition of Japan's "special interests" in Asia, the later Washington Treaty refused to acknowledge Japan's regional ambitions as valid. The American objective, under the "open-door" policy, was to guarantee and protect the independence of China. This frustrated Japan's desire to combine its global and regional interests and it could be argued that it was this inability to combine the two objectives that eventually pushed Japan to seek a military solution.

After the war, Japan's regional ambitions remained rather subdued. Priority was given to economic growth and establishing an identity as an industrial power. The Japanese withdrawal from the region can also be partially attributed to the lingering pre-war and wartime legacies. The experience of the short-lived Japanese colonialism in the region ensured that there was not going to be a Japanese "commonwealth" after the liberation of these countries, and the vivid memories of Japanese atrocities helped to sustain a strong feeling of antagonism towards Japan. At the same time, from a regional perspective, besides reparations payments, these countries could expect little from Japan. Thus, not only was there no desire, but also no incentive to allow Japan a greater role in the region.

Japan's isolation from the region was further entrenched by the policies

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pursued by the American occupation forces, which sought to purge all Japanese influence from the region. The method used was the repatriation of all Japanese, a task that was undertaken with thorough-going and ruthless efficiency. Reischauer explained that, in the interest of rooting out all Japanese influence from the neighbouring countries, the repatriation programme included not only soldiers, but all Japanese, "... regardless of humanitarian considerations and the long-range interests of the countries in which they resided. Civilians and their families who had been legitimate, permanent residents in overseas areas for decades and sometimes for their whole lives were deported on essentially the same terms as soldiers and camp followers".[11] This must have been a traumatic experience for the Japanese nation, and made it more difficult for them to identify with the region. Another factor behind Japan's isolation from the region was the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty signed in 1951, which barred relations with the communist regime on mainland China, a country with which Japan would, otherwise, have had a closer relationship after independence.

During this period, however, Japan's globalist vision was brought to full bloom, beginning with its admission to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in the mid-1960s. It was only after Japan had finally joined the ranks of advanced industrial countries that it began to reconsider its regional role. Although as far back as 1957, the *Diplomatic Blue Book*, published yearly by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, declared that Japan's foreign policy orientations ought to be determined partly by the fact that Japan was an Asian country, this essentially remained a verbal exhortation and an agenda for future consideration. Throughout the 1960s, there were similar calls for Japan to establish a regional role, by Prime Minister Kishi, who emphasized the idea that "Japan [was] a member of the Asian Community", and later by Prime Minister Sato, who forthrightly remarked that Japan would play "a leading role" in Asia.[12] Nevertheless, Japan kept a low profile and chose, instead, to rely mainly on the American presence in the region to protect and safeguard its interests.

Perhaps the only exception to this was in Japan's relations with Indonesia. Indonesia was important because of its oil resources and because the Indonesian archipelago straddled the Malacca Strait, through which Japan's imports of Middle East oil had to pass. The economic and geographic significance of Indonesia explains why Japan persevered to maintain friendly relations even throughout the turbulent years when Indonesia swerved back and forth between pro-Washington, pro-Moscow, and pro-Beijing policies. The uncertainty of Indonesian foreign policy throughout the mid-1960s made it risky for Japan to rely solely on the United States to protect Japanese interests. This forced Japan to adopt a more active stance in its relations with Indonesia, and one Japanese analyst has observed that these were "special" years of Japanese-Indonesian relations.[13] The Japanese task was made easier by the influence wielded by President Soekarno's Japanese wife, Ratna Devi.

The early Japanese regional overtures were, understandably, couched in globalist terms. The two most prominent ideas that were floated around this

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time were the Pacific Free Trade Area (PAFTA) and Pacific Basin Economic Co-operation (PBEC), the former by a group of academics, and the latter by private businesses. Professor Kojima of Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, initiated the concept of PAFTA in 1966, but at that stage it was only marginally regional. The membership that he envisaged included only the five developed economies in the region – the United States, Japan, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Even with the restricted membership, he realized that the prospect of establishing a regional free trade system was not promising, considering that the gains would accrue mainly to Japan. As originally intended and if brought to fruition, a PAFTA scheme could have been potentially harmful to the developing countries of Asia because of the trade diversion effects.[14] With modifications, the two concepts of PAFTA and PBEC have since been institutionalized as a series of conferences, the former as PAFTAD (Pacific Area Free Trade and Development). These were private initiatives, which was not surprising since the Japanese Government still felt insecure about how an official initiative would be received by the Southeast Asian countries. Hostility towards Japan was still high and manifested itself in a rather ugly manner when Prime Minister Tanaka's visit to the region, in 1974, prompted widespread riots and demonstrations in Thailand and Indonesia.

Apart from the psychological gap between Japan and the regional countries, there also developed an economic and trade gap which became an additional source of hostility. Although Japan's resource dependence ensured a persistent Japanese trade deficit *vis-à-vis* the raw material exporting countries, Japan was criticized for shutting out the manufactured exports of the regional countries. This, however, was a common complaint of the less developed countries against the developed countries in general, which maintained high trade restricting tariff barriers against developing countries' exports of semi-processed and manufactured products. It was not particularly unusual, therefore, that the Japanese tariff structure, for example, gave preferential treatment to lumber in the form of logs over processed lumber such as plywood. But, to make matters worse, Japanese tariffs discriminated unfairly against developing countries' exports in the same product categories, despite the fact that the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) prohibited such discrimination. For example, the differential tariff structure in Japan for softwood and hardwood plywood made the regional exports of hardwood plywood less competitive, compared to softwood plywood exports of North America. Finally, in 1985, after years of protest from the Asian exporters of plywood, the tariff schedule was revised. The softwood-hardwood catergorization was removed and the tariff rates, too, were lowered. However, a differential, and discriminatory, tariff structure remained in place, as plywood exceeding a certain thickness was given a lower tariff rate. The consequence, as before, was continued discrimination of hardwood plywood which was usually thinner than softwood plywood.

The above was symptomatic of some of the problems that Japan confronted in reconciling its regional and global interests. It was felt that without a differential, and discriminatory, tariff structure on plywood, the lumber trade would

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be diverted to the Asian countries, causing unhappiness in the United States. Moreover, with the U.S.–Japan trade imbalance seemingly out of control, Japan was pressed to show some improvement even if this was at the expense of the regional countries of Asia. It should be emphasized that Japan's first and foremost priority is to maintain harmonious relations with the United States, but, as will be argued below, it may no longer be possible to view the regional and global concerns as a zero-sum game, although it would appear to have been treated as such by Japanese policy-makers.

Japan's Regional Role and System Stability

Throughout their growth period, it was exceedingly difficult for the regional countries to penetrate the Japanese market for manufactures although the Japanese Government insisted that there were no systemic biases against the exports of these countries. This, however, appeared not to be so as can be seen in the case of the processed lumber trade. Apart from this, a major obstacle to market penetration was the Japanese distribution system. If the Japanese distribution network was frustrating for Western countries to overcome, it had a considerably more negative effect on the manufactured exports of ASEAN and the ANICs. In addition to the already low level of Japanese manufactured imports, in general, imports from the less developed countries (LDCs) also suffered from the traditional marketing practice of surrounding imported products with a brand image. Understandably, this was difficult to accomplish in the case of Third World manufactures. Rightly or wrongly, goods produced in the developing countries had acquired the image of shoddy workmanship and poor quality. Since brand image was a major selling point for imported goods in Japan, allowing the local importer to sell at a high unit price and profitability to compensate for low sales volume, it disadvantaged the manufactured exports of the regional countries which promised moderate quality at low prices. The fact that the Japanese market minimized price competitiveness between domestic and imported products meant that exporters from the developing countries were handicapped in their ability to secure a niche for their products. In so far as this was concerned, the Japanese market was substantially different from the American market which absorbed a large quantity of cheap, lower quality, products.[15]

Recently, however, exporters in some of the regional countries have expressed confidence that the quality of their products have improved sufficiently to allow them to take advantage of the opportunities provided by the appreciation of the Japanese yen. According to S.K. Chung, deputy general manager of Daewoo Japan (the Japanese branch of the South Korean conglomerate), "We're at a point now that our product quality is good enough to sell in Japan. If the yen had risen five or six years ago, we wouldn't have been ready, and price competitiveness wouldn't have made a difference".[16] Other countries, too, have been making similar efforts to improve their product quality. For example, in Singapore, manufacturers have been actively implementing Japanese-style quality control circles in the work-

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place, in a move aimed at improving product quality and attracting the more quality conscious consumers in Japan and elsewhere.

Besides the Japanese distribution system, the maze of government-established standards and certification procedures has also proved difficult for the Third World exporters to master and overcome, given their relatively limited marketing skills. These standards, too, have tended to minimize price competition in favour of uniform quality and prevented the Third World exporters from exploiting their cost advantages.

Because of the handicaps confronting regional exporters in trying to penetrate the Japanese market, as their industrialization programme gathered speed, so did their dependence on the United States. It is not relevant here to determine how easy the access to the American market was or the number of obstacles that had to be overcome. The important point is that these smaller countries were not only successful but, in fact, they were very successful. For example, until the late 1950s, when two-thirds of Taiwanese exports still consisted of agricultural products such as rice and sugar, Japan was the principal export and import partner of Taiwan, accounting for one-half of its total exports and one-third of its imports. The United States replaced Japan only after 1967 and in 1971, the share of exports to the United States peaked at almost 42 per cent.[17] Hong Kong's traditional export markets were the Commonwealth countries which together accounted for about 40 per cent of the total exports in 1955. The United States, in that year, accounted for only 2 per cent of Hong Kong's exports but later became the main destination of its exports. In the mid-1970s, West Germany also overtook the United Kingdom to take second place.[18] The growth of the regional countries' exports to Japan was not insignificant but it took place mainly in primary commodities and industrial raw materials. Japan's import of manufactures, however, remained low. Although more than 50 per cent of all Indonesian exports went to Japan, this included only about 13 per cent of its manufactures. Kershner, in his study of Japanese trade patterns, found that during the decade of the 1960s, there was very little change in the composition of exports to Japan by the regional countries. His data clearly showed that the region's exports to Japan comprised a set of commodities that, when taken together, formed a pattern that was significantly different from their exports to the rest of the world.[19]

As an indicator of the trade dependence on the United States, it is worth noting that the United States alone accounted for almost half of the total OECD imports from ASEAN and the ANICs. Table 1 gives the total OECD imports as well as the American share in the exports of a select group of regional countries.

The export growth stagnation in the early 1980s was due to the global recession but the strong American economic recovery starting in 1983 and weaker growth rates in other countries meant that the export drive of the regional countries was concentrated in meeting the import demand in the United States. However, with the economic decline of the United States, its ability to serve as the principal vent for *sustained* external supply and demand imbalance became politically

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TABLE 1
OECD IMPORTS FROM ASIAN COUNTRIES
(In US$ billion)

	1979	*1980*	*1981*	*1982*	*1983*	*1984*[1]
Singapore	5.1	7.0	6.6	6.6	6.9	8.6
Korea	10.8	11.1	12.5	12.7	14.6	18.1
Taiwan	11.9	13.8	15.2	15.6	18.4	23.7
Hong Kong	10.2	12.3	12.6	12.2	13.3	15.5
Malaysia	8.3	9.2	7.7	7.2	7.7	10.1
Total	46.2	53.4	54.6	54.2	60.8	75.9
Of which U.S.	17.6	20.4	23.0	24.1	29.7	39.8
Annual Rate of Change in Real Terms[2]						
Total		6.3	2.2	11.6	17.5	29.4

[1] Based on data for the first three quarters.
[2] Volume of imports: Values deflated by export price index of manufactures.
SOURCE: OECD, *Costs and Benefits of Protection* (Paris, 1985), p. 173.

difficult. Therefore, unless efforts were made to reduce trade dependence on the United States, it was likely to continue to fan the protectionist movement in that country.

Criticisms in the United States about the excessive dependence of the ANICs have centred around their trade policies and their practice of maintaining an exchange rate structure that favoured exports. In response to this, the Government of Singapore tried to dissociate itself from the remaining three ANICS on the grounds that Singapore was a free port and that its trade surplus with the United States was only slightly more than 1 per cent of the total American trade imbalance.[20] No doubt, this was an accurate portrayal of their bilateral trade relations but it should be pointed out that American concerns, in so far as these focused on the level of the trade imbalance, were also seen as reflecting the high trade dependence of the ANICS on the U.S. market. It should be noted that the United States was the destination for about 35 per cent of Singapore's manufactured exports (SITC categories 6, 7, and 8) in 1984, whereas only 3.6 per cent was exported to Japan. To the extent that this was true, it would be practically impossible to resolve the problem of trade structure on the basis of ANIC-U.S. relations alone. It could now only be resolved through a multilateral arrangement between the United States, Japan, and the ANICs. In terms of the balance of payments position, the American deficit had increased rapidly and in 1984 was nearly US$28 billion in favour of the ASEAN/ANIC group (excluding Thailand).

Since these countries' export dependence on the United States was partly a function of a lack of alternative markets, one possible mechanism for managing trade friction was the creation of a greater horizontal division of labour within

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the region, between Japan, the United States and the regional countries. It would also be beneficial to the developing countries since it would provide them with a large market close to home. For such a burden sharing to take place, Japan has to alter its import preference and give easier access to those processed and manufactured products that are of primary concern to the regional countries. If we can extrapolate from Japan's recent decision to allow the import of refined petroleum, optimism may not be totally unwarranted.

Japan's dependence on foreign sources of raw materials, including petroleum, is well known. Like most of the other industrialized countries, Japan's tariff structure was biased in favour of primary products over processed goods. However, with the increased emphasis in developing countries to expand export shares of value-added products, the oil-exporting countries, too, had built up a large refining capacity. In July 1985, the Japanese Government, for the first time, agreed in principle to import refined petroleum from the Middle East, instead of only crude oil. Accordingly, the first purchase of refined petroleum from the Middle East was made in January 1986. *The Economist* (London), commenting on this departure from past practice, observed that this should,

> ... take some pressure off from the community [EC], which otherwise would have to import the bulk of 50m [million] tonnes of refined petroleum that the oil producing states of the Middle East and North Africa are expected to produce between now and 1990. Without extra purchases from Japan, the Ten would feel obliged to protect themselves against the quite legitimate desire of the third-world oil producers to increase their exports of refined products.[21]

As a group, the ANICs could not be expected to deviate much from their export-oriented development strategy but, if this was to be prevented from becoming a destabilizing force within the trading system, other markets had to be made available to them, such that the cost of balancing the excess of domestic supply to domestic demand would not be imposed, exclusively, on one country. The importance of an open market in Japan would become even more important if the ASEAN countries were just as successful as the ANICs in promoting an export-oriented development strategy.

The currency realignment that followed the G-5 agreement of 1985 provided a significant opportunity for the regional countries to increase their exports to Japan. In this, they were helped also by the market liberalization programme in Japan and the relaxation of standards and certification procedures. All these factors contributed significantly to increasing regional manufactured exports to Japan. Although, in the April–October 1985 period, Japanese imports from the four ANICS (Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, and Hong Kong) had declined by 4.8 per cent compared to the same period a year before, imports have since increased, led by manufactured products. South Korea and Taiwan boosted their exports of manufactures to Japan by 31.3 per cent and 23.4 per cent respectively in March 1986 compared to the same period in 1985.[22] Furthermore, this did not appear to be a temporary phenomenon.

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A JETRO (Japan External Trade Organization) report issued in September 1987 noted that the exports of the four ANICs to Japan in the first six months of 1987 had increased by 66 per cent, largely in the category of manufactured goods: "The rise in Japan's manufactured imports is directly connected to changes in the country's industrial structure. Major contributors to the increase in Japan's imports of manufactured goods were the Asian NICs (40.5 per cent) and the European Community (37.4 per cent)".[23] The rapid growth in manufactured imports, *albeit* from a low base, was a distinct move away from past patterns and could be attributed to a recognition of the importance of fostering a regional horizontal division of labour, as the Maekawa report on industrial restructuring (1986) had proposed. The Japanese concern reflected a desire not merely to forestall protectionism in the United States but also to ensure a favourable economic climate in the region, a precondition to regional stability. With the rapid increase in exports to Japan, some of the regional countries also expressed optimism that dependence on the United States could be reduced to less critical levels. Taiwan, for instance, officially announced a new policy that would lower its export dependence on the United States from 45 to 33 per cent over a five-year period.[24] This was, of course, predicated on the belief that other export destinations would become more easily accessible. To ensure this, the Government of Taiwan, in late November 1987, demanded that the Japanese companies operating in Taiwan submit firm proposals outlining their plans to import more Taiwanese products.[25]

In the past, the various market-opening measures adopted by Japan had been geared to promoting imports from the United States and the European countries, to the neglect of the regional NICs. Watanabe and Kajiwara wrote: "It is one of the first priorities for Japan to rectify this oversight.... Most urgently required of Japan is a policy review reformulating its current stance on international trade and investment, development aid, and structural adjustments to facilitate the horizontal ties to the ANICs, ASEAN-4, and other Asian neighbours".[26] In recent reports released by the Japanese Government on the future of the domestic economic structure, the term "softization" of the economy was taken as an indicator of the future direction of the economy. This was not meant to imply a weakening of the economic resilience but rather a concentration of economic activity in the upper levels of the technological spectrum. To the extent that the "softization" of the economy progresses as envisioned, there should be new opportunities for the regional countries to fill the vacuum created at the lower ends of the technology spectrum, leading to the development of a genuine horizontal division of labour.

That wartime legacies continue to influence interactions within the region may be an irrational manifestation but it is true not only for Japan but also for the other Asian countries. Given the importance of "not losing face" in Japan, it was understandable that the Japanese approach had been cautious and subdued for fear of stirring up latent hostilities. The regional countries also, at least in their public statements, had displayed an aversion to a larger Japanese role in the region. The persistence of this negative attitude and ill-feeling could, perhaps, be attributed to the relative neglect of regional concerns in post-war Japanese foreign policies.

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Japanese development assistance, throughout the 1970s, had remained tied and, in general, the economic linkages were seen to result in asymmetrical benefits. Recent events, however, suggest that this could be changing. Confidence about each other has grown as trade linkages expanded and as the ASEAN-ANIC grouping increased its penetration of the Japanese market. The Japanese Government has also, recently, announced its intention to establish a US$2 billion fund to aid in the development of the ASEAN countries and, if successfully implemented, could help to restore regional relationships on a more even keel.

Conclusion

This article has attempted to identify a potential problem area for the stability of the trading system and an area in which Japan could do considerably more to relieve a buildup of stress. Japanese foreign economic measures have so far been geared to alleviating trade frictions with other industrialized countries to the relative neglect of the developmental aspirations of the regional countries. It was only in the mid-1970s that Japan, according to Akaha Tsuneo, began to take a "visibly active" interest in Southeast Asia. The occasion was the explication of the Fukuda Doctrine of December 1976 in which the Japanese Prime Minister stated that "the area for which Japan is responsible in the international society is Southeast Asia, particularly ASEAN".[27]

The reason for the low profile of Japanese regional diplomacy was that, besides the wartime legacies, none of these countries were as important to Japan as was the West, which essentially meant that these countries had very little influence over Japanese policy-making. At the same time, these countries were less than successful in overcoming their individual weaknesses through a collective effort. It is necessary to overcome this handicap and according to one Filipino analyst, "... ASEAN would be well-advised to mount its own political lobbying for the lowering of import barriers in Japan involving products of export interest to them. Joint efforts of ASEAN countries in seeking trade concessions from Japan would, of course, be more effective than individual country efforts".[28] Within Japan, there has been a growing realization that Japan has to play a larger role in the region to stabilize the global trading system. Okita Saburo, a former Japanese foreign minister, for example, argued that, "... Japan must continue its efforts to import more primary products and, more important, more internationally competitive manufactured products from other Asian countries".[29] Japan's post-war diplomacy was characterized by a regional-global divide that disadvantaged the regional countries but it was no longer possible to maintain such an artificial separation because of a growing convergence between Japan's global and regional interests.

Although Japan has been an important trading partner for these countries, the major part of Japanese imports, from ASEAN in particular, has been in the category of primary products. Indonesia, with its oil, has alone provided more than half of the total ASEAN exports to Japan. However, with the ongoing

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industrialization, first in the ANICs, and presently in the ASEAN countries, it will be necessary for Japan to increase the import of manufactured products to prevent an asymmetrical, destabilizing dependence on the United States. It is no longer possible to regard trade relations with the United States, on the one hand, and the regional countries, on the other, as a zero-sum game.

NOTES

1. This article is based on a chapter of the author's book, *The Japanese Response to the Growth of Protectionism* (Croom Helm and The Nissan Institute of Japanese Studies, Oxford University, forthcoming).
2. A.A. Stein, "The Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States and the International Economic Order", *International Organization* 38, no. 2 (Spring 1984): 383 (emphasis in original).
3. B. Russett, "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony", *International Organization* 39, no. 2 (Spring 1985): 226–27.
4. R.O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984.)
5. D.A. Lake, "International Economic Structures and American Foreign Economic Policy, 1887–1934", *World Politics* 35, no. 4 (July 1983).
6. M. Wolf, "Two Edged Sword: Demands of Developing Countries and the Trading System", in *Power, Passions and Purpose: Prospects for North-South Negotiations*, edited by J.G. Ruggie and J.N. Bhagwati (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1984), especially pp. 205–6.
7. See, for example, N. Amaya, *Nihon Kabushiki Kaisha: Nokosareta Sentaku* (Tokyo: PHP Research Institute, 1982), pp. 35–44.
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9. See D.L. Berlin, "New Situations Facing the NICs in East Asia", *Intereconomics* 21, no. 6 (November/December 1986): 267.
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Indonesia's Political System: Continuity and Change*

LEO SURYADINATA

There are many ways of interpreting Indonesia's political system. One way of looking at it is that it is a contest between two different political cultures, namely, *abangan* (nominal Muslim) and *santri* (pious Muslim).[1] Even the present party system can be accounted for in that light. The three political parties represent different cultural traditions: the army-controlled Golongan Karya or GOLKAR (the functional group)[2] is *abangan* in nature while the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (Development Unity Party or PPP) is a *santri* party. The third one, the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party), a secular party, is closer to the *abangan* in its orientation.

The competition between the *abangan* and *santri* is not a new one. Indonesian politics, from the beginning, has been a struggle between these two distinct political cultures. It would be useful to examine briefly the evolution of the present political system with some reference to these two political cultures.

The Evolution of the Political System

To start with, it should be noted that Indonesia is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious state. However, the Javanese are the dominant ethnic group. They control the military, the bureaucracy, and politics. The Javanese themselves are not homogeneous as they can be divided into at least two groups with different religious/political cultures: the *abangan/priyayi* on the one hand and the *santri* on the other. The *abangan* are syncretic in their beliefs and are often termed "nominal Muslim". Their strong Hindu and Javanese inclinations often differentiate them from those who are more Islamic in their religious beliefs and practices.[3] The *abangan* believe in Allah, but they also worship Hindu gods/goddesses such as Batara Kala (the god of death and time) and Dewi Sri (goddess of rice). They also believe in spirits and magic power — for instance, that in the banyan tree there live spirits, while the *keris* (dagger) and *gamelan* (Javanese musical instrument) are believed to possess supernatural powers. The *abangan* also perform *selamatan*, a kind of feast ritual involving offerings to the spirits and the supernatural in order to achieve a state of calmness and safety. Their frame of reference is the family, not the *umat* (Islamic community), which is the frame of reference of the *santri*. The *santri* are usually very rigid in terms of their beliefs, reject the pre-Islamic elements in Javanese society and desire to "purify" Javanese religion in order to fit their own vision.

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Although the *abangan* and *santri* categories were originally applied to the Javanese, they can now be used to differentiate the Indonesian population in general: those who are nominal and those who are rigid Muslims (the Achenese and Minang should be grouped into this latter category). The existence of these *abangan* and *santri* cultures is the result of the uneven penetration of Islam in the Indonesian archipelago. People who live in the coastal areas tend to be more "indigenous". The *santri* also tend to engage in trading/commercial activities while the *abangan* and *priyayi* (official class) are more interested in the bureaucracy. It is also well known that most Indonesian generals are of *abangan* belief and are less sympathetic to the *santri*'s aspirations.

The *abangan* and *santri* outlooks are also reflected in their perception of the nature of the Indonesian state. While the *abangan* tend to favour a secular state, the *santri* have a tendency to favour the creation of an Islamic state — or at least a state in which Islam plays the dominant role.

During the Liberal (or Constitutional) Democracy period (1949–58), there were four major political parties representing the two cultures, although they were not without class connotations. The Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI), basically a Javanese party, enjoyed the support of the *priyayi* (government officers) and the *abangan*. The Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) also drew its support from Java, but it was largely based among the lesser *priyayi* and *abangan* peasants. The two Muslim parties received their support from devout Muslims. The Nahdatul Ulama's (NU) support came from the Javanese *santri* and commercial elements in small towns in both Central and East Java. The MASYUMI, on the other hand, drew its support from the outer islands. Its influence was especially strong among landlords, traders, and modern Islamic intellectuals.[4] It is true that the followers of those parties represented different ethnic groups and classes, but their origins cannot be explained solely in class terms. It is not surprising that Clifford Geertz called these parties *alirans* (streams) or cultural traditions, while Soedjatmoko referred to them as cultural solidarity groups.

Politics in the Liberal Democracy period can be interpreted partly in terms of the conflict between these two political cultures, especially with the ascendancy of the *abangan/priyayi* culture over the *santri* culture. This can be seen in the results of the 1955 general election in which the combined votes of the Islamic parties (MASYUMI, PSII, PERTI and the Nahdatul Ulama) made up only 43.5 per cent (see Table 1). The majority votes were obtained by *abangan* parties. Soekarno, the PKI and the army, who were dominant in the Guided Democracy era (1959–65), were also part of this political culture. But the struggle between the PKI and the army for power led to the liquidation of the PKI and the downfall of Soekarno. After 1965 the army emerged as the most significant force on the Indonesian political scene. However, dominated by *abangan* elements, the army co-operated with the Islamic and Christian groups in its efforts to fight and totally eradicate the PKI and left-wing PNI elements, resulting in the greater influence and power of the Islamic groups during the New Order period (1966–present).

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TABLE 1
RESULTS OF THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION, 1955

Party	*Number of Valid Votes*	*Percentage of Total*	*Number of Seats*
1. PNI (Indonesian Nationalist Party)	8,434,653	22.3	57
2. MASYUMI (Consultative Council of of Indonesian Moslems)	7,903,886	20.9	57
3. Nahdatul Ulama (NU, Ulama Association)	6,955,141	18.4	45
4. PKI (Indonesian Communist Party)	6,176,914	16.4	39
5. PSII (Islamic Association Party)	1,091,160	2.9	8
6. Parkindo (Christian Party)	1,003,325	2.6	8
7. Partai Katolik (Catholic Party)	770,740	2.0	6
8. PSI (Socialist Party)	753,191	2.0	5
9. IPKI (League for the Upholding of Indonesian Independence)	541,306	1.4	4
10. PERTI (Islamic Education Party)	483,014	1.3	4
11. PRN (National People's Party)	242,125	0.6	2
12. Partai Buruh (Labour Party)	224,167	0.6	2
13. GPPS (Movement to Defend the Pancasila)	219,985	0.6	2
14. PRI (People's Party)	206,261	0.5	2
15. PPPRI (Police Employees' Association)	200,419	0.5	2
16. Partai Murba (Proletarian Party)	199,588	0.5	2
17. Baperki (Citizenship Consultative Council)	178,887	0.5	1
18. PIR (Greater Indonesian Union) — Wongsonegoro	178,481	0.5	1
19. Gerinda	154,792	0.4	1
20. Permai (Proletarian People's Union)	149,287	0.4	1
21. Partai Persatuan Dayak (Dayak Unity Party)	146,054	0.4	1
22. PIR (Greater Indonesian Union) — Hazairin	114,644	0.3	1
23. PPTI (Tharikah Unity Party)	85,131	0.2	1
24. AKUI	81,454	0.2	1
25. PRD (Village People's Party)	77,919	0.2	1
26. PRIM (Party of the People of Free Indonesia)	72,523	0.2	1
27. Acoma (Young Generation Communists)	64,514	0.2	1
28. R. Soedjono Prawirosoedarso and Associates	53,305	0.1	1
29. Other parties, organizations, and individual candidates	1,022,433	2.7	—
TOTAL	37,785,299	100.0	257

SOURCE: A. van Marie, "The First Indonesian Parliamentary Elections", *Indonesie*, 1956. Reproduced in Herbert Feith, *The Indonesian Elections of 1955*, Interim Reports Series, Modern Indonesia Project (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1957), pp. 58–59.

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The co-operation between the army and the Islamic parties, however, was short-lived. Once the PKI was eliminated, the *abangan*-dominated army began to be suspicious of the Islamic parties. This suspicion towards Islam is rooted in the political history of Indonesia, specifically the movement of the Darul Islam/ Islamic Army (D.I./T.I.I.) in west and central Java, Acheh and South Sulawesi in the 1950s and early 1960s. The movement was crushed by the central government largely through military means.[5] Together with the PKI, political Islam was considered by the army as the greatest threat to the Indonesian secular state. Not surprisingly, once the PKI was eliminated, the army began to focus its attention on political Islam.

The *abangan*-dominated army felt that the Islamic (*santri*) groups posed a major challenge to the government as was shown by the election campaigns and results in 1971, 1977 and 1982 (see Table 2). In those elections, despite excessive controls and restrictions, the Islamic parties still won about 30 per cent of the popular vote. However, in the 1987 elections, the government managed to reduce the electoral strength of the Islamic party, partly as a result of the law requiring all mass organizations to adopt Pancasila as their ideology.

Although there was an *abangan/priyayi* party in the PNI when the army came to power, it did not represent the interests of the army and the New Order intellectuals. Therefore, before the general election of 1971, the army and the New Order intellectuals revived an obscure organization known as Golongan Karya (GOLKAR) to contest in the election. GOLKAR, which began as an electoral machine, has been gradually developed into a political party, dominated by the *abangan* generals. The structure and the symbols of GOLKAR clearly reflect its *abangan/priyayi* nature.

Perhaps the term "*abangan/priyayi* and *santri* dichotomy" does not fully convey the national political reality because it is confined to the Javanese Muslims. The term "Pancasila versus political Islam" is perhaps more appropriate because it includes the non-Javanese and non-Muslims.[6] Nevertheless, the Javanese majority of Indonesia's population are still either *abangan/priyayi* or *santri*.

As a matter of fact, the Pancasila and political Islam dichotomy, or Indonesian secular nationalism versus Islamic nationalism, originated in the Indonesian independence movement before World War II. This dichotomy existed even in the pre-war youth movement in Indonesia, which constituted a vital component of Indonesian nationalism and on many occasions became the actual vanguard of the nationalist struggle.[7] The Indonesian youth movement failed to cut across secular and Islamic boundaries because of deeply rooted socio-cultural differences existing among the Indonesians, particularly the Javanese. Differences between secular and Islamic nationalists were never resolved, and the division surfaced again in independent Indonesia.

The issue of the Jakarta Charter (*Piagam Jakarta*) and the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution in which the Muslim nationalists wanted to make the practice of *Syariah* Law mandatory for Indonesian Muslims is a case in point. Because of opposition by the non-Muslims and *abangan* Javanese, and in order to unite the

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TABLE 2
THE 1971, 1977, 1982 and 1987 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

Party	1971		1977		1982		1987	
	Votes	%	Votes	%	Votes	%	Votes	%
GOLKAR	34,348,673	62.80	39,750,096	62.11	48,334,724	64.34	62,783,680	73.16
PDI	(5,516,894)	(10.09)	5,504,751	8.60	5,919,702	7.88	9,324,708	10.89
PNI	3,793,266	6.94						
Parkindo	733,359	1.34						
Partai Murba	48,126	0.09						
IPKI	388,403	0.62						
Partai Katolik	603,740	1.10						
PPP	(14,833,942)	(27.11)	18,743,491	29.29	20,871,880	27.78	13,701,428	15.97
NU	10,213,650	18.67						
PARMUSI	2,930,746	5.36						
PSI	1,308,237	2.39						
PERTI	381,309	0.70						
Total	54,699,509	100.00	63,998,338	100.00	75,126,308	100.00	85,809,816	100.00

SOURCES: 1971 data from Lembaga Pemilihan Umum, *Daftar Pembagian Kursi Hasil Pemilihan Umum Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Tahun 1971* (Jakarta, 1971); 1977 data from *Kompas*, 9 June 1977; 1982 data from Panitia Pemilihan Umum, *Penetapan Pemilihan Umum Anggota DPR Tahun 1982 Daftar Perhitungan Pembagian Jumlah Wakil Untuk Pemilihan Umum Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* (Jakarta, 1982), pp. 96–97; and 1987 data from *Kompas*, 7 June 1987.

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country which is multi-religious, a compromise was eventually reached in the 1945 Constitution. The mandatory clause was dropped, and so was the requirement of a Muslim Indonesian president. The compromise did not resolve the problem, however. During the Constituent Assembly discussions of the 1950s conflict based on the issue of a Pancasila state versus an Islamic state once again emerged.[8] The Islamic leaders insisted on having Islam as the foundation of the Indonesian state while the *abangan/priyayi* (or "secular") nationalists wanted to have a Pancasila state. The conflict could not be resolved and Soekarno proposed the re-adoption of the 1945 Constitution. The Islamic nationalists, however, insisted on restoring the deleted words in the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution. Soekarno refused to yield and dissolved the Constituent Assembly, which in the end led to the introduction of Guided Democracy. He adopted the 1945 Constitution without any change. Although he succeeded in preserving Pancasila as the state philosophy (*falsafah negara*) and the Political Manifesto (*Manifesto Politik*) as the General Direction of the State (*Garis Besar Haluan Negara*), Soekarno did not force the Islamic organizations to abandon their religious principles. One can thus argue that during the Soekarno era, Pancasila and political Islam co-existed side by side, and the army and the Islamic parties both used the first principle of Pancasila — belief in one God — to attack the PKI, which was atheist. It was only later, under Soeharto that the government managed to push Pancasila law through parliament and make it the sole ideology, although it often faced considerable extra-parliamentary opposition.

As noted earlier, the government, representing the Pancasila force, was convinced that Pancasila — which in essence represents religious pluralism and a non-Islamic state — should be perpetuated in Indonesia. A series of measures was taken by the government to achieve this objective. In 1973, *kebatinan* or Javanese mysticism, which was practised by many *abangan/priyayi*, was given a new name — Belief In One God or *Kerpercayaan Terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa* — and was included in the General Direction of the State, which is periodically formulated by the Congress (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat), and gained respectability in New Order Indonesia.[9] This was said to be aimed at weakening orthodox Islam. Beginning in 1975, all schools were required to teach Pancasila moral education. At the same time, a high level committee for promoting Pancasila was set up, and since 1979, all civil servants and later civilian leaders have been required to attend classes on Pancasila and pass an examination on it. The climax of this policy was making Pancasila the only political ideology for all mass organisations (including religious and political organizations) in 1985.

The Responses of Political Islam

Why did Soeharto and his generals insist on having Pancasila as the sole ideology? It appears that the "1945 Generation" which has ruled Indonesia until now is being superseded and the younger generation is beginning to take over power. Soeharto and his New Order generals are not sure that political stability will remain

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intact after their retirement. In fact, in 1983 Soeharto, after winning the election for the third time, noted in his address to the nation that the state ideology of Pancasila was the most effective way of holding the diverse groups in the vast archipelago together, "now and in the future".[10] He also said that if political parties and groups were to pursue their respective ideologies, chaotic conditions similar to the Soekarno era would recur.

However, the Islamic community was split on the issue of Pancasila. Before proceeding further, it would be useful to note that the *santri* or "fundamentalists" can be divided into two groups: the radicals and the moderates. Prior to the 1965 coup, the radicals wanted to establish an Islamic state through revolutionary (violent) means as exemplified by the movement of Kartosoewirjo of West Java, Kahar Muzakar of Sulawesi and Daud Beureueh of Acheh, while the moderates were exemplified by MASYUMI and NU with their leaders such as Mohammad Natsir and Idham Chalid.[11] With the establishment of the New Order, the fundamentalists could still be divided into two groups: those who were radicals (represented by the leaders who engaged in terrorist activities, including the so-called Komando Jihad) and those who were moderates. The latter group included those who were involved in the reform movement (*Gerakan Ide Pembaruan*).[12] The moderates could be further subdvided into those who favoured the separation of Islam and politics (such as Nuchorlish Majid) and those who rejected the notion of such a separation (for example, M. Amien Rais).[13] The moderates during the New Order neither advocated violence nor the formation of an Islamic state *per se*. However, they insisted on the major role of Islam in Indonesian life and politics. In the eyes of these moderates, Islam could accept Pancasila but they rejected the *abangan* interpretation of Pancasila. For them, Islam was more than Pancasila, not the other way round.

When the Pancasila issue was debated, former MASYUMI leader, Syarifuddin Prawiranegara, in an open letter to Soeharto, questioned his wisdom in forcing every organization in society to adopt Pancasila as the only ideology. This elicited an angry response from the government.[14] Other fundamentalists opposed the sole ideology idea because they felt it would jeopardize the practice and development of Islam. A Muslim scholar, Deliar Noer, noted that the acceptance of the sole principle by the PPP would deny the development of diversity in Indonesian society, that it was against democratic principles, and finally, that it would divorce Islam from politics, which was against the Islamic religion. Islam, he said, did not separate religion from politics.[15] Deliar Noer also noted that the Pancasila ideology would tend to push Indonesian politics towards secularization and a one-party system, which, in his view, would not benefit the development of the country in general.

The opposition parties, the PDI and the PPP, were eventually pressurized to accept Pancasila as the sole ideology of their organizations, as were other mass organizations. In 1985, the Sole Ideology Act became law, but resistance to the law did not cease. Opposition took the form of demonstrations and eventually developed into violence. The Tanjung Priok incident in September 1984 (when

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the law was still being discussed), followed by the bombings of the Bank of Central Asia (BCA) offices (owned by Liem Sioe Liong, business partner of the Soeharto family) and other business centres can be seen as a manifestation of the conflict between Pancasila and political Islam. Of course, the economic conditions in Indonesia in general and the extreme conditions in the Tanjung Priok area in particular also contributed to the violence. This added a new dimension to the conflict between Pancasila and political Islam. It is true that the Islamic groups, which also represent commercial elements in indigenous Indonesian society, believed that the government's economic policy gave preferential status to the military élite and Chinese businessmen. Chinese economic power under the New Order government has grown rather than declined; this has often been seen to be at the expense of the *santri*. The gap between the rich and the poor has also widened under the present economic policy which has drawn criticism from the "political public",[16] many of whom are sympathetic to political Islam. Therefore, there is now an economic dimension to the conflict between these two political cultures. The involvement of Islamic fundamentalist politicians and preachers together with the Islamic nature of that movement is, however, a more crucial factor because these groups see the Pancasila force as a threat to their survival and development.

Despite some violent opposition to the Pancasila bill, the GOLKAR and army-dominated Parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) passed the bill on the sole ideology for all mass organizations (including religious and political parties) in Indonesia in 1985. The acceptance of Pancasila as the sole ideology of the state required all mass organizations to drop any other ideology.[17] Islamic organizations are not allowed to use even Islam as their additional ideology. This sole ideology (*asas tunggal*) principle can be seen as a rejection of the possibility of establishing an Islamic state. In all, the law has further weakened the opposition parties, especially the Islamic party, by creating an identity crisis for them.

The Impact of the Sole Ideology Law on the Political System

The impact of the sole ideology law on the political system has been a profound one. GOLKAR, the *abangan*-dominated political party, adopted Pancasila as its ideology from its inception, and the PDI, whose ideological moorings are close to GOLKAR, does not have much difficulty making this adjustment. Nevertheless, the law has further blurred the identity of the PDI and made it weaker.

Its greatest impact, however, has been on the PPP, an Islamic party. Without Islam, the PPP has no identity and little basis for existence. Fachry Ali (of Lembaga Penelitian Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial, better known as LP3ES) has argued that,

> the sole ideology, i.e. Pancasila as the only ideology for all political forces is the largest experiment which has been conducted by the government because with this sole ideology, one of the socio-political forces (i.e. the Islamic Party) has to alter its basis. This will generate confusion in it because the political party

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has to have reidentification, and reorientation, and its supporters will also have to redefine their loyalties vis-à-vis the old leaders.[18]

Indeed, the PPP has had to pay a tremendous price as a result of this drastic change. Even the emblem of the PPP, which was the *Ka'bah*, had to be replaced by one of the Pancasila symbols, the star. With the loss of its Islamic identity, it became a problem for the PPP to gain the votes of devout Muslims (*santri*) in the 1987 elections. The PPP was further weakened by the withdrawal of the NU, which was its major component.[19] In other words, it was no longer obligatory for members of the NU to vote for the PPP during the elections. Indeed, some NU leaders even campaigned for GOLKAR during the 1987 elections, expressing their support for the government party. However, officially the NU claimed that it had changed its character and declared itself to be "non-political", having decided to return to "socio-religious activities" for which it was originally formed in 1926. There was also speculation that the NU, under a new leadership, would join GOLKAR one day since the PPP and GOLKAR were based on the same ideology. Although such a merger is unlikely at the moment, because of the cleavages between *abangan* and *santri* cultures in Indonesia, it does not appear impossible.

As a strategy, some Muslim leaders think that it would be beneficial for the NU to join GOLKAR and influence politics from within. For one thing, the *abangan* culture has undergone gradual changes in the last twenty years, and the *abangan*, in fact, have been re-Islamized. This was due to the government's promotion of religion (particularly Islam) to counter-balance the PKI. Even after the removal of the PKI, the new government, in order to win the support of the Islamic population, continued to cultivate Islam by building more and more mosques and Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren*).[20] The government expected to develop Islam in the religious field but at the same time hoped to undermine its role in politics. This appears, however, to contradict its "weakening political Islam policy", because, as some observers have argued, the government policy would eventually only strengthen Islam.[21] Indeed, many children of the *abangan* have become more Islamic than their parents. They are more familiar with the symbols and rituals of Islam because of their exposure to religion and they tend to identify themselves more strongly with Islam. If this trend continues, there will be two possibilities in the long run: firstly, the *abangan* culture will become more Islamic and hence more acceptable to the *santri*; and secondly, more *abangan* will join the rank and file of *santri* organizations which will eventually consolidate political Islam.

However, at present, it seems that political Islam is under attack and politicized Muslims feel that they are under governmental pressure. They find themselves cornered. Finding it impossible to gain acceptance of their demands through constitutional means, some of them have chosen to go underground, and engage in violent activities.

It should be noted that political Islam is not alone in its opposition to the Soeharto government. The opposition consists of military officers (mainly retired),

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intellectuals, students, businessmen and politicians. The *Petisi Kelompok* 50 (Group of 50 Petition) emerged in August 1980 asserting that the President had misinterpreted Pancasila and deliberately sharpened the conflict within Indonesian society for the purpose of harassing his opponents. This group urged Parliament to do something about the matter. The signatories of the petition, fifty in all, included such well-known retired generals as A.H. Nasution, Ali Sadikin, M. Jassin, and Hoegeng, and veteran politicians such as Syarifuddin Prawiranegara, Mohammad Natsir and Burhanudin Harahap. The government-dominated Parliament ignored the petition.

Apart from this, there existed a more influential opposition group, known as FOSKO (*Forum Studi dan Komunikasi*, or the Study and Communication Forum). It was established in 1978 with the permission of the army Chief of Staff. FOSKO, consisting of retired senior military officers, aimed at offering ideas and suggestions to the army leadership on various matters. The executive board consisted of 17 people, including three in the presidium, Lieutenant General Djatikusumo, Lieutenant General Sudirman and Major General Sukendro. The Secretary-General of FOSKO was Lieutenant General Dharsono. FOSKO was later banned by the Ministry of Defence because of its critical attitude towards the government.

Students also represent a potential political force. Although they have no power, they are able to agitate against certain government policies. In general, many student activities are critical of the government, especially its economic and development policies. However, students cannot even begin to challenge the military group in power unless they are supported by powerful elements within the military as was demonstrated in the January 1974 Malari Affair. It is also relevant to point out that the attitude of the students towards the sole ideology is not clear. There was sympathy with Islam, but since the "de-politicization" of the campus in the late 1970s, there has not been any strong student movement against government policy (including the Pancasila bills).

Undoubtedly, the strongest group in Indonesia is the military, especially the army. However, the army is far from being a homogeneous group. It has ethnic, divisional and "generational" cleavages. Nevertheless, when facing political opposition from the civilians, unity tends to prevail. Of the many groups within the army, the Soeharto group appears to be most powerful. Soeharto has been able to balance army factions and push aside potential opponents so that he remains paramount in the political configuration. According to David Jenkins, Soeharto has also tried to neutralize his opponents through offering them positions and other benefits.[22] In the past twenty years he has been challenged a few times but has been able to respond to those challenges with ease.

Political System and Political Stability

As was mentioned earlier, Indonesia has been able to maintain political stability for twenty years. There have been minor challenges and turbulence but nothing excessively damaging. The Soeharto government has had the backing of the military

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élite and the co-operation of technocrats and politicians. Control measures and reforms have been introduced and the government has also attempted to "depoliticize" the population by limiting the activities of both secular and Islamic parties in the rural areas. The most important factor has been the expansion of the army's role in the bureaucracy, hence enabling it to control the population through the central government as well as the local authorities. Accompanying these control measures were economic development programmes. In the past, large oil revenues made possible various development projects and also continuing economic growth in the country. Many argue that stability in Indonesia can be attributed to the development of what is known as the bureaucratic polity (the application of the concept to Indonesia was developed by Karl Jackson).[23] It seems that the success of the bureaucratic polity is subject to two conditions: the cohesion of the ruling élite and the passivity of the masses. These two conditions, according to some observers (including Harold Crouch), were present in the past but are now gradually eroding.[24]

The élite has become disunited. Even those generals and politicians who were pro-Soeharto are becoming critical of his government. They even openly oppose Soeharto. This group includes frustrated politicians, especially Islamic nationalists, who have been thwarted from sharing political power with the military group. There has also been a growing indigenous middle class (or lower middle class) in the urban areas whose aspirations have not been satisfied under the present political system. The New Order economic policies have been seen to have benefited only a small number of the élite and Chinese businessmen. The urban masses, or "political public" as they are called by Herbert Feith, have also been growing, and so has their discontent.

Discontent has been further aggravated by other factors: the falling oil price and the world recession, the rapid population growth, and the resultant surplus in the labour market, the growing unemployment in the cities, and the uneven distribution of income. The widening gap between the rich and the poor is more obvious in the urban than the rural areas. Futhermore, problems of corruption and abuse of power are being increasingly viewed by the political public as a severe threat to Indonesia.[25]

In view of these circumstances, the Soeharto government considers it imperative that political participation should remain limited. Removal of restrictions, they argue, can only give rise to conflict which will directly threaten Indonesian unity and stability. Instead of loosening political controls, the government has further tightened them. It is clear that the government fears that the opposition parties, especially political Islam, would take advantage of any liberalization of the polity to create chaos.

Indeed, the government has identified political Islam as a major threat to the present regime. The opposition has rallied around political Islam as it has been viewed as the only alternative to the New Order regime. This may have led the government to think that the way to prevent political Islam from coming to power was to make Pancasila the only legitimate ideology. National unity is interpreted

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in terms of an *abangan*-dominated political system rather than a *santri*-inspired political order.

Has the government's approach further antagonized political Islam? Some observers have argued that by cornering political Islam, the Soeharto government has unnecessarily polarized further the two forces, Pancasila and political Islam. In the long run, this will harm Indonesian political stability. But the government appears to think that this is the time when it can neutralize political Islam so that it will have little claim for a share of power and no opportunity to eventually dominate the Indonesian political system. Some observers have noted that Soeharto wants to be remembered not only as the "Father of Development" but also as the one who brought social stability to the country.[26] It can also be argued that Soeharto wants to leave a legacy of a Pancasila state, a political system which is not based on Islam. However, the tussle between the two political cultures has not ended.

Since the military is the strongest force in Indonesian politics, it seems that the future of the struggle between Pancasila and political Islam will depend on the attitude of the younger generation in the military, especially the army officers who succeed Soeharto. It has been suggested that the army was concerned about this and, therefore, they introduced the practice of accepting only those with non-*santri* backgrounds into the military academy.[27] Among the rising stars who are to take over power from Soeharto's group, only General Try Sutrisno has been identified by the Indonesian weekly *Tempo* as a *santri*. It is interesting that Sutrisno's *santri* background only came to the surface after the Tanjung Priok affair. So far, however, his publicly expressed political views have been very close to those of Soeharto's generation.

If the younger generation military continues to be dominated by *abangan*-type leaders, it is likely that the Pancasila force will continue to hold the upper hand. After all, the army is the only organized force which can hold the country together.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

* This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Conference on Political System and Nation Building in ASEAN, held in January 1986 in Singapore.

1. The concept of *abangan-santri-priyayi* is treated in detail in Clifford Geertz's classic, *The Religion of Java* (New York: Free Press, 1959). The concept has been criticized by a few scholars but the basic division between *abangan* and *santri* is still extremely useful to explain the political behaviour of Javanese Muslims. His argument on the relationship between the concept and *aliran* can be found in his *The Social History of an Indonesian Town* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965), especially pp. 127–29. For a discussion on the "cultural solidarity groups", see Soedjatmoko, "The Role of Political Parties in Indonesia", in *Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia*, edited by Philip W. Thayer (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1956), pp. 128–40.

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2. For a brief study of GOLKAR, see Leo Suryadinata, *Political Parties and the 1982 General Election in Indonesia*, Research Notes and Discussions Paper No. 36 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982), especially pp. 12–18; and Awad Bahasoan, "Golongan Karya Searches for a New Political Format", *Prisma* (Jakarta), no. 25 (June 1982), pp. 55–82.
3. See note 1.
4. For a brief discussion on the nature of Indonesian political parties up to the Guided Democracy period, see Daniel Lev, "Political Parties in Indonesia", *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 8, no. 1 (March 1967): 54–57.
5. See Staf Angkatan Bersendjata, *Sedjarah Singkat Perdjuangan Bersendjata Bangsa Indonesia* (Djakarta, 1964), pp. 98–107. For a brief discussion on the Darul Islam movement, see Abdurrahman Wahid and Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti, "Government responses to armed communist and separatist movements in Indonesia: Islamic and military perspectives"; and Purbo S. Suwondo, "Comments", in *Governments and Rebellions in Southeast Asia*, edited by Chandran Jeshurun (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985), pp. 166–79; 180–85.
6. "Pancasila" or Five Principles was first formulated by President Soekarno on 1 June 1945 when Indonesia was about to declare its independence. It was supposed to be the philosophical foundation of an independent Indonesian state. The five principles are: Belief in One God, Internationalism (or humanitarianism), Nationalism, People's Sovereignty (or Democracy), and Social Justice. Although the majority of the Indonesian population are Muslim, Islam is not adopted as the state religion, as reflected in Pancasila. The first principle, "Belief in One God", aims at unifying various ethnic and religious groups in Indonesia and this also suited the idea/inspiration of the Western-educated Indonesian leaders who were in power.
7. Leo Suryadinata, "Indonesian Nationalism and the Pre-War Youth Movement: A Re-examination", *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 9, no. 1 (March 1978): 99–114.
8. For a discussion on the early compromise, see H. Roeslan Abdulgani, *Pendjelasan Manipol Dan Usdek* (Jakarta: Departemen Penerangan RI, Penerbitan Chusus No. 147, 1969), pp. 20–21. For a more detailed discussion, see Allan Samson, "Conceptions of Politics, Power and Ideology in Contemporary Indonesian Islam", in *Political Power and Communications in Indonesia*, edited by Karl Jackson and Lucien Pye (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 196–226. For a study by a Muslim scholar, see H. Endang Saifuddin Anshari, *Piagam Jakarta, 22 Juni 1945 dan Sejarah Konsensus Nasional Antara Nasionalis Islam dan Nasionalis Sekular tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia 1945–1959* (Bandung: Pustaka Perpustakaan Salman ITB, 1981).
9. Muhammad Kamal Hassan, *Muslim Intellectual Responses to "New Order" Modernization in Indonesia* (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1980), pp. 137–39.
10. *Straits Times*, 25 August 1983.
11. See note 8.
12. On the reform movement, see Fachry Ali and Bahtiar Effendy, *Merambah Jalan Baru Islam: Rekonstruksi Pemikiran Islam Indonesia Masa Orde Baru* (Bandung: Mizan, 1986), pp. 93–143.
13. For the idea of Nurchorlish Majid, see his book entitled, *Islam Kemoderenan dan Keindonesiaan* (Bandung: Mizan, 1986). For the ideas of M. Amien Rais, see his collected work entitled *Cakrawala Islam Antara Cita dan Fakta* (Bandung: Mizan, 1987), especially pp. 116–28.
14. *Straits Times*, 25 August 1983.
15. Deliar Noer, *Islam, Pancasila dan Asas Tunggal* (Jakarta: Yayasan Perkhidmatan, 1983), pp. 51–61.
16. Herbert Feith developed this concept in his early work, *Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 113–22.
17. "Undang-Undang Nomor 8 Tahun 1985, tentang Organisasi Kemasyarakatan", in ibid., pp. 466–80.
18. Cited in "Pembelaan (Pleidooi) Perkara Terdakwa Ir H.M. Sanusi, Dilibatkan Dalam Kasus Peledakan BCA Tgl 4 Oktober 1984 di Jakarta", mimeographed, p. 79.
19. NU was in conflict with the other major component of the PPP, Partai Muslimin Indonesia, which was under the control of J. Naro. Apparently, there was a struggle for power as well as differences in ideology and strategy within the party.

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20. The figures on *pesantren* are not available, but there are figures on mosques. For instance, in Jakarta alone, before the coup there were about 400 mosques but at the present time there are 1,600. In 1984, Indonesia had more than half a million mosques which were registered with the Ministry of Religious Affairs (*Tempo*, 14 June 1986, p. 56).
21. This observation has been made by my Javanese friends whose families have been "re-Islamized".
22. David Jenkins, *Suharto and His Generals* (Ithaca: Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project, 1984), p. 249.
23. For this argument, see Karl Jackson,"Bureaucratic Polity: A Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of Power and Communications in Indonesia", in *Political Power and Communications in Indonesia*, edited by Karl Jackson and Lucien Pye (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 3–22; and idem, "The Prospects for Bureaucratic Polity in Indonesia", pp. 395–97.
24. For Harold Crouch's argument, see "The New Order: The Prospect of Political Stability", in *Indonesia: The Making of a Nation*, edited by J.A.C. Mackie (Canberra: Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian National University, 1980), pp. 657–67. For more recent information on political opposition to Soeharto, see Leo Suryadinata, "Suharto's Indonesia: Two Decades On", in *Southeast Asian Affairs 1987* (Singapore: ISEAS, 1987), especially pp. 134–36.
25. For instance, see an opinion poll conducted by *Tempo* in 1980. *Tempo*, 16 August 1981, pp. 9–11.
26. R. William Liddle, "Depolarizing Indonesian Politics", *Asian Wall Street Journal*, 31 December 1985.
27. I have not been able to verify this, but Ruth McVey's observation of the post-war Indonesian army appears to support this view: "The long years of warfare against Muslim rebellion encouraged a tradition of army distrust of militant Islam, and the many Javanese officers of *abangan* persuasion were strengthened in their objection to Muslim aggressiveness. As a result of all this, the secularizing tendency common to the modern professional military was, in the Indonesian case, particularly marked; the *santri* officer became a rare bird. . .". SeeRuth McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army" (Part I), *Indonesia*, no. 11 (April 1971), p. 139. A political scientist in Jakarta who has done research on the military told me that none of the AKABRI (Akademi Angkatan Bersendjata Republik Indonesia) students is known as a *santri*.

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The United States Versus the USSR in the Pacific: Trends in the Military Balance*

AMITAV ACHARYA

In recent years, the United States and the Soviet Union have repeatedly accused each other of relentlessly expanding and modernizing their military forces and presence in the Pacific region. "The most far-reaching military development of recent years", says the Reagan Administration, "has been the dramatic increase of Soviet offensive power in East Asia and the Pacific and the Indian Oceans".[1] The Soviets have returned the compliment; as one commentator put it, "Striving for military superiority, the U.S. imperialists have overtly embarked, since the second half of the 1970s, on a dangerous road of speeding up the naval arms race in the Pacific region".[2] While such accusations and counter-accusations may seem to be a propaganda exercise, they are indicative of significant new trends in the military situation in the Pacific. During the past decade, the Pacific has become an arena for intensified military competition between the superpowers. This paper will look at the nature and dimensions of this competition, the trends in the superpower force structures, changes in their warfighting strategies and the major factors affecting the military balance between them in the region. It addresses two particularly important issues: whether the Soviet military buildup in the Asia-Pacific region has been prompted by an "offensive" strategy, as alleged by the Reagan Administration; and whether the military balance in the Pacific has actually shifted in favour of the Soviet Union as a result of its buildup during the past decade.

Dimensions of the Soviet Pacific Military Buildup

With its Far East territory covering an area of 6.2 million square kilometres, the USSR can legitimately claim to be an Asia-Pacific power. Although the importance of the Asia-Pacific theatre is secondary to that of Europe in Soviet strategic calculations, the existence of major adversaries (China and Japan) on its eastern flank and its vulnerability to American sea-based attacks are important factors in the security perception and policies of the Soviet state. This is reflected in the fact that, currently, one-third of the Soviet Union's land- and submarine-based strategic nuclear forces and one-quarter of its general purpose forces are stationed in the Soviet Far East.[3] The creation of a wartime theatre level command (TVD) for the Soviet Far East in 1979, several years before such commands were created for other regions of the USSR, further attests to the growing importance of the Asia-Pacific region in Soviet military planning.

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The nuclear component of the Soviet force structure in the Far East includes all the legs of the strategic triad — land-based intercontinental (ICBM) and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and strategic bombers. There are about 380 ICBMs (of the SS-18 and SS-11 types) deployed at seven launching sites in the Soviet Far East.[4] About one-third of these, in depressed-range configurations, are aimed at targets in the Asia-Pacific region, mainly China.[5] Of the 32 ballistic missile submarines currently deployed with the Soviet Pacific Fleet (SOVPACFLT), seven are of the conventional *Golf* class while the rest are of the modern nuclear-powered *Delta* and *Yankee* classes. Although some of the *Golf* class submarines probably have China and the U.S. forward bases in Japan and Korea as their targets, the Soviet SSBN fleet in the Pacific is primarily aimed at the United States. The *Delta* class SSBNs carry the SS-N-8 or SS-N-18 missiles that can reach most targets in the continental United States from the Sea of Okhotsk. These are soon expected to be joined by the new *Typhoon* class SSBNs, which carry 20 SS-N-20 missiles with nine warheads each. The Soviets have built tunnels at Petropavlovsk for their SSBNs. These are in the process of being hardened so as to enhance SSBN survivability.

The number of launchers of the SS-20 triple-warhead mobile intermediate range ballistic missiles in the Far East, targetted mainly at China and Japan, reached 171 by 1987. These are now to be scrapped as part of a U.S.-Soviet arms control agreement. The Soviets will, however, keep their intermediate-range bomber force. Since 1978, about 45 TU-26 *Backfire* supersonic bombers have been deployed in the Far East (apart from those in Soviet Naval Aviation). These, along with the older-generation bombers, 30 TU-22 *Blinders* and 100 TU-16 *Badgers* (now equipped with AS-6 *Kingfish* air-launched cruise missiles), provide the Soviet Union with an ability to conduct nuclear strikes against China and the United States and allied forces and installations in the region.

Of the 53 Soviet ground force divisions currently stationed in the Far East theatre, three are deployed in Sakhalin and Kamchatka, while the equivalent of one division (coastal defence) is on the Kurile islands. The rest of the ground forces and the major part of Soviet tactical air forces in the Far East and Siberia are designated against China. Between 1965 and 1980, the number of Soviet divisions on the Sino-Soviet border was more than doubled while the number of tactical fixed-wing aircraft was more than tripled. Although manpower reinforcements reached its peak in the early 1970s, the emphasis since then has been on qualitative modernization, particularly with the introduction of T-72 tanks, nuclear capable 152mm cannons and attack helicopter regiments.

In addition to the regular ground forces, the Soviet Union also has five special force (Spetsnaz) regiments and 120,000 KGB border troops (which can fight outside Soviet borders as well as inside and would be part of the regular Soviet armed forces in wartime) in Siberia and the Far East. There is some disagreement among Western intelligence sources whether there are any airborne divisions in this region; some sources report the stationing of one division at Khabarovsk, the headquarters of the Far Eastern Military District. There are also

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two air assault brigades in the Far East theatre, one each in the Central Asian and Far Eastern Military Districts.[6]

The Soviet air forces in the Far East theatre comprise some 2,400 aircraft. The number of fighter aircraft has experienced the most dramatic growth – from less than 300 in the mid-1970s to more than 1,200 in the 1980s. Qualitative improvement has followed the rise in numbers. According to the Japan Defense Agency, as much as 80 per cent of the Soviet tactical aircraft in the region are third-generation aircraft such as SU-24 *Fencers*, MiG-23/27 *Floggers* and most recently, MiG-31 *Foxhounds*. The U.S. Defence Department has claimed that the Soviet air forces in the Far East have been recently reconfigured for deep-strike operations, reflected in the rise in the number of ground-attack regiments from 15 to 21 since 1978.

The Soviet Pacific Fleet (SOVPACFLT) is the largest of all the four Soviet fleets (see Tables 2 and 3). The United States views the SOVPACFLT as the key to the Kremlin's objective of developing a two-front warfighting capability, and as the principal instrument of Soviet power projection into the Asia-Pacific region. The size of the SOVPACFLT has grown by 80 per cent since the mid-1960s, while that of its naval aviation component has grown by 50 per cent. The number of principal surface combatants has increased from about 50 in the mid-1960s to

TABLE 1
TRENDS IN SOVIET EAST ASIAN FORCES

	1965	*1985*
Ground Force Manpower	150,000	470,000
Ground Force Divisions	20	53
Tanks	4,000	14,900
Cannons	1,500	10,000
Tactical Aviation	<300[1]	>1,350
Major Surface Ships	50	89
Theatre Nuclear Weapons[2]	400	>982[3]

[1] Fixed-wing aircraft only.

[2] Includes bombers, medium, intermediate, intercontinental and submarine ballistic missiles.

[3] 171 SS-20 intermediate range missiles are to be dismantled as part of the recently concluded INF Treaty.

SOURCE: Paul Dibb, *The Soviet Union as a Pacific Military Power*, Working Paper No. 81 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University, 1984); *The Military Balance 1986–87* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1987); and U.S. Department of Defence, *Soviet Military Power 1983* (Washington D.C., 1983).

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TABLE 2
FLEET DISTRIBUTION OF SOVIET NAVAL FORCES

	Baltic Sea	*Northern Fleet*	*Black Sea*	*Caspian Flotilla*	*Pacific Ocean*	*Total*
Submarines[1]	41	163 (113)	35	–	123 (70)	362 (183)
Surface Warships	203	132	161	31	237	764
Mine Warfare Vessels	126	62	62	26	87	363
Amphibious Landing Craft	49	19	31	26	51	176
Naval Aviation (Aircraft/Helicopter)	275	410	280	–	525	1,490

[1] Numbers in parentheses indicate nuclear-powered submarines.

SOURCE: *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 27 June 1987, p. 1383.

TABLE 3
SOVIET PACIFIC FLEET, 1968–87

	1968	*1978*	*1987*
Carriers	0	0	2
Principal Surface Combatants	55	64	88
Submarines (General Purpose)	95	73	90
Submarines (SSBN, SSB)	10	30	32
Amphibious Ships	0	9	18
Naval Bombers	–	110	160

SOURCES: D.C. Daniel and Gael D. Tarleton, "The U.S. Navy in the Western Pacific", *Asia Pacific Community* (Winter 1986); Barry M. Bleehman and Edward N. Luttwak, ed., *International Security Yearbook 1983/84* (London: MacMillan, 1984); U.S. Department of Defence, *Soviet Military Power, 1987*; and *The Military Balance, 1986–87* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1987); and *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 27 June 1987, p. 1383.

about 90. The modernization of the surface fleet has been particularly evident since 1978. Since then, the SOVPACFLT has been assigned two *Kiev* class carriers, one *Kirov* class guided missile cruiser, four *Kara* class cruisers, one *Udaloy* and one *Sovremenny* class destroyer, eight *Krivak* class frigates (not including three *Krivak* operated by the KGB), one *Berezina* class fleet tender and one *Ivan Rogov* class amphibious landing dock (LPD). The U.S. Department of Defence expects that the SOVPACFLT will eventually receive two *Kirovs*, five *Sovremennys* and

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four *Udaloy*s. In addition to the new generation surface ships, the submarine fleet has been strengthened with the introduction of *Victor*-III and *Akula* nuclear-powered attack submarines and *Charlie* I nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines. Almost half of the SOVPACFLT's attack and cruise missile submarine fleet are nuclear-powered.

The Soviet Naval Aviation in the Far East has been significantly upgraded with the deployment of TU-22M *Backfire* bombers carrying AS-4 *Kitchen* long-range anti-ship cruise missiles. Since 1978, 45 *Backfire*s have been assigned to the Far East (based at Alekseyevka). Finally, the size of the Soviet Naval Infantry in the Pacific has grown to two regiments (about 8,000 troops). Its organic firepower and operational capabilities have been enhanced with the introduction of artillery and anti-tank battalions as well as T-72 tanks. The expected introduction of Helix-B naval combat helicopters, which could be deployed aboard *Ivan Rogov* class ships, would enhance close air support for amphibious operations.

But overall, the modernization of the SOVPACFLT has been limited in scale, affecting only a small portion of its surface ship and submarines. Despite the introduction of the *Sovremenny*, and a number of *Udaloy* class destroyers and *Krivak* frigates, about half of the SOVPACFLT's major surface ships consists of obsolete gun frigates (*Riga*, *Grisha* and *Petya* classes) and gun-destroyers (*Skory*, *Kotlin* and *Kildin* classes). Although the SOVPACFLT may be the largest Soviet fleet, it is not the most powerful. That distinction goes to the Northern Fleet, whose power derives largely from its submarine component and which receives the latest classes of Soviet warships several years before they appear with the SOVPACFLT. Further, with the departure of Admiral Gorshkov and the growing crisis in the Soviet economy, the Soviet shipbuilding programme has come under strong pressure. [Although the pace of Soviet shipbuilding in the 1970s raised alarm in the West, the U.S. and its allies actually built 53 more warships, displacing 62,500 more tons than the Soviet Union during that decade.] The same can be said of Soviet naval operations, which has "declined significantly" in the past two years compared to the operational tempo reached during the period from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s.[7]

It should be noted that only a very small portion of Soviet forces stationed in the Far East are power projection forces. These can be defined as ground, naval and tactical air forces that are to be deployed for "contingency operations quickly and in force over long distances against armed opposition".[8] Historically, Soviet forces have had a modest capability to operate in areas far from Soviet borders. Except for the air-mobile brigades, Soviet ground forces in the Far East comprise tank or motor-rifle divisions, which cannot be used for power projection. Of course, the Soviet Union's ability to use its Pacific fleet as a political instrument has been enhanced with the deployment of the *Kiev* and *Kirov* class ships. The contingent of Soviet Naval Infantry (SNI) troops stationed in the Pacific could, "on a limited scale, rapidly respond to local contingencies",[9] but that is not their primary mission. The SNI is a small force, meant to be used in support of heavy ground forces in the Eurasian flanks of the Soviet Union. Large-scale Soviet force

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projection missions in areas such as Southeast Asia and the South Pacific would be constrained by the distances involved, limited range of Soviet tactical aircraft, lack of base/logistics facilities in the region (Cam Ranh Bay notwithstanding), and the small number of amphibious and replenishment vessels in the SOVPACFLT. In fact, power projection does not appear to be a major factor behind the Soviet military buildup in the Asia-Pacific region. The main mission of Soviet forces in the region, as Paul Dibb has pointed out, are threefold.

> The first is to deter the United States and China from attacking Soviet territory. The second is, in the event of war, to launch nuclear strikes on the United States, its allies in East Asia and Oceania, as well as China, so as to prevent the successful prosecution of a separate theatre of war against the Soviet Union in the Pacific. The third mission is to launch conventional attacks against China and against US and allied naval and air forces in the northern and mid-Pacific, including perhaps the conventional phase preceding global nuclear war.[10]

Since the late 1970s, the Soviet Union has maintained a military presence in Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam. U.S. Defence Department officials have variously described Cam Ranh Bay as the "largest concentration of Soviet naval assets outside the Soviet Union",[11] or, in a more restrained note, as the "largest concentration of Soviet naval units and aircraft deployed to a naval facility outside the Warsaw Pact".[12] In August 1987, the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC), Admiral Ronald Hays, claimed that in Cam Ranh Bay, "on any given day, one finds 20–25 (Soviet) ships, approximately half of which are combatants, including three to four submarines . . .".[13] But satellite pictures of the base released by the United States have shown fewer combatants than the number claimed by the CINCPAC. Furthermore, it should be noted that Soviet naval forces homeported at Cam Ranh Bay, or deployed from there on a routine basis, do not include its most modern ships or submarines; the vessels identified in the U.S. satellite pictures showed only the older *Echo* and *Foxtrot* class submarines and *Grisha* and *Nanchuka* class surface combatants. However, the more advanced vessels have made periodic visits to Cam Ranh Bay, sometimes for exercise purposes. One of the most notable instances of such deployment occurred in 1984 when the SOVPACFLT carrier *Minsk*, and the *Ivan Rogov* class amphibious warship, *Alexander Nikolaev*, joined Vietnamese units to carry out "the Soviet Navy's first amphibious landing on the Vietnam coast".[14]

Apart from naval forces, the Soviet installation at Cam Ranh Bay includes a composite air unit, including bomber, reconnaissance, ASW, and fighter aircraft. There are 16 naval TU-16 *Badgers*, 10 of which have strike capabilities. These aircraft carry either the AS-2 *Kipper* air-to-ground cruise missile with a range of 200 nautical miles, or the AS-6 *Kingfish* air-to-sea missile with a range of 250 nautical miles. In addition, the Soviets have deployed a total of 8 *Bear* D/F aircraft, including both the TU-95 (reconnaissance) and TU-142 (ASW) versions. For base defence, the Soviets have deployed a squadron of 14 MiG-23 K *Floggers*.

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The Soviets insist that Cam Ranh Bay is nothing more than a "point of logistics support for the warships of the Soviet Pacific Fleet". According to the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral N. Smirnov, Soviet facilities at Cam Ranh Bay are "designed for replenishing the stocks of fuel, food and water, for minor repairs and rest for the personnel on brief calls by Soviet warships and vessels in transit from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean and vice-versa".[15]

Presently, the forces deployed at Cam Ranh Bay give the Soviet Union a limited regional power projection capability. There is no large-scale stationing of projection forces (such as amphibious ships, naval infantry, airborne troops, and aircraft carriers), although it is conceivable that such forces could operate out of Cam Ranh Bay at short notice in response to regional contingencies. However, the Soviets would need to develop the facilities at Cam Ranh Bay a lot further before it could truly serve as a power projection base. Currently, the major benefit offered by Cam Ranh Bay is to ease the logistical problems involved in sustaining Soviet naval presence in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean (apart from its usefulness as a communications and signal-intelligence collection centre). Cam Ranh Bay would have an important role should the Kremlin attempt to use its naval power as a political instrument in regional conflicts. But its role in a conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union is likely to be limited. It is highly unlikely that the Soviets would be able either to reinforce the base or defend it from U.S. attacks. This vulnerability could be a major factor behind Moscow's apparent unwillingness to homeport its most advanced ships and submarines at Cam Ranh Bay. Finally, it should be noted that while the Cam Ranh Bay base may be a strategic asset to Moscow, it is also a serious political liability. The Soviet military presence in Indochina has further alienated the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which views it as a threat to its security. Indeed, U.S. officials are not particularly alarmed by the political impact of the Soviet military buildup in the Asia-Pacific region.

U.S. Military Posture and Capabilities in the Pacific: Trends since the Vietnam War

In a recent testimony before Congress, the U.S. CINCPAC, Admiral Ronald Hays, described the U.S. security posture in the Pacific as consisting of: "strong, forward deployed US military forces and an effective network of alliances and friendships". The two components are closely interconnected; a sizeable portion of U.S. forces in the region are deployed in the territories of its three principal Asia-Pacific allies — Japan, Korea and the Philippines. These forces, along with the U.S. Pacific fleet and forces based in U.S. Pacific territories and the West Coast, have two primary missions: firstly, to ensure the "defence of North America, with emphasis on strategic deterrence", and secondly, to "assist in the defence of allies located in Asia and the South Pacific regions".[16]

In the early 1970s, the outlook on the future of the U.S. military presence and commitments in the Pacific appeared bleak, largely as a result of the fall-out

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of the U.S.–Vietnam War. This has since proved to be unfounded. Between 1968 and 1973, the U.S. withdrew seven army and one marine divisions from the Pacific. The strength of the U.S. Pacific fleet dwindled from 427 to 247 ships while the long-range bomber force (B-52 and F-111) was reduced by half. President Nixon's Guam Doctrine of 1969 — which ruled out any future direct commitment of U.S. troops in defence of its regional allies and asked the latter to assume the principal burden of their own defence — added to the impression of U.S. military decline in the region. The Carter Administration aggravated this perception by proposing to remove U.S. ground forces from Korea, and by actually carrying out the withdrawal of some troops. (The withdrawal was suspended after new intelligence estimates found the North Korean military to be much stronger than previously believed.)

The Carter Administration took a relatively positive view of the military balance in the Pacific. The Reagan Administration, however, questioned this view. Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger pointed out that while Soviet air, ground and naval forces in the Far East and the Pacific region continued to grow:

> U.S. naval forces in the Pacific, because of expanded commitments in the other regions such as Southwest Asia, have been reduced to a post-World War II low. Our warships and submarines in the Pacific are about half of the 1965 level. The nuclear balance in the region has also shifted in favour of the Soviet Union.[17]

The Reagan Administration pledged to reverse the trend and strongly reaffirmed its alliance commitments in the region. It cancelled the planned troop withdrawal from Korea, pledging instead to upgrade U.S. capabilities by providing its forces there with "the most modern and sophisticated equipment available to our forces anywhere in the world". In relation to Japan, the Reagan Administration strongly pressed the Nakasone government for an enhanced defence effort, with a view to strengthen the Japanese forces' ability to provide "sea and air defence in the North-west Pacific (and) complement U.S. strategic and conventional forces in the area".[18]

The modernization of the U.S. Pacific forces was particularly evident in the case of its Pacific fleet. Geography makes the Pacific a maritime theatre and naval forces form the largest segment of the U.S. PACOM forces. About half of the total U.S. naval forces and two-thirds of its marine forces are Pacific-based. U.S. naval forces in the Pacific are divided into two separate fleets. The Third Fleet, head-quartered in Hawaii, is responsible for operations off Alaska, the Berring Sea, the Aleutians, the Eastern Pacific and the mid-Pacific region. The other compo-nent, the U.S. Seventh Fleet, is headquartered at Yokosuka, Japan. Its area of responsibility (AOR) includes the Western Pacific, Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. In peacetime, the Third Fleet comprises five carrier battle groups (CVBG), one-and-a-half battleship surface action groups (BBSAG) and four underway replenishment groups (URG), while its wartime strength would consist of two CVBGs and one URG. The Seventh Fleet is allocated two CVBGs, half of a BBSAG,

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and one URG in peacetime, but this will increase to five CVBGs, two BBSAGs and three URGs in wartime. Of these, two CVBGs, one BBSAG, and one URG would be assigned to the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia in wartime, while the rest of the Seventh Fleet would operate in the northwestern Pacific. It is assumed that in wartime, the missions of the two fleets would overlap and there would be some trading back and forth between them, as happened during World War II.[19]

The U.S. Pacific fleet is a very modern one. Most of its older-class combatants were withdrawn from active service in the 1970s. The Carter Administration undertook a limited modernization of the fleet, but the Reagan Administration, as part of its commitment to build a modern 600-ship navy, has carried the process much further. In the past decade, the U.S. Pacific fleet has received *Spruance* class destroyers, *Perry* class frigates, *Los Angeles* class nuclear attack submarines, *Ohio* class Trident SSBNs, *Tarawa* class amphibious assault ships, *Whidbey Island* class amphibious ships, and *Aegis* cruisers. Two of the U.S. Navy's four reactivated battleships (*New Jersey* and *Missouri*), and three of the Navy's five nuclear aircraft carriers are also assigned to the Pacific fleet. In addition, *Aegis* guided-missile destroyers of the *Arleigh Burke* class and attack submarines of the *Seawolf* class are due to join the fleet in the near future. A noteworthy feature in the strengthening of the U.S. Pacific fleet is the emphasis on offensive and power projection capabilities, particularly the deployment of Tomahawk long-range cruise missiles aboard the fleet's surface ships and submarines which substantially enhances the strike power of the fleet. The Tomahawk missiles would enable the fleet to target and attack enemy forces, both on land and in the sea, at longer ranges than previously possible. In addition to the cruise missile deployment, U.S. carrier-based aviation in the Pacific has been strengthened with the replacement of the F-4 fighters with the F-14 aboard all large-deck carriers, as well as with the introduction of the F/A-18 *Hornet* dual-role aircraft and the S-3A Viking anti-submarine warfare aircraft.

The modernization of the U.S. Pacific fleet has been accompanied by increased attention to the north Pacific and Indian Ocean waters. The Third Fleet, which hitherto was regarded as a training group for forces preparing to deploy to the Western Pacific, has boosted its strength with the acquisition of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. The Third Fleet's area of responsibility includes Petropavlovosk and the waters east of Kamchatka peninsula, which is a major area of Soviet submarine activity. U.S. navy officials believe that by threatening Soviet forces in these waters, the Third Fleet would help offset the Soviet threat to Japan and the sea lanes. Destruction of Soviet submarines based in these waters is also a key objective of the U.S. "maritime strategy".

In the Indian Ocean, the U.S. Pacific fleet has contributed the major part of the forces deployed to the Persian Gulf and the Arabian sea since 1979. These deployments to the Indian Ocean have added a new dimension to the importance of the U.S. bases in the Philippines, especially the Subic Bay naval base and Clark air base. Subic Bay, as the major port, training area, and logistics support base for the Seventh Fleet, has become a prime supply point for U.S. operations in

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TABLE 4
U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND FORCE STRUCTURE AND DEPLOYMENTS, 1987

AIR FORCE	
(1 strategic bomber squadron, 11 tactical fighter squadrons, 5 tactical support squadrons)	
– Hawaii	Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) 1 Air division 1 AWACS squadron 1 Tactical transport squadron (C-130)
– Guam	1 SAC bomber squadron (B-52) 1 refuelling wing (KC-135)
– Japan. (5th Air Force)	1 Tactical Fighter Wing (F-15) 1 Tactical Fighter Wing (F-16) 1 Strategic Air Wing (KC-135, RC-135) 1 Tactical Transport Wing (C-130) 1 AWACS Wing
– Korea (7th Air Force)	2 Tactical Fighter Wings (F-4, F-16, A-10)
– Philippines (13th Air Force)	1 Tactical Fighter Wing (F-4) 1 Tactical Airlift Wing (C-130) 1 Tactical Fighter Group (Training)
ARMY	
– Hawaii (18,900)	U.S. Army Western Command, 25th Infantry Division
– Korea (29,750)	2nd Infantry Division
– Japan (2,400)	Headquarters, IX Corps
MARINE	
– Hawaii	Fleet Marine Force Pacific, 1st Marine Amphibious Brigade
– Japan	3rd Marine Division, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade
– U.S. West Coast (California and Arizona)	1st Marine Division, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, 5th Marine Amphibious Brigade, 7th Marine Amphibious Brigade
NAVY	
– U.S. Third Fleet	Headquarters, Hawaii (8 SSBN, some 25 SSN, 4 carriers, 72 principal surface combatants, 26 amphibious ships, 32 support ships)
Major bases	Pearl Harbour, San Francisco, Alameda, San Diego, Long Beach, Bango, Bremerton, Adak
– U.S. Seventh Fleet	Headquarters, Yokosuka, Japan 15 SSN and SS, 2 carriers (1 helicopter), 23 surface combatants, 6 amphibious ships, 8 support ships, 4 maritime prepositioning ships
Major bases	Yokosuka (Japan), Subic Bay (Philippines), Guam, Midway

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Defence, *Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1988* (Washington, D.C., January 1987); *The Military Balance, 1986–87* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1987); *Asia-Pacific Defense Forum* (Anniversay Issue: 1976–1986) 11, no. 1 (Summer 1986).

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the Indian Ocean. The Clark air base serves as a staging point for strategic airlifts to the U.S. base in Diego Garcia.

While the bases in the Philippines are important to the U.S. Pacific Command's operations in the Indian Ocean, its bases in Japan are critical to operations in the northwest Pacific. The Reagan Administration's "forward offensive" Pacific naval warfighting strategy has enhanced the importance of the U.S. bases in Japan. In a U.S.–Soviet conflict, the U.S. Seventh Fleet, from its headquarters in Yokosuka, would "direct all aircraft carrier, surface ship, amphibious, and submarine attacks on the Soviet Union", while the Fleet's command centre at Kamiseya would direct anti-submarine and naval surveillance operations. The Yokota air base, headquarters of the Fifth Air Force, would direct all non-strategic air operations. Other U.S. facilities in Japan would be used for "refuelling, targetting, intelligence collection and surveillance" operations.[20] Overall, the U.S. force posture in the Pacific has improved considerably in the 1980s.

Offence Versus Defence: The Changing Warfighting Strategies of the Superpowers and the Pacific Balance

One of the obvious, but important, results of the modernization of superpower forces in the Pacific is that each now perceives an increased direct military threat to its territory and interests from the other's Pacific forces. The American perceptions were summed up by James Kelly, the deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for East Asia and the Pacific:

> ... Soviet military forces in the Pacific for the first time pose a significant, direct conventional military threat to United States forces, territory and line of communication. We can no longer assume that an Asian conflict will be confined "over there" and that our involvement will be determined by whether we want to be involved or not. The Soviets now have and are steadily improving the capability to bring war to us by attacking our forward-deployed forces, our supply lines, including the critical Alaskan oil shipping lanes, and our territory in Guam and the Aleutians.[21]

The Soviet Union also sees great dangers to its security and territorial integrity from the buildup of U.S. Pacific forces. Soviet military strategists are particularly concerned about the forward offensive posture of the U.S. Navy (which is seen as playing "the main part in their [American] expansionist policy in the region ...").[22] As might be expected, the buildup of Soviet naval power in the Pacific is explained by the Kremlin as a "strictly defensive ... measure ... to counter U.S. expansionist policy".[23]

But while both the superpowers seem equally alarmed by the trends in the military balance in the Pacific, the challenges facing them in the region are not symmetrical. Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union faces two major adversaries in the region and its efforts to increase its military power in the Pacific must be viewed with this consideration in mind. As discussed earlier, the Sino-Soviet

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conflict has been the key factor behind the growth of Soviet land and air power in Asia.[24]

The China orientation of the Soviet Far East Forces is recognized by the United States as a major strategic advantage. U.S. officials believe that the Chinese "tie down" as much as 90 per cent of Soviet ground forces in the Far East. This would, among other things, greatly assist NATO's (North Atlantic Treaty Organization's) ability to counter Warsaw Pact forces in wartime by preventing the Soviet Union from diverting its Far East forces to Europe. It is, of course, possible that China may choose to remain neutral in a future East-West conflict. If Sino-Soviet relations improve significantly, the Soviet Union may reduce its force presence in the Far East.

Interpretations of the rationale behind the buildup of Soviet naval power in the Pacific vary. However, there is general agreement among analysts that the evolution of the modern Soviet Navy has been influenced by two decisive considerations: the defence of Soviet territory from sea-based nuclear attacks and the protection of its own nuclear second-strike capability, which lie primarily in the ballistic missile submarine fleet.[25] It is reasonable to assume that the modernization of the SOVPACFLT is closely linked to developments in the superpower ballistic-missile submarine force. Of the Soviet Union's 61 modern SSBNs, 25 are Pacific-based, deployed in deep-water trenches east of the Sea of Okhotsk. The importance of these Pacific submarine bastions increased significantly with the deployment of *Yankee* class and *Delta* class SSBNs in the early 1970s. The *Deltas* were especially important as they have the missile range to carry out nuclear-strikes against continental U.S. targets without having to leave home waters. At about the same time as these deployments took place, the Soviets began to transfer some of their newest surface combatants and attack submarines to the Pacific. This contrasted with the practice in the 1960s, when "surface combatants were still being transferred to the Pacific only when the ships would be spared from the Western fleets".[26] In addition to this, the buildup of the SOVPACFLT was partly spurred by a mistaken assumption on the part of Moscow that U.S. submarines equipped with *Polaris* and *Poseidon* missiles had been deployed to the northwest corner of the Indian Ocean, which would provide the best target coverage of the Soviet Union for these U.S. missiles. The SOVPACFLT provided the major part of the naval forces deployed by the Soviet Union to the Indian Ocean to counter this perceived threat.[27]

In contrast to the essentially defensive missions of the SOVPACFLT, the U.S. strategy in the Pacific, centred on its naval power, emphasizes offensive operations. Here, the most important development is the Reagan Administration's maritime strategy. The primary aim of this strategy is to attack and destroy Soviet SSBNs "protected and defended in their Arctic sea bastions by the Northern and Pacific fleets' general purpose pro-SSBN naval and air units".[28] The strategy puts the premium on forward operations. In wartime, U.S. naval forces in the Pacific would move forward aggressively, aiming to close the gaps at chokepoints through which Soviet ships and submarines must transit in order to reach open waters, destroy Soviet submarines that manage to reach the open waters, and kill as many as

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possible of the Soviet attack and ballistic missile submarines in their home waters. In addition to such offensive sea control and counterforce operations, which are to be conducted at an early stage of the conflict, U.S. forces would also strike at military installations in the Soviet Far East from which the Soviet naval aviation could threaten the attacking American forces, particularly aircraft carriers. The former U.S. Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral James D. Watkins, explained this strategy in the following terms:

> The portion of the Soviet land mass in the Far Eastern theatre that is within range of (US) naval forces stretches from Vladivostok to the Berring Strait. This entire area, including contiguous waters, contains numerous military installations and afloat forces which directly threaten Allied control of the Pacific sea lines of communication. Honouring treaty commitments to our allies in all portions of the Pacific Basin demands neutralization of that threat in a rapid and effective manner. We recognize these facts both in our strategy and in developing the capabilities to execute that strategy. Again, maintaining the initiative and using the inherent flexibility of naval forces to strike swiftly at a time and place of our choosing gives us the ability to pose a highly credible threat to the Soviet forces in their home operating bases and waters. Sequential operations involving various combinations of surface, sub-surface, air, and space assets tailored for action based on the nature of the opposition can be planned and executed with a realistic expectation of success.[29]

Integral to the U.S. maritime strategy is the concept of "horizontal escalation". This assumes that a superpower conflict, no matter where its origins lie, would quickly develop into a global confrontation. Accordingly, the U.S. Navy, the most flexible and deployable instrument of U.S. military power, has to be prepared to fight on a global basis. The emphasis of this global warfighting doctrine is on an ability to attack Soviet weak points wherever these could be found. The Soviet Pacific forces and its Far East territory are assumed to be among the principal horizontal targets. Thus, if a U.S.-Soviet confrontation broke out in Europe, "Powerful (US) strike forces in the Far East would exert pressure from the sea on the geographic area of the Soviet Union most vulnerable to attack", thereby forcing the USSR to devote greater resources to the Pacific and "reducing the forces they can commit to an attack against NATO".[30]

It is clear that the importance of the Pacific as a wartime theatre of operations has increased immensely as a result of these developments in U.S. naval strategy. No longer is the U.S. Pacific fleet regarded as a "swing" force whose assets would be diverted to the European theatre at the onset of a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. The "swing strategy", the former Navy Secretary John Lehman contended, had reached "total obsolescence" as a result of the growing strategic, political and economic importance of the Pacific to the United States.[31] Similarly, in crisis time the U.S. Seventh Fleet is no longer required to withdraw to the Marianas in order to remain beyond the range of Soviet land-based aircraft.

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TABLE 5
THE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET, 1969–87

	1969	*1976*	*1987*
Surface Combatants			
Aircraft carriers	12	6	6
Cruisers	18	15	18
Destroyers	102	28	29
Frigates	23	33	46
Subtotal	155	82	99
Attack Submarines	40	35	43
Ballistic Missile Submarines	7	NA	8
Amphibious Assault Ships	99	32	32
Support Ships	132	59	44

SOURCES: Barry M. Blechman and Edward N. Luttwak, ed., *International Security Yearbook 1983/84* (London: MacMillan, 1984); *Time*, 24 November 1986; and *The Military Balance, 1986–87* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1987).

Instead, the new strategy envisages the forward movement of the Seventh Fleet closer to the Asian mainland.

The U.S. Navy's emphasis on penetrating Soviet SSBN bastions and attacking Soviet bases and territory at an early stage of the conflict would confront the SOVPACFLT with a formidable challenge, forcing it to devote most of its resources to defensive missions near coastal waters. This, in turn, would leave it with few assets with which to conduct blue-water strike operations, including interdiction of the sea lanes lying south. The sea lanes interdiction potential of the SOVPACFLT deserves special consideration, since it has often been highlighted by the United States as a key aspect of the Soviet "threat" in the Pacific. It is often ignored that a Soviet threat to the sea lanes is unlikely to materialize in situations other than a superpower conflict. Conflicts between regional states, such as between Vietnam and Thailand or between China and Vietnam, are extremely unlikely to prompt a Soviet assault on the sea lanes, since such action would almost surely invite a U.S. response and escalate a regional conflict to a superpower confrontation. And in a conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, the threat of early forward offensive action by the U.S. Navy would largely neutralize any possible Soviet threat to the sea lanes. In 1979, a study group of the Atlantic Council headed by Paul Nitze concluded that the Soviets would have only 12

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TABLE 6
THE PACIFIC NAVAL BALANCE

	U.S.	*Soviet Union*
Principal Surface Combatants:		
— Aircraft carriers	6	2
— Battleships	2	0
— Cruisers	18	15
— Destroyers	29	16[1]
— Frigates	46	55[2]
Submarines:		
— Strategic	8[3]	32[4]
— Attack	43	90[5]
Amphibious	32[6]	21[7]

[1] About 10 are obsolete gun-destroyers of *Skory*, *Kotlin* and *Kildin* classes.
[2] About 30 are obsolete gun frigates of *Riga*, *Grisha* and *Petya* classes.
[3] *Ohio* class SSBNs. Each carries 24 *Trident* missiles with a total of 192 warheads per boat.
[4] Includes 16 *Delta*, 9 *Yankee* class SSBNs and 7 *Golf* class SSBs.
[5] About half are nuclear-powered. 25 carry cruise missiles.
[6] Includes 6 assault carriers, about 30,000 tons each.
[7] Includes one *Ivan Rogov* class landing ship dock (LPD).

SOURCE: Statement by the Australian Minister of Defence in Federal Parliament, 26 February 1987; *The Military Balance 1986/87* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1987); *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 27 June 1987; *Time*, 24 November 1986, p. 16; and U.S. Department of Defence, *Soviet Military Power 1987* (Washington D.C., 1987).

submarines available for sea lane interdiction.[32] Since then, while the size of the Soviet fleet has grown, so has the offensive capabilities of the U.S. Navy.

In a conflict with the Soviet Union, the U.S. Pacific fleet would seek to fully exploit the SOVPACFLT's geographical vulnerabilities and technological limitations. Geography imposes a severe constraint not only on the SOVPACFLT's ability to receive reinforcement but also on its ability to conduct operations far from its home waters. The SOVPACFLT is isolated from the Soviet Union's western fleets and major shipbuilding centres, a fact which would render its wartime reinforcement exceedingly difficult. The Kamchatka peninsula, where the SOVPACFLT's only major open ocean submarine base, Petroplavovsk, is located, has no railroads and the base has to be resupplied by air. Access to the open sea from the two other main bases of the SOVPACFLT, Vladivostok and Sovetskya Gavan, is subject to

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safe transit through three narrow straits (Tsushima, Tsugaru and Soya) linking the Sea of Japan to the Pacific Ocean; denying the SOVPACFLT safe passage through these chokepoints would be one of the principal wartime objectives of the U.S. Pacific fleet and the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force, the capabilities of which have improved substantially in recent years. Soviet efforts to reinforce Cam Ranh Bay in wartime from its Siberian bases could be similarly interdicted along the Sea of Japan, the Formosa Strait or the Bashi channel.

Despite its modernization, the SOVPACFLT remains qualitatively inferior to its U.S. counterpart in most classes of combatants. The U.S. Pacific Fleet maintains its substantial edge in most areas of maritime tactical operations, including anti-submarine warfare, anti-air, anti-ship and early-warning capabilities.[33] Even estimates pointing to the numerical superiority of the SOVPACFLT tend to be highly selective. As the data show, the U.S. Pacific Fleet is numerically superior to the SOVPACFLT in most classes of major surface combatants. The United States enjoys a far better support structure, both in terms of at-sea replenishment and shore-based facilities.

The foregoing analysis has been focused on the role of the naval forces. The largely maritime nature of the Pacific theatre and the China orientation of the Soviet ground forces would render them marginal, though not entirely inconsequential, to the outcome of a U.S.-Soviet conflict. For the Soviets, land-based tactical airpower would play a greater role, especially in the defence of Soviet territory, and in the battles involving Japan. But even if all the elements of the U.S.-Soviet force posture are taken into account, the net assessment is favourable to the United States.

Conclusion

The foregoing analysis indicates that while the growth of Soviet military power in the Asia-Pacific region during the past two decades has been impressive, its underlying rationale and orientation has not been purely, or mainly, offensive. The main factors influencing the Soviet buildup appear to have been the Sino-Soviet conflict (spurring the growth of Soviet ground and air power) and the development of submarine-launched ballistic missiles capable of hitting U.S. targets from Soviet Far East coastal waters (influencing the modernization of the Soviet Pacific Fleet). While the potential missions of forces built in response to these developments can be varied, it is not too far-fetched to suggest that the Soviet Union's primary objectives in building this force structure has been the development of a conventional deterrent against China and a more credible nuclear deterrent against the United States. This is not to say that the mission of the Soviet Far East forces are purely defensive nor that they have been developed only as a response to offensive Chinese and U.S. military buildups in the region. It is that the Kremlin has had to recognize new realities in its Asian front following the Sino-Soviet split and has had to develop a two-front warfighting capability. It is also that the offensive potential of the Soviet forces in the region, its power

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projection capabilities, and the role of Soviet military power as a political instrument of its policy in the region, are largely derivative in nature. These do not appear to have been a primary consideration in the Kremlin's decision to expand and modernize its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Soviet military buildup in the Pacific has been met with a strong response from the United States. The decline evident in U.S. military capabilities in the region in the immediate aftermath of the Vietnam War has been reversed. The U.S. strategy in the Pacific is focused on a vigorous buildup of its Pacific fleet as part of a markedly offensive naval warfighting strategy aimed at ensuring the "containment" of Soviet naval power at its source in the north Pacific. The U.S. posture, combined with the growing self-defence capabilities of its main Pacific ally, Japan, should ensure that the superpower military balance in the Pacific will continue to favour the United States for the foreseeable future.

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Cambodia: The Vagaries of "Cocktail" Diplomacy

JUSTUS M. VAN DER KROEF

In the history of modern diplomacy there have been few episodes as tortuous as the attempt to reach a settlement in the Cambodian conflict. For nearly a decade the parties concerned with such a settlement — not only the various Cambodian factions and their respective superpower backers, but also regional participants such as ASEAN and Japan, and mediators as distant from the scene as Austria and Yugoslavia — have travelled on a serpentine road of proposals, rejections, and new initiatives. The latest turn of events has been the meetings between Cambodia's Prince Norodom Sihanouk and the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) Prime Minister and concurrently Foreign Minister, Hun Sen, in December 1987 and January 1988 near Paris. The following pages are focused on the march of diplomatic manoeuvres and their underlying motivating forces leading up to these Sihanouk–Hun Sen discussions.

I

On 14 October 1987, the United Nations General Assembly, for the ninth consecutive year, passed a resolution demanding that the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) withdraw its estimated 160,000 military occupation forces from Cambodia, and urging that the latter's inhabitants be allowed to exercise democratic self-determination. Sponsored by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and almost identical in wording with similar resolutions adopted by the Assembly in previous years, the 1987 resolution won a 117 to 21 majority (with 16 abstentions), the largest ever since the Cambodian question began to be raised in the United Nations.

The size of the support for the resolution was surprising, in part because of the special diplomatic offensive waged against it by the SRV and its Soviet backer in and out of the United Nations. For the first time since 1983, Soviet and Vietnamese spokesmen involved themselves in the debate on the Cambodian resolution. Perhaps more importantly, the ASEAN states, as well as the various contending factions, in recent months had appeared to be moving at last, however slowly, towards a consensus on the format for direct discussion of a settlement of the long Cambodian stalemate. In addition, shortly before the Assembly vote, the Hanoi-backed PRK government in Phnom Penh had announced on 11 October a new partial withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. Hanoi and the PRK also intimated — in view of widespread skepticism about the bona fides of

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such announced troop withdrawals in the past — that consideration might be given to the presence of certain "interested" foreign observers to view the planned partial pull-out.[1]

Finally, in the run-up to the 14 October U.N. General Assembly vote, the PRK also announced on 27 August 1987, a new "national reconciliation policy" which would include a meeting with other anti-PRK and anti-Vietnamese Cambodian factions "regardless of their past, class, ideology, religious belief, or ethnic background" to settle their differences and achieve a common state.[2]

In line with this "national reconciliation" approach (voiced, ironically, by Sihanouk as early as 1981), the PRK, on 8 October 1987, also issued a five-point "Declaration on the Political Solution to Kampuchea's Problem". In analysing this five-point declaration it should be noted that it reiterated most of the themes of the annual communiqués of previous conferences of the foreign ministers of the three Indochinese countries, and in itself presented little news. The declaration, in its preamble, professed, however, to find in "the current situation" of the Cambodian conflict certain "positive developments" that seemed to offer prospects of "breaking" the stalemate. Clearly, this particular formulation was also designed as a cautionary admonition to those critics of Hanoi, particularly at the United Nations, where within the week another vote on the Cambodian question (and another condemnation of Vietnam's presence in that country) was expected.

In the event, this admonition proved in vain. But the new peace overture retained its significance as a concretization of the Hanoi-PRK line. The five-point declaration itself 1) reiterated a PRK willingness to meet with Cambodian opposition groups, including Sihanouk, and their participation in a process of "national reconciliation", excluding only Pol Pot and his "close associates", 2) offered a complete withdrawal of Vietnamese forces at the same time that foreign aid to the PRK's enemies ceased, 3) promised foreign-observed general elections in Cambodia after the Vietnamese withdrawal — elections designed to establish a "peaceful, independent, democratic, neutral and non-aligned Kampuchea", 4) called for direct Thailand-PRK talks to settle border problems, and 5) proposed that an "international conference" be convened to be attended, among others, by the United States, the USSR, and the People's Republic of China (PRC), in order to "guarantee the reached agreements" of the contending Cambodian parties. Not least, the five-point plan even offered Prince Norodom Sihanouk, once Cambodia's ruler (1946–70), and now President of the opposition "Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea" (CGDK), "a high position in the state leading apparatus" of the PRK. This offer was being made "for the sake of the nation's supreme interests" and because of the Prince's "contribution to peace" and other attributes.[3]

A closer look at the Vietnamese-PRK position is needed. Hanoi and its PRK ally seemed to be making a special effort to persuade skeptical observers of the many failed peace and reconciliation initiatives that had been made by various quarters as regards the Cambodian problem in previous years, that this time, for sure, there were no hidden reservations in their diplomatic overtures.[4] For example, in the past, Hanoi and PRK spokesmen had always insisted that their willingness

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to discuss Cambodia's problems with the CGDK or other opposition figures did not include discussions with "the Pol Pot clique". This is a reference to the leaders of the former government of "Democratic Kampuchea" (DK) which held sway in Cambodia between 1975 and 1979 and was mainly led by premier Pol Pot. The now oppositionist and Beijing-backed DK, and its estimated 40,000-man guerrilla "National Army", is the CGDK's mainstay. And while Pol Pot himself, at least overtly, has been relegated to the background in the present DK opposition leadership, Pol Pot's colleague, DK chairman Khieu Sampan, currently is the CGDK's Vice-President.

II

However, Hanoi and the PRK, unlike in previous years, now seemed to be attempting to narrow their definition of the "Pol Pot clique" so as to allow for discussions even with some DK representatives. On 21 September 1987, in an interview with a U.S. daily, PRK premier Hun Sen had declared that his government was now willing to talk directly to Khieu Sampan, as well as with Sihanouk and Son Sann, the leader of the third anti-PRK faction in the CGDK's uneasy alliance. Only Pol Pot and his DK associate, one-time DK Foreign Minister Ieng Sary, both of whom had been condemned *in absentia* for their crimes by a PRK tribunal in 1983, were now held to be *persona non grata* at such an all-Cambodian factional conference, Hun Sen said.[5] Subsequent PRK and Vietnamese commentaries on Phnom Penh's national reconciliation policy and the 8 October 1987 five-point proposal continued to reiterate that all opposition figures "except Pol Pot and some of his close associates" would be welcomed "in the national reconstruction" effort planned for Cambodia, and, earlier, on 1 October, a PRK diplomat had said that "we are ready to discuss matters with Khieu Sampan".[5] Hanoi and the PRK evidently were abandoning their earlier, blanket opposition to the DK and the Khmer Rouge as a whole.

Hanoi's and the PRK's seemingly new flexibility may well have been prompted, as will be considered shortly, by a growing weariness on the part of the new Soviet General Secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev, of the Cambodian stalemate and of Russia's continuing, costly need to prop up its economically stagnant SRV ally. Then, too, there probably has been a realization, both in Beijing and among the uneasily allied factions of the CGDK, that not much more is to be gained from the long deadlocked Cambodian status quo.

It should be noted also that as recently as February 1987, CGDK President Norodom Sihanouk seemed to prefer the path of direct bilateral discussions, for example, between Hanoi and himself, or between Moscow and himself, to get the Cambodian problem off dead centre, rather than use an inter-factional Cambodian conference. A meeting of the PRK with the three CGDK groups was not only unacceptable to him, Sihanouk declared, presumably because it might imply recognition of the legitimacy of the PRK, but the idea, said Sihanouk, had also been rejected by Beijing and its DK ally.[7] And again, in May 1987, during the meeting

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in Moscow between the Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs, Siddhi Savetsila, and Soviet Foreign Minister Edouard Shevardnadze, Cambodian affairs had been analysed extensively. One insider Western diplomatic source had summarized the conclusion of this meeting to the effect that any discussion of Cambodia merely would "continue the dialogue of the deaf".[8] For the moment, even Sihanouk seemed to have despaired of bringing all the ingredients of the Cambodian "cocktail" together. He had already determined to take "leave of absence" as CGDK President. In any event, a breakthrough in the Cambodian conflict, from Sihanouk's perspective, seemed at this point to be achievable only through the outside backers of the PRK, that is, Vietnam and the USSR, and of the CGDK, that is, the PRC.

Yet, within months, there was to be still another turn in the diplomacy of the Cambodian conflict. An analysis of this new turn suggests that, more than any other diplomatic figure, Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, was responsible for a change towards the new and more conciliatory direction, first in the PRK-Vietnamese camp, and eventually also in Sihanouk's position. Mochtar's intervention at this critical point was not surprising. After all, as ASEAN's officially designated "dialogue partner" with Hanoi (the official term is "interlocutor"), which presumably gives Indonesia an informal licence to carry on what has come to be generally known as "back-channel diplomacy" on ASEAN's behalf with the SRV, Mochtar earlier had been the most dedicated propagator, and indeed even may have been the inventor, of the notion of a so-called "cocktail party" among the Cambodians. The term, in this instance, refers not so much to an occasion of festive libations, but rather to an image of a mixture, contained in a single entity, of quite diverse ingredients — in short, the different Cambodian factions.

During previous years, various proposals had been offered, either to establish a "four-party" national "reconciliation" Cambodian government (composed of the PRK and the three CGDK factions), or to convene a conference to hold "indirect" discussions between the PRK and the CGDK seated in separate quarters and with ASEAN officials acting as conduits between them. The idea of "direct" negotiations between the Cambodian contenders, along with Vietnam, had also been floated. For example, on 25 August 1985, Sihanouk, speaking at Dangred, a small CGDK resistance camp at the Thai border, had called for an inter-factional Cambodian peace conference. But Hanoi's blanket objection to dealing with the "Pol Pot clique" had proved a major obstacle to this and similar suggestions. It was the Indonesians, however, who kept the idea of such a conference alive. On 8 November 1985, Indonesia's Mochtar, at a Jakarta press interview, openly endorsed the idea, at a time when even the mercurial Sihanouk, perhaps because of evident Chinese reluctance, seemed to have cooled towards it. During 1986–87, Jakarta also began prodding the Vietnamese to be more flexible about a meeting with representatives of the tainted "Pol Pot clique". Not least, the Indonesians popularized the whole conference notion by widely bestowing the *nom de paix* of "cocktail party" on it. Shrewdly, Mochtar made it appear as well that the idea of an all-Cambodian conference really had been implicit all along in various past diplomatic decisions and initiatives. Here, Mochtar referred, for example, to an

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announced willingness by the PRK at the Indochinese Foreign Ministers Conference in Phnom Penh in mid-August 1985, to begin discussions with some other Cambodian "opposition groups" (though not the "Pol Pot clique"), and to an apparent consensus of ASEAN Foreign Ministers at their own 1983 conference that the Cambodian conflict should be resolved by Cambodians themselves.[9]

However, when in the closing weeks of 1985 the Indonesians sought to pursue the "cocktail" idea further with their Hanoi dialogue partner, the Vietnamese as well as the PRK, in a hard-line stance, insisted on the unconditional "elimination" of "Pol Pot supporters" and their "political and military organization", as a prerequisite in the Cambodian peace process.[10] Not surprisingly, the position of the DK's main political ally and supplier, the PRC, stiffened in proportion. Beijing, by the close of December 1985, appeared to emphasize the importance of the CGDK, in order to compel the Vietnamese to withdraw from Cambodia by military means.[11] All this hardly seemed to be the kind of climate in which the "cocktail" idea was likely to thrive.

During 1986, the Cambodian stalemate at first appeared to be as rigid as ever. Towards the end of the year, however, there were some signs of softening on Hanoi's part — even as skeptics suggested that such apparent softening was only for the benefit of the world community. After yet another lopsided U.N. General Assembly vote on 21 October 1986 (115 for, 21 against and 13 abstentions) calling on Vietnam to withdraw its forces from Cambodia and to permit Cambodians to exercise their right of self-determination, the SRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach, in a much publicized press interview with the West German weekly *Der Spiegel*, seemed ready to consider dealing with the "Pol Pot clique". Thach now declared that there was a distinction between "bosses" and mere "followers" of the DK regime. The latter, according to Thach, could be accepted as "ordinary citizens" of the PRK if, henceforth, they dissociated themselves from Pol Pot.[12] And earlier, on 24 October 1986, hours after the latest adverse U.N. General Assembly vote, the Vietnamese apparently let it be known through Austrian channels that they were supportive of a meeting of different Cambodian factions in Vienna. This particular proposal, if true, reportedly may have gone awry, however, because of Sihanouk's insistence that the SRV be included in such a Cambodian factional conference. Hanoi apparently found it necessary to reject such a notion, on the grounds, as it emphasized, that the PRK alone is and remains "the sole legitimate representative of the Kampuchean people".[13]

III

By the beginning of 1987, as indicated earlier (cf. note 7 *supra*), Sihanouk was still insisting that only bilateral relations between himself and the Vietnamese and the Soviets could have any productive results. But within weeks, all this was to change. By early July 1987, and after the indefatigable Mochtar had visited Sihanouk in Pyongyang, the "cocktail" concept (or some facsimile thereof) suddenly appeared to have been reborn. According to the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Sihanouk

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had reacted favourably to the notion of an all-Cambodian conference, even as Singapore's leading daily warned that to agree to any "cocktail" notion at all, along with its implication that the Cambodian question is essentially something for Cambodians to settle, might "take some of the diplomatic heat off Vietnamese backs at places like the United Nations" where Hanoi regularly has been branded the aggressor in Cambodia.[14]

Since Sihanouk, meanwhile, disturbed over intra-factional disputes within his anti-Vietnamese and anti-PRK alliance, had taken an official "one year's leave of absence" as CGDK President, one might wonder just what his new posture was worth at this point. Perhaps he had been merely pleasant to his Indonesian visitor, or else the Prince might have felt there was nothing to lose, in any case, by endorsing the "cocktail" idea now. Mochtar suggested that, if needs be, Sihanouk, DK chairman Khieu Sampan, and Son Sann (leader of the third CGDK faction called the "Khmer People's National Liberation Front" or KNPLF), could meet with the PRK's party leader and chief of state (chairman of the PRK State Council) Heng Samrin, "as concerned Khmers" and not necessarily as factional leaders, so that they might work out a preliminary solution to the Cambodian conflict.[15]

It was the seemingly greater enthusiasm on the part of Hanoi for the "cocktail" idea that, along with Indonesian initiatives, proved a real breakthrough. This Vietnamese interest became particularly apparent during the visit of Indonesia's Foreign Minister to his SRV counterpart, Nguyen Co Thach, on 27–29 July 1987. The joint communiqué issued at the end of this visit notes that both Jakarta and Hanoi had agreed that "an informal meeting between the two Cambodian sides be held without preconditions or labels", and on the basis of equal footing. A second meeting, at a *later* time, at which Vietnam and perhaps other concerned countries would be present, was, according to the communiqué, seen as the next step in the conference process.[16] Mochtar was loath to provide further directions as to just how the "cocktail" party might be held, other than to offer Indonesia as a possible venue. But others were quick to deduce that since Hanoi had agreed to such a Cambodian conference without preconditions or "political labels", this meant that DK representatives — that is, those whom the SRV, thus far, steadfastly had dubbed "the Pol Pot clique" — would be able to participate.[17]

However, as has occurred so often in the diplomatic history of the Cambodian conflict, seemingly promising initiatives have a way of quickly evaporating. For one thing, among the other ASEAN states, and especially in Thai and Singaporean political circles, there soon developed uneasiness over the Mochtar-Thach agreement of 29 July. Hurriedly, a meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers was held on 16 August 1987, in Bangkok to review the "cocktail" idea. Thailand and Singapore voiced their opposition to the Mochtar-Thach approach, reportedly "because it lacked a time frame for Hanoi's participation" in the Cambodian talks.[18] Such a delay might make it appear as if what was happening in Cambodia essentially was a civil war, and not an act of aggression/occupation by Vietnam that repeatedly had been condemned in various international forums.

When asked about this alleged Thai-Singaporean opposition immediately

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afterwards, Mochtar attempted to put as good a face on the developing intra-ASEAN disagreement as possible, saying that the views put forth by Thailand and Singapore merely had been in the nature of "comments". Mochtar also brushed aside reported opposition to his agreement with Thach, reputedly coming from the Khmer Rouge (just "a temporary reply" from the DK, the Indonesian Foreign Minister breezily asserted, "which set some conditions", but which "hopefully" soon would see a change of "attitude").[19]

It shortly became apparent, however, that Mochtar had not wholly managed to persuade his ASEAN colleagues at the 16 August Bangkok conference. That conference, in effect, had insisted, as one Thai daily's editorial subsequently put it, that any Cambodian "cocktail party ... will be *immediately* followed by Hanoi's participation", and that, therefore, there will be only "one such party and that one strictly informal". Otherwise, as the same editorial emphasized, Vietnam would have "left herself the route open to say that the meeting of the four factions signified a domestic problem and Vietnam had nothing to do with it".[20]

In retrospect, it appears that ASEAN concerns about the implications of what Mochtar and Thach had done were not without some foundation. The new mood of greater "openness" and "experimentation" in Mikhail Gorbachev's Kremlin did not preclude continued caution in settling the Cambodian question. Neither did evident Soviet weariness with the drawn-out Cambodian stalemate itself. It is noteworthy, for example, that in its initially favourable reaction to the 29 July Indonesian-Vietnamese communiqué, the USSR emphasized that an "irreversible process of national rebirth" now had been taking place in Cambodia itself, and that the "Khmer people are the true masters of their country".[21] Clearly, it had been Bangkok's and Singapore's particular point of emphasis at the 16 August 1987 conference that not the "Khmer people", but rather the 160,000 Vietnamese troops occupying Cambodia were the latter's "true masters". Moreover, Mochtar, even before his 29 July communiqué with Thach, already might have incurred a measure of Thai irritation by his effort in early April to help settle the long-standing array of simmering problems existing between the Thais and the Vietnamese, ranging from frontier disputes to the problems of tens of thousands of Cambodian and Laotian refugees within Thailand or camped on the Thai-Cambodian border. To a suggestion made by Mochtar during a Bangkok trip in early April 1987, that Thailand and the SRV begin direct bilateral talks in order to settle the Cambodian and other issues, Thai Foreign Minister Siddhi Savetsila had replied that "while such a suggestion is seemingly well-meaning, it is regrettably misleading", because the "root cause" of the Cambodian problem was not any traditional fears between the Thais and the Vietnamese, "but the Vietnamese military invasion and occupation of Cambodia".[22]

Bangkok, in the days following the 16 August ASEAN Foreign Ministers conference, was to keep reiterating this theme. The Thais said that by trying to shift attention to an intra-factional Cambodian conference "Hanoi totally avoids the real problem which is only one — the invasion and occupation of Kampuchea

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by Vietnam", as one Thai daily put it.[23] In Jakarta, however, especially in anti-Chinese circles, there is an interest in eventually developing a strong, long-term, strategic *rapprochement* between Indonesia and Vietnam, once the Cambodian issue is out of the way. Hence, the 16 August Bangkok conference was perceived differently in Indonesia, for example, not so much as an "attempt to prevent the cocktail party from leading to a *de facto* recognition of the PRK government", but rather, the reverse, "as a trap to lure Vietnam into recognizing the CGDK".[24]

The bickering and concern within ASEAN was aggravated further by reports of mounting opposition to the whole "cocktail" idea coming from within the DK and from the DK's principal backer, Beijing. Concern reached a culmination with fresh reports that the Thais also had proposed at the 16 August ASEAN conference that instead of a Cambodian "cocktail" meeting, followed thereafter by discussions with Vietnam, the truly proper basis for a Cambodian settlement should be the so-called "eight-point proposal" which the CGDK had formulated on 17 March 1986.

The substance and implications of this "eight-point" proposal, which Hanoi quickly rejected, have already been detailed elsewhere, and can be summarized here.[25] The "eight-point" proposal calls for 1) negotiations between the CDGK and Vietnam for a gradual withdrawal of the latter's forces; 2) a subsequent cease-fire between all hostile forces in Cambodia; 3) U.N. supervision of both the Vietnamese withdrawal and the cease-fire; 4) negotiations between the PRK and the CGDK to establish a new, temporary coalition government headed by Sihanouk; 5) the holding of new U.N.-supervised elections; 6) restoration of Cambodia as a "liberal democratic" country, "peaceful, neutral and non-aligned"; 7) readiness to accept aid from all countries to rebuild Cambodia, and 8) signing of a non-aggression pact with Vietnam.[26]

Analysing the "eight-point" proposal reveals it to be essentially a summation of previously announced CGDK demands, sweetened with an emphasis on a presumably neutral, non-aggressive, "Finlandized" foreign policy of a new "liberal democratic" Cambodian regime. Such an arrangement would have meant both the abandonment of the PRK regime and the "irreversibility" of the Cambodian revolution, and an end to Hanoi's special "unity bloc" relationship (as Vietnamese media call it) with Phnom Penh. The Vietnamese, therefore, had been quick to reject the "eight-point" proposal. But it represented the lowest common denominator among the demands of the three different CGDK factions — and of the DK's uncompromising backer, Beijing.

By resurrecting the "eight-point" proposal during the 16 August Bangkok conference, the Thais must have realized that they would be perceived not only as trying to scuttle the Mochtar–Thach communiqué of 19 July 1987, but also as aligning themselves closely with Beijing's continuing hard-line posture towards Vietnam. In the latter respect, Bangkok particularly ran counter to Jakarta's long-term foreign policy perspectives and security concerns over the need to contain a future, modernized China.[27]

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IV

In the light of this ASEAN reaction, Hanoi's own position stiffened again. On 20 August 1987, Hanoi media indicated that the revived "cocktail" concept was moribund once again, and that it was all ASEAN's fault. An SRV Foreign Affairs spokesman noted that during a "consultative meeting" in Phnom Penh, on 12 and 13 August 1987, the three Indochinese vice-foreign ministers unanimously had concurred with the substance of the Mochtar–Thach communiqué. The ASEAN countries, however, at their own "unofficial meeting" on 16 August, had "sought to change the agreement on this cocktail party" by trying to transform what had been a planned "talk between the two Cambodian sides" into "a dialogue between Vietnam and the Cambodians". Moreover, the same SRV spokesman asserted, ASEAN also had attempted to turn the original Mochtar–Thach agreement into a discussion on the basis of the "eight-point proposal of the so-called CGDK". This could only be seen, he continued, as an effort "to abolish the PRK and to bring back the criminal Pol Pot genocidal clique".[28] Adding to the deepening controversy was a nearly simultaneous statement by CGDK premier and KPNLF leader Son Sann to the Chinese press. Sann reiterated that discussions between the Cambodians and Vietnamese had to be based on the "eight-point proposal" and that the CGDK could never accept "Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia as a *fait accompli*".[29]

Through it all, Indonesia's Mochtar sought to find the bright side of things by declaring that there still remained hope for a Cambodian "cocktail party". As the Indonesian Foreign Minister saw it, Hanoi basically still agreed with the original Mochtar–Thach accord of 29 July. As for Hanoi's recent criticism of the 16 August ASEAN meeting in Bangkok, Mochtar said that this did not mean that there could not be a "cocktail party" *per se*, because the formula rejected by Hanoi "is the ASEAN formula and not another formula agreed to by both Indonesia and Vietnam".[30]

This statement by Mochtar was rather extraordinary, because it could be interpreted as implying that the Cambodian factions — with or without ASEAN's blessing — in fact could go ahead and have their own "cocktail conference" on the basis of the Mochtar–Thach accord, presumably with Vietnam joining in, along with others, at some later point. Mochtar's new tack certainly seemed to catch the hard-line Thai Foreign Office by surprise. Still, a Thai spokesman subsequently seemed to think it best to straddle the diplomatic fence a bit: whether a "cocktail party" would be successful "would depend on whether the parties in conflict support the proposal", he said, but (returning to Bangkok's policy lodestar) he added that in any case "it is already clear that the Kampuchean issue is not a civil war among the Kampucheans".[31]

However, some of the Thai press, with close connections to politically influential high-ranking Thai military circles, were much more defensive. It was not true, Bangkok's *The Nation* declared, for example, that Thailand had tried to "sabotage" Mochtar's "cocktail party" initiative. And, in any case, intra-ASEAN

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differences had been smoothed out at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting on 16 August, an editorial in the paper said.[32] The latter in particular seemed more an expression of hope than a reflection of the real state of affairs in ASEAN. Mochtar, ever diplomatic and with the United Nations General Assembly debate on the Cambodian issue rapidly approaching, saw different ASEAN roads leading to the same goal. Indonesia's task, he said on 4 September, was to "soothe Vietnam" in the whole Cambodian question, whereas Thailand's "is to soften the attitude of China".[33]

Whether Thai diplomatic circles necessarily took the same broad view as Mochtar that the non-Cambodian players in the complicated Kampuchean scenario needed "soothing" and "softening" may well be doubted. The present writer has the impression that most informed Thai and other "hard-line" observers in the Southeast Asian region probably agreed with one Thai commentator on 2 October 1987 that though the "cocktail party" notion was still very much alive, the 16 August ASEAN meeting, in airing internal differences, had helped to prevent what could have become "a *fait accompli* in Kampuchea", in which Vietnam somehow would have been able to assume the role of a regional bystander, even though tens of thousands of its troops, technicians, and party cadres remained in Cambodia as its real government.[34]

V

Under the circumstances, and with its Soviet ally impatient for a solution to the long-drawn Cambodian conflict, both Hanoi and the PRK gradually moved towards still further flexibility, but not without sharp criticism of ASEAN. Soviet pressure doubtlessly was essential for this process. On 28 August 1987, the USSR, after meeting with Foreign Ministry representatives of the three Indochina states in Phnom Penh, had agreed to a Cambodian "national reconciliation" policy that would include discussions with the CGDK, except "the Pol Pot clique".[35] The Soviets clearly had used the occasion of this Phnom Penh meeting to move the Cambodian stalemate more quickly towards a process of intra-Cambodian factional dialogue and political solution. In subsequent weeks, with the U.N. General Assembly vote on Cambodia rapidly coming nearer, Moscow kept emphasizing the theme of the need for Cambodian "national reconciliation" and for a "unification of all the country's patriotic forces" regardless of "their past and of ideological and religious views". The Soviets took care, however, to note that the 16 August ASEAN reaction — despite the positive features of the Mochtar–Thach discussions earlier — had been unacceptable. For that ASEAN reaction suggested, in Moscow's view, the participation of "the Pol Pot bosses" in an ultimate Cambodian political settlement.[36]

Still, in this period, the overarching Soviet theme remained that the USSR, "together with all other countries concerned", continued to be "prepared to facilitate a political settlement in Cambodia".[37] Hanoi, for its part, could only keep on emphasizing that it too desired a political settlement in Cambodia, but not at the

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price of a simultaneous withdrawal of all Vietnamese forces from Cambodia, as the CGDK's "eight-point proposal" had demanded (cf. note 26 *supra*). With the Cambodian debate starting to warm up in the United Nations, SRV Vice Foreign Minister Nguyen Dy Nien, addressing the General Assembly on 29 September 1987, asserted that "the three Indochinese countries hold that in the 'cocktail party' as agreed upon [presumably in the Mochtar–Thach communiqué of 29 July] the stands of all parties concerned will have a basis for discussion". But, as for the demand that the Vietnamese withdraw their forces from Cambodia at the same time (the heart of the CGDK's "eight-point proposal"), Nguyen Dy Nien regarded this as tantamount to "bringing the genocidal Pol Pot regime, which is hiding under the label of the Coalition Government of Kampuchea, back to Cambodia".[38]

In this period of diplomatic thrust and counterthrust leading up to the 14 October U.N. General Assembly vote on Cambodia, it was natural that ASEAN too — despite its internal differences — did not wish to be portrayed as the main obstacle to peace in Cambodia. On 28 September 1987, ASEAN Foreign Ministers met in New York and agreed to issue a "joint explanatory note" regarding their position on Cambodia. The note subsequently was handed to the U.N. Secretary General and informally circulated among U.N. General Assembly members as well. In the note, ASEAN declared that as a result of the Mochtar-Thach discussions in Hanoi, during 27–29 July 1987, "the idea of the 'cocktail party' proposed by Indonesia" (that is, an "informal" Cambodian factional meeting "without any preconditions") had been agreed to. "After that", the note went on, "Indonesia will invite all countries concerned, including Vietnam to join the meeting". From this note, it was not clear just what Hanoi thought of such a procedure. But the note went on to say that ASEAN had been pleased with Vietnamese readiness "to participation in the informal or 'cocktail party' meeting", which would "initially" be held among the Cambodians.[39]

The note says not a word, however, about what had after all been the main source of contention at the 16 August 1987 ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Bangkok, that is, that Hanoi should not be permitted to get away from the central issue of the Cambodian dispute, namely, the Vietnamese invasion and occupation, and that, moreover, Vietnam's responsibility in this regard should not be relegated to discussions "after" the conflicting Cambodian factions had met. Had ASEAN, then, in the face of the upcoming U.N. vote, decided to push this source of contention into the background? It is hard to say. But it seemed to some observers that for the sake of making a gesture of unity towards its own official "interlocutor" with Vietnam, Indonesia's Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, and in order to undercut any waverers among potential supporters of another ASEAN resolution on Cambodia, ASEAN now seemed to be more fully endorsing the Mochtar-Thach "cocktail" concept at last.

Let it be said, however, that it was not so with Sihanouk. Somewhat surprisingly, considering the exigencies of diplomatic manoeuvring at the United Nations at this time, in the CGDK President's address to the U.N. General Assembly on 29 September 1987, there was a sharp critique of Hanoi's attempt "to bury

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the issue" of Vietnamese aggression against Cambodia. And, with reference to the "eight-point proposal", Sihanouk also put first among the prerequisites to bring the conflict in his country to an end the need for a phased Vietnamese pullout from Cambodia, as, meanwhile, an interim national reconciliation regime would be established preparatory to elections. It should be stressed, however, that the mercurial Sihanouk's hard-line position on this occasion contrasted sharply with his earlier announced willingness to participate in a Cambodian "cocktail party". As early as 7 September 1987, for example, Norodom's son, Prince Ranarith, reported in a Jakarta press interview that his father was quite interested in meeting with all Cambodian factional leaders, including the PRK. And, as late as the night of 13 October 1987, Indonesia's Mochtar claimed in a Jakarta press interview that Sihanouk had agreed to meet with PRK President Heng Samrin and other Cambodian leaders in the Indonesian capital, but that "the date is not yet fixed".[40]

VI

In any case, initiatives in the diplomatic jostling over the Cambodian issue were, as usual, shifting to non-Cambodian regional actors, particularly at this point. It was noteworthy, for example, that Mochtar's conversations with the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wu Xueqian, at the United Nations, produced an uncontradicted report in the Jakarta press that Beijing had agreed not to press for a return to power in Cambodia of the original DK ("Khmer Rouge") faction, the Cambodian opposition group which it had supported with weapons, training, and treasure for so long. The Chinese People's Republic, in fact, was now also said to be in favour of the Mochtar-Thach style "cocktail party" meeting among the Cambodian factions.[41] Mochtar, in turn, was reported to have expressed his "relief" over Wu's remarks, which were described by the Indonesian delegation at the United Nations generally as constituting "a progressive step".[42] As for Sihanouk's seemingly uncompromising United Nations address on 29 September 1987, and its resurrection of the "eight-point proposal" Hanoi has deemed anathema, Moscow apparently chose to ignore it. Soviet spokesmen and media not only praised the PRK's earlier mentioned "national reconcilation" policy announced on 27 August 1987, but, more importantly perhaps, on 30 September 1987, also lauded Sihanouk's earlier announced willingness to take part in talks among the various Cambodian groups.[43]

The previously noted PRK "five-point proposal" of 8 October 1987 (cf. note 3 *supra*) seemed to be coming almost in response to both Beijing's surprise shift in attitude towards its own DK ally and towards Moscow's praise of Sihanouk. It will be remembered that this PRK "five-point proposal" not only announces a readiness to meet with other Cambodian opposition leaders, including Sihanouk, but offers the latter "a high position in the state leading apparatus" (Pol Pot and "his close associates" are excluded from the offer). Sihanouk's hard-line speech on 29 September 1987, during the U.N. General Assembly's debate on Cambodia (cf. note 40 *supra*), and the subsequent overwhelming vote in the Assembly on 14 October demanding a Vietnamese withdrawal and democratic Cambodian

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self-determination, seemed to elicit on the part of the PRK-SRV primarily a somewhat lofty, "let's rise above it" reaction of pained tolerance for so much misguided thinking in the world community.

Indeed, both Vietnamese and PRK pronouncements following the U.N. vote asserted that some countries somehow had been compelled to vote for the Cambodian resolution against their true interests. Phnom Penh's official news report of the U.N. vote asserted *inter alia* that 1) any U.N. action on the Cambodian question "without the participation of its genuine and legitimate representative, the PRK, is null and void", 2) that "some countries, for some reason have voted against their will for this erroneous resolution", but that 3) "the main thing is to see what happens after the U.N. vote" and that events "certainly will develop" contrary to the U.N. resolution.[44]

Hanoi's official press report professed to see a silver lining, declaring[45]

> A general trend is to push for the dialogues now being arranged between the Cambodian parties as well as between the two groupings of the Indochinese and ASEAN countries. We understand and sympathize with various countries that for one reason or another had to vote for a resolution against reality and their own will. It can be said that the situation following the vote will not develop as dictated by the U.N. resolution on Cambodia. The situation will develop in accordance with the pattern of life and with the irresistible trend of dialogue. The Cambodian issue will be solved outside the U.N. framework and in Cambodia between the opposing Cambodian parties as well as between countries concerned.

In the weeks following the passage of the Cambodian resolution vote, Hanoi maintained a discreet silence, as its Cambodian opponents and some ASEAN members, meanwhile, expressed satisfaction over the outcome of the voting. Malaysia's Deputy Foreign Minister, Abdullah Fadzil Che Wan, urged Vietnam to "take heed" of the apparently growing international support for the CGDK. The DK's clandestine transmitter crowed over "another brilliant victory for our Cambodian people", adding that the world community remained unwilling to accept Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia as a *fait accompli*.[46]

At the same time, however, Sihanouk, on a visit to Yugoslavia (whose government had assured him of its support for the CGDK), muddied the waters by once again insisting that any political solution to the problems of his country could only be achieved on the basis of the CGDK's "eight-point proposal" and on an "unconditional pullout" of Vietnamese forces. The same point seemed to be reinforced in a CGDK "clarification" on 31 October 1987, signed by Sihanouk, in which any "national reconciliation" discussions only could take place "after the first phase of Vietnamese troop withdrawal" in accordance with a general military pullout agreement. A month later, in a communiqué issued by Sihanouk's press representative, it was insisted that "national reconciliation" was possible only "within the framework of a completely independent Cambodia", a Cambodia wholly free of foreign troops "and one that is neutral and noncommunist".[47]

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And even with ASEAN's "interlocutor", Indonesia, relations were becoming somewhat strained during this period over the question of just what had been discussed during the Mochtar-Thach meeting on 27–29 July regarding an international observation of any future partial Vietnamese troop withdrawal.

VII

But if the "cocktail party" idea seemed to have acquired a life of its own, despite periodic seemingly irreversible comatose conditions, then that was to be demonstrated again very shortly. Within days of the U.N. General Assembly vote, sources close to Sihanouk disclosed that he would have a "cocktail party" of sorts after all, in the near future. This party, however, would be for two, and would be limited to only PRK premier (Council of Ministers' chairman) Hun Sen and Sihanouk himself. It would be held in Paris in December 1987. In Hun Sen's recollection, Sihanouk twice before, in 1984 and 1986, had declined a similar opportunity to meet with the PRK leader. According to Sihanouk, however, an "audience" already had been offered Hun Sen in early October 1987, presumably even before the U.N. vote took place. Whatever its origins, Hun Sen professed great optimism about the possibilities of the outcome of such a meeting with Sihanouk. The reason, Hun Sen said, was because Sihanouk had set no preconditions, and "all questions pertaining to elections and the future coalition government" of Cambodia could be discussed "at the negotiating table".[48]

Whether the latter term referred to a Hun Sen-Sihanouk "negotiating table", or to one at which *all* Cambodian factions, including Sihanouk's, would be seated seemed not altogether clear, although Hun Sen in his statement appeared to look towards the latter format. The PRK premier expressed confidence that "if Samdech Norodom Sihanouk sits at the negotiating table, this could soften the position of the other two factions" (presumably the DK and the KPNLF). But because Sihanouk at that point, at least pro forma, had temporarily stepped down as CGDK leader, and because Hun Sen's explanation seemed designed to reaffirm the Mochtar-Thach accords which would have Vietnam only "later" join any Cambodian discussions, the problem of how a "cocktails for two" meeting might yet be turned into an acceptable "cocktails for four" arrangement remained unresolved.

Indonesia's Mochtar, meanwhile, continued to express confidence that both "cocktail parties" would be held, and that the Sihanouk-Hun Sen one in Paris would probably precede a CGDK-DK cocktail meeting. The latter, Mochtar at first claimed, would be held in Jakarta but "the date is not yet fixed".[49] Later in October, however, Mochtar, probably as a result of new, more covert pressure from his ASEAN colleagues not to let wear off too quickly the effect of the renewed condemnation on 14 October of the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia by the U.N. General Assembly, seemed to hesitate. By 26 October 1987, the embattled Indonesian Foreign Minister was quoted as saying that while Indonesia "had earlier expressed its readiness to host a meeting between the Cambodian leaders in Jakarta", the decision on this matter "was left to the disputing parties".[50] And it

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also seemed to be becoming evident that whatever a Hun Sen-Sihanouk "cocktails for two" in Paris might accomplish, none of the other CGDK factions, nor a seemingly reluctant ASEAN, was ready to push for the original Mochtar-Thach idea of an intra-Cambodian factional "cocktail party". At their mid-December 1987 summit meeting in Manila, the ASEAN heads of state pledged to continue efforts to find "a durable and comprehensive political solution to the Kampuchean problem". But neither the specific formula of such a solution, nor the flurry of activities engaged in by their own "interlocutor" was noted. "Cocktail" diplomacy seemed too controversial a gambit to ASEAN even now.

Sihanouk himself also was coming under fire from unexpected quarters over his willingness to sit down with PRK premier Hun Sen. For example, in mid-October 1987, Romanian President Nikolae Ceausescu reportedly had expressed his own strong reservations to the visiting Sihanouk about any intended meeting with Hun Sen. In the past three years Ceausescu intermittently and unsuccessfully had acted as an intermediary between the various Cambodian factions and Vietnam so that his interest in the conflict at this juncture was not surprising. But, by seeming to warn Sihanouk away from any bilateral contact with Hun Sen, the Romanian President — *mirabile dictu* — appeared to be aligning himself with the hard-line Chinese–DK position, reflected also, it will be recalled, in Thailand's criticism of the Mochtar-Thach communiqué. Ceausescu, reportedly, had sent Sihanouk a message telling the latter that Vietnam should withdraw its forces from Cambodia "at the same time as, and not after, the formation of a four-party government of national reconciliation in Cambodia".[51]

How and why Ceausescu came to assert what is the esssence of the CGDK's "eight-point proposal" at this point in time remains a mystery; the Rumanians, as is well-known, when a relatively safe opportunity arises, have been ready to demonstrate some degree of independence in foreign policy matters, particularly those that fall outside the Soviets' immediate security interests. But Ceausescu's intervention — though it certainly did not change Sihanouk's mind — did demonstrate once again how much the Cambodian embroglio has entered the foreign policy perceptions of various powers outside the Southeast Asian region. Indonesia's Mochtar himself, reportedly, decided to be in Paris when the Sihanouk-Hun Sen dialogue "mini-cocktail" took place, in order, as he put it, to consult with his French counterpart Jean-Bernard Raimond and so as to avoid any "misunderstandings" that could arise between possibly new French peace initiatives in the Cambodian affair and those of ASEAN.[52] Just what these particular French initiatives might be was not disclosed. But from all this activity, an observer might deduce that, whatever the long-term contribution of the Mochtar initiative, all manner of "cocktail" arrangements seemingly were beginning to capture the imagination of world chanceries.

VIII

It is only fair to give the Soviets, and particularly USSR party secretary Mikhail

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Gorbachev, a large measure of the credit for this renewed upsurge in international concern. For too long, perhaps, it has seemed as if the superpowers, each for its own political-strategic reasons, appeared content to let the Cambodian crisis stew in its own juices.[53] Already during the first few months of 1986, both Soviet Foreign Minister Edouard Shevardnadze, and his deputy Mikhail Kapitsa, had voiced a new emphasis on the need for a solution to the Cambodian problem. Among the prospects they raised were not only the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia, but also a new process of Cambodian self-determination, one that would not necessarily be under the auspices of the existing PRK regime. Implicit in their pronouncements as well was the assertion that the Cambodians themselves should be allowed to work out their own destiny and that what had caused the Cambodian problem in the first place was the intervention of various external forces, particularly China, the United States, and ASEAN.[54] A sense that Moscow was getting weary of Hanoi's Cambodian involvement clearly shone through some of these pronouncements, as, meanwhile, with the start of 1987, the Russians also seemed to be seeking closer trade and cultural relations with a number of Southeast Asian nations.[55]

At the back of all these manifestations of Soviet interest lay the much discussed address by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Vladivostok on 28 July 1986. In this address there was recognition that Cambodia, having "sustained terrible losses" had "gained the right to choose friends and allies for itself", and that "it is impermissible to try and draw it back into the tragic past", or "to decide the future" of Cambodia in "distant capitals or even in the United Nations".[56] While the latter phraseology might be interpreted as an encouragement to Hanoi and Phnom Penh to continue to remain impervious to U.N. resolutions condemning the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, the fact is that the Vladivostok speech also marked the start of a time of increased Russian pressure on the SRV to find a Cambodian settlement.

The format of that pressure campaign unmistakably seemed to point in the direction of a Mochtar-Thach-type "cocktail party", that is, a meeting among Cambodians, and separate or "later" meetings with or between Vietnam, ASEAN, China, or other concerned powers, but, in any case, an injunction to begin meeting and talking *now.* During a Laotian visit in March 1987, Shevardnadze declared in Vientiane that "We have stressed everywhere that the solution to the Cambodian problem is the affair of the Cambodian people themselves". But, shortly afterwards, in Hanoi, the Soviet Foreign Minister also came out in support of discussions between Vietnam and interested regional states. It was especially the latter endorsement which reportedly made the Vietnamese uneasy.[57] For the SRV must have realized that in Beijing and in ASEAN capitals — even in Jakarta — any Vietnamese attempt at a "decoupling" of an intra-Cambodian "cocktail" conference from Hanoi's own continuing occupation of Cambodia simply would not be accepted. And already in mid-December 1986, Yegor Ligachev, a ranking Soviet leader speaking at the Vietnamese party congress in Hanoi, had urged Vietnam to normalize its relations with the People's Republic of China.[58]

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Shevardnadze's remarks in Jakarta, in early March 1987, subsequent to his Indochinese journey, may have also given subtle notice to Hanoi that the Gorbachev era meant that the usual diplomatic roundelay on the Cambodian problem might not continue. While in the Indonesian capital, the Soviet Foreign Minister emphasized that Moscow itself did not intend to intervene in the Cambodian conflict, but instead urged "Southeast Asian nations" to continue their discussions to find a settlement. In this context he also suggested that ASEAN countries which might be reluctant to talk with the PRK directly should begin recognizing and dealing with the "reality" that, after all, "there's a government in Phnom Penh". In January 1988, after the first Sihanouk-Hun Sen meeting in France, Soviet media praised PRK efforts to find a settlement of the Cambodian issue through "national reconciliation".[59]

What one discerns in these various Soviet pronouncements is not just an impatience with Hanoi to get the Cambodian issue settled, but more specifically the road to such a settlement, that is, the substance of the Mochtar–Thach "cocktail" idea — an intra-Cambodian plus an intra-regional conference. Justified skepticism might well greet these suggestions. But let it be noted that meanwhile neither from Beijing nor from Washington did one hear any comparable urging of diplomatic initiatives. For example, until the Mochtar-reported indication of Chinese approval of the Mochtar–Thach "cocktail" party formula (cf. note 41 *supra*), Beijing's standard reaction to any policy proposal coming out of Hanoi — as the PRC's *Renmin Ribao* put it — was that Vietnam was singing "the same old tune" of a political solution "which does not have any new meaning". Invariably, too, Beijing's comment tended to link the SRV's stagnating economy to the need for Hanoi "to stop the war of aggression against Cambodia and withdraw its troops".[60]

Moreover, in the opinion of regional observers at the time, the deadlocked status quo in the Cambodian conflict, and the continuing Vietnamese military presence there, seemed to suit Chinese interests just fine, as it opened up significant new opportunities for Beijing to widen its influence in the Southeast Asian region, for example, by close Thai-Chinese military co-operation, also in support of the anti-PRK and anti-Vietnamese Cambodian guerrilla resistance.[61] In turn, it was precisely such Chinese aid for the DK's "National Army" (commonly called "Khmer Rouge") that enabled Hanoi to cite Beijing's policy as constituting a major stumbling block to a Cambodian peace.[62]

IX

As for the United States, it continued, as it had during the Reagan Administration, to let ASEAN, and indirectly also the PRC, set the course towards any solution of the Cambodian problem. In March 1987, a U.S. State Department spokesman averred that ASEAN not only had "worked effectively" to "increase the international stature of the noncommunist resistance", but that the Cambodian non-communist factions themselves had succeeded "in marginally expanding" their operations against the Vietnamese and PRK within Cambodia itself.[63] One

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notes, *inter alia*, that this U.S. assertion came at a time when the disunity within the CGDK — also exemplified by the imminent stepping down for one year of Sihanouk as CGDK head — was greater than ever, and when renewed efforts were under way by Mochtar to revive the "cocktail" approach.

But something of the new diplomatic flurry surrounding the Cambodian question seemed to have caught on. By the close of May 1987, for example, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Gaston Sigur, had more closely identified his government with the CGDK's "eight-point proposal", declaring that a solution to the Cambodian problem depended on a Vietnamese withdrawal, as well as on "negotiations between those parties directly involved", and on the holding of democratic elections in Cambodia itself. Sigur also envisaged "a permanent state of neutrality" for the country, although why that needed to be so was not explained.[64]

But from then on, the United States did not deem it wise, however, to comment further, for example, on the intermittent Mochtar–Thach discussions during the second half of 1987, on the "Kampuchean clause" of such intra-ASEAN meetings as the mid-December 1987 Manila heads of state conference, or even on the subsequent "mini-cocktail" meetings of Hun Sen and Sihanouk near Paris.[65] Yet, already by October 1987, the USSR and, to a much lesser degree, even the PRC had appeared to be more interested in pressing their respective Indochinese constituencies to move the Cambodian issue off dead centre. And the Reagan Administration itself had requested a modest US$5 million assistance package for the two non-communist factions of the CGDK. But more importantly, perhaps, at a time when the Reagan Administration seemed concerned to find grounds for *rapprochement* with the USSR in vital strategic areas, and when it affirmed that it remained as firmly committed as ever to develop a solid diplomatic and commercial relationship with Deng Xiaoping's China, Washington's persistently detached posture in a diplomatic area where joint superpower initiatives seemed positive and, indeed, inviting, is rather curious.

X

Ultimately, considering the jousting of the Cambodian factions and their various foreign supporters, it almost seemed miraculous that the Sihanouk–Hun Sen "mini-cocktail" conferences were held at all. It is too early to evaluate the significance of these meetings, the first of which began at Fère-en-Tardenois near Paris on 2 December 1987, and the second at St. Germain-en-Lave, also near Paris, on 20 January 1988. Neither meeting achieved any substantial breakthroughs. Agreement that the Cambodian conflict required a political solution by the Kampuchean people themselves and that, eventually, an international conference would have to endorse such a solution, was achieved at the first meeting.[66]

But subsequent criticism by KPNLF leader and CGDK premier Son Sann, and Hanoi's refusal to participate in the discussions despite Sihanouk's insistence, as well as the mercurial Prince's own initial decision to cancel a second round

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of talks with Hun Sen (later rescinded) — all these developments signified that within his own CGDK coalition Sihanouk would find it hard to forge any concurrence, even if some agreement with the PRK could be gotten. At the 20 January 1988 meeting, Hun Sen insisted that the CGDK be dismantled and that the DK's "National Army" be dissolved before all Vietnamese forces were withdrawn from Cambodia. This demand came, even as DK chairman and Khmer Rouge leader, Khieu Sampan, had let it be known that his faction would refuse to participate in any intra-Cambodian peace talks of the Sihanouk–Hun Sen variety, unless Vietnam was prepared to participate as well. To do Sampan's bidding, Hanoi, in effect, would concede a degree of recognition of the DK–Khmer Rouge opposition — something the Vietnamese have consistently refused to do (cf. note 13 *supra*). Son Sann, meanwhile, insisted, that neither Sampan nor he should join discussions with Hun Sen, unless Hanoi first promised in writing to the United Nations to withdraw its forces from Cambodia.[67]

All the while Sihanouk himself was compelled to justify the fact that he had been meeting with Hun Sen in the first place. Defensively, Sihanouk reiterated that he consistently had demanded from Hun Sen various guarantees for free elections and a democratic government. At the same time, the PRK premier's own demand for a Khmer Rouge dissolution confirmed the skeptical, silently hostile attitudes towards the talks increasingly conveyed by the DK and Beijing as the time of the first "mini-cocktail" meeting came nearer. The bickering within the CGDK camp reached such intensity that on 30 January 1988, Sihanouk, citing "constant hostility" coming from the direction of Son Sann's KPNLF, once again formally declared his resignation as CGDK head. This was the third time the Prince had announced he was quitting the CGDK leadership, and twice before, he had been prevailed by ASEAN, the United States, the PRC and other supporters to rescind his decision. Whether the volatile Sihanouk will do so again remains to be seen. It was noteworthy, however, that the Prince did not criticize the Khmer Rouge, whose opposition to the "cocktail diplomacy" process also had undermined the new gambit towards Hun Sen.

Despite these developments, it seems unlikely that the concept of future intra-factional Cambodian peace negotiations will vanish. The significance of the Sihanouk–Hun Sen meetings lies in the fact that they were held at all. There is no vista of journey's end, as yet, in the Cambodian tragedy. But, in reaching that end, the world most probably will see more "cocktail diplomacy".

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33. Oana-Bernama despatch, Jakarta, 4 September 1987 (*FBIS:AP*, 8 September 1987, p. 22).
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35. Reuter's despatch, Bangkok, 29 August 1987.
36. *Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya* (Moscow), 19 September 1987, p. 3 (*FBIS:AP*, 25 September 1987, p. 22).
37. Cited in *Asiaweek* (Hong Kong), 13 September 1987, p. 14 (USSR Foreign Ministry statement, 31 August 1987).
38. Radio Hanoi, domestic service, 30 September 1987 (*FBIS:AP*, 2 October 1987, p. 45).
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62. Hanoi, VNA despatch, 14 April 1987 (*FBIS:AP*, 15 April 1987, p. K4).
63. Statement of U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, John C. Monjo, in *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington, D.C., May 1987), p. 29.
64. Gaston J. Sigur, Jr., "East Asia and the Pacific: An Era of Opportunity", *Current Policy*, no. 971 (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C., 28 May 1978), p. 2.
65. In contrast, Moscow did comment favourably and early on a Hun Sen-Sihanouk meeting, expressing hope that the "two sides" would find a way to "normalize" the Cambodian situation. Radio Moscow, 29 October 1987 (*FBIS:AP*, 30 October 1987, p. 32).
66. Agence France Presse despatch, Fère-en-Tardenois, 4 December 1987 (*FBIS:AP*, 4 December 1987, p. 30).
67. *The Nation* (Bangkok), 17 January 1988 (*FBIS:AP*, 19 January 1988, p. 33).

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BOOK REVIEWS

PAVN: People's Army of Vietnam. By Douglas Pike. Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1986. 384pp.

As Douglas Pike points out in his preface, the previous absence of book-length studies on the Vietnamese communist armed forces is surprising, given the prominent place that the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) has occupied in Southeast Asia's recent history. Having defeated the will (if not the armed forces) of both France and the United States in their struggles to control the destiny of Indochina, the PAVN went on to subjugate Cambodia while simultaneously defending Vietnam against its erstwhile ally, China. In 1987, the PAVN comprised more than a million regular personnel, making it the fifth (though not the third, as claimed by Pike) largest military force in the world. Several non-communist Southeast Asian governments claim that Vietnam's apparent military might poses a serious threat to their countries' security.

The strength of Pike's study lies in his masterful discussion of the position of the PAVN in relation to the wider Vietnamese communist movement and Vietnamese society as a whole, both historically and more recently. As Pike continually emphasizes, perhaps the PAVN's single most important feature is "the integrated, symbiotic relation of military to Party", in both war and peace. Two of the most impressive and convincing chapters are those concerned with *dau tranh*, the Vietnamese communists' mutant version of their Chinese comrades' ideas about how to fight a guerrilla war. *Dau tranh* was a "seamless web" of political and (increasingly as the Vietnam War continued) armed struggle. The political struggle was not restricted to Vietnam: it was taken to the United States' home territory where it turned "the weight of the enemy's philosophical system against him". Pike's most important conclusion regarding *dau tranh* is that the anti-communist side in the Vietnam War failed to develop an effective counter-strategy: for the South Vietnamese and their allies "it was possible to lose the war by losing battles, but winning the battles did not mean victory".

Pike's three chapters on "Party, Ideology and Leadership" are also excellent. Despite the close relations between Party and Army, there are conflicts — especially concerning the extent to which the armed forces should be used for economic and other non-military tasks and the "red versus expert"conundrum. Pike points out that the "experts" are probably still a minority amongst the officer corps, and that the PAVN's consequent technological and doctrinal weakness has become increasingly significant since Hanoi's armed forces have become involved in counter-insurgency in Cambodia and the defence of the northern border against China. The Cambodian experience, in particular, has revealed "serious shortcomings": the PAVN now finds itself on the receiving end of *dau tranh*.

In his concluding chapter, "PAVN and the Future", Pike makes two worthwhile points. Firstly, the PAVN's military prowess should not be exaggerated: "with the exception of Thailand, Vietnam does not represent a significant direct threat to its neighbours". Secondly, Pike points to the "anachronistic" nature of the Vietnamese communists' political

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and military system, which has been challenged by both "southern" influences and the relative socio-economic success of non-communist Southeast Asia. In his view, this system lives on borrowed time, and is in danger of falling prey to the "Polish syndrome" involving the imposition of military-dominated "Marxist fascism". However, Pike was writing in 1983 and much has changed in Hanoi since then. While his first conclusion remains valid (perhaps more so than ever, given Hanoi's apparent determination to withdraw most of its troops from Cambodia by 1990), the second obviously needs to be re-evaluated in the light of the vigorous attempts to "renovate" Vietnam's economic and political system since the sixth party congress in December 1986.

Douglas Pike was extraodinarily well-equipped to write a standard work on the PAVN, having followed its fortunes over a quarter of a century and with Berkeley's incomparably comprehensive Indochina Archive at his fingertips. But although Pike has undoubtedly succeeded in his attempt to produce "a straightforward explanation of the PAVN's place and role in terms of Vietnamese national philosophy and governmental behavior", *PAVN: People's Army of Vietnam* is not without flaws.

Pike argues that the PAVN's crucial strength during the Vietnam War was its ability to use its own superlative skill in organization to exploit the other side's organizational weakness. The PAVN also seems to have got the better of Douglas Pike in a rather similar manner. Somehow, the constituent chapters of *PAVN: People's Army of Vietnam* fail to mesh together to form a satisfactorily cohesive whole. For example, the central doctrinal concept of *dau tranh* is introduced almost at the very beginning (p. 17), but the meaning and significance of the term are not explained until Chapter 9 (p. 213 *et seq*). More importantly, Chapters 3, 4, and 5, replete with details of the PAVN's contemporary operations, command structure, order of battle and auxiliary forces come as a shock immediately after two historical, introductory chapters: they might have been better positioned after the more important sections on "Party, Ideology and Leadership" and "Strategy".

A second problem is Pike's sometimes unsatisfactory handling of the more strictly military aspects of the PAVN. In particular, Chapters 4 and 5 (on "The High Command Structure" and "Paramilitary Forces" respectively), while including a great deal of useful and interesting information, abound with unfortunate factual errors, typographical mistakes, repetition, contradictions and confusion. In places, Pike seems quite out of his depth when discussing the PAVN's military hardware. For example, on p. 112 there is the astounding statement that "Some of these Vietnamese warships are equipped with SSN-3 antiship missiles (twenty-one mile range), SSN-2 STYX missiles (thirty-mile range), and SS-21 Frog and SS-23 Scud missiles". A glance at standard reference works such as *Jane's Fighting Ships* and *The Military Balance* would have revealed that the SSN-2 is the only one of these missile types in service with the Vietnamese navy; the SS-21, SS-23, Frog and Scud are *four* different types of *land-based* missiles, none of which are in service with the PAVN.

Despite these problems (which could be rectified without a great deal of difficulty if a second, updated edition is eventually produced), *PAVN: People's Army of Vietnam* is highly recommended to anyone interested in penetrating the myths which surround Vietnam's "military might".

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Malaysia: Tradition, Modernity and Islam. By R.S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy. Boulder: Westview Press, 1986. 180 pp.

In this volume, one of a series of profiles on contemporary Asia, the authors set out to explain "what is going on" in Malaysia and also to provide readers with a picture of the complex cultural composition of this ethnically diverse country. The book is pitched at an introductory level and is meant for both the general reader and undergraduate students. As the authors explain in the preface, this work is not the result of any specialized research; rather it is written from the long-standing research experience of the authors, which extends over many years and has produced a number of works on Malaysian politics.

The authors provide a concise historical background to the contemporary scene, taking the reader through Malaysia's early history, the colonial era, the winning of independence, the main events of the post-independence period and developments under the present Mahathir administration. Subsequent chapters deal thematically with the political process. Ethnicity, class and culture are examined, the major political institutions and processes identified and the structure, strengths and weaknesses of the Malaysian economy discussed. A separate chapter is devoted to developments in Malaysian foreign policy.

There are a number of attractive features in this book. The various themes and background are handled in a concise way, enriched with the insights of the authors, and expressed in a clear and readable style. Care has also been taken to explain the political saliency of some of the more complex dimensions of ethnicity, such as language and religion.

Less attractive, however, is the marked tendency of the authors to view developments from the perspective of the regime. In a number of instances, the authors display a dangerous willingness to accept uncritically the official version of events, to regard opponents of the government with suspicion, and even to slip into the partisan language associated with the pronouncements of the ruling party. Thus, for example, Malaysians of Chinese descent campaigning for the recognition of Chinese as an official language prior to the 1969 inter-communal riots are branded as "chauvinists" (p.40), while the more contemporary dissidence of some Malay youth studying overseas, is dismissed as "activities of an Islamic extremist variety" (p. 94). Elsewhere, in their discussion of the mass media, the authors are apparently sympathetic to official controls in the interests of preserving inter-ethnic harmony. Nothing is said of the controlling interests held in almost all of Malaysia's press by component political parties of the ruling coalition and the political consequences of such control. The authors are embarrassingly effusive in their praise of the ascendant leadership. We read that Dr Mahathir is a "serious, impatient, resolute, and direct individual" whose action-oriented administration has sought "to propel the country, and particularly the Malays, toward modernization" while at the same time seeking "to reinforce moral values and discipline in society" (p.121). No doubt, events since the publication of this book may lead other observers to a more sober view of the Mahathir administration. By contrast, the opponents of the ruling party, who are described as adopting "strident and abrasive positions" at elections, are judged by the authors as seeming to be "more intent on delaying proceedings, arguing or embarrassing the government than on offering constructive criticism" (p. 123). Little effort is made to explain why opposition parties regularly receive a significant percentage of the vote.

At an analytical level, this work also has some problems. At times the authors become somewhat confused and muddled in their apparent desire to reconcile a benign view of the government's (that is, the UMNO-dominated Barisan Nasional) policies and actions, with the objective reality. For example, despite their statement that the Malays are

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politically hegemonic and that certain Malay goals are non-negotiable (p. 118), the authors persist in concluding that, in inter-communal relations, "the spirit of accommodation continues" (p. 119). There is also a marked failure to reconcile the apparent contradiction between "modernity" (as the concept is commonly understood in political science literature) with Islamization. Sooner or later the dominant Malay (Muslim) leadership must reach an impasse in attempting to Islamize a multi-ethnic nation state whose constitution is essentially secular and Western in concept and whose Muslim citizens form but a slender majority of the overall population. In this regard, the present reviewer cannot accept as accurate the authors' claim that "by 1984, because UMNO was still responding to the basic concerns and fears of the non-Muslims, the alarm over Islamization had been smoothed" (p. 54).

On balance, the book provides a useful and readable introduction to Malaysia and its ethnic and political complexities for the general reader and undergraduate student. However, the view of Malaysia presented is perhaps more benign and in conformity with the official version of events than is actually the case.

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China and Vietnam: The Roots of Conflict. By William J. Duiker. Indochina Research Monograph Series No. 1. Berkeley, California: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1986, 136 pp.

This small volume is a most comprehensive and highly readable general account of Sino-Vietnamese relations from a historical perspective. Containing six chapters, the book begins with a survey of the legacy of history and then highlights the troubled relationship between the two countries during the 1945–75 period, before examining more recent developments. A separate chapter is devoted to each of the two Indochina wars, and one to the immediate aftermath of the Second Indochina War and the Cambodian conflict. The book ends with a general evaluation which places the Sino-Vietnamese conflict in the larger geopolitical context involving the superpowers, and also assesses its future prospects.

In his search for the roots of the conflict, Professor Duiker exhausts virtually the complete range of factors that have helped shape the relations between the two countries over the past forty years. Among the major factors that have been given special attention are conflicting security concerns, ideological differences, divergent perceptions of the Soviet Union, the issue of the overseas Chinese, and territorial disputes, all of which are blended into an essentially chronological and therefore straightforward survey of developments in Indochina. The end product is a most carefully balanced and succinct summary of important variables and events. As such, the book serves as an excellent introductory text on Sino-Vietnamese relations.

Perhaps precisely because of the extent of coverage and the limited space available, instead of examining in detail any major cause or aspect of the conflict or advancing any new theory, the book seeks only to construct a somewhat simplified picture of a highly complex story, which Duiker must be commended for having done successfully. By the same token, the book does not shed any new light in its analysis on the subject nor does

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it present any new sources in its documentation. In fact, with the exception of the author's personal interviews with officials in Beijing and Hanoi during 1984–85, virtually all the material contained in the book is already available from existing literature on the subject. The book is, therefore, more useful for general readers than for specialists.

In his interpretation of the sources of the Sino-Vietnamese dispute, Duiker clearly emphasizes the relevance of past events and also discounts the conflict as a proxy war between the superpowers. The general thrust of his arguments indeed points to the centrality of the incompatibility of security interest between China and Vietnam, reinforced by ideological differences, which are believed to be inherent in their relations and therefore bound to generate a good amount of mutual distrust all the time. Consequently, all the contentious issues that erupted after 1975, including the ongoing conflict over Cambodia, are mere reflections of such distrust between the two countries, rather than the causes of the deterioration in relations. This being the case, Duiker contends that both Beijing and Hanoi have settled on long-range strategies, and that Vietnam possesses a number of significant advantages *vis-à-vis* China in the continuing war of nerves. Also, from his perspective, Cambodia is too critical to Vietnamese national security to be bargained away under pressure, and Vietnamese leaders are confident that the anti-Hanoi alliance is inherently vulnerable and will eventually collapse from its internal contradictions. Therefore, Hanoi is counting on its ability to outlast its adversary, as it did during the previous war against the United States. And the success of China's strategy depends, above all, on its ability to maintain the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea as "a credible force and an alternative to the Hanoi-dominated regime in Phnom Penh" (p.108).

Whereas all these are sound observations, Duiker gives the impression, perhaps inadvertently, that the Cambodian war is a conflict purely between China and Vietnam and that its outcome also can be determined exclusively by these two countries. This does not correspond to the actual situation. One may, for instance, have some reservations about whether ASEAN support is indeed "not essential to the success of China's strategy" and whether China has more or less single-handedly engineered and manipulated the anti-Vietnamese resistance movement in Cambodia, as Duiker contends. Here Duiker's own interviews with Chinese and Vietnamese officials, which are reported only in the footnotes, contain some interesting information, showing that China did not suspect Vietnam's ambitions before 1975, nor did it, in the view of the Vietnamese, mastermind Pol Pot's anti-Vietnam campaign (pp. 51, 55). In fact, a strong case can be built to the effect that the conflict over Cambodia is as much one between Thailand and Vietnam and still another between the Khmer people and their traditional enemy, the Vietnamese, as one between China and Vietnam. Hence, the protracted nature of the war and the remarkable stability of the united front maintained so far between China and ASEAN and among the ASEAN states themselves. Viewed in this light, the conflict over Cambodia is being waged on at least three different levels, over which China has only partial control. This also means that the Vietnamese do not find only one adversary in Cambodia, but several, and China need not be the most formidable nor the last one Vietnam has to defeat in that country.

Another minor shortcoming in analysis has to do with the way Duiker presents his arguments. Apparently out of his concern to give a balanced treatment of the subject, Duiker occasionally appears non-committal and even deliberately ambiguous in his discussion of the sources of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict and thereby unwittingly contradicts himself. This is particularly so in the second half of the book. Thus, Duiker comments on the overall situation on page 89: "It is clear that there were several factors involved in the breakdown in Sino-Vietnamese relations. It is more difficult to single out the underlying

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factor most responsible for the outbreak of armed conflict." But on the very next page, he writes: "The dispute over Cambodia was obviously a central factor in the gradual breakdown in mutual relations, and may have been the single most important immediate cause of Beijing's decision to go to war" (p.90). Then on page 91, Duiker again reverts to his initial position and argues: "There were multiple causes of the deterioration of Sino-Vietnamese relations that took place at the end of the Vietnam War. Some involved practical concerns related to national security, territorial integrity, and national independence. Others related to questions of ideology or other factors connected with the Cold War. Still others appeared to be a product of mutual suspicion and perceptions rooted in the distant past". Similarly, on China's Vietnam policy, Duiker contends at one point that China's major concern is its relations with the global powers. "For Beijing the 'Vietnam problem' was only part of its larger concern over how to deal with the Soviet threat. The Cambodian crisis was also affected by its rapidly evolving relationship with the United States" (p.82). A few pages later on, however, Duiker writes: "Great power interests, then, were clearly implicated in the crisis, but they were not critical either in bringing it about or leading it to its final military confrontation. The real roots of the conflict must be sought in the complicated relationship between China and Vietnam and between Vietnam and Cambodia. Phnom Penh, Hanoi, and Beijing all base their actions on the conviction that their larger adversary was determined to reassert its past dominance over its weaker neighbour" (p.92). While these assessments sound familiar to the well-informed, on the following page Duiker proceeds to play down the relevance of such mutual suspicions by arguing that "it is difficult to attempt a definite answer to this question" and that Phnom Penh, Hanoi and Beijing "may have exaggerated the threat to their own security" (p.93).

In a similar vein, Duiker refrains from making clear forecasts for the future. Having identified the Cambodian problem and "the geographical factors that surround it" as the "key issue" in the Sino-Vietnamese dispute, and affirming Vietnam's determination to persist in its policy of occupation, Duiker declines to speculate on the likely outcome of the conflict or the kind of solution that may become acceptable to both China and Vietnam. In spite of the title of the final chapter, "The Road to Reconciliation", the author remains noncommittal in his forecasts and presents the possibilities of both continuing conflict and reconciliation. Hence, on the one hand, Duiker writes: "The security objectives of the two sides remain mutually incompatible, while the legacy of bitterness surrounding the relationship remains too deep to permit the emergence of a spirit of compromise" (p.117). On the other hand, he argues that "the historial record of Sino-Vietnamese relations is marked by periods of cooperation as well as conflict, and the arguments for improved relations are persuasive on both sides. While an element of uneasiness and distrust is likely to remain, the demands of reality will militate against the perpetuation of hostility" (p.124). If indeed Cambodia does constitute the key issue in the Sino-Vietnamese dispute as the author asserts, then the way in which the problem is likely to be resolved, or rather the question of whether China is more likely to tolerate the demise of the Khmer resistance movement than Vietnam is to accept the permanent denial of its domination over Cambodia, perhaps could be and should be more clearly answered as a matter of logical consistency. Then, of course, to expect Duiker or any scholar to produce clear answers to all the questions about a very complicated issue is not fair. After all, by projecting all the likely developments without pronouncing judgements on them, Duiker concludes his survey in a manner typical of most historians, that is, to leave the assessment of the future prospects to the readers themselves.

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ANZUS: The United States and Pacific Security. By Henry S. Albinski. Lanham, M.D.: University Press of America for The Asia Society, 1987. 62 pp.

Professor Albinski's book is a most useful addition to the growing library on the ANZUS dispute, most especially because it offers an American perspective on the issue. The author is one of the few American academics who have taken an interest in either the alliance or Australia and New Zealand. This undoubtedly reflects the low profile of the alliance and the asymmetry of the relationship for, as he points out, New Zealanders and Australians know a great deal more about the United States than Americans know of them. His perspectives on the historical and contemporary attitudes of the two smaller countries are, with some reservations, gratifyingly sophisticated. His survey of American interests, Australian and New Zealand security policies, and public attitudes to the alliance are quite thorough. The final chapter looks at the state of the alliance in the mid-1980s, detailing American criticisms of New Zealand's ship-ban policy, the broad security implications of that policy, and, in that context, the state and prospects for the bilateral relationship between Australia and the United States. Its style is narrative, and as a record of the dispute, its background and consequences, it is an excellent primer for those interested in the issue (though the absence of references and an index is a hindrance).

The real strength of this book lies in the survey of American interests and American perceptions of how Australia and New Zealand contribute to those interests. In a reasonably balanced fashion, he also endeavours to detail Australian and New Zealand criticisms of the alliance. However, like most non-New Zealanders, Professor Albinski tends to treat Australia and New Zealand as a single entity. To be sure, his account of the bilateral dispute between the United States and New Zealand is more thorough than one would expect from what is a relatively short book, but the impression remains that he is more familiar with Australia than with New Zealand.

A problem arises from the length and the familiarity with Australia: though he recognizes the greater cultural closeness of Australia to the United States, he does not develop the argument to any great degree. The lack of sympathy in New Zealand for the United States has its historical antecedents in New Zealand's determination to cling to its former colonial connection with Britain. New Zealand sought little more than a guarantee of local security from its relationship with the United States until Britain withdrew East of Suez in the late 1960s.

Without this context, it is more difficult to see the dispute for what it is: a lack of fundamental mutual sympathy. Though he perceptively details New Zealand criticisms of the United States, he does not, except by implication, reach the point of deciding that New Zealanders and Americans do not understand each other. On the other hand, he shows very clearly in a section entitled "Political and Cultural Compatibility" that Australia and America have a great deal more in common, and that mutuality can be expected to grow. Indeed, Australia, though it has had a difficult path to follow, has reaped the most benefits from the ANZUS rift: it has earned the gratitude of both the United States and New Zealand for its loyalty to them.

Apart from these criticisms, the analysis of American interests and responses is very interesting, and is helped considerably by putting Australian and New Zealand contributions to those interests in perspective. Once again, it is clear that the bilateral relationships within the alliance, with the exception of the United States-New Zealand leg, were just as important as the tripartite treaty itself. Professor Albinski concludes that the continued strengthening of these bilateral ties, particularly between Australia and the United States,

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may well achieve many of the same functions of the tripartite alliance. In this sense at least, the three countries' interests remain relatively unharmed, but the fall-out from the dispute means that all the relationships will continue to require careful tending if healing is to ever occur.

Professor Albinski's book is a contribution to that process, in that it sets out the perceptions and misperceptions that have occurred in a reasonably balanced way. His scrutiny of the alliance presents a good coverage of New Zealand and Australian criticisms as well as the American responses. Understandably, he looks most closely at the "broad security implications" of the ANZUS rift for United States interests, which is a useful background to American thinking in the dispute, and he clearly has little sympathy for the New Zealand policy, calling it "much regretted".

Few New Zealanders would agree that the Reagan Administration has not resorted to "bludgeoning methods". Small independent countries can get very sensitive when their historical right to decide policy for themselves is under pressure, and there is no doubt that the tone of the American response (and the style of personalities such as the United States Ambassador to New Zealand) had a negative effect on New Zealand public opinion. While alliance management skills were clearly deficient on both sides, the fundamental truth which this book illuminates is that New Zealand's continued membership of the alliance was less important to the United States than other American regional security interests. What it does not show so well is that because of the effects of history on New Zealand political culture and sympathies, retaining membership of the alliance was not the shibboleth it was thought to be.

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DOCUMENTATION

Excerpts from the "Full Text" of the Vietnam–Afghanistan Joint Statement issued in Hanoi on 29 December 1987

At the invitation of the CPV Central Committee and the SRV Council of State, a high-level delegation of the party and state of Afghanistan led by Comrade Najibollah, General Secretary of the PDPA Central Committee and President of the Republic of Afghanistan, paid a friendly official visit to the SRV from 25th to 29th December, 1987.

... The world situation is going through major and rapid changes. The struggle waged by the forces of peace and progress against the imperialist forces have been unfolding with intense fierceness. The growth of the three revolutionary currents, the rapid advancement of the scientific and technological revolution, the danger of a nuclear holocaust and need to internationalise economic life are vigorously speeding up the trend of struggle for peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems. The two sides highly valued and fully supported the USSR's constructive initiatives for peace, for curbing and putting an end to the arms race, eliminating the danger of a nuclear catastrophe, for disarmament, peace and security in the world. The agreement signed by the USSR and the USA to abolish medium- and short-range missiles constitutes a practical step of great importance towards nuclear disarmament. This is an historic victory of all progressive and peace forces in the world, which starts a new phase in the process of disarmament aimed at building a world free from nuclear weapons and from violence in international relations.

The two sides affirmed that the most important task of mankind at present is to consolidate peace and security, curb the arms race and eliminate the danger of a nuclear catastrophe.

The SRV and the Republic of Afghanistan extended their full support for the comprehensive peace plan for Asia and the Pacific put forth by Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in Vladivostok on 28th July 1986, as well as for the New Delhi Declaration on the principles of building a world without nuclear weapons and violence in international relations.

Both sides were of the view that it is an imperative in the present situation to reduce tension and turn South-East Asia into a zone of peace, stability and co-operation between countries with different socio-political systems. The Indochinese countries are ready to enter into dialogue with the ASEAN countries, to improve relations and co-operate with all sides concerned to create a friendly atmosphere in the region for the sake of peace, friendship and good neighbourliness.

The two sides expressed their full support for the PRK's statement of 27th August 1987, on national reconciliation and that of 8th October 1987, on a political solution to the Cambodian problem. They welcomed the fine success of the meeting between Comrade Hun Sen and Prince Sihanouk and the four-point joint communiquè signed at Paris on 4th December 1987, considering it an important initial step in the process of negotiations between the Cambodian parties towards a political solution of the Cambodian issue, in

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keeping with the interests of the Cambodian people and with the wish of other countries who want to contribute to the settlement of the Cambodian issue, to peace and stability in South-East Asia and the world.

The two sides expressed their desire to normalise and improve relations with the PRC, regarding it as a positive factor for the consolidation of peace and security in Asia and international affairs in general. The Afghan side applauded the goodwill of the SRV aimed at achieving a solution of outstanding problems between Vietnam and China.

The two sides firmly supported India's peace-loving foreign policy, highly praised the role of the Republic of India in solving the regional and global disputes in the interest of peace and security in Asia and the world.

The two sides responded warmly to the initiative put forth by the People's Republic of Mongolia on the signing of an international convention on non-use of force among countries of Asia and the Pacific, and to the initiative of the DPRK on turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone. They supported the South Pacific states' policy of denuclearisation, welcomed the proposal of building South-East Asia into a nuclear-free zone and supported the plan to make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace.

SOURCE: SWB, Hanoi Radio (home service), 1100 gmt, 29 December 1987, FE/0037 A3/1, 31 December 1987.

Excerpts from the Opening Statement by Noboru Takeshita, Prime Minister of Japan, at the Meeting of Heads of Government of Japan and ASEAN, Manila, 15 December 1987.

. . . I wish to take this opportunity to reaffirm that Japan will be unswerving in its adherence to the fundamental principle of its foreign policy which calls for doing its utmost for world peace and prosperity and rejecting the path to a military power. This principle is firmly rooted in the keen sense of self-criticism of every Japanese on the deplorable history of the last war and thus is particularly crucial in the context of Japan's relations with the ASEAN countries.

It is with this recognition that the promotion of friendly and cooperative relationship with the ASEAN countries has constituted one of the pillars of Japan's foreign policy.

. . . Thanks to the vigorous efforts on both sides, ASEAN has become the third-largest trading partner for Japan after the United States and EC, and for ASEAN, trade with Japan accounts for the largest share of its overall trade. In the area of investment, Japan ranks first or second in the list of overseas investors in all the ASEAN countries.

On the political side, Japan and ASEAN have cultivated close coordination in tackling various regional issues, including the Cambodian problem. The cooperative relationship thus developed has become an indispensable factor for the dynamic growth and political stability of the Asia-Pacific region, and the whole world.

. . . I would like to outline the economic, political, and cultural aspects of Japan's basic policy aimed to forge such partnership between Japan and ASEAN as we approach the new century.

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My first point concerns the economic aspect of our policy.

It is my belief that Japan's economic cooperation measures should be designed so as to be well attuned to the needs of individual ASEAN countries, which are constantly changing with the development of their respective economies, as well as the evolving international economic conditions.

In recent years, developing economies have been buffeted by the vagaries of the world economic environment, such as the decline and stagnation in demand and the prices of primary commodities, and the drastic fluctuations in exchange rates.

The thrust of the ASEAN countries' efforts to overcome these difficulties has been directed toward enhancing the resilience of their economies through such measures as injecting greater inefficiency, diversifying their economic structure, and expanding their export capabilities. Particularly noteworthy in their efforts is the emphasis given to the strengthening of the private sector reflected in encouragement of foreign investment.

Japan is ready to extend as much cooperation as possible for these efforts on the part of the ASEAN countries, in a manner which will take full advantage of the vitality of the private sector. To this end, I intend to put into effect the following concrete measures, as an expression of Japan's positive response to the Manila Declaration.

First, the Japanese Government will extend financial cooperation of no less than 2 billion US dollars over a period of three years, for the promotion of the private sector development of each ASEAN country and to promote regional cooperation among the ASEAN countries. This will be called the ASEAN-Japan Development Fund (AJDF), and will be in addition to the normal bilateral financial cooperation. For this purpose, we intend to make available generally untied official and private funds through such measures as the ongoing recycling scheme.

The Fund will mainly be intended for private enterprises in the industrial sector. The actual modality of drawing on the Fund will be sufficiently flexible to the needs of individual countries, taking account of close consultations between Japan and the ASEAN countries. To be more specific: first, measures will be taken to promote direct investment in the ASEAN countries by setting up an investment fund in Japan through official and private funding. Second, what are termed two-step loans will be provided. This is to say, loan facilities of generally untied ODA loan funds and Export-Import Bank funds extended mainly utilizing development financial institutions in the ASEAN countries will be made available. In response to the requests of the ASEAN countries, more concessional terms and conditions than are usually offered will be applied to the loans under this scheme. In implementing this scheme, due consideration will be given to promoting such intra-regional cooperation as is exemplified by the ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures (AIJV).

With a view to contributing to the further development of the ASEAN economies, as well as accelerating the process of internationalization of Japan's economic structure, I am determined to exert efforts to further improve the market access of our country. Under the ongoing Action Program, measures with particular attention to ASEAN's interests have already been taken. Moreover, Japan significantly improved its Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) scheme on mining and industrial products this April. In view of the important role the scheme plays in promoting imports of manufactured products from the ASEAN countries, we intend to expand the ceiling quotas on these products, for the second consecutive year, in the coming fiscal year.

Japan regards highly the role played by the ASEAN Promotion Centre on Trade, Investment and Tourism, and intends to consider the increase of its budgetary contributions

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to double the Centre's current project budget of approximately 2 million US dollars for the coming fiscal year.

... It is my firm belief that Japan and ASEAN should strengthen cooperation on international political issues having an important bearing on peace and prosperity of the world, and particularly of Asia. The conflict in Cambodia still continues after nine years since its outbreak, and is yet to be resolved. It is regrettable that this dispute has impeded peace and stability in Southeast Asia and has continued to be a source of untold misery for Cambodians and others affected by it.

Japan has consistently pursued a comprehensive political settlement to this problem and has been taking such steps to urge the parties concerned to work to that end, taking, for instance, the opportunity of the political dialogues with Vietnam. In this context, Japan has held the peace efforts of the ASEAN countries in highest regard and will continue to support these efforts.

In the future process of political settlement, particular consideration should be given to the establishment of a Cambodia that is genuinely neutral and independent through withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces and the self-determination of the Cambodian people, as well as to ensuring the security of the countries concerned, particularly Thailand. Japan is resolved to play an active role with a view to achieving an early and comprehensive political settlement that satisfies these requirements while keeping in close touch with the ASEAN members.

Recent dialogue between Cambodians, which was realized through the serious initiative of Prince Sihanouk, is a first step toward political settlement. I heartily welcome this development. Japan hopes that development for dialogue centering around Prince Sihanouk will make further progress and, through the positive response of Vietnam, lead to a concrete process for peace. We are resolved to lend maximum support to the efforts of Prince Sihanouk, with whom we have long maintained friendship. It is the ardent hope of Japan that not only the parties concerned but also the international community as a whole will sympathize with the Cambodians in their agony and distress, and provide active support to Prince Sihanouk.

On the broader question of international peace in the world as a whole, including Asia, the greatest factor is U.S.-Soviet relations. I sincerely welcome the progress made at the recent U.S.-Soviet Summit meeting, where the INF treaty was signed, to realize the global elimination of INFs, including those in Asia, as our country had strongly supported. While outstanding issues between East and West still remain, Japan will continue to support the diplomatic efforts of the U.S., with a view to building more stable East-West relations. Japan is also determined to increase its active contribution toward peace and disarmament.

... Japan, fully cognizant of the increasing international responsibility it must now shoulder, must now take bold initiatives in its foreign and domestic policies to pursue a society that will share its prosperity with the rest of the world as we enter the 21st century. One of the most important pillars of such bold initiatives is our cooperation with the ASEAN neighbors. As Japan's new Prime Minister, I pledge unequivocally that Japan will continue its active and sincere cooperation with our ASEAN neighbors.

As I pursue the policy of cooperation with ASEAN, the following three tenets shall guide me.

The first is that friendship shall be the basis of our approach toward others at all times. I shall always be mindful of the friendly ties with our ASEAN friends and in addressing whatever international or domestic issue, I will listen carefully to the views of our ASEAN friends and give full consideration to their wishes.

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The second is that private and local initiatives, in both Japan and the ASEAN countries shall be respected. There is already a growing trend at the grass-roots level to organize voluntary exchange programs in many fields, including the economic and cultural. This will undoubtedly give a new impetus to further development of Japan-ASEAN relations. I shall always respect and give my full support to such private initiatives.

The third notion to guide me is that Japan and ASEAN maintain and develop a relationship that contributes and is open to the rest of the world. The relationship between Japan and ASEAN can be described as that of "natural allies", closely linked by geography and history. But today when interdependence is deepening, not just within Asia and Pacific but on a global scale, we must not allow our relationship to be exclusive. It is imperative that we cooperate with one another for the peace and prosperity of the entire world.

SOURCE: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan.

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

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